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Azimuddy v. Emperor
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Rankin, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
Five appellants were convicted by the Sessions Judge of the Assam Valley Districts sitting with a jury of seven. There had been a previous trial and this Court had sent the case back for retrial; on retrial the jury were unanimous.
The convictions: all appellants were found guilty under section 302 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code; three of them were also found guilty under section 302 by itself; the remaining two were found guilty under section 324.
Parties and roles identified in the opinion: Basir Haji (fifth appellant) is the father of appellants (1), (3) and (4): Azimuddy, Johiruddy and Rahimuddy. The second appellant is Sayed Ali (a friend and neighbour).
Factual core: the occurrence took place between about 8 and 9 a.m. on 7 March 1925 in the vicinity of Kimu's patta land and adjoining khas land. The prosecution's case was that Kimu was erecting a but on his land when the accused, armed with spears and lathis, came to prevent this and proceeded to attack Kimu's party; three persons were killed and others injured. The defence said the accused were erecting a but on the khas land and that Kimu's party attacked them.
Individual lethal/violent acts summarized in the text: the first appellant killed Alimuddi with a spear; the second (Sayed Ali) killed Kalimuddin; the third killed Mokim; the fourth (about 18 years old) struck Yaruddin (simple hurt); Basir Haji struck Mukdum with a ram dao and cut his arm (simple hurt).
Procedural posture before this Court: the appellants appealed convictions and contended among other things that passages in the trial judge's summing up were erroneous; the Court examined objections under section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code and other evidentiary and procedural points, and re-determined consequences for the convictions and sentences.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code applies to statements made by an accused on trial (i.e., whether such statements are inadmissible under S.162).
- Whether the learned Judge's admission and use in his summing up of (a) a later information reportedly laid by one accused (Ex. 6) and (b) evidence by police officers that they found no trace of a house at the place pointed out, were contrary to section 162 and therefore improper.
- Whether the trial judge's reference in the summing up to a prior complaint (Exh.4) and evidence that Monu had been driven from a plot constituted an improper propensity direction (permitting the jury to infer guilt from prior conduct) and thereby materially misdirected the jury on the question of which party was the aggressor.
- Whether the use of section 149 (constructive liability for a common object involving murder) to charge multiple murders in a single count was appropriate in these circumstances, or whether separate heads of charge should have been preferred (with reference to Radha Nath Karmakar v. Emperor).
- Consequential question: if misdirection or improper charging is found, what are the appropriate consequences for convictions and sentences (including whether retrial should be ordered for some appellants)?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (as recorded)
- The learned vakil for the appellants objected to three passages in the trial judge's summing up; two of these raised questions under section 162 CrPC (i.e., that certain statements/admissions put to the jury were contrary to S.162).
- Specifically, it was objected that Ex. 6 (an information laid by the first appellant Azimuddy at 2:30 P.M., stating Basir Haji was beaten but not injured) was admitted and put to the jury contrary to S.162.
- It was also objected that the judge's reference to police evidence that they found "no trace of the erection of a house" at the spot pointed out by Basir Haji was contrary to S.162.
- A further complaint was that the judge's treatment of a prior complaint (Exh. 4) and evidence about Monu Fakir being driven out improperly suggested propensity and thereby misdirected the jury on the central factual question of which party was the aggressor.
Prosecution's Arguments (as recorded)
- The learned vakil for the prosecution contended that section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as it then stood, had no application to statements of accused persons who were on trial.
- The prosecution relied on the construction that statements by accused are governed by the Evidence Act (admissions/confessions and their specific safeguards) rather than being brought within S.162's prohibition on use of certain police-recorded statements.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| King-Emperor v. Maung Tha Din | Held (in a Full Bench decision in one High Court) that statements by an accused are not within section 162 CrPC (i.e., S.162 does not apply to accused's statements). | The Court accepted and followed this decision; Rankin, J. stated that these decisions are right and should be followed in this Court. |
| Rannun v. Crown | One of the decisions in High Courts holding that statements by an accused are not within S.162. | Identified by the Court as authority supporting the view that S.162 does not apply to accused statements; the Court followed these authorities. |
| Jagwa Dhanuk v. King-Emperor | Another High Court decision reaching the view that accused's statements are not within S.162. | Cited by Rankin, J. as among the decisions to be followed in this Court. |
| Queen-Empress v. Jadub Das | Established in this Court that, despite general language of section 161 CrPC, that section does not apply to an accused. | Rankin, J. treated this as settled law in this Court and used it to support the construction that S.162 likewise does not extend to accused's statements. |
| Radha Nath Karmakar v. Emperor | Authority on proper form of charging multiple murders (the Court referred to the law that separate heads of charge are the proper way rather than a single constructive multiple murder charge under S.149). | The Court relied on this authority to criticise the "constructive multiple murder" form of charge used and to conclude that convictions under S.302 read with S.149 could not safely be upheld for all appellants without reexamination; the Court indicated that three separate heads of charge were the proper approach. |
| King-Emperor v. Mating Tha Din; Rakha v. Crown; Emperor v. Vithu Balu Kharat | These cases (as cited) were referenced in relation to the construction that third-party statements to the police are governed by S.162 and the Evidence Act — i.e., the limitation that if such statements are recorded in writing they cannot be used except in limited ways (notably, the defence may apply under S.145 if the maker is called). | Rankin, J. cited these as authorities adopting the Court's view on the limited admissibility/use of third-party statements recorded by police under S.162 and the Evidence Act; he relied on them in explaining how S.162 operates with respect to third-party statements. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed the contested issues in a structured legal analysis focusing on the construction and effect of section 162 CrPC in relation to the Evidence Act and the trial judge's summing up.
1. Construction of section 162 CrPC as it relates to accused's statements
- The Court observed there was substantial doubt and conflicting authority but found that various High Courts (Patna, Lahore and Rangoon) had held that statements by an accused are not within S.162 (citing King-Emperor v. Maung Tha Din, Rannun v. Crown, Jagwa Dhanuk v. King-Emperor).
- Rankin, J. adopted that view for this Court, saying "these decisions are right and should be followed in this Court."
- The Court reasoned that the context and contents of S.162 point away from including accused persons: (a) the phrase "any person" is to be read quivis ex populo and is not reasonably read to extend to accused given existing special law for accused statements; (b) applying S.162 to accused would conflict with the special rules in the Evidence Act (e.g., section 27) — invoking the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant; (c) S.162 appears designed to prevent the prosecution using certain witness statements made to police under the Evidence Act provisions, not to abridge an accused's crucial right to show an immediate explanation when challenged.
2. Treatment of first information reports (FIR) and statements to police
- The Court held that a first information report is not a "statement" within the contemplation of S.162 because (a) it is not made in the course of an investigation, and (b) section 154 requires it to be signed whereas S.162 forbids signing of statements in certain circumstances. FIRs do not "prove themselves" and must be tendered under the Evidence Act (e.g., S.157 corroboration; possibly S.32(1) or S.8 in proper cases).
- Third-party statements made to police "in the course of their investigation" are restricted by S.162: if not recorded in writing they cannot be used at all; if recorded in writing they cannot be used except in limited circumstances (notably the defence may use a recorded statement to contradict the maker under S.145 if the maker is called by the prosecution).
- The Court emphasised two overriding considerations when construing S.162: it does not affect statements as to cause of death under S.32(1) Evidence Act, and it concerns "statements" not conduct (section 8) or res gestae.
3. Statements by accused under the Evidence Act
- Statements of accused are admissions under the Evidence Act (ss.17,18) and prima facie evidence against the maker. Confessions have separate protection (ss.24–26 Evidence Act) and confessions made to police or while in custody are inadmissible except in limited circumstances. The Court concluded S.162 does not disturb those positions under the Evidence Act.
4. Application to the objections against the summing up
- On the two objections grounded in S.162 (use of Ex.6 — a later information by Azimuddy, and the judge's reference to police evidence that no trace of a house was found at the place pointed out by Basir), the Court held these objections were not sustainable under the construction adopted: both were statements by an accused, neither was a confession or part of a confession, and one was an information under S.154.
- However, a third objection was sustained: the judge had put in evidence (or allowed to be put) a complaint by Mokim of an occurrence 11 days earlier (Exh.4) and evidence that Monu had been driven off a plot. Although the Court did not decide the relevance of those pieces of evidence in abstract, it held it was necessary, if they were admitted, that the judge should have carefully directed the jury that those pieces of evidence could not be taken to mean the accused had committed the offence charged simply because of prior conduct. Instead, the judge's direction suggested the opposite — that these prior circumstances showed Basir Haji's party "were capable of taking the aggressive" — thereby giving the jury a direction likely to be taken as permitting propensity inference.
5. Consequences for convictions and charges
- The Court analysed the effect of the misdirection on the convictions under section 149 (common object) and section 302. It found that because the common object alleged was to prevent Kimu erecting a but on his land (or to interfere with possession), a misdirection affecting which party was the aggressor vitally undermined convictions under S.149.
- The Court criticised the charging method as a "charge of constructive multiple murder," observing that the proper approach would have been three separate heads of charge (citing Radha Nath Karmakar v. Emperor). Given that the three murders were part of the same series but separable, the Court considered it unsafe to uphold convictions under S.302 read with S.149 against all appellants without re-evaluating the facts — something it refused to do on the paper-book.
- The Court therefore addressed the lesser-included and alternative findings: for the three accused found guilty under S.302 by itself, the Court found it would be unsafe to sustain murder convictions in light of the doubt about aggressor and possibility of private defence; accordingly it convicted them under S.304(1) (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) and reduced sentence.
- As to Basir Haji and Rahimuddy (the younger son, ~18), who had convictions under S.324, the Court found difficulty in ordering a re-trial at that late stage (third trial) because of likely injustice and fading memory; it set aside their convictions and declined to order a re-trial.
Holding and Implications
Holding (core rulings):
- The Court held that section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not apply to statements made by an accused person on trial and adopted the view of several High Court decisions to that effect; it treated first information reports as not being statements within S.162.
- The Court found that one aspect of the trial judge's summing up was a material misdirection: the judge's treatment of a prior complaint (Exh.4) and evidence about Monu led the jury to infer propensity (that Basir Haji's party were likely aggressors) without a careful limiting direction; this misdirection was material to convictions under S.149.
- Consequential disposals:
- The three appellants who had been convicted under S.302 by itself were held to be guilty only under S.304(1) (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) on the facts as considered by the Court, and their sentence of transportation for life was reduced: the Court imposed sentences of ten years' rigorous imprisonment under S.304(1) on those three appellants.
- The convictions of Basir Haji and Rahimuddy (convicted under S.324) were set aside, and the Court declined to order a re-trial in their cases.
- Other convictions (where applicable) were set aside as outlined by the Court's reasoning.
Implications:
- The opinion resolves, for this Court, the constructional question that S.162 CrPC does not extend to statements made by the accused, and it expressly follows the High Court authorities cited to that effect. Thus the Court provided authoritative guidance on the relationship between S.162 CrPC and the Evidence Act with respect to accused statements and with respect to third-party police statements and first information reports.
- Practically, the decision emphasises careful judicial directions when prior complaints or collateral similar-acts evidence are admitted: the jury must be explicitly cautioned that such evidence cannot be used to infer guilt for the charged offence simply because the accused had been involved in prior hostile acts.
- The Court declined to re-try factual issues on the paper-book in relation to the central question of which party was the aggressor and instead adjusted convictions and sentences where appropriate; it also signalled reluctance to order further retrials where doing so would likely be unjust (third trial, fading memories).
This summary is strictly limited to the statements, reasoning and outcomes contained in the provided opinion of Rankin, J. No information has been added beyond the text of that opinion.
Rankin, J.:— In this case there are five appellants. They have been convicted by the learned Sessions Judge of the Assam Valley Districts sitting with a Jury of seven. There had been a previous trial, and the case was sent back by this Court to be retried. The Jury on this occasion were unanimous.
They have found all the appellants guilty under S. 302 read with S. 149 of the Indian Penal Code. Three of them have also been found guilty under S. 302 by itself, while the other two have been found guilty under S. 324.
The fifth appellant, Basir Haji, is the father of appellants (1), (3) and (4), Azimuddy, Johiruddy and Rahimuddy. The second appellant Sayed Ali is a friend and neighbour.
The occurrence took place between 8 and 9 a.m on the 7th March 1925. According to the prosecution it took place at the south-east corner of the patta land of one Kimu where it abuts upon some khas land of which Basir and Sayed Ali were wanting to get settlement from Government. According to the defence it took place to begin with on the east of Kimu's land and upon the adjacent plot of khas land marked “N” upon the plan. The prosecution story is that Kimu was erecting a but at the south-east corner, of his own land when the accused with others came armed with spears and lathis to prevent this, and that, when he called certain people who were in the field, an altercation commenced, and the accused proceeded to attack Kimu's party. Three people were killed undoubtedly and others injured.
The case for the defence is that the accused were proceeding to erect a but on the khas land, and that the complainant's party attacked them.
The individual acts of each accused are not really in doubt. The first appellant killed a man called Alimuddi with a spear. The second appellant killed Kalimuddin, and the third killed Mokim in the like manner. The fourth appellant, a lad of about 18 years, struck Yaruddiu with a spear in the buttock. Basir who was armed with a ram dao struck Mukdum and cut his arm. The injuries of Yaruddin and Mukdum amounted only to simple hurt.
Three passages in the summing up are objected to by the learned vakil for the appellants, and as the first two of these raise questions under S. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code, I will deal with them first.
The occurrence having taken place about 9 a.m, the first information was given at the thana some five miles away, at 12-30 P.M by Abdul Basir P.W 1. At 2-30 P.M, on the same day, the first appellant, Azimuddy, laid an information at another thana accusing the complainant's party.
The learned Judge admitted this latter document in evidence. It is Ex. 6. It contains a statement that Basir Haji was beaten, but that there was no injury. At the trial it was part of the defence case that Basir had considerable injuries wholly unexplained by the prosecution evidence. The learned Judge on this point and on others put Azimuddy's information to the Jury. It is said that this is contrary to section 162 of the Code.
The other passage to which the objection is taken explains itself. “On the other hand, against the theory that the posts were in the first place erected by the accused on the land to the east, we have Sub-Inspector Prodip Roy Deka's evidence that he found no trace of the erection of a house at the place pointed out to him by the accused, Basir Haji, and Sub-Inspector Uday Chand Sarma also says he found no trace of a house having been erected there, though he reached the place at 3 P.M the next day.” This too is said to be contrary to section 162 of the Code.
The learned vakil who appears for the prosecution contends that section 162 of the Code, as it now stands, has no application to the statements of the accused persons who are on their trial. As regards the first of the two objections, other points may arise, viz., whether a first information report is within S. 162 at all, and whether, if so, this particular information laid at 2-30 P.M was made to a police officer “in the course of an investigation” begun presumably at 12-30 on receipt of the prior information.
Now the effect of section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as amended in 1923, has been the subject of much doubt, and this is creating difficulty in the conduct of trials. There are unreported cases in this Court in which S. 162 has apparently been assumed to apply to statements made by the accused. I find, however, that in the High Courts of Patna, Lahore and Rangoon it has been held that statements by an accused are not within the section: King-Emperor v. Maung Tha Din, Rannun v. Crown, Jagwa Dhanuk v. King-Emperor. The first of these cases was decided by a Full Bench and the judgments, including the dissenting judgment of Heald, J., deal very fully with the arguments pro and con.
In my opinion these decisions are right and should be followed in this Court. In this Court it is settled law (Queen-Empress v. Jadub Das that, in spite of the generality of the language of section 161 of the Code, that section does not apply to an accused. Both the context of section 162 and its contents point in the same direction. “Any person” means quivis ex populo. It is unreasonable, in view of the special law applicable to the statements of accused persons to the police, to refuse to apply the well-established rule “generalia specialibus non derogant.” A contrary view involves an implied but complete repeal of section 27 of the Evidence Act. A clear and intelligible purpose can be collected from the section, without involving any such consequences, viz., to prevent the statements of witnesses made before the police from being used by the prosecution under ss. 145, 155 and 157 of the Evidence Act which sections are not confined to criminal cases. Lastly, while it is clear that S. 162, though amended in the interests of accused persons does abridge certain rights of an accused in the matter of evidence, it would seem to require express and compelling language to deprive an accused of what is so often the mainstay of a good defence, the right to show that the moment he was challenged he gave the explanation on which he still relies. It is difficult to believe in this as an amendment designed in the interest of accused persons while on the contrary view, it is comparatively easy to see that the rights, of accused persons have been no further abridged than may well have been thought necessary for the purpose above-mentioned. As this question has been thrashed out in the cases to which I have referred, I prefer to put any further observations in the form of a statement of the law as I understand it.
The first information report against the accused is clearly not a statement within the contemplation of section 162, because it is not made in the course of an investigation. Again section 154 requires it to be signed whereas statements within section 162 are forbidden to be signed even when recorded in writing. It is usually put in by the prosecution which in any ordinary case has a duty to put it in. But, however important first informations may be, they do not prove themselves, and have to be tendered under one or other of the provisions of the Evidence Act. The usual course is for the prosecution to call the informant; and for the first information to be tendered as corroboration under S. 157; but it could also be tendered in a proper case under S. 32(1), as a declaration as to the cause of the informant's death, or as part of the informant's conduct (of the res gestae) under S. 8. Theoretically, the defence could prove the information to impeach the informant's credit under S. 155, or to contradict him under S. 145.
Statements made by third parties to the police, in the course of their investigation, stand under the Evidence Act as follows: They can be Used as corroboration under S. 157, or in contradiction under S. 145, or to impeach credit under S. 155, provided the person who made the statement is called as a witness. This would apply to the prosecution and to the defence indifferently under the Evidence Act. But S. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code enacts first that, if such a statement is not recorded in writing, it cannot be used in evidence in any circumstances, or for either side or for any purpose. This view of the section has been dissented from in one case at least in Madras, but it is in my opinion right, and it has been adopted by at least three High Courts (King-Emperor v. Mating Tha Din Rakha v. Crown, Emperor v. Vithu Balu Kharat
Secondly, if such a statement has been recorded in writing, then it cannot be used for any purpose but one, and that by the defence. Provided that the person who made it is called as a witness for the prosecution, the defence may apply for a copy of the statement, and if it be proved, may use it under section 145 of the Evidence Act to contradict that witness.
Two over-riding considerations have to be noticed, in connection with section 162(1) that the section, does not affect any statement as to the cause of death under section 32(1) of the Evidence Act; (2) that the section is dealing with “statements” not with conduct, in the sense of section 8, but with mere statements.
It sometimes happens that after the first information has been laid against the accused, a counter-information is laid against the complainant or his party by a member of the accused's party who is not himself an accused. As this comes under section 154 and must be reduced to writing and signed, it cannot, in my opinion come, within section 162. Whether it is admissible at the trial of the accused will depend upon the circumstances, and must be decided, under the Evidence Act. The police cannot, of course, treat statements as informations unless they are really received as such, and come truly and properly within section 154.
Statements made by an accused belong to a class which the Evidence Act calls “admissions” (sections 17, 18), and primâ facie they are evidence against the maker but not in his favour. “Confessions” are a subspecies of “statements”, and a species of admissions. Sections 24, 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act provide that in criminal cases confessions are irrelevant if they are induced by threat or, promise, and are inadmissible as against the accused if made to a police officer, or if made while the accused is in custody (unless made in the presence of a Magistrate). As S. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code is only concerned with statements made to a police officer, I need only observe here that broadly speaking a statement made by an accused to a police officer may be proved against him under the Evidence Act if it is not a confession; and even if it is a part of a confession, it is admissible under S. 27 if a fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of the information. In my opinion S. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not disturb this position.
In the present case, the two objections which I have referred to as made against the summing up of the learned Judge are not sustainable on this construction of S. 162. Both statements are statements by an accused: neither is a confession or part of a confession; and one is an information recorded under S. 154.
There is, however, a third objection to the summing up which is well-founded. It appears that a complaint to a Magistrate was put in evidence to show that the accused's party had been trying to interfere with certain land in the possession of Mokim, and there was other evidence that a similar interference with the rights of others had been attempted by the accused in the case of one Monu Fakir. I will not here consider the course of the case so as to enquire whether either or both pieces of evidence were relevant, or were properly admitted at all. There seems in this case to be some reason for saying that they could not have been rejected. But the learned Judge in dealing with that matter says as follows: “This is the information given by Mokim of an occurrence alleged to have taken place 11 days before this occurrence (Exh. 4 read). If this information and the evidence that Monu was driven out of the plot (L) is true, it would show that Basir Haji's party were capable of taking the aggressive, though they were numerically weaker, having only two baris containing (according to Kimu) 20 or 30 houses, while in Kimu's samaj there were 25 or 30 baris”. Now, it seems to me that it was necessary for the learned Judge, if he let in those two pieces of evidence at all, to explain most Carefully to the Jury that the Jury were not entitled to take it that the accused had committed the offence charged, because they had previously been found to have attempted to commit similar offences. The learned Judge has not only given no such direction, but the direction which he has given must have been taken by the Jury as intended to be the contrary, for he says that these previous circumstances would show that Baser Haji's party were capable of being the aggressors. This makes it necessary for us to consider carefully the question whether certain of the charges upon which the appellants have been convicted can be sustained. All the accused were found guilty under S. 302 read with S. 149. The common object alleged was to prevent Kimu from erecting a but upon his own land, or to interfere with his possession. If, therefore, there has been a misdirection going to the question which of these two parties was really the aggressor, that misdirection seems to affect vitally any conviction under section 149.
There is another objection to the conviction under S. 149. Apparently in this part of the world the Courts think no more of killing three men in one charge than the accused persons are supposed to do of killing three men in one fight, and the form of charge which has been employed in this case can only be described as a charge of constructive multiple murder. It is clear that the proper way would be to have had three separate heads of charge, and the law upon this subject was laid down in the case of Radha Nath Karmakar v. Emperor*. It is, however, plain that the three murders were all part of the same series of transactions, and it is clear that three separate heads of charge could have been employed in the present, case. The decision to which I have just referred was one in which, in similar circumstances, this Court thought it unsafe to proceed upon the basis of sections 149, and it appears to me that unless this is a case where the Court will go through all the facts and make a new finding for itself, it is not a case in which it is possible for the Court to uphold the conviction against all these appellants under S. 302 read with S. 149. I do not think that it is reasonable or right for is to try this case on the paper-book for ourselves as regards that particular point.
Having come to that finding, the next question is as to the consequence of this finding upon the other charges. Three of the accused have been found guilty under S. 302 by itself; but if there be any doubt as to the spot upon which this fight began, it is, at any rate, unsafe to say that those three appellants would not have had some case upon the question of private defence. It is quite clear, on the facts of this case, that they could not justify committing murder in the way they did under any right of private defence, and it is, therefore; certain that they must be convicted under S. 304(1). Their other convictions are set aside. We have considered this matter carefully as regards the sentence, and we are of opinion that it would be unjust to leave the sentence of transportation for life without substantial reduction, and, in our opinion, the proper sentence for us to pass upon those three appellants is the sentence of ten years' rigorous imprisonment under S. 304(1).
That leaves the case of Basir Haji and Rahimuddy who is the youngest of the three sons, apparently in the neighbourhood of 18 years of age. They have been convicted under section 324, and until one settles the question whether there was some right of private defence, it is difficult to say that the infliction of simple hurt may not have been justified. In their cases we are, therefore, faced with the alternatives of sending the case back for re-trial, or setting aside their convictions and refusing to order a re-trial. So far as the youngest son, Rahimuddy, is concerned, as his father and his elder brothers were engaged together upon this land dispute, a reasonable knowledge of human nature leads one to suppose that he had not very much chance of keeping out of it. So far as he is concerned, as he only inflicted a simple hurt, I do not find very much difficulty in setting aside the conviction against him and refusing to allow him to be re-tried. I have, however, much more difficulty in the case of the father, Basir Haji, who is very probably, to put it no higher, the main source of all the trouble. It is, however, I think, important to notice that if this case is tried again at this distance of time, and after two previous trials, it is almost inevitable that the third trial would be somewhat unjust. The witnesses must have forgotten much, and the third trial would be, it seems to me, of a very difficult and doubtful nature. If I could have found any logical way of finding him guilty under S. 324. I confess I should not have been particularly sorry; but it seems to me that there is no logical way of finding him guilty under S. 324 except by doing, what I for one to refuse to do, what it would be difficult to do, and what we should have to do in respect of all the appellants, namely, finding for ourselves on the paper-book who was really the aggressive party and on what exact spot. For these reasons, all the convictions of Basir Haji and Rahimuddy will be set aside, and, in the circumstances, we do not order a re-trial.
Duval, J.:— I agree.
E.H.M
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