State Of M.P. Throug... v. Dinesh Singh Parihar

(Passed on 27/11/2015 Per Mrs. S.R. Waghmare,J. By this Writ Appeal under Section 2 (1) of M.P. Uchha Nyalaya (Khand Nyapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, the appellants State of Madhya Pradesh and others are being aggrieved by the order dated 8/6/2014 passed by the learned Writ Court in 2Writ Petition No.896/2014(s) allowing the petition.

02. Briefly stated the factual matrix pertains to appointment of the respondent/petitioner Dinesh Singh Parihar on the post of Constable, General Duty, Home Department (Police). The respondent/petitioner was subjected to criminal prosecution for offence under Sections 294, 323, 341 of the IPC read with 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 registered at crime No.44/2012. However, he has been acquitted from the same offences on 3.8.10. Thereafter he was selected for the post of Constable General Duty in the year 2013. However, consequently an order dated 11/11/2013 the petitioner was declared unfit for appointment on the ground that a criminal case was registered against him in which he as been acquitted by giving the benefit of doubt. The same was the subject matter of the writ petition and the learned Judge of the Writ Court quashed the impugned order and directed the respondents to take appropriate steps for issuance of 3the appointment of the respondent/petitioner within a period of thirty days. The back wages were not granted to the respondent/petitioner, but he shall be entitled to seniority and all consequential benefits. Being aggrieved, the appellants/State Government filed the present writ appeal.

3. Counsel for the appellants/State has vehemently urged the fact that the respondent/petitioner had not been honourably acquitted by the Trial Court and the question of appointment of the respondent/petitioner in the police force would not arise. Counsel relied on Commissioner of Police, New Delhi vs. Mehar Singh in Civil Appeal No.4842/2013, whereby the Apex Court has held that there was a Standing Order No.398 and directed that the eligibility of the candidate was to be decided against the said order by constituting a Screening Committee to decide the suitability of the candidates for the Government job. And considering the fact that the offence amounts to one of moral turpitude then the police personnel performs sensitive nature of duty hence his conduct 4should be beyond suspicion and doubt and the police personnel must have impeccable character and integrity. These facts have been considered in the case of Rakesh Sharma vs. State of Madhya Pradesh in Writ Petition No.9913/2012, whereby the Gwalior Bench of this Court has directed that the Screening Committee in terms of Mehar Singh (supra) be constituted an the case of the petitioner be considered. Whereas in the matter of Dinesh Singh Parihar (the present respondent) after considering the facts, the Counsel for the appellant State submitted that the Standing Order was not available with the State Government, however the Rules themselves provided discretion to the Superintendent of Police to consider the issuance of the appointment order and whereas the Inspector General of Police under the M.P. Manual and Regulations under the Regulation 54 could grant approval and the Court directed that thirty days time is granted to consider the case.

4. Counsel for the appellants/State has vehemently 5urged the fact that the respondent has been acquitted from the offence registered against him on the ground of compromise and hence the acquittal of the respondent cannot be termed as honourable acquittal. Hence, Counsel submitted that the learned Writ Court had erred in not considering the orders Annexures A/ 2, A/3 & A/4, whereby in similar matter the Gwalior Bench had directed for constitution of Screening Committee for consideration of the case of similarly situated petition. The learned Writ Court had allowed the writ petition and directed to the respondents/State to appoint the petitioner Dinesh Singh Parihar/respondent. Counsel submitted that the police personnel perform sensitive nature of duty hence the conduct should be beyond suspicion and doubt and the police personnel must have impeccable character and integrity. And in this light criminal antecedents and integrity of the candidate has to be considered. The respondent/petitioner did not furnish information of the registration of the offence and is also guilty of suppression and only 6after verification the appellants/State learnt of the criminal case registered against the respondent/petitioner. To bolster his submissions, Counsel placed reliance in the case of Joginder Singh vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh and others (2015) 2 SCC 377 and State of M.P.others vs.Parvez Khan (Civil Appeal No.10613/14 {arising out of SLP(C) No.36237 of 2012}) In the case of Joginder Singh (supra) the Apex Court has categorically held that acquittal of appellant was honourable acquittal and hence, he should not be denied appointment to the post in question. And in the case Parvez Khan (supra) Apex Court has categorically considered the fact that the Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority and no malafides were mulcted on the officer and even in this light the Apex Court had set aside the order passed by the High Court holding that the Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order rejecting the claim of the respondent for appointment to the police service by 7way of giving him compassionate appointment.

5. Per contra, Counsel for the respondent has opposed the submissions put forth by the Counsel for the appellants/State. He had relied on the ratio laid down in Braj Mohan Bhadoria & another v. State of M.P. [W.P. No.5004/2013] including Mehar Singh (supra) whereby the Apex Court had directed considering the case of similarly situated employees of the police service. Counsel has fully supported the order of the learned Writ Court. Hence, he prayed that the writ appeal be dismissed.

6. Considering the above submissions, the impugned order of the Writ Court and considering the case of Mehar Singh (supra), we find that in the matter of Mehar Singh Apex Court had come down heavily regarding the fact that the police force is a disciplined post and it shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. It is clear that a candidate to be recruited to the police service must be worthy 8of candidature and must be a person of utmost rectitude and must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was completely exonerated. Persons who are likely to erode the credibility of the police ought not to enter the police force. No doubt the Screening Committee has not been constituted in the case considered by this Court, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the respondent, in the present case, the Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority. There is no allegation of mala-fides against the person taking the said decision nor is the decision shown to be perverse or irrational. There is no material to show that the appellant was falsely implicated. Basis of impugned judgment is acquittal for want of evidence or discharge based on compounding. In the present case the appellants/State having alleged concealment regarding the registration of offence by the respondent/petitioner 9and hence the impugned order of cancellation of his candidature is passed. Whereas the learned Writ Court in the present case has considered that there was provision for an approval of the Inspector General of Police under Regulation 54 of the M.P. Manual and Regulations even when a candidate had been convicted. In this aspect, we find that the appeal needs to be allowed. The discretion is available to the appellants/State regarding concealment/suppression; and parity cannot be claimed in the present case with Mehar Singh (supra). Hence, the order of learned Court is set aside and the petition of the petitioner is dismissed.

7. Consequently, the present Writ Appeal is hereby allowed to the extent herein above indicated. C.c. as per rules. (Mrs. S.R. Waghmare) (Prakash Shrivastava Judge Judge moni