Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Allied Blenders & Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. v. John Distillers Limited

Intellectual Property Appellate Board
Mar 8, 2013
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This case involves two parties, Allied Blenders & Distillers (ABD) and John Distillers Ltd. (JD), both engaged in the liquor business, disputing trademark rights over the marks "OFFICERS CHOICE" (ABD) and "ORIGINAL CHOICE" (JD). The conflict centers on allegations of similarity, confusion, and deception between the marks. ABD claims prior use and reputation of "OFFICERS CHOICE" dating back to 1986, while JD contests the claims and asserts its mark's validity. The matter has been litigated through various proceedings including oppositions, excise authorities, and courts, culminating in this decision by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) on rectification applications filed by both parties. Technical objections regarding procedural compliance and ownership rights were also raised and addressed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the marks "OFFICERS CHOICE" and "ORIGINAL CHOICE" are deceptively similar or likely to cause confusion among the public.
  2. Whether the registration of the mark "ORIGINAL CHOICE" should be removed on grounds of prior user rights and deceptive similarity.
  3. The effect and scope of disclaimer of the word "CHOICE" in the trademarks and its impact on the comparison of the marks as a whole.
  4. Whether technical objections raised regarding the validity of the Counter Statement filed by JD and ownership claims by ABD are tenable.
  5. Whether ABD's conduct amounted to acquiescence in JD's use of the mark "ORIGINAL CHOICE".

Arguments of the Parties

Allied Blenders & Distillers (ABD)

  • Claims prior and continuous use of the mark "OFFICERS CHOICE" since 1986, with registration granted in 2007.
  • Argues that JD's mark "ORIGINAL CHOICE" is deceptively similar and likely to cause confusion due to identical trade channels and consumer base.
  • Contends that JD had knowledge of ABD's mark and deliberately adopted a similar mark to benefit from ABD's goodwill.
  • Rejects the technical objections raised by JD, including the validity of JD's Counter Statement and ownership claims.
  • Disputes any acquiescence, asserting that ABD has actively opposed JD's mark through legal notices, excise objections, and litigation.
  • Relies on market surveys indicating confusion and extensive evidence of reputation and consumer loyalty.

John Distillers Ltd. (JD)

  • Asserts that the marks "OFFICERS CHOICE" and "ORIGINAL CHOICE" are distinct, especially given the disclaimer of the word "CHOICE".
  • Claims that JD's mark was adopted bona fide and that ABD committed fraud in claiming ownership prior to the assignment deed.
  • Argues that ABD had knowledge of JD's mark and acquiesced in its use, evidenced by failure to challenge excise authority decisions and delay in opposition proceedings.
  • Contends that the sales growth and consumer base of JD's mark justify its continued use.
  • Challenges the validity of ABD's evidence of confusion and claims that the marks are not deceptively similar.
  • Raises technical objections regarding the timing and authority of extensions granted for filing Counter Statement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Squirt Co. v. The Seven-up Company et al (207 USPQ) Use of market surveys to indicate confusion between marks. Referenced to support the relevance of survey evidence in assessing confusion.
Caprihans (India) Private Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (PTC (Suppl) (2) 497 (Cal) (DB)) Judicial discretion in assessing whether a trade mark is calculated to deceive or confuse. Applied to emphasize that the court must consider evidence but ultimately apply its own mind to the question of deceptive similarity.
Registrar of Trade Marks v. Ashok Chandra Rakhit Ltd. (AIR 1955 S.C 558) Effect of disclaimer on exclusive rights in trade marks. Used to clarify that disclaimer limits exclusive rights only to parts disclaimed, not to the mark as a whole.
T.V Venugopal v. Ushodaya Enterprises Ltd. (2011) 4 SCC 85 Protection against dishonest adoption of marks even for unrelated products if dishonesty is proven. Referred to in considering bad faith elements in adoption of marks.
Times Publishing House Ltd. v. The Financial Times Limited (Order No. 91/2012-IPAB) Knowledge of rival's mark in the same business and evidence of dishonesty. Cited to support the argument of JD's alleged dishonesty in mark adoption.
Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel (2006) 8 SCC 726 Principles of fraud, delay, and acquiescence in trademark injunctions. Applied to reject ABD's claim of acquiescence and assess conduct of parties.
BALI Trade Mark (Rectification C.A) 1968 RPC P-426 Assessment of confusion based on mark similarity and consumer care. Used to illustrate minimal likelihood of confusion even with similar marks when consumers are reasonably careful.
Khoday India Ltd. v. Scotch Whisky Association (2008) 10 SCC 723 Relevance of delay in considering continuance or removal of a mark. Referenced regarding the impact of delay and acquiescence in trademark disputes.
Hindustan Pencils Pvt. Ltd. v. Universal Trading Company (2000 PTC 561 (DB)) Prejudice caused by rectification of marks after long use and business expansion. Considered in evaluating prejudice due to removal of marks after extended use.
London Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Durex Products Incorporated AIR 1963 SC 1882 Likelihood of confusion and proof thereof. Noted for the principle that actual confusion must be demonstrated.
Jolen Inc. v. Shobanlal Jain & Ors. No. 1210 of 2005 Recognition that average customers may be confused by similar marks. Used to support the possibility of consumer confusion in trademark disputes.
S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by Lrs. v. Jagannath (Dead) by lrs. (1994) 1 SCC 1 Requirement of proving fraud and intention to deceive in trademark claims. Applied in assessing ABD's claim of fraud in ownership prior to assignment deed.
Pt. Ram Avtar Sharma v. Pt. Chakradhar Saran Sharma AIR 1971 Allahabad 157 General and vague allegations of fraud are insufficient for court notice. Referenced to reject unsubstantiated fraud allegations.
William Derry, J.C Wakefield, M.M Moore, J. Pethick and S.J Wilde v. Sir Henry William Peek, Baronet - Privy Council (House of Lords) In actions of deceit, actual fraud must be proven. Used to emphasize the burden of proof for fraud in trademark disputes.
Neon Laboratories Limited v. Medical Technologies Ltd. 2012(50) PTC 346 (Bom) Negligence in conducting trademark search cannot be exploited. Noted in the context of search and knowledge of prior marks.
Alfred Dunhill Limited v. Kartar Singh Makkar & Ors. 1999 PTC (19) 294 Protection of traders who have built reputation and goodwill against passing off. Applied to support protection of ABD's mark against JD's alleged passing off.
Century Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar & Co AIR 1978 Delhi 250 Evidence required to prove actual use and commonality of marks in trade. Referenced regarding proof of common trade usage.
Lachhmandas Biharilal v. Bhagwan Dass AIR 1977 Delhi 200 Affidavits filed in evidence in mark removal proceedings cannot be withdrawn. Considered in evidentiary aspects of the case.
Diamond T. Motor Car Company v. Registrar of Trade Marks [Vol. XXXVIII] RPC [No. 13] 373 Distinctiveness of combined marks despite common elements. Used to illustrate that combined marks can have distinctiveness despite shared features.
In the matter of “FORD-WERKE AG.'s Application for a Trade Mark” [Vol. L XXII] RPC-191 Minor features do not add to inherent non-distinctiveness of a mark. Noted in the context of assessing distinctiveness of marks.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a detailed comparison of the marks "OFFICERS CHOICE" and "ORIGINAL CHOICE" considering the entire marks rather than isolated parts, despite the disclaimer on the word "CHOICE". It relied on the principle that a trademark should be assessed as a whole, as supported by the Supreme Court's interpretation of disclaimer provisions under Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act. The court rejected the argument that only the non-disclaimed parts should be compared, emphasizing consumer perception where buyers request the full mark.

On the evidence of confusion, including market surveys and affidavits, the court found the survey insufficiently explanatory and affidavits filed by JD negated confusion claims. The court also noted the marks are sufficiently distinct in appearance, sound, and consumer recognition, referencing the Bali case to highlight that only an illiterate or exceptionally careless person would confuse the marks.

The court examined the technical objections relating to procedural irregularities in filing the Counter Statement by JD and found no jurisdictional error, recognizing the practice of Deputy Registrar granting extensions and confirming the Counter Statement's validity.

Concerning the claim of fraud by ABD in ownership prior to the assignment deed, the court found no intention to deceive, given the corporate relationships and board resolutions indicating an understanding that the assignment was in progress. The court also rejected the estoppel argument based on JD's prior opposition statements, as amendments had been filed to delete grounds.

The court addressed the issue of acquiescence, concluding that ABD had actively opposed JD's mark through various legal channels and that inadvertent procedural failures did not amount to acquiescence or delay.

Overall, the court balanced the evidence and legal principles, concluding that there was no deceptive similarity or likelihood of confusion warranting removal of JD's mark.

Holding and Implications

The court's final decision is to DISMISS both applications for rectification, thereby allowing both marks "OFFICERS CHOICE" and "ORIGINAL CHOICE" to coexist on the register.

The direct effect of this decision is that JD's registered mark "ORIGINAL CHOICE" will not be removed, and ABD's claim to exclusive rights over the mark "OFFICERS CHOICE" does not extend to excluding JD's mark. No broader precedent altering trademark law principles was established; the ruling primarily applies the established principles of trademark comparison, disclaimer effect, and procedural propriety to the facts of this dispute.

Show all summary ...

Smt. Prabha Sridevan, Chairman:— Both the parties are in the liquor business. The financial stakes are high obviously, though it is submitted that the appearance of the marks and the labels are as on date very different from one another, the battle has been fought over several days, the two Senior Counsel engaged us with the different issues that are involved in this case. Raymond Chander said “There is no bad whisky. There are only some whiskeys that aren't as good as others”. We do not know into which category the parties fall, we are only concerned with their marks.

2. The mark of the applicant in ORA/143/2008/T/CHi.e Allied Blenders & Distillers (ABD) is “OFFICERS CHOICE”. The mark of the applicant in ORA/34/2008/TM/CH John Distillers Ltd. (JD) is “ORIGINALCHOICE”. If the names are abridged to the initials, it is obvious that both will be “OC”. This is one of the bone of the contention. There are many others. The parties have also raised some technical objections against each other. According to Allied Blenders & Distillers (ABD), John Distilleries (JD) hadin their opposition to ABDs mark in parallel proceedings raised the question of similarity, confusion and deception. Therefore, they are bound by this statements and in ORA/143/2008/TM/CH the issues of confusion and deception stand admitted. They are estopped from contendingotherwise. To this, John Distillers (JD) stand is that they have filed amendments in those oppositions for deleting other grounds. The other technical objection raised by ABD is that the Counter Statement was filed by JD long after the time granted under the law had passed. And in any event, extensions of time were granted by the Deputy Registrar who had no authority to sanction. And these extensions are, therefore non-est in the eye of law. Therefore, this Board shall not take into account the Counter Statement. To this JD's response is that they had filed the Counter Statement after obtaining extension from the Deputy Registrar who alone had been granting extension at that time. When the last such extension was granted JD had sent the Counter Statement within the time granted and it was because of intervening holidays that the mail was not delivered on time.

3. The technical objection raised by John Distillers is that when Allied Blenders & Distillers (ABD) filed its Form TM-1 for registering its trade mark claiming ownership from a particular date, it had actually not obtained the right to apply for the mark. On those dates, it was Crunkshank & Co, the assignee of the mark who was the owner. As they had given a false or wrong statement, ABD Distillers was not entitled to any relief. It was pointed out that it was four months after the date on which the Form TM-1 was filed, that the Assignment deed was actually executed and consideration was paid. The user of Cruickshank & Co cannot be the user of ABD.In fact Crucikshank & Co had filed a Suit for declaration that the assignment deed was invalid. It was contended that the fact that subsequently a settlement was arrived, cannot advance the case of ABD.To which ABD replied that there were several Board resolutions which would make it clear that it was understood that the assignment was through and indeed it was and if there was some inaccuracy, in view of the then existing relationship between Cruickshank & Co and BDA. (the predecessors of ABD) itwould be clear that there was no intention to deceive. And unless there is fraudulent intent, a wrong statement cannot be a ground to deny ABD its right. It was also submitted that the fact that the matters pending in Court have now been resolved amicably will only advance the case of ABD. We will deal with these technical objections at the end.

4. We will first take up the objection as to the registration of the trade mark itself, as for instance, the effect of disclaimer, effect of acquiescence, the proof relating to confusion & deception, dishonesty in adoption of the mark etc. we will deal with the facts in brief.

5. ABD is in the business of manufacture & marketing alcoholic beverages including Indian made foreign liquor. The trade mark “OFFICER'S CHOICE” was originally adopted by Cruickshank & Co. This was assigned to M/s BDA by a Deed of Assignment dated 26.02.1991 Subsequently, by a Composite Scheme of Arrangement, duly approved by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court. ABD became the proprietor of the mark OFFICER'S CHOICE as per the demerger, transfer and vesting of liquor business of M/s BDA Breweries & Distillers limited into ABD (P) limited. According to ABD it has been using and promoting the mark OFFICER'S CHOICE and publicizingits products through the predecessors in title and thereafter by itself. There is an evidence of extensive use and the growth of the reputation of the mark. ABD had also filed market surveys to show the high likelihood of confusion. Since 1995, ABD has been opposing the adoption and use of the mark ORIGINAL CHOICE.ABD had filed its Excise objection in 1995 against the label “ORIGINAL CHOICE”. Initially JD's alleged use was limited to the State of Karnataka and they ventured outside Karnataka in 2002. Immediately, a legal notice was sent to them, and a, passing off suitwas filed before the Delhi High Court. ABD filed its opposition to the registration of the mark but it met with failure. Butthe Hon'ble Supreme Court while dismissing ABD's special leave petition directed the hearing of the rectification petition. According to ABD, JD's mark shall not remain.

6. JD on the other hand also claimed to be well entrenched in the business of liquor manufacture & sale and had adopted its mark bonafide ABD's mark on the other hand must go since it had committed fraud on the Registry.

7. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. P.S Raman appearing for ABD submitted that their mark OFFICER'S CHOICE had been in use from 1986. Cruickshank & Co had applied for it in 1990 and registration was granted in 2007. In 1995, when the respondent applied for label approval of ORIGINAL CHOICE, ABD opposed it before the Excise authorities. Excise authorities rejected the opposition. Initially, the respondent had restricted its sales to Karnataka. but expanded to Andhra Pradesh in 2002. Immediately, ABD filed OS No. 1058/2002, before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, though no interim order was obtained. The learned Senor Counsel also referred to the filing of Counter Statement, in these proceedingsand said that an abandoned Counter Statement cannot be restored without a Miscellaneous Petition. Thenhe referred to thejudgement of Hon'ble Mr Justice Badar Durrez Ahmed between the parties. The Senior Counsel submitted that in their Written Statement, JD had referred to ABD'spriority of user and also the strong consumer loyalty to OFFICERS CHOICE thereby admitting ABDs reputation. According to the learned Senior Counsel since OFFICERS CHOICE was registered before ORIGINAL CHOICE, ABD had both statutory and common law right over JD. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that OFFICER'S CHOICE had got the reputation of being atop whisky. The learned Senior Counsel referred to 50 proceedings, initiated by ABD to protect its mark, and that not even one has been initiated by JD. Therefore, JD has not acted as a proprietor, while ABD had zealously guarded its mark OFFICER's CHOICE. The learned Senior Counsel submittedthat the trade channel for this product from the stage of manufacturing the liquor to serving the product to the consumer, both were alike. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the liquor trade was a closed trade and no manufacturer can claim to be ignorant of the mark of a rival in this business. So the JD had deliberately adopted a mark, deceptively similar to ABD's mark. The nature of the two businessesare admitted to be identical. The learned Senior Counsel referred to the cross examination of JD's witness where this is admitted. He also referred to the tendency to abbreviate the names of such goodswhich results in enhanced possibility of confusion. Learned Senior Counsel submitted if the adoption is deceptive at its inception, no ground of subsequent history can cleanse it.

8. The learned Senior Counsel referred to Question 34 in the Cross Examination of DW-1 in CS(OS) No. 383/2007. Also referredto the Written Statement filed in Suit No. 1058/2002 where it is admitted that ABD has been selling their product of OFFICERS CHOICE from 1986 while JD was selling from 1996 and there was acquiescence. [para 42 of the Written Statement]. He referred to paragraph 34 where the confusion and dilution of the mark is specifically referred to and the fact that there is no explanation for JD adopting the mark ORIGINAL CHOICE. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Cadila Case (2001 PTC 541 SC) deals with the factors for decidingdeception and confusion andif they are applied in the instant case andlooks at the nature of mark, degree of resemblance, nature of goods of both parties, Class of purchasers, the mode of purchase and other surrounding circumstances. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that JD's growth after notice is hardly relevant. JD took the risk and it was done with constructive and actual notice. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the tendency to abbreviate has been proved and referred to “George Ballantine & Son Ld. v. Ballantyne Stewart & Coy Ld.” 1959 RPC (273), “Mark Stateroom” Chancery Division- 29 RPC (489). According to him CHOICE was common to the trade. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that there were bad faith elements in JD'sadoption of its mark. The learned Senior Counsel also cited The Taverner's case to prove the case of initial natural confusion and their mark must remain and ‘ORIGINAL CHOICE’ shall go.

9. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. Sanjay Jain appearing for JD submitted that JD's mark shall remain and OFFICER's CHOICE shall go. The Trade mark Registry had communicated to ABD's predecessor in title in 1995 when they made their application under No. 538727 that the registration may be accepted subject to disclaimer to the word ‘CHOICE’ and this was accepted by the predecessor in title of ABD of their letter dated 4th April, 1997. This would show that they cannot object to the adoption of ORIGINAL CHOICE by JD. The search report obtained from the Registryshows that CHOICE has been used by many applicants with relation to many goods. On October, 17, 1995 BDA lodged its objection with the Commissioner of Excise to the approval granted to the label of ORIGINAL CHOICE on ground of confusion anddeception etc. By a detailed order in which both the parties hearing were represented, The Commissioner of State Excise had rejected the appeal arising out of approval to ORIGINAL CHOICE only in 2002. OS No. 1058/2002 was filed by ABD predecessors in title against BDA for injunction before the Delhi High Court. The reason for filing before the Delhi High Court appears to be a letter sent by some one to BDA asking BDA if they have any objection to the sale of ‘ORIGINAL CHOICE’. The written statement was filed by JD and then a Comprehensive Suit CS(OS) No. 383/2007 was filed by ABD. To this action, the JD has filed a written statement. In the original order in the interim application passed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, the learned judge held that there was delay on the part of ABD in approaching the Court and because of non-disclosure of material facts which in that case was in the knowledge of ABD of JDs activity, injunction will not be granted. The order made it clear this was a prima facie conclusion. Against that an appeal was filed and the Division Bench did not interfere with the conclusion of the learned single Judge. The learned Senior Counsel for JD submittedthe single Judge had restrained his observations to the minimum because the matter was pending before IPAB. The Special Leave Petitions were dismissed. The Deed of Assignment by Cruickshank & Co in favour of BDA reads as “Deed made on this day on 26 day of February, 1991”. The learned Senior Counsel submitted thatthe TM application made by ABD was on a false premise. He submitted that when choice is disclaimed what was left was OFFICER's and ORIGINAL which were not likely to confuse. He submitted that though JD's product was later, now the rivals were almost same level in business. The huge consumer base built by JD should be a special circumstance for exercise of discretion. The Learned Senior Counsel stated that the evidence filed by ABD was not strong enough to prove confusion. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that having allowed JD to grow by leaps and having bounds and acquiesced in its growth, ABD cannot ask for removal of the mark.

10. Documents have been filed to show the user of ‘ORIGINAL CHOICE’ by filing the labels along with the stamp of approval by the Excise Authorities for the years 1995-96, 199-97 and so on. CA's Certificates have also been filed to show the trade promotion expenses by JD.

11. There is a Market Survey Report filed by one GFK Mode Pvt. Limited. The Report shows the background to study whether to accept or reject the hypothesis that the presence of ORIGINAL CHOICE in the OFFICER'S CHOICE market would create confusion. The report contains the research methodology, the size of each panel is 100. The questionnaire was restricted to residents of Jaipur, Kolkata and their conclusion is that there was a significantdegree of confusion. In addition to this, the parties have also filed affidavits. The affidavits have been produced by ABD to show that the mark OFFICER'S CHOICE is exclusively associated with BDA which is the predecessor in title of ABD. The affidavits filed by JD are from license holders who have been selling both the brands and according to these affidavits, the consumers know the difference and there is no confusion. These affidavits have been filed from dealers in Bilaspur, Pondicherry, Bangalore, Hyderabad etc. Articles have been produced to show how successful ‘OFFICERS CHOICE’ has been. There are also Bar Menus where the ‘OC is used.

12. Following judgments were cited on:

1. “Squirt Co. v. The Seven-up Company et al” - Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit-207 USPQ - with relation to the mark of Squirt & Quest. In this case, common survey indicated 25% confusion.

2. “Caprihans (India) Private Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks” - PTC (Suppl) (2) 497 (Cal) (DB) - In this case, at para 41, Hon'ble Kolkata High Court held that ultimately it is for the Court or the tribunal to Judge whether a trade mark is calculated to deceive or confuse by the impression the mark makes on those who use the goods. The Court held that this does not mean that the evidence is of no assistance but that the Court should consider the evidence and also apply its own mind.

3. “Registrar of Trade Marks v. Ashok Chandra Rakhit Ltd.”., - AIR 1955 S.C 558

“The third thing to note is that the avowed purpose of the section is not to confer any direct benefit on the rival traders or the general public but to define the rights of the proprietor under the registration. The registration of a trade mark confers substantial advantages on its proprietor as will appear from the sections grouped together in Chapter IV under the heading “Effect of Registration”.

It is therefore, clear that the section itself contemplates that there may be a disclaimer in respect of parts contained in a trade mark registered as a whole although the registration of the mark as a whole does not confer any statutory right with respect to that part.

4. “T.V Venugopal v. Ushodaya Enterprises Ltd.,” - (2011) 4 SCC 85 - In this case the Supreme Court held that the protection for a mark could be granted against a person with relation to even an unrelated product if the vice of dishonesty of adoption is satisfied and the Court held that the word “Eenadu”though a descriptive word, had acquired a secondary or subsidiary meaning with relation to the respondent.

5. “Times Publishing House Ltd. v. The Financial Times Limited”-Order No. 91/2012-IPAB - In this case Hon'ble Board held that both the parties being in the same business one would know of the existence of the other and because of the publicity that must have been generated, there was a strong evidence to show that the applicant was aware of the existence of the respondent. This was cited to show that the alleged dishonesty of JD.

6. “Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel” - (2006) 8 SCC 726 - In this case “fraud” “delay” and “acquiescence” and their relevance was referred to in the context of granting injunction and the principle of acquiescence could be applied where one allows another to invade one's rights or advance a course of conduct in consonance with the claim for exclusivity of the trade mark.

7. “BALI” Trade Mark (Rectification C.A) - 1968 - RPC - P-426 There the Court held that what is relevant is whether there is confusion on the date of application for rectification. The marks were “BALI” & “BERLEI” and the court held that both the names start with ‘B’ and end with ‘I’ and that no one but an illiterate andexceptionally careless person could mistake one for the other and since the goods are presented in different coloured packs at different prices, the likelihood of confusion was minimal. In this case also the goods were the same. This case was cited by JD.

8. “Khoday India Ltd. v. Scotch Whisky Association” - (2008) 10 SCC 723 : AIR 2008 Supreme Court 2737 - Held delay was relevant while considering the continuance of the mark that has sought to be removed.

9. “Hindustan Pencils Pvt. Ltd. v. Universal Trading Company” - 2000 PTC 561 (DB) Here the mark was NATRAJ and the Division Bench of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court held that whether the have been using the mark for 25 years and its business had been expended and prospered during the period if the rectification application is allowed it would cause serious prejudice.

10. “London Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Durex Products Incorporated” - AIR 1963 SC 1882 - It was held that there was hardly any likelihood of confusion and no instance of confusion was proved.

11. “Jolen Inc.… v. Shobanlal Jain & Ors.…) No. 1210 of 2005-In this case, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court held that there is no doubt that an average customer will be confused.

12. “S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by Lrs. v. Jagannath (Dead) by lrs.” - (1994) 1 SCC 1. This was Cited to show that fraud was played on the court in the context of ABD claiming to be a proprietor before the Assignment Deed was signed. To the same effect was “Satish Khosla v. Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. - Crl. C.P.8 of 1997 & F.A.O (OS) 50 of 1997 was also cited.

13. “Pt. Ram Avtar Sharma v. Pt. Chakradhar Saran Sharma.” - AIR 1971 Allahabad 157 (V 58 C 33). Thiswas a proceeding that arose out of Trade Marks Act. It was held that general and vagueallegations of fraud cannot be taken notice of by Courts.

14. “William Derry, J.C Wakefield, M.M Moore, J. Pethick and S.J Wilde v. Sir Henry William Peek, Baronet-Vol. XIV and PRIVY COUNCIL [HOUSE OF LORDS] It was held that in an action of deceit, the plaintiff must prove actual fraud.

15. “Neon Laboratories Limited v. Medical Technologies Ltd.” - 2012(50) PTC 346(Bom) - Hon'ble Bombay High Court held that if a defendant does not carry out the search it cannot take advantages of its negligence.

16. “Alfred Dunhill Limited.… v. Kartar Singh Makkar & Ors.…” — 1999 PTC (19) 294 - It was held that trader who has built name, fame, reputation and goodwill needs to be protected from other trader passing off his goods.

17. “Century Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar & Co”- AIR 1978 Delhi 250 - The court held that there is no evidence to show that there is actual user of the mark by any party other than parties before the Court and that common to the trade had not been proved.

18. “Lachhmandas Biharilal v. Bhagwan Dass” - AIR 1977 Delhi 200 - The Court held that in an application for removal of mark, affidavit filed in evidence cannot be allowed to be withdrawn.

19. “Diamond T. Motor Car Company v. Registrar of Trade Marks” - [Vol. XXXVIII] RPC [No. 13] 373 - In that case there was diamond shaped border with the addition of the letter ‘T’. Court found thatdiamond shape border was common to the trade and in fact called the class of marks as “diamond marks”. The trade marks with the initial letter ‘T’ which were called ‘T’ Marks, this would not prevent the applicants' mark, which for the first time combines the common feature of each class the applicants' mark is a “Diamond T” mark. Learned Judge of the Chancery Division therefore stated that this is actual distinctive of the applicants vehicles and therefore he is entitled to registration.

20. “In the matter of “FORD-WERKE AG.'s Application for a Trade Mark”—

[Vol. L XXII] RPC-191 The mark had its essential features, the letters “F” and “K” in interlaced ovals. In this case, the Court held that minor features do not add anything to the inherent non-distinctiveness of the mark.

DISCLAIMER:

13. The Old Trade Marks Act contains Section 17 which deals with registration of trade marks subject to disclaimer that if a mark contains a part which is not subject of a separate application or which is not separately registered or contains matter common to the trade or is non-distinctive, then while testing whether a trade mark shall be entered and or shall remain on the register, the tribunal may insist on a disclaimer which means that the proprietor shall either disclaim the right to the exclusive of said part or of all any portion of such matter. There is a proviso to the section.

14. In the new Act, the provisions relating to disclaimer were removedinstead the present Section 17 refers to such marks or part of such marks which were earlier described in Section 17 for the purposes of disclaimer and states that “the registration of the mark which contains such a part shall not confer any exclusive right in such part

i) which is not the subject of a separate application by the proprietor for registration as a trade mark; or

ii) which is not separately registered by the proprietor as a trade mark;

b) contains any matter which is common to the trade or is otherwise of a non-distinctive character, the registration thereof shall not confer any exclusive right in the matter forming only a part of the whole of the trade mark so registered.

15. In the present case both counsel mainly argued on the words i.e OFFICER'S CHOICE vis-à-vis ORIGINAL CHOICE or vice-versa. The device or description of the label did not find a part in the arguments. So while deciding whether the mark of JD should be removed we will consider only the words. According to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for JD, since the word CHOICE had been disclaimed, we should compare the word OFFICERS & ORIGINAL and it was plain that no one would confuse one for the other. The learned Senior Counsel for ABD submitted that the whole mark should be taken into account. Now we will see what are thedeciding judgments in this regard.

16. In Ashok Chandra Rakhit Ltd. the effect of disclaimer has been explained. Though the act inquestion was the earlier Act, this judgement clarified all confusion relating to disclaimer. In the above case, the Hon'ble Calcuttta High Court reversedthe Controller's decision rectifying the register by including the disclaimer of the word ‘Shree’. The disclaimer said that the registration of the trade mark shall give no right to the exclusive use of the word ‘Shree’. The Supreme Court held that the power of the Tribunal to insist upon a disclaimer is conditional on the existence of one or more of the situations described in Section 17 (a)(b) or (c) of the (Old) Act. The Registrar must find that there are part or matters included in the trade mark to the exclusive use of which the proprietor is not entitled. The Supreme Court then observed that the purpose of the section does not conferany benefit on the rival traders or the general public, but defines the rights of the proprietor. The Supreme Courtobserved that many proprietor had made exaggerated claim to the exclusive use of parts or matters contained in the trade mark though expressly disclaimed. The Supreme Court stated that the real purpose of requiring a disclaimer is to define the rights of the proprietor and to minimize evenif it cannot wholly eliminate the possibility of extravagant and unauthorized claims being made upon registration. The Supreme Court further stated that the disclaimer is only for the purpose of the Act. It does not affect the rights of the proprietor except such as arise out of registration. In short, the disclaimed parts or matters are not within the protection of the statute. The Supreme Court also stated that it is true that where a distinctive label is registered as a whole, such registration cannot possibly give any exclusive right to the proprietor of the mark to the use of any particular word or name contained therein apart from a mark as a whole. And they quoted LORD Esherthat “the truth is that the label does not consist of each particular part of it but consists of the combination of the mark”.

17. In this case OFFICER'S CHOICE is the earlier mark did not give the proprietor namely ABD the exclusive right to the word CHOICE. But that does not mean that we should eschew CHOICE and consider only whether ‘ORIGINAL’ was similar or deceptively similar to ‘OFFICERS’. We accept the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel for ABD that the mark must be taken as a whole. The registration certificate does not contain disclaimers. The labels are not expected to publicize the disclaimers. When the customers asks for the goods, he only knows what he wants is ‘OFFICERS CHOICE’ or “ORIGINAL CHOICE” as the case may be and not just ‘OFFICER’ or ‘ORIGINAL’. Let us take the case of a mark which contains two words, both of which are required to be disclaimed. Does it mean the proprietor has no right to be protected in spite of the registration?It only means he has a right to the mark as a whole, containing both the words. Suppose a person gets registration of the mark RED DOLL and is required to disclaim both RED and DOLL and along comes a competitor who chooses the mark RED ALL. Can Red All be heard to say that since RED has been disclaimed, you compare DOLL & ALL.In the circumstances of the case one might find RED DOLL and RED ALL, deceptively/phonetically similar, in spite of the disclaimer of the word RED and the proprietor of ‘RED DOLL’ would be entitled to relief. On the other hand, suppose the competitor markets his product as ‘RED GATE’. Now the owner of ‘RED DOLL’ cannot say since I have registered the ‘RED DOLL’ and his mark also starts with the word RED, his mark can go. Of course, here, the situation will be different if the labels were identical. We make it clear we are doing this hypothetical comparison only on the basis of the words alone. Therefore, we have to see the rival marks as a whole, taking ‘OFFICER's CHOICE’ on the one hand and the ORIGINAL CHOICE on the other hand. If we do that, we do not see any confusion or deceptive similarity. It is seen from the evidence before us that ‘CHOICE’ is a popular word on the trade mark Registry especially in the case of alcoholic manufacturers. Perhaps, JD wanted a name which indicates that his was the original stuff, these are all boastful claims made by many manufacturers. In anycase, we are not required to go into that.

18. The mark that has to be removed in ORA143/2008.TM/CH is Application No. 722161 registered in 2007. It was contended on behalf of the learned senior counsel for JD, that ABD knew about its label and had objected to the Central Excise Authorities. They had lost before the Central Excise Authorities, and they had not challenged this order by way of any writ petition and JD naturally thought that they could proceed with manufacture and marketing of the goods and have grown multifold in these several years since commencement. At this juncture, to remove the mark would not be correct. According to the learned Counsel, acquiescence clearly came in the way. He has cited several judgments in his arguments.

19. Learned counsel appearing for ABD on the other hand submitted that JD knew about the earlier mark of ABD since they had protested both before the Central Excise Authority and had also sent legal notice. Any growth with full knowledge of the objection cannot strengthen JD's case. We have referred earlier to the decisions cited by both the sides. The power to rectify marks arises only after the mark is registered, because the grievance relates to absence or omission from the register of any entry or entry made without sufficient cause or any entry wrongly remaining in the register or an error or defect in the entry. The objection made by ABD to the Central Excise Authority is accepted. It is true that ABD had not challenged the order. But after the application of JD's mark was advertised before acceptance on 25.09.2003, ABD filed a TM-44 seeking extension to file the notice of opposition. The notice of opposition was not taken up because by inadvertence an unsigned cheque was sent towards fees for the TM-44. Story of the ill-fated notice of opposition need not be dealt here suffice to state the fate that against the refusal to take notice of opposition, ABD filed an appeal that was dismissed by the IPAB and the matter went all the way upto Supreme Court and ended in failure. The mark was registered on 17.07.2007 and its rectification has been filed in 2008. The conduct of ABD does not appear to be of a party who is lying quietly allowing the rival to prosper and acquiescing in a mark which it finds objectionable. In Ram Dev Food products cited above, the conduct described was one allowing another to invade one's rights or advance a course of conduct which is in consistent with the claim of ownership to the Trade Mark. We do not think that ABD can be accused of allowing JD to invade its rights, on the other hand we find that it has been voicing its opposition vehemently. It is true that the unsigned cheque resulted in the rejection of the opposition. There has to be a deliberateact of acquiescence and an act of inadvertence that results in failure cannot be described as acquiescence. We do not find ABD guilty of acquiescing in the continuance of JDs mark in the register nor is there any delay.

EVIDENCE OF CONFUSION:

20. We have before us a confusion test report prepared by GFK Mode Private Limited. The market surveyors were informed that due to similarity in looks of OFFICER's CHOICE and ‘ORIGINAL CHOICE’ there will be confusion among consumers. Therefore, the surveyors' client ABD commissioned them to this test. They conducted the survey in Jaipur and Kolkata and it is not disputed that in Jaipur & Kolkata, the JD's product had not yet been introduced. According to the learned Senior Counsel for JD, this is an exercise in futility, since conducting the survey in a place where they had not introduced their mark, would not lead us anywhere. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for ABD would submit that the confusion recorded by the Survey even in places where JDs product had not been introduced precisely proved the point. The key finding of the Survey is that the presence of ‘ORIGINAL CHOICE’ was creating confusion and that “it can be concluded that if ‘ORIGINAL CHOICE’ is introduced in the market where it is not currently present. It could create confusion among the customers of ‘OFFICERS CHOICE’. This report was prepared in 2007. In addition to this report, affidavits have also been filed on behalf of both sides. The affidavit filed by BDA or ABD is only to the effect that the deponents have not come across any mark identical to ABD's mark and that this mark is only associated with ABD's predecessors namely BDA. The affidavits filed by JD are to the effect that they sell both the brands and there has been no confusion. By these affidavits filed by JD, many are not dated, but in three of the documents we find a date which is of the year 2007. These affidavits filed by JD are identical and it is clear that those deponents have signed prepared affidavits given to them by JD. The affidavits filed by ABD do not really resolve the question of confusion. As regards the report filed by the professional surveyor, it would have been preferable, had it been marked by the person who could have explained how he conducted the survey. But we only have this document. Even if we accept this document, we do not know whether the presence of the markhad caused confusion. All that we know is that even before the mark was marketed in Jaipur & Kolkata, one surveyor had conducted a survey and had given a finding that there is likelihood of confusion. We have stereo-typed affidavits undoubtedly of dealers who deal in both the products that they have not come across any confusion. With this evidence in hand, we look at the marks ourselves. When the marks are taken as a whole as they should be, we do not think that ‘ORIGINAL CHOICE’ and ‘OFFICERS CHOICE’ are in any way identical, or that there is likelihood of confusion. In this regard, the Bali case is very apt. In that case Bali & Berleiwere the marks. In fact they are much more close to each other than ‘OFFICERS CHOICE and ‘ORIGINAL CHOICE’ will ever be. We bear in mind the reality that customers in India are all not familiar with English and the standards of comparison adopted by English Courts may not be suitable in India. But we can properly take note of the fact that the three English words in this case which are “OFFICER”, “ORIGINAL” and “CHOICE” are used even by persons who are not very conversant with English. Therefore, the Target Consumer who is not very fluent in English will easily know the difference between ‘OFFICERS CHOICE’ and ‘ORIGINAL CHOICE’. In Bali, the Court said that “no one but an illiterate and very careless person will mistake one for the other”. Here even an illiterate person can distinguish between sounds and Officer's Choice is nowhere near Original Choice.

21. Documents produced before us to show are the sales record of whisky. We find that in 2002, 3.15 million cases of ‘OFFICER's CHOICE’ were sold. ‘ORIGINAL CHOICE’ came into the market in 2004. ‘OFFICERS CHOICE’ was selling 3.30 million and ‘ORIGINAL CHOICE’ was selling 2.28 million cases. The Sales of ‘OFFICERS CHOICE’ was growing. Till 2006, it was at 5.01 and the sale of ‘ORIGINAL CHOICE’ also was growing and in 2006 it was at 4.12 It was admitted and not disputed that both the parties are now marketing their goods in bottles which are totally unlike each other. Therefore, it is clear that each brand has its own consumer group, and brand images with faithful following. Before the Hon'ble Delhi High courtthe comparative chart of the sales of both brands in Crates was produced. And we see that in 2007, the ‘ORIGINAL CHOICE’ sales was 4773005 crates and ‘OFFICERS CHOICE’ sales was 5085367 crates. Both the judgments of the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench clearly indicated that the issue of deceptive similarity would be decided by IPAB. Yet the following paragraph in the judgment is a valuable guidance in this jurisdiction too.

“Law does not require to list out similarities and the dis-similarities bymaking a check list because the consumer is not expected to do so whilebuying a product. The test is to have a glance at the two competinglabelsand as a reasonable and a prudent person forming an opinionwhether there is a chance of deception and/or confusion. Inherentinthis test is the cognitive faculties of a judge impromptu telling thejudicial mindwhether the imprints in the brain have resulted in a confusion.”

In the judgments cited before us, we find that in Caprihans (India) Private Ltd. Division Bench of the High Court has held that the it is for the Court to decide whether there is any deceptive similarity and that this is not to be intended to be understood as minimizing the weight of the evidence but what the judicial opinion is regarding deceptive similarity & confusion. On weighing the evidence and the material evidence before us, we find that there is no deceptive similarity or confusion. Both the marks are capable of standing independent on each other.

Next we come to the Technical objection.

TECHNICAL OBJECTION

22. There is technical objection whether the Counter statement file by JD ought to have been received and whether it is non-est in the eye of law. Form-C was issued by the IPAB to JD on 28.07.2008 It was received by them on 08.08.2008 In September, 2008 Vakalat was filed and Form-3 was filed seeking extension of time. On 04.12.2008, the IPAB has addressed a communication to the Counsel for JD stating that if the defects are not rectified within 15 days, the Counter Statement will be treated as abandoned. JD's counsel sent a reply on 20.12.2008 stating that JD had filed the Counter Statement within the time granted by IPAB upto 27.10.2008, the extension of time sought for by JD from 29.09.2008 was granted and time was granted upto 27.10.2008 In their letter dated 20.10.2008, the Counsel for the JD had stated that the Counter Statement was dispatched by the Counsel on 25.10.2008 And it was because of the Diwali holidays, the Courier had delivered it beyond time. And there was no delay on their part. On 13.01.2009, the IPAB had sent a letter requiring the Counsel for JD to file Form-3 for extension of time over 28.10.2008 In response to this on 06.02.2009, the Counsel for JD had sought for extension of time for four months from 28.10.2009 to 27.02.2009 By order dated 13.02.2009, the Counsel for JD was informed that the C.S was taken on file.

23. In this regard, we must record here that till 18.07.2011 it appears to have been the practice in this Board that extension of time was granted by the Deputy Registrar. On the other hand, Rule 14 of (Intellectual Property Appellate Board) Procedure Rules, 2003 requires that the Appellate Board should be satisfied if there is sufficient cause for extending the time. As per Section 2(a) of the Act, “Appellate Board” means the Appellate Board established under Section 83 and we have stated in our order (ORA/267/2009/TM/CH)-“Shri Shyam Singh v. Shri Manohar Singh” that this power to extend the time is within the sole discretion of IPAB and it cannot be delegated to the Deputy Registrar. This order can only be prospective and we cannot nullifyall that had transpired before our order. We do not think there is any jurisdictional error in receiving the Counter Statement filed by JD.

TENDENCY TO ABBREVIATE:

24. It is the case of ABD that where alcoholic beverages are concerned, the tendency is to abbreviate and he has produced some bar menus where the word ‘OC’ is used. The mark in question is not OC. It is ‘ORIGINAL CHOICE.To remove a mark on the ground that there is a tendency to abbreviate the mark, we require strong evidence from the consumers and the retailers that ‘ORIGINAL CHOICE’ and ‘OFFICERS CHOICE’ were in fact abbreviated as ‘OC’ thus resulting in confusion. No such evidence is produced. On the basis of certain sheets of paper, which appear to be bar menus which are not even marked through the bar tenders or hotel owners we cannot accept this ground.

THE FALSE CASE OF ABD:

25. It is apparent and undisputable that the assignment deed was dated 26.02.1991 One party had signed in October, 1990, the other party had signed in December, 1990. In the application (TM-1) the date of user was shown as 1986. The question is whether before the rights were assigned; the assignee could claim the user of the assignor and whether it was not a false statement. The question that was also raised is if a false statement is made by a party in a judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, will he be entitled to any relief though as on date there may not be any controversy in this regard. We have already referred to thejudgmentswhere it has been held how a fraud is to be proved and the intention to deceive must be proved. In this case M/s Cruickshank & Co., the assignor and BDA (the predecessor of ABD) were both in the hands of brothers whofell out later. The Learned Senior Counsel for ABD stated that at the time of the deed of assignment, it was understood that the assignment would go through and it was expected that the formalities will be over. In this context, the Suit No. 1800/1993 filed by M/s Cruickshank & Co against BDA becomes relevant. It is seen from this that M/s Cruickshank & Co. and BDA were subsidiarised and related companies. Being the Managing Director of Shaw Wallace & Co, K.R Chhabria had the control of the Shaw Wallace Group.

26. In paragraph 40 of the plaint, it is stated that on 20.02.1990, there was a resolution passed by the Board of Directors of BDA and by resolution dated 24.04.1990 signed by the Board of Directors of M/s Cruickshank & Co. that the trade marks brand names and labels would be transferred. Of course, in this they refer to some game plan of Mr. K.R Chhabria. But we are not concerned with that. We are concerned with the fact that these resolutions were there.

27. In paragraph 42, there is reference to de-subsidiarisation of BDA. In paragraph 44, it is stated that even after de-subsidiarisation, BDA was managed as a company of M/s Shaw Wallace Group without any intervention by any person until April, 1992. It is stated in the same paragraph that all the Directors of BDA since 1988 to April 1992 were employees of Shaw Wallace. It is stated in the same paragraph, “actual day today affairs of BDA Breweries Limited were looked after and controlled by the Officers of M/s Cruickshank & Co.” When this was the position it is not surprising that when the date of user had to be mentioned, they had mentioned the date of user M/s Cruickshank & Co. We are not saying that it is accurate or correct, we are only saying that this statement was made by M/s Cruickshank & Co. & Directors and there does not appear to have been any intention of defrauding. Therefore, this objection is also rejected.

STATEMENT MADE BY JD IN THE OPPOSITION PROCEEDINGS.

28. JD had cited grounds of similarity and confusion in their opposition proceedings against ABD's mark. So it is ABD's case that they are estopped from opposing ABD reaching removal of their mark on the same grounds. The Learned Senior Counsel on behalf of JD submitted that applications have been filed for amending the two opposition, and that it was a mistake. It is evident why that stand has been taken in the opposition. All that we can say is rather than including every ground of attack available in the statute, considered decisions must be taken regarding the appropriate ground of attack. We are reminded of the demon in the myth who sought a boon that anyone touching his head must burn. And ended up as ashes by touching his own head. Hoist with one's own petard one might say.

29. We have already decided that ‘ORIGINAL CHOICE’ and ‘OFFICERS CHOICE’ are not deceptively similar to each other and are not likely to confuse the public. We have also rejected all the technical objection raised by one against each other. All the MPs are closed. In the result, both applications are dismissed.