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Jagendra Chandra Roy Accused v. Superintendent Of The Dum Dum Special Jail Opposite Party.

Calcutta High Court
Jan 16, 1933
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Judgment Summary — Patterson, J. (Rule re: Ordinance 2 of 1932)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was convicted on 12 March 1932 under Section 21 of Ordinance 2 of 1932 for disobeying or neglecting to comply with an order made by the District Magistrate of Bakargunj under Section 4 of that Ordinance; the order had been served on the petitioner on 4 March 1932. He was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 18 months and to pay a fine of Rs. 150, with a default term of three months, and was serving the sentence in the Dum Dum Special Jail.

A Rule called on the Superintendent of the Jail to show cause why the petitioner should not be set at liberty on two grounds (stated in the Rule): (1) that provisions of Section 21, Ordinance 2 of 1932, authorizing sentences of imprisonment extending beyond the date of expiry of the Ordinance, were ultra vires Section 72 of the Government of India Act 1919; and (2) that the petitioner's sentence ceased to have effect after the expiry of Ordinance 2.

Relevant chronology in the opinion: Ordinance 2 of 1932 came into force on 4 January 1932 and remained in force up to and including 3 July 1932 (expiring by effluxion of time under Section 72, Government of India Act). Before that expiry, Ordinance 10 of 1932 was promulgated by the Governor‑General in Council under Section 72 and came into force on 30 June 1932. Ordinance 10 reenacted the provisions of Section 4 and Section 21 of Ordinance 2 and contained Section 80, a saving clause deeming anything done in pursuance of any provision of Ordinance 2 to have been done in pursuance of the corresponding provision of Ordinance 10.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether sentences of imprisonment imposed under a temporary Ordinance (Ordinance 2 of 1932) could lawfully extend beyond the date of expiry of that Ordinance without being ultra vires Section 72 of the Government of India Act, 1919.
  2. Whether the saving clause in Section 80 of Ordinance 10 of 1932 ("anything done in pursuance of any provision of Ordinance 2 ... deemed to have been done in pursuance of the corresponding provision of Ordinance 10") was sufficiently clear to justify continued detention for penalties inflicted under Ordinance 2.
  3. Whether the Governor‑General was competent under Section 72 to authorize courts (by Ordinance) to impose sentences of imprisonment that would continue after the Ordinance had expired.
  4. Whether the presence of explicit provisos in other temporary statutes (the Defence of India Act 1915 and the Emergency Powers Act 1920) implying the survivability of penalties after expiry meant that such provisos were necessary in every temporary statute to preserve punishments.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The sentence of imprisonment imposed under Section 21 of Ordinance 2 of 1932 was ultra vires Section 72 of the Government of India Act, 1919, in so far as it authorized imprisonment extending beyond the date of expiry of the Ordinance.
  • Upon expiry of Ordinance 2 on 3 July 1932, the sentence ceased to have effect and the petitioner should be set at liberty.
  • If, absent Ordinance 10, the petitioner would have been entitled to release, then Section 80 of Ordinance 10 was not sufficiently clear and precise to justify continued detention; specifically, the words "anything done" do not include penalties.
  • Because an Ordinance is based on a state of emergency, it should cease to have effect as soon as the emergency is over, and sentences imposed under it ought logically to terminate with the Ordinance.
  • The fact that the Defence of India Act and the Emergency Powers Act contained express provisos protecting penalties after expiry showed that an express proviso was necessary to preserve punishments under temporary statutes.

Respondent / Court's Position (as presented in the opinion)

  • Section 80 of Ordinance 10 provides a complete answer to the petitioner's contention: the saving clause deems anything done under Ordinance 2 to have been done under the corresponding provision of Ordinance 10, and the language is sufficiently comprehensive to include penalties.
  • Ordinances made under Section 72 have the like force of law as Acts passed by the Indian legislature for six months and should be regarded, for present purposes, as if they were temporary Acts; established rules of construction support the continuity of rights and penalties incurred while the statute was in force.
  • Parliament, in limiting the duration of an Ordinance to six months, did not intend thereby to limit or nullify sentences necessarily imposed to meet an emergency; an interpretation that sentences must expire with the ordinance would be absurd and inconsistent with reason and justice.
  • The express provisos in the Defence of India Act and Emergency Powers Act were precautionary and not indicative that such provisos are necessary in every temporary statute to preserve penalties.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Steavenson v. Oliver (1841) 8 M & W 234 Recognized the principle that transactions completed, rights acquired and penalties incurred while a statute is in force are not affected by the mere fact of the statute's cessation (in the absence of express provision to the contrary). The court relied on this English authority as an established rule of construction supporting the conclusion that penalties imposed under a temporary statute survive its expiry and therefore that penalties under Ordinance 2 remained effective.
Interpretation Act, 1889 — Section 38, Clause (2) Statutory recognition (in the case of express repeal) of the rule that rights and penalties acquired under a statute survive repeal. The court noted these provisions would have made the question straightforward if an express repeal had occurred; though they do not apply in terms to expiration by effluxion of time, they give statutory expression to the rule of construction recognized in Steavenson v. Oliver.
General Clauses Act, 1897 — Sections 6 and 30 Provisions dealing with consequences of repeal and continuity of certain effects after repeal (statutory recognition in cases of express repeal). Referenced alongside the Interpretation Act to explain how statutory law treats rights and penalties after repeal; the court observed these provisions do not literally apply to expiration but reflect a rule of construction relevant to the issue.
Section 72, Government of India Act, 1919 Provides that an Ordinance made under that section shall, for six months from promulgation, have the like force of law as an Act passed by the Indian legislature; power is subject to like restrictions as that legislature. Central to the dispute: the court analyzed whether limiting an Ordinance's duration to six months was intended to limit sentences imposed under it to that period. The court concluded Section 72 does not support the petitioner's restrictive interpretation and that Parliament could not have intended sentences to expire automatically with the Ordinance.
Ordinance 2 of 1932 — Sections 4 and 21 Section 4 empowered certain orders by the District Magistrate; Section 21 authorized imposition of sentences of imprisonment (up to two years). These were the provisions under which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced. The court treated them as clear and unambiguous and noted they were reenacted by Ordinance 10.
Ordinance 10 of 1932 — Section 80 (Saving clause) Deeming provision: anything done in pursuance of any provision of Ordinance 2 should be deemed to have been done in pursuance of the corresponding provision of Ordinance 10. The court held Section 80 to be sufficiently clear and comprehensive to include penalties imposed under Ordinance 2 and thereby provided a complete answer to the petitioner's claim that his detention became illegal after Ordinance 2 expired.
Defence of India Act, 1915 Temporary statute that contained a proviso preserving penalties after expiry (as noted in argument). The petitioner relied on the presence of such provisos to argue they were necessary; the court rejected that inference, holding the provisos were precautionary and not necessary given the rule of construction noted in Steavenson v. Oliver.
Emergency Powers Act, 1920 Temporary statute which contained express provisos to preserve penalties or regulations after expiry (as noted in argument). Used by the petitioner to argue necessity of express saving clauses; the court found this was not persuasive evidence that such provisos are indispensable, calling them precautionary.
Ordinances 4 and 8 of 1930 Examples of ordinances (relating to martial law) that contained provisos preserving penalties after expiry. The court observed these were exceptional and could not explain why provisos were included in these two ordinances and not in others; concluded no firm inference should be drawn from the selective presence of provisos.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded in a sequence of legal-constructive steps based solely on the materials and arguments before it:

  1. Initial, dispositive finding: Ordinance 10 of 1932 came into force before Ordinance 2 expired and reenacted Sections 4 and 21 of Ordinance 2 while containing Section 80, which saved "anything done" under Ordinance 2 by deeming it to have been done under Ordinance 10. Because the language of Sections 4 and 21 (and their reenactments) and Section 80 were clear and unambiguous, the court held Section 80 provides a complete answer to the petitioner's contention that his detention became illegal after Ordinance 2 expired.
  2. On the petitioner's subsidiary argument that Section 80 was not sufficiently clear (specifically that the phrase "anything done" did not include penalties), the court rejected this: the judge considered "anything done in pursuance of any provision" to be a comprehensive expression plainly covering penalties inflicted under the earlier Ordinance.
  3. The court then addressed the broader constitutional question raised: whether the Governor‑General (under Section 72) could authorize courts by Ordinance to pass sentences of imprisonment extending beyond the expiry of the Ordinance. The judge treated this as essentially a question of statutory construction as to the intended effect of Section 72's six‑month limitation.
  4. The court invoked the established rule (as illustrated by Steavenson v. Oliver) that rights and penalties incurred while a statute is in force ordinarily survive the statute's cessation in the absence of express provision to the contrary, a principle reflected by statutory provisions applicable to express repeal (Interpretation Act 1889 and General Clauses Act 1897). Although those statutory provisions did not literally apply to expiration by effluxion of time, they were treated as statutory recognition of the underlying rule of construction.
  5. Applying common‑sense construction, the court found it untenable to read Section 72 as intending that sentences authorized by an Ordinance must necessarily expire with the Ordinance. Such an interpretation would produce absurd practical consequences (for example, sentences varying in efficacy depending on where within the six‑month period conviction occurred). The court therefore rejected the petitioner's restrictive interpretation of Section 72.
  6. The court also considered the petitioner's reliance on temporary statutes (Defence of India Act, Emergency Powers Act) that contained explicit saving provisos. The judge held these provisos were precautionary and not necessary to preserve penalties, given the rule of construction already discussed; the selective presence of such provisos in some instruments did not justify inferring that they were essential in all cases.
  7. On this combined analysis—(a) the saving operation of Section 80 of Ordinance 10, and (b) the rule of construction that penalties survive the cessation of temporary statutes—the petitioner failed to show illegality or cessation of his sentence upon expiry of Ordinance 2.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court ordered that the Rule be discharged. The core ruling is stated as:

Rule discharged.

Implications (as reflected in the opinion):

  • The petitioner's detention under the sentence imposed pursuant to Section 21 of Ordinance 2 of 1932 was held to be lawful; he failed to show that the sentence had become illegal or that it ceased to have effect on expiry of the Ordinance.
  • The court concluded that Section 80 of Ordinance 10 of 1932 was sufficiently clear to preserve acts (including penalties) done under Ordinance 2 by deeming them to have been done under Ordinance 10.
  • The court also determined, on construction of Section 72 of the Government of India Act, 1919 and by reference to established rules of construction (including Steavenson v. Oliver), that Parliament did not intend that sentences authorized by a temporary Ordinance should automatically expire with the Ordinance; therefore the Governor‑General was competent to promulgate an Ordinance authorizing courts to impose sentences which might continue beyond the Ordinance's expiry.
  • The opinion records that Panckridge, J. agreed with the conclusion.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond what the court stated.

Show all summary ...

Patterson, J.:— The petitioner was convicted under S. 21, Ordinance 2 of 1932, on 12th March 1932 for having disobeyed or neglected to comply with an order that had been made by the District Magistrate of Bakargunj under S. 4 of that Ordinance and that had been duly served on the petitioner on 4th March 1932. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 18 months and to pay a fine of Rs. 150 and in default to undergo a further term of imprisonment for three months: he is now serving out his sentence in the Dum Dum Special Jail. By this Rule the Superintendent of the Jail has been called on to show cause why the petitioner should not beset at liberty on the ground that the provisions of S. 21, Ordinance 2 of 1932, authorizing the Court to pass sentences of imprisonment which would continue beyond the date of expiry of the said Ordinance are ultra vires of Section 72 of the Government of India Act of 1919, and also on the ground that the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 18 months passed on him ceased to have effect after the said date. It appears that Ordinance 2 of 1932 came into force on 4th January 1932 and that it remained in force up to and including 3rd July 1932, on which date it expired under the provisions of Section 72 of the Government of India Act, which limit the duration of an Ordinance under that section to a period of six months. It further appears that before the expiry of Ordinance 2 of 1932 another Ordinance (Ordinance 10 of 1932) was made by the Governor-General in Council under Section 72 of the Government of India Act, and that it came into force on 30th June 1932. This Ordinance, among other things, reenacted the provisions of Section 4 of the Ordinance 2 of 1932, and also the provisions of S. 21 of that Ordinance, while S. 80 contained a saving clause to the effect that anything done in pursuance of any provision of Ordinance 2 should be deemed to have been done in pursuance of the corresponding provision of Ordinance 10.

2. Now Section 72 of the Government of India Act, lays down that an Ordinance made under that section shall for the space of six months from the date of its promulgation have the like force of law as an Act passed by the Indian legislature, and that the power of making such Ordinances is subject to the like restrictions as the power of the Indian legislature to make laws. That being so the two Ordinances with which we are now concerned may, for the purposes of the present case, be regarded as standing on precisely the same footing as if they had been temporary Acts passed by the Indian Legislature. Ss. 4 and 21, Ordinance 2, are perfectly clear and unambiguous, as are also the corresponding provisions of Ordinance 10, and this being so, it must I think be held that S. 80, Ordinance 10, provides a complete answer to the petitioner's contention that at any rate since 3rd July 1932, (the date on which, the Ordinance 2 expired), he has been illegally detained in custody.

3. It has been urged on his behalf that if, apart from the provisions of Ordinance 10, he would have been entitled to be released from custody on the expiry of Ordinance 2, the terms of S. 80 of the former Ordinance are not sufficiently clear and precise to justify his further detention. It is contended that if the intention of the legislature, (the legislature in the present instance being the Governor-General), was that sentences imposed under the expiring Ordinance should continue to have effect even after the date of its expiry, it should have expressed its intention with greater clearness and should not have left it to be gathered by inference; that the words of S. 80 do not make it at all clear that such was the intention; and in particular that the words “anything done,” as used in that section, do not include penalties. I do not agree with these contentions: I cannot imagine any more comprehensive expression than “anything done in pursuance of any provision” of such and such Ordinances, and it seems to me to be perfectly clear that this expression covers, and was intended to cover, the case of penalties inflicted under Ordinance 2 and the other expiring Ordinances referred to in Ordinance 10.

4. The conclusion stated above is of itself sufficient for the disposal of this Rule, but as the question of the competence of the Governor-General to authorize the Courts by means of an Ordinance to pass sentences of imprisonment for terms extending beyond the date of expiry of such Ordinance has been raised by this Rule and has been fully discussed before us, I think it is desirable that this question should be decided. If the Ordinance had been expressly repealed, the question would probably have presented very little difficulty in view of the provisions of Section 38, Clause (2) of the Interpretation Act of 1889 and of Sections 6 and 30 of the General Clauses Act of 1897, but although these provisions do not apply in terms to the case of a temporary statutes the term of which has expired, it may very reasonably be contended that they merely give statutory expression to a rule of construction which was already in existence and which applied with equal force to statutes that had been expressly repealed and to temporary statutes the terms of which had expired. This rule of construction was recognized, in England as far back as the year 1841 in Steavenson v. Oliver . 1841 8 M & W 234, in which a question similar to the one now under consideration arose with reference to the effect of the expiry of an Act on rights acquired while the Act was in force.

5. The learned Judges who dealt with, that case were of opinion that not only rights acquired under a temporary Act, but also penalties imposed thereunder, would survive its expiration. The principle underlying their decision appears to have been that transactions that have been completed, rights that have been acquired and penalties that have been incurred while a statute is in force, are not (in the absence of an express provision to the contrary), affected by the mere fact of the statute having ceased to be in force, a principle which has since received statutory recognition in the Interpretation Act of 1889 in the case of express repeal, though not as yet in the case of expiration by effluxion of time. This rule seems to me to be founded not only on considerations of convenience, but also of reason and justice, and it ought in my opinion to be kept prominently in mind in endeavouring to decide the question now under consideration.

6. The question is really one of construction, and relates mainly to the construction of Section 72 of the Government of India Act. S. 21, Ordinance 2 of 1932, authorizes the imposition of sentences of imprisonment that may extend to two years, and is clearly within the competence of the Indian legislature to create offences by statute and to make them punishable in this manner: it was therefore prima facie within the competence of the Governor-General to make and promulgate an Ordinance containing provisions of this character. The question is whether it was the intention of Parliament in limiting the duration of an Ordinance to six months, to limit also the sentences of imprisonment that might be imposed under any such Ordinance to sentences that would expire with the expiry of the Ordinance. There is nothing in the wording of S. 72 to justify such a conclusion, and in my opinion Parliament cannot possibly have intended anything so unreasonable. To hold otherwise would be to hold that Parliament intended not only to prevent the Governor-General from authorizing the Courts to impose such sentences of imprisonment as might be necessary for the purpose of dealing effectively with the emergency the existence of which the promulgation of an Ordinance presupposes, but also that the maximum sentences of imprisonment that the Courts might be authorized to impose should vary from six months rigorous imprisonment in the case of convictions on the date on which the Ordinance came into force, to imprisonment till the rising of the Court, or something equally futile, in the case of convictions on the date on which the Ordinance was due to expire. The consequences of such an interpretation have only to be stated for its absurdity to become apparent, and I have no hesitation in holding that the interpretation that the petitioner would have us put on S. 72 cannot possibly be the correct interpretation.

7. It is true that a penal statute should be strictly construed, but it is nonetheless true that every statute, whether penal or not, should be construed in a manner consistent with common sense, and that if the intention of the legislature is not apparent from the words of the statute itself, it ought to be presumed to have been such as is consistent with reason and justice. If the test be applied to the provisions of S. 72, it is clear that the legislature can never have intended that sentences authorized by an Ordinance should not extend beyond the term of the Ordinance, or that such sentences should automatically expire with the expiration of the Ordinance. The section will not bear the interpretation sought to be put on it by the petitioner, and that interpretation cannot be accepted as correct. It was also suggested on behalf of the petitioner that as an Ordinance is necessarily based on the existence of a state of emergency it ought to cease to have effect as soon as the emergency is over, and that sentences imposed under the provisions of an Ordinance ought logically to terminate with the termination of the Ordinance. The argument is clearly fallacious for the reasons already indicated, and does not call for further comment.

8. Before leaving the case I ought perhaps to refer to another argument that was urged by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner. It was pointed out that the Defence of India Act of 1915 and the Emergency Powers Act of 1920 were temporary statutes which, like Ordinance 2 of 1932, contained provisions by which offences were created and made punishable with imprisonment and that both these Acts contained special provisos to the effect that penalties imposed thereunder should not be affected by the expiry of the Acts, or (in the case of the Emergency Powers Act) of the regulations framed, thereunder. It was contended that the fact that such provisos were considered necessary in the case of those two Acts show that if it is intended that punishments inflicted under the provisions of temporary statutes should be given effect to after the expiry of those statutes, it is necessary that this should be specifically stated. I do not agree with this contention, for having regard to the rule of construction indicated in Steavenson v. Oliver and already referred to in the earlier portion of this judgment, I am of opinion that the provisos in question were not really necessary and that they were merely inserted (as is frequently done in the case of provisos and saving clauses) as a precaution against misinterpretation of the intention of the legislature. Moreover I find that out of some 12 Ordinances promulgated between 1922 and 1932 by which inter alia offences were created and penalties provided, only two, (viz.: Ordinances 4 and 8 of 1930), contain provisos of the nature indicated above. These two Ordinances related to martial law and empowered the military authorities to frame regulations creating offences and imposing penalties, but I have been, unable to discover any possible reason why the provisos in question were inserted in these two Ordinances and not in the others. In these circumstances I do not think it is possible to draw any such inference as the learned advocate for the petitioner would have us draw from the fact that the Emergency Powers Act and the Defence of India Act contain provisos of the nature indicated above.

9. The petitioner has in my opinion failed to show that the sentence of imprisonment passed on him was illegal or that it ceased to have effect on the expiry of the term of the Ordinance. The rule ought therefore to be discharged.

Panckridge, J.:— I agree.

R.K

10. Rule discharged.