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B.V. Ilango Himachalapathy v. Rank Xerox Limited

Intellectual Property Appellate Board
Sep 21, 2012
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

These seven rectification petitions concern the trade marks registered under various classes for the word "XEROX" and "XEROX THE DOCUMENT COMPANY" covering goods ranging from cleaning preparations to photocopiers and computer software. The petitions challenge the validity of these trade marks on the ground that the word "XEROX" has become generic and lost its distinctiveness, allegedly entering the public domain as a common synonym for photocopying. Though the matter arose within the jurisdiction of Kolkata, the hearings were conducted by consent at Chennai. Both parties submitted extensive written and oral arguments supported by voluminous documentary evidence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the word "XEROX" has become a generic term in public usage and thus lost its distinctiveness as a trade mark.
  2. Whether the respondent has sufficiently proved continuous and bona fide use of the trade marks as claimed.
  3. Whether the rectification petitions filed against the registrations should be allowed or dismissed based on the evidence of use and distinctiveness.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The word "XEROX" is commonly used as a generic synonym for photocopying and has lost its distinctiveness as a trade mark.
  • The term "XEROX" has been used as a verb in common language and appears in etymology dictionaries, indicating generic status.
  • The respondent’s efforts to police the mark came only after the word had already entered the public domain.
  • The trade mark was registered long after the patented technology was known, indicating it was not an invented word.
  • Cited several judgments supporting rectification where user was not proved or marks had become generic.
  • Filed numerous documents and examples, including advertisements and official communications, showing widespread generic use of "XEROX".

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent is a large multinational company with a history of exclusive use of the "XEROX" mark since 1948 or earlier.
  • The mark "XEROX" is a coined word distinct from the patented process "xerography" and has been actively policed through legal actions, caution notices, and advertising campaigns.
  • The respondent claims continuous use of the mark in India from 1961 or 1960 depending on the class of goods.
  • Documents showing misuse or generic use are mostly casual, non-commercial, or biased internet extracts and do not reflect competitor use.
  • Competitors do not use "XEROX" to describe their products, indicating public recognition of the mark’s distinctiveness.
  • Public authorities and institutions have acknowledged the respondent’s proprietary rights and have agreed to cease misuse of the mark.
  • The respondent’s trade marks have been continuously renewed without opposition for decades, evidencing recognition of ownership.
  • Argued that genericity arises only if the proprietor fails to protect the mark, which is not the case here.
  • Distinguished the cited judgments by highlighting factual differences, especially the absence of competitors at the time of registration and continuous use since then.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hunt Masters Incorporated v. Landry's Seafood Restaurant Inc., 240 F.3d 251 Marks that begin as coined terms may become generic depending on consumer understanding. Used to illustrate how marks can lose distinctiveness by becoming generic.
Everingham v. Roundell, 2M & ROB. 139 241 Related to secondary evidence being a copy of a copy. Referenced regarding admissibility of evidence.
Haughton Elevator Company v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 80 (1950) Trade mark "escalator" became generic due to descriptive use and capitalization style. Applied to assess the importance of distinctiveness and how usage affects it.
Uttam Chemical Udyog v. Rishi Lal Gupta, TRA/88/2004/TM/DEL (IPAB) Person aggrieved and locus standi should be liberally construed. Considered in determining the applicant’s locus standi.
Enrique Bernat FSA v. Guadalajara Inc., 210 F.3d 439 Proprietor’s encouragement of consumers to treat part of a mark as generic affects trademark rights. Distinguished on facts since no competitor would be affected by exclusivity here.
In re Registered Trade Mark David Gestetner, 1907-2 Ch. 478 Marks derived from patented inventions may not be fanciful or invented words. Compared with Xerox’s derivation from xerography but held distinct.
Skyline Education Institute (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. S.L Vaswani, 2010 2 SCJ 344 Generic use of a mark by many institutions. Referenced for genericity principle but distinguished on facts.
Bharat Enterprises (India) v. M.s C. Lall Gopi Industrial Enterprises, AIR 1999 Punjab & Haryana 231 Test of descriptiveness and public recognition of source. Applied to assess distinctiveness of "XEROX".
Hindustan Unilever Limited v. Ms. Girnar Exports, TA/47/2003/TM/CH Non-descriptive common words cannot be monopolized. Considered but respondent argued "XEROX" is distinctive.
Gee Kay Enterprises v. Hemant Haricharan Goel, ORA 3 to 12/2007.TM/AMD (IPAB) No exclusive rights over non-distinctive, descriptive marks. Referenced in context of distinctiveness.
Times Publishing House Ltd. v. The Financial Times Limited, TRA/6/2005/TM/DEL (IPAB) Failure to prove user results in rectification. Distinguished on facts; Xerox user proved here.
Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba v. Tosiba Applicance Co, AIR 2009 SC 892 Distinction between intention to use and actual use under Sections 46(a) and (b). Considered in assessing genuineness of use claim.
Toshniwal Brothers (P) Limited and Toshniwal Instruments Madras, AIR 1992 Madras 74 This precedent was cited but specific principle not detailed in opinion. Referenced in the context of user proof.
Infosys Technologies Ltd. v. Jupiter Infosys Ltd., 2011 (a) CTC 721 Referenced regarding trade mark disputes. Used as supporting precedent.
McCarthy on Trade Marks (Extract) Most names become generic when the public is not given alternative names for unfamiliar products. Discussed in relation to genericity risk.
Dupont Cellophane Co. Inc. v. Waxed Products Co. Inc, 85 F.2d 75 (1936) Conduct of complainant can cause a mark to become generic if connection with origin is not maintained. Used to emphasize importance of distinctiveness maintenance.
Magic Wand, Inc. v. RDB, Inc., 940 F.2d 638 Referenced regarding trade mark distinctiveness. Used as supporting precedent.
Bayer Company v. United Drug Co., 272 F.505 (S.D.N.Y.1921) Balance between consumer understanding and trade monopoly rights. Discussed to show complexities in genericity and monopoly.
Pilates, Inc. v. Current Concepts, Inc. and Kenneth Endelman, 120 F. Supp.2d 286 (2000) Types of evidence relevant to genericity determination. Considered in evaluating evidence of generic use.
Honda Motors Co. Ltd. v. Charanjit Singh & Ors., 2003 (26) PTC Reputation of mark supported by undertakings from others not to use it. Applied to assess respondent’s policing efforts.
Shri Kanish Gupta v. Liberty Footwear Company, ORA/104/06/TM/DEL (IPAB) Person aggrieved and locus standi considerations. Used to assess applicant’s standing.
Kushi Ram Behari Lal v. New Bharat Rice Mills, TA/166/03/TM/DEL (IPAB) Proof of date of user is crucial; deliberate misrepresentation can lead to rectification. Distinguished on facts as no deceit alleged in current case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court carefully examined the voluminous evidence submitted by both parties. It acknowledged the applicant's contention that the word "XEROX" has been used generically in public discourse and official documents. However, the Court found that the respondent actively policed the mark through legal notices, advertisements, and enforcement actions, which were acknowledged by various government bodies and institutions that agreed to cease inadvertent misuse.

The Court noted that the mark "XEROX" is a coined term distinct from the patented process "xerography" and that the respondent has demonstrated continuous use and renewal of the trade mark registrations since the 1960s without opposition. The absence of competitors using "XEROX" to describe their products was significant in maintaining the mark's distinctiveness.

The Court distinguished the precedents cited by the applicant on the basis that in those cases either the mark was not used continuously, user was not proved, or competitors were present at the time of registration, which is not the case here. The Court also accepted that the proof of user from 1961 was reasonable given the circumstances, including early sales to government institutions.

In conclusion, the Court found that the trade mark had not become generic and that the respondent had sufficiently proved continuous bona fide use of the mark for certain classes of goods.

Holding and Implications

The rectification petitions are partly allowed and partly dismissed. Specifically, the petitions seeking removal of the trade marks in Class 03 (Regd. No. 254546), Class 16 (Regd. No. 217826), and Class 01 (Regd. No. 217823) are allowed due to lack of proof of use. The petitions against the trade marks in Class 09 (Regd. Nos. 217825 and 546220), Class 07 (Regd. No. 217824), and Class 01 (Regd. No. 155627) are dismissed as the respondent has proved user and maintained distinctiveness.

The direct effect of this decision is that the respondent retains exclusive rights over the "XEROX" mark for the classes where use is proved, preserving its trademark protection. The decision does not establish a new precedent on genericity but reinforces the importance of continuous use, policing, and public recognition in maintaining trade mark rights. No order as to costs was made.

Show all summary ...

Smt. Prabha Sridevan, Chairman:— These seven rectification petitions are in respect of the following marks:

Trade Mark Class Regd. No. Goods XEROX 03 254546 Cleaning, polishing, scouring and abrasive preparations. XEROX 09 217825 Photographic, electrophotographic, photomechanical, electrostatographic and thermographic instruments and apparatus, display machines (for use in producing optical images), machines for producing a permanent visual record or copy, optical apparatus, photographic apparatus, films and parts and fittings of such machines and apparatus all included in class 9. XEROX 01 217823 Films (sensitized); chemical products used in industry and plastics included in class 1. XEROX 07 217824 Printing machines, plates and drums tehrefor; parts and fittings of the foregoing goods included in class 7. XEROX 01 155627 Developers consisting of a mixture of electroscopic powder and granular material used for producing powder images in making electrophotographic copies, toners comprising llectroscopic powder used in connection with granular material to produce developer powders used for making electrophotographic copies, plates used in connection with photographic copying machines, all being goods included in class 1. XEROX 16 217826 Paper, paper articles and cardboard articles, all included in class 16; cardboard, newspapers, periodical publications, office requisites (other than furniture), index and record cards and forms, printers' type and clichès (stereotype); lithographic printing apparatus for office use, lithographic plates for use therewith and lithographic prints; books, photographs, stationery, adhesive materials (stationery), ribbons for printing, calculating tables, tickets, stencil sets, writing sets, document holders, office machinery; trays and racks, all included in class 16. XEROX THE DOCUMENT COMPANY 09 546220 Photographic, electrophotographic, photo-mechanical, electrostatographic and thermographic apparatus and instruments; display machines (for use in producing a permanent visual record or copy); optical apparatus; photographic apparatus; films, facsimile transceivers; photocopiers; xerographic copying apparatus and instruments; document scanners, computers; computer programs computer software; optical character recognition apparatus, instruments and software, document management systems, electronic publications; multimedia publications; CD-roms; parts and fittings included in class 9 for all the aforesaid goods.

2. The grounds of attack are the same. Though the matter arises within the jurisdiction of Kolkata, by consent and for convenience they were all argued at Chennai. Both the counsel made elaborate submissions and the applicant also filed his written submissions.

3. The applicant's main contention is that the word XEROX is now used as a common word and in the minds of the general public is a synonym for photo copying. Since it has come to be used in a generic sense it has lost its value as a trade mark. It has lost its distinctiveness and by passage of time and by acquiescence it has fallen into the public domain. XEROX has been used as a verb in the etymology dictionary. There has been no other mark comparable to XEROX which enjoys such an astronomical usage as a verb. It is used in all the languages of India and the efforts made by the respondent to show that they have been policing their mark are all actions taken after the word had become publici-juris. According to the applicant, the respondent has admitted that they have been using the mark only for 22 years. The duty to prove user as claimed has been laid down in the Financial Times case (TRA/6/2005/TM/DEL etc.) and Kushi Ram Behari Lal case (TA/166/2003/TM/DEL) by this Board and if it is not proved it results in rectification. The applicant is an aggrieved person. XEROX was patented in 1936 while the trade mark was obtained only In 1952. Therefore, it is not an invented word. The learned counsel produced numerous documents to support his case. The efforts taken by the counsel in this regard are monumental and they are compiled in many paper books which must be called Extra Large. He also referred to an advertisement where mango juice was referred to as ‘Kutchey aam ke Xerox’ in the sense of duplication of the original to show how Xerox had passed into public domain. According to the learned counsel, the argument of Metonymy destroys the distinctiveness of the argument.

4. The judgements referred to are:

(i) Hunt Masters Incorporated v. Landry's Seafood Restaurant Inc., 240 F.3d 251. — In this case the word Crab House was accepted as a generic term for a restaurant serving crabs. In that it was observed that certain marks which began life as a coined term may become generic depending upon the consumers' understanding of the goods.

(ii) Everingham v. Roundell, 2M & ROB. 139 241 it related to secondary evidence being copy of copy.

(iii) 85 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 80 (Commr. Pat. 1950); Haughton Elevator Company v. Seeberger - The question was whether the trade mark escalator had become generic. One of the facts that persuaded the Court to uphold the cancellation was that escalator was written in small letters in the same context as elevators and used descriptively not indicating that it describes the origin.

(iv) TRA/88/2004/TM/DEL (IPAB) Uttam Chemical Udyog v. Rishi Lal Gupta. This was regarding person aggrieved and therefore the locus standi should be liberally construed.

(v) The Oxford English Dictionary - Xerox was also defined to mean reproduced by xerography or photo copy

(vi) Nodin v. Murray, 18/12 K.B 3 CAMP - This related to duplicate of a writing taken by a copying machine.

(vii) Enrique Bernat FSA v. Guadalajara Inc., 210 F.3d 439. In this case the Court had to decide the confusion between “Chupachups” and “Chupa Gurts” and it was observed that even the proprietor had encouraged the consumers to think chupa as a common word and not a trade mark and that if the Court permitted the company to monopolise the term ‘Chupa’ which means lollipop in Spanish it would impede other Mexican Candy makers' ability to compete effectively in the US lollipop market.

(viii) In re Registered Trade Mark David Gestetner, 1907-2 Ch. 478 — This decision was stressed as being squarely applicable to the present case where the patent was obtained for the new kind of pen called cyclostyle. Then a trade mark was obtained. It was held that since the word though invented had already been applied to a patented invention, it cannot be a fancy word and not an invented word capable of registration.

(ix) In 2010 2 SCJ 344; Skyline Education Institute (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. S.L Vaswani the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the learned Single Judge's finding that Skyline was a generic word used by many educational institutions.

(x) AIR 1999 Punjab & Haryana 231; Bharat Enterprises (India) v. M.s C. Lall Gopi Industrial Enterprises - Here the mark was Heat Pillar. It was held to be descriptive, and it was observed that the test was whether the public would record the mark as belonging to a particular source.

(xi) TA/47/2003/TM/CH Hindustan Unilever Limited v. Ms. Girnar Exports — In this case also the Board would not allow the monopoly to use common words like which are non-descriptive.

(xii) ORA 3 to 12/2007.TM/AMD (IPAB) Gee Kay Enterprises v. Hemant Haricharan Goel, the word was XTRONG and this Board held that no single person can claim exclusive right over the non-distinctive, descriptive mark.

5. The respondent filed its counter-statement and by our leave also filed additional documents in view of the importance relating to proof of user as laid down in Financial Times case. According to the respondent, they are a huge US based company with operations in more than 160 countries having the world's most established innovative documents solutions digital printers, copiers, facsimile machines etc. According to them, their expertise is unmatched. The respondents have an association with the trade mark since 1948 when no such word was used. In 1906, the US Patent for electro-photograph, later called xerography was granted. In 1948, Allied Company which obtained license to xerography patent coined the word Xerox. In 1961 the company's name was changed to Xerox Corporation. It then became Rank Xerox and in 1962 Fuji Xerox Company was launched for marketing Xerox brand through out most of Asia. In 1977, the industry's first laser printer was announced. Apart from being the trade mark, the coined word Xerox is an integral and conspicuous part of their trade mark as a result of which the company's goods and services are identified with their trade mark. Among the marks which are sought to be rectified herein, claimed user is from 1961 with regard to five of the registrations., as regards the registration in Class 3 the user claimed is from 1960 and as regards the trade mark 155627 it is proposed to be used.

6. The trade mark is different from the name of the patent ‘xerography’ though it may have etymologically derived from that. As stated earlier, the applicant has filed as many as seven volumes of typed set of papers to show that the word Xerox had been used in Courts, notifications, circulars, judgements etc., and therefore, it has passed into public domain. In response to this, it is submitted that on behalf of the respondents that some of the High Courts and Government Undertakings have acknowledged the respondent's proprietary rights in the word Xerox and those letters have been filed by the respondent. The respondent has also issued caution notices, advertisement campaign, numerous oppositions, law suits, cease and desist notices and other activities to protect its trade mark from becoming free for all.

7. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the documents filed by the applicant could be divided into three groups: (i) documents indicating casual non-commercial third party misuse; (ii) documents downloaded through biased and non-representative internet search; (iii) documents filed to show third parties using Xerox mark or its various other trade mark or company name. The learned Senior Counsel referred to the history of Xerox, then the respondent's evidence to show internal vigilance and external vigilance, third party unsolicited evidence, documents evidencing extensive use. He submitted that respondent's vigilance in policing the mark before and after the institution of ORA has been consistent. He submitted that a mark will not be hit by genericity or become publici-juris because if for the said word has a conversational English language equivalent and that non-commercial casual use will not make the trade mark to publici-juris. There is no evidence to show that in relation to the goods in question, the competitors have been compelled to use the mark to sell the goods. The learned counsel submitted that the leading competitors of Xerox machines like Canon have always called themselves as Canon Photocopiers and not Canon Xerox machines. So the public, especially the competitors, knew that the ownership of this mark could be traced to the respondent. He submitted that genericity of the trade mark will creep in only if the proprietor does not take steps to protect it. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that there are letters from Public Sector Undertakings acknowledging misuse. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that when there was only one player in the market it is not unusual for the mark to be used as a synonym for the goods but if all along the origin of the mark is not forgotten then the mark will not become generic. Since its initial registration the mark has been constantly renewed and this shows the conscious assertion of trade mark rights by the respondent.

8. In the Chupa Chups case, the Court felt that giving exclusivity to ‘Chup’ would prevent other makers of lollipop from entering the market. But in this case, no competitor will suffer by the continuance of exclusivity since any way they do not use the word Xerox to describe their goods. In fact that is the important test. None of the competitors complain about the existence of the mark Xerox in the Register. In fact, the appellants had also not objected to it until a suit was filed against them before the Hon'ble High Court in the year 2004. The evidence shows that the trade mark was active. Capitalization of the first letter of the trade mark is consciously done wherever Xerox is used. The learned Senior Counsel referred to the Escalator case where one of the indicators of the mark slipping into generic use is the use of small letter. The learned senior counsel submitted that user is claimed only from 1961 and because of import restrictions initially the user in India was only by import and use in embassies. In 1965 the first sale of Xerox copying machine in India was to Baba Atomic Centre. This would show that the mark had been in use even before which is the reason why a Government undertaking like Baba Atomic Centre has chosen to place an order and the machine itself was installed in 1965. The learned counsel submitted that the patent for xerography machine was in 1947 and till 1967 no one could have entered the market. The learned counsel submitted that neither the Kushiram Biharilal Case nor the Financial Times case would apply here. In both the cases, as there were competitors. Here in 1965 when Xerox got its registration claiming user from 1961 there was no occasion for it to give a false date since there was no other photo copying machine in the market. It was not registered for preventive nor for defensive registration. None of the conditions of S. 32 arise. There is no pleading whether the non-user in this falls u/S 46 or S. 56. The applicant does not say that the mark was generic at its inception, his case is that by continued user it had become generic. The primary objection to registration is to the genericity which is not the case here. There is no evidence to show that the applicant was in any way affected from pursuing his calling or business. To prove generic use one should have evidence of production, consumer service and the competitor's perception none of which have been shown here. The learned Senior Counsel also referred to the concept of metonymy and submitted that the term Xerox was on such a high pedestal that concept of metonymy comes in to play. Several decisions have been cited.

(i) 235 F.3d 54; Creative Gifts, Inc. Fascination Toys & Gifts, Inc. and William Hones, Plaintiffs v. Ufo, Michael Sherlock and Karen Sherlock — In which the Court observed that the compilation of website extracts was made in a biased manner drawing upon only those websites which appeared to use the term “Levitron” generically. This was relied on to show the websites relied on by the applicant were also drawn on the same basis.

(ii) AIR 1992 Delhi 22; Avis International Limited v. Avi Footwear Industries.

(iii) AIR 1969 Madras 126, The Andhra Perfumery Works Joint Family Concerns v. Karupakula Suryanarayaniah — where it was held that the test whether a mark has become publici juris is whether the use by other persons has calculated to deceive the public but, whether it would have the effect of inducing the public to buy the goods not made by the original owner. The court held that surreptitious piracy cannot destroy distinctiveness.

(iv) MIPR 2011 (3) 317, Jagpin Breweries Limited v. Shaw Wallace and Company Limited — In this case it was held that a few unchallenged, scattered infringements by a number of traders would not render a registered trade mark common.

(v) TRA/6/2005/TM/DEL Times Publishing House Ltd. v. The Financial Times Limited (IPAB) — In this case the user from 1948 had not been proved and therefore the mark was removed.

(vi) AIR 2009 SC 892; Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba v. Tosiba Applicance Co. — In this case it was held that the intention to use the trade mark was genuine and real and true distinction was made between S. 46(a) and (b).

(vii) AIR 1992 Madras 74; Toshniwal Brothers (P) Limited and Toshniwal Instruments Madras—

(viii) 2011 (a) CTC 721; Infosys Technologies Ltd. v. Jupiter Infosys Ltd.

(ix) Extract from McCarthy on Trade Marks — where it is observed that most names become generic because the public is not given any other name to apply to an unfamiliar product.

(x) 85 F.2d 75 (1936); Dupont Cellophane Co. Inc. v. Waxed Products Co. Inc. — Here the trade mark involved was Cellophane and the Court held that the course of conduct of the complainant tended to make cellophane a generic term descriptive of the product than of its origin but in the advertisement no connection with Dupont Company was originally mentioned.

(xi) 940 F.2d 638; Magic Wand, Inc. v. RDB, Inc.—

(xii) 272 F.505; (S.D.N.Y.1921) Bayer Company v. United Drug Co., - There it was held that “The case, therefore, presents a situation in which, ignoring sporadic exceptions, the trade is divided into two classes, separated by vital differences. One, the manufacturing chemists, retail druggists, and physicians, has been educated to understand that ‘Aspirin’ means the plaintiff's manufacture, and has recourse to another and an intelligible name for it, actually in use among them. The other, the consumers, the plaintiff has, consciously I must assume, allowed to acquaint themselves with the drug only by the name ‘Aspirin,’ and has not succeeded in advising that the word means the plaintiff at all. If the defendant is allowed to continue the use of the word of the first class, certainly without any condition, there is a chance that it may get customers away from the plaintiff by deception. On the other hand, if the plaintiff is allowed a monopoly of the word as against consumers, it will deprive the defendant and the trade in general, of the right effectually to dispose of the drug by the only description which will be understood. It appears to me that the relief granted cannot in justice to either party disregard its division; each party has won, and each has lost.”

(xiii) 120 F. Supp.2d 286 (2000); Pilates, Inc. v. Current Concepts, Inc. and Kenneth Endelman — In this case the Court observed that the types of evidence to be considered in determining whether the mark is generic include dictionary definitions, generic use by competitors and other persons in the trade, plaintiffs own generic use, generic use in the media, consumer services.

(xiv) 2003 (26) PTC; Honda Motors Co. Ltd.…Plaintiffs; v. Charanjit Singh & Ors.…Defendants. — In this case one of the reasons why the Court accepted that plaintiff's mark had acquired reputation is the undertaking given by several persons that they will not use the mark.

(xv) ORA/104/06/TM/DEL (IPAB); Shri Kanish Gupta v. Liberty Footwear Company — This relates to persons aggrieved.

(xvi) TA/166/03/TM/DEL (IPAB); Kushi Ram Behari Lal v. New Bharat Rice Mills — Here the proof of the date of user as claimed was crucial for the decisions.

9. Now we will refer to the evidence filed by the applicant. The Indian Section which is A1 to A728 are the rules of various High Courts, rules of various tribunals, cause lists etc. Then there is a foreign section which shows how this word had been used outside India and there are judgments wherein the word Xerox has been used. According to the appellant the words “Xerox copies” have been used in these documents. According to the respondent in most of these documents Xerox is capitalized. The applicant has also filed the copies of several judgements where the word Xerox has been used. To given an example at page 2 of this volume it relates to a judgement of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the word Xerox copy is used. Similarly in 2007 Criminal Law Journal 2031 at page 82, which is the judgement of the Allahabad High Court, again the word Xerox copy is used. Here too the learned Senior Counsel submitted that Xerox copy is capitalized. Two voluminous paper books relating to these judgements have been filed. He The applicant has also filed documents where Xerox is used as verb. He has filed very many documents from USA Law Department, Defence, Local Government, Parliament where the word Xerox copy has been used.

In response to this, and not to be out done by the massive paper books filed by the applicant, the respondent has filed 1356 pages to show that they had issued cease and desist notice against the misuse of the word Xerox. Many of these documents are post-litigation. In response to these letters, the Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Development, Government of Sikkim, The Registrar General of the High court of Jharkhand, Mumbai Port Trust and Andhra Pradesh High Court have acknowledged that they have inadvertently used the trade mark Xerox belonging to the respondent instead of using the word photocopy and that they have duly instructed the deletion of that word Xerox. The respondent has also filed a notice dated July 31, 2009 to the effect that Xerox cannot be used as another word for copying.

Both the parties filed additional documents. The documents filed by the applicant are again extracts from the communications issued by various Government departments where Xerox is used as a word in various forms. In response, the respondent also filed additional documents one being a display advertisement, other extracts of a book titled” Industrial restructuring” and the third several display advertisement right from 1972.

The Xerox marks have been registered in 1952 (155627), 1963 (217823 to 217824), 1969 (254546) and 1991 (546220). These marks have been periodically renewed, without any objection or opposition by anyone and no one, not even the respondent's major competitors, has attempted to remove the mark from the Register till date on the ground of “genericity,” until these batch of petitions were filed.. While a trade mark owner may take pride in his mark acquiring a stronghold in the people's minds with relation to the particular goods, if the public stops identifying the mark with the origin namely, the trade mark owner and starts using it as a synonym for the goods or services to which it was originally attached, then the trade mark risks the danger of losing its distinctiveness and ends in trademark death. Examples of such marks are ‘Aspirin’, ‘Zipper’, ‘Laundromat’ etc. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the respondent had policed its mark vigilantly both internally and externally. To which the applicant responded that all their evidence was post-litigation and in any event it is of no use since by that time it had become generic.

10. We find that at least from 2003, the respondent had begun to aggressively protect its mark by campaigning with advertisements like ‘If you use Xerox the way you use Zipper, our Trade mark could be left wide open’ and “If you use Xerox the way you use Aspirin, we get a headache”.

11. It is also seen from the evidence filed before us that when the respondent took objection to the loose use of the word Xerox by Government, public sector undertakings etc., the response came in the form of apologies with assurances to set right the inadvertent error. We find, as referred to earlier, that the High Courts, Port Trust and like institutions and even the Government of India have agreed to delete the word Xerox and use the word” photocopy”. Several Governmental organizations have also given an undertaking that they will not use the mark in violation of the trade marks rights of the respondent. Therefore, though the public had been using the word Xerox in a loose manner, clearly knew that the owner of the trade mark was the respondent's. Perhaps the respondent has acted just in time to save its mark losing its life. Xerox has also been cited in text books as an example of a coined or invented word. Therefore, while there is no ignoring the documents that have been produced by the applicant to show the use of the word Xerox instead of using photocopy the equally voluminous replies filed by the respondents show the public's knowledge of the trade mark rights of the respondent. Further, since the word photocopier is available for the public to use the goods for which Xerox was first registered as a trade mark, the public will not be deprived by the exclusivity granted to Xerox. In the Chupa Chups case, that was the issue, that the Mexican lollipop makers will be deprived of the use of the word Chupa which means lollipop. Here the competitors like Canon only use the word “photocopier”. In the Escalator case the proprietors had been using the word escalator with a small ‘e’ and along with elevator, thereby reducing the trademark strength. In the Aspirin case the Court felt that if Aspirin is made exclusive, then the defendants would be deprived of the right to use the word by which alone the public would be able to identify the product. That is not the case here. The word photocopier is available, not only for commercial use but also for non-commercial use. The public is quite familiar with that word. Further the patented invention was for Xerography from which the respondent has evolved Xerox unlike the “cyclostyle” case. The one factor which leads us in favour of the respondent in this issue, is the uniform acknowledgement of all those who had used the word Xerox, that their use was inadvertent and that they would refrain from doing anything in violation of the Trademark rights of the respondent. This then is the evidence that the public was conscious of the ownership of the Trademark.

12. The trade mark has also been on the Register for a long time and had been renewed periodically and put in use continuously. The competitors knew of the existence of the mark and had they been hampered in their business by the continuance of Xerox in the register, they would have been the first to protest. In the Khodays case the Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to rectify a mark which had been on the register for 14 years. Here the mark has been on the register from 1960s. Of course in the Khodays case the rectification application was filed by the trademark owner, in this case it has been filed against the owner on the ground that the mark has lost its strength. But we find the long continuous existence on the register and the public acceptance of the trademark rights when pointed out are factors which weigh with us in our exercise of discretion.

13. And finally we come to the proof of user as claimed. Here the appellant cited two of IPAB's judgements to support their case. When Xerox first applied for registration way back in 1961, there was no other photocopier in the market. It was not necessary for the respondent to gain a lead by giving a date of user earlier than the actual date. When the respondent applied there was no competitor dealing with the goods in respect of which the applications were made in 1963 claiming user from 1961. We find that as early as in 1965, Baba Atomic Centre had purchased the first Xerox machine in India. The difficulties of the respondent in producing evidence of use in 1961 when the registration has been renewed since then without any challenge must be accepted. The fact that they have given evidence of use from 1965 lends strength to their claim of user from 1961 when they applied in 1963.

14. Two judgements of the IPAB cited are slightly different. In Kushiram Behari Lal v. New Bharat Rice Mills (cited supra) both the parties are traders in rice and long time rivals. Kushiram Behari Lal applied for registration on 27.02.1989 claiming a 11 year user i.e from 01.01.1978 Immediately its rival New Bharat Rice Mills which claimed user from 01.07.1978 challenged it. If there was proof of user it should have been easy to produce it because soon after the application for registration it was attacked. There was evidence in that case that Kushiram Behari Lal was associated with New Bharat Rice Mill and therefore knew of the latter's claimed date of user. New Bharat claimed that it was to steal a march over it that a date earlier i.e 01.01.1978 was given. We have observed in our order that the claim of date of user is not a mere mistake; “it has been made with a deliberate intention to deceive.” Therefore, that case turns on those facts. Here there is no allegation of deceit nor can there be any such allegation since the attack is made 46 years after registration.

15. In the Times Publishing House case (Supra), the trade mark that was subject matter of dispute was applied for in 09.03.1987, claiming almost 40 years user. That is Financial Times claimed that they had been in use from 1948 when the application was made in 1987. If they had claimed user from 1948 they should have produced those documents at the time of registration, since the registration was immediately attacked by its rival Times Publishing House. But they did not, or at least the only evidence which was a newspaper item produced by them was not accepted by us as proof of use. Further the Times Publishing House had already got the title ‘Financial Times’ approved in 1984 by the authority under the present Registration of Books Act. Though they had initiated to publish the paper, subsequently it was submitted that Times Publishing House had to discontinue the publication. Therefore, when Financial Times applied in 1987, they definitely needed to give a date of user which was prior to 1984. They chose 1948. In fact in that case, there was evidence of user subsequent to 1948 but prior to 1984. But for reasons best known to Financial Times, they chose to give 1948 as the date of use for which there is no evidence. The registration by Financial Times was immediately attacked and the evidence produced was insufficient Here the registration is attacked after several decades.

16. This case stands out on a different footing. There was no rival at the time of registration. The date of application and the date of user are almost contemporaneous. There is just a two years' difference 1961 and 1963. In contrast in the two cases the gap is 11 years and 40 years. Xerox has proved that their machine was installed in 1965. We can reasonably presume user earlier to 1965 to that which is why the Baba Atomic Centre had placed an order for procuring the machine for installation. Therefore, after almost 50 years (1963-2009) of continued existence on the register without challenge, proof of almost 44 years user (1965-2009), we do not think the mark deserves to be removed.

17. The applicant knew that the respondent company was a huge multinational company with operations in more than 100 countries and yet the applicant took on the challenge. We appreciate the pains-taking manner in which the learned counsel for the applicant had gathered materials in several volumes to prove his case. While in consideration of environmental protection, we would definitely urge the parties to use less paper, the effort taken by the learned counsel deserves appreciation since the opponent was a formidable opponent.

18. We have considered the additional documents filed by the parties. Miscellaneous Petitions No. 22/2011, 115/2011, 116/2011, 17 to 23/2012 and 219.to 225/2012 for filing additional documents are ordered accordingly. Miscellaneous Petitions No. 240, 241 and 322/2009 for stay stand closed.

19. To sum up:

a) The response from High Courts, Government organizations, public sector undertakings, universities etc. acknowledging the trademark rights of the respondent proves that the mark had not become generic;

b) The mark had been on the Register since 1963 and continuously renewed without opposition.

c) After 40 years of continuance in the Register, the respondent has been called upon to prove use and we are of the opinion that they have proved their user almost to the date of user claimed in these particular facts of this case. However, the user so proved relates only to Class 09 - application No. 217825 in ORA/199/2009/TM/KOL, Class 07 - application No. 217824 in ORA/200/2009/TM/KOL, Class 01 - application No. 155627 in ORA/204/2009/TM/KOL, Class 09 - application No. 546220 in ORA/291/2009/TM/DEL. Hence these rectifications are dismissed. For the other three marks in Class 03 - application No. 254546 in ORA/202/2009/TM/KOL, Class 16 - application No. 217826 in ORA/201/2009/TM/KOL and Class 01 - application No. 217823 in ORA/203/2009/TM/KOL there is no proof. Hence these rectification applications are allowed. No order as to costs.