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Bhaiganta Bewah v. Himmat Badyakar

Calcutta High Court
May 11, 1916
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Written Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This suit was brought for ejectment. The Plaintiff alleged that she owned the land by succession and that she had let the land to the Defendant by way of a barga (tenancy) on 14 January 1910 for one year (to 14 January 1911), with rent payable in kind (one-half share of the profits). The half share of the jute crop was delivered to the Plaintiff but the half share of other crops was not. After the tenancy had expired, the Defendant remained in possession and the Plaintiff instituted this suit for ejectment (the opinion records the suit's institution as both 4 February 1911 and 25 February 1911 in different passages).

Procedurally: the trial Court (Subordinate Judge / Munsif) originally decreed for the Plaintiff. On first appeal the Plaintiff's suit was dismissed on the ground that the Defendant proved entitlement to the land; the Subordinate Judge had found that the Plaintiff had let the land to the Defendant as a tenancy in 1910, but concluded that since the tenancy had come to an end sec. 116 of the Evidence Act did not apply and the Defendant could set up his own title. The matter was then brought to the Court whose opinion is summarized here on appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a person who has been let into possession as the tenant of land (by permission of the alleged landlord) may, without first surrendering possession, set up an independent title to the land after the tenancy has expired.
  2. Whether section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act (which precludes a tenant, during the continuance of the tenancy, from denying the landlord's title at the beginning of the tenancy) alters or displaces the common-law rule that a tenant in possession by permission is estopped from disputing the lessor's title unless he first gives up possession.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiff) — principal contentions

  • The Plaintiff asserted that she was the owner by succession and had let the land to the Defendant as a tenancy beginning 14 January 1910 for one year.
  • The Plaintiff maintained that the Defendant, having been let into possession, was estopped from disputing her title and could not set up a competing title without first surrendering possession.
  • The Plaintiff relied upon section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act in support of the contention that the tenant could not deny the landlord's title.

Respondent (Defendant) — principal contentions

  • The Defendant asserted a title to the land and the trial on appeal found the Defendant entitled to the land.
  • The Defendant contended that, because the tenancy had expired on 14 January 1911, section 116 of the Evidence Act did not prevent him from disputing the Plaintiff's title after the tenancy ended.
  • The Defendant also contended that section 116 (and related sections) was intended by the Legislature to be exhaustive on estoppel as to tenant/landlord matters and therefore had modified the common law rule.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Doe dem Manton v. Austin (1832) The principle that a tenant shall not contest his landlord's title; if he objects he must go out of possession. Quoted by Sanderson, C.J. as the foundational statement of the estoppel rule used to hold that the Defendant could not set up title without first restoring possession.
Ganges Manufacturing & Co. v. Sourujmull That sections 115 to 117 of the Evidence Act are not exhaustive as to estoppel rules. Relied upon to conclude that section 116 of the Evidence Act did not displace the common-law estoppel rule; used to support the view that other rules of estoppel remain operative.
Doe v. Smythe (1815) Illustration that a tenant in possession who wishes to dispute the title should give up possession first. Referred to by Mookerjee, J. as part of the English authorities showing the long-standing rule that tenants must surrender possession before contesting title.
Doe v. Pegge Affirmation of the rule that neither tenant nor those claiming through him can controvert the landlord's title without surrendering possession. Cited to show historical English rulings affirming the estoppel principle.
Alchorne v. Gomme Re-affirmation of the estoppel doctrine. Listed as one of the decisions repeatedly re-affirming the rule that a tenant cannot dispute landlord's title while in possession.
Doe v. Austin and Tadman v. Herman Re-affirmation of the tenant estoppel principle. Grouped with the English authorities relied upon to describe the settled rule.
Bayley v. Bradley Discussion on whether the estoppel continues after the term; contains judicial debate and qualification that tenant must restore possession before disputing title. Used to explain nuances of temporal extent of estoppel and the qualification requiring restoration of possession prior to dispute.
Accidental Death Insurance Co. v. Mackenzie Distinguishes situation where tenant had possession before taking the lease (exception to the rule). Noted as indicating a different position when possession preceded the lease; used to identify a recognized exception.
Mohesh Chandra Biswas v. Guru Prosad Bose Express formulation in India that a tenant let into possession is estopped from denying landlord's title without first surrendering possession. Referred to as one of the Indian authorities expressly formulating the doctrine which the Court found still applicable.
Vasudeb Daji v. Babaji Ranu Another Indian decision formulating the same doctrine. Referred to as supporting Indian precedent for the estoppel rule.
Banee Madhab v. Thakoor Das Implicit recognition of the doctrine in Indian decisions. Listed among cases in which the doctrine was impliedly recognized.
Gouree Das v. Jugurnath Implicit recognition of the doctrine. Listed as one of the cases implying the doctrine in India.
Burn & Co. v. Rushomoyee Implicit recognition of the doctrine. Listed among the Indian authorities supporting the rule.
Jainarain v. Kadambini Implicit recognition of the doctrine. Included as part of the Indian authority line cited by the Court.
Muthumaiyan v. Sinna Samavaiyan Opinion by Sir Subramanya Ayyar, C.J., that the Indian Evidence Act did not alter the common-law estoppel rule. Relied upon to support the proposition that the Evidence Act did not change the established estoppel principle.
Ram Chandra v. Gulam Zilani Another supporting decision (cited briefly). Referred to as additional authority consistent with the estoppel rule.
Rup Chand v. Sarbeswar Chandra Used alongside Ganges Manufacturing to show secs. 116 and 117 are not exhaustive. Invoked to confirm that statutory sections do not exhaust the rules of estoppel.
Ammu v. Ramakrishna Sastri Affirms the principle that a tenant is not estopped from showing that the lessor's title had determined. Distinguished by the Court as inapplicable because the present case did not involve a showing that the lessor's title had determined.
Subbaraya v. Krishnappa Similar to Ammu; affirms that a tenant may show the lessor's title had determined. Distinguished for the same reason—different factual defence (title determined) than that raised here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis follows two complementary lines of reasoning set out by Sanderson, C.J. and Mookerjee, J.

Sanderson, C.J. — core reasoning:

  1. The Subordinate Judge had found that the Plaintiff had indeed let the land to the Defendant as a tenancy beginning 14 January 1910.
  2. Given that the Defendant came into possession by permission of the Plaintiff under that tenancy, the Defendant could not, while retaining possession which he obtained by permission, set up his own title against the Plaintiff without first restoring possession.
  3. The principle preventing a tenant from contesting the landlord's title without surrendering possession is long-established in English law (citing Doe dem Manton v. Austin (1832)): “a tenant shall not contest his landlord's title; on the contrary, it is his duty to defend it. If he objects to such title, let him go out of possession.”
  4. It was argued that section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act altered this rule; Sanderson, C.J. rejected that contention, relying on the authority that sections 115–117 are not exhaustive and so the common-law estoppel rule survives in proper cases (citing Ganges Manufacturing & Co. v. Sourujmull).
  5. The Court emphasized the substantive importance of possession in disputes where strict title proof is difficult and concluded the Plaintiff was entitled to possession and the small damages awarded by the Munsif (Rs. 5), plus costs.

Mookerjee, J. — complementary and historical analysis:

  1. Reviewed English authorities showing a long-established rule that a tenant who has been let into possession by a landlord cannot dispute the landlord's title without first surrendering possession (examples include Doe v. Smythe, Doe v. Pegge, and a line of cases referred to collectively).
  2. Discussed doctrinal nuances from Bayley v. Bradley and noted the qualification that if a tenant had possession before taking a lease a different position might arise (citing Accidental Death Insurance Co. v. Mackenzie).
  3. Surveyed Indian decisions which either expressly formulated or impliedly recognized the doctrine (e.g., Mohesh Chandra Biswas v. Guru Prosad Bose; Vasudeb Daji v. Babaji Ranu; Muthumaiyan v. Sinna Samavaiyan), and cited judicial authority that the Evidence Act did not alter this rule.
  4. Considered the Respondent's submission that section 116 represented an intentional legislative departure. Mookerjee, J. concluded that section 116, by its terms, applies during the continuance of the tenancy and does not carry an implication that after expiration the tenant is free to dispute the landlord's title while remaining in possession.
  5. Relied on the proposition, reinforced by Ganges Manufacturing and Rup Chand, that the statutory provisions are not exhaustive and do not displace other rules of estoppel; distinguished cases (Ammu and Subbaraya) that were inapplicable because they concerned proof that the lessor's title had determined.
  6. Therefore concluded the Defendant's defence (that the Plaintiff had no title at the time of lease) was not available while the Defendant retained possession obtained by permission.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; PLAINTIFF RESTORED TO POSSESSION

Holding (core ruling): The appeal was allowed. The Court held that the Plaintiff is entitled to possession of the land and to damages awarded by the Munsif (recorded as Rs. 5). The Plaintiff is also entitled to her costs in all Courts.

Implications (direct consequences and doctrinal effect as stated in the opinion):

  • Direct effect on the parties: the Plaintiff is restored to possession, receives the damages awarded by the trial Court, and is awarded costs in all Courts.
  • Doctrinal affirmation: the Court affirmed the long-standing common-law principle that a person let into possession as tenant by permission of the landlord is estopped from disputing the landlord's title without first surrendering possession. The Court held that section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act does not, by its terms or by necessary implication, displace that rule; sections 115–117 are not exhaustive of estoppel rules.
  • Limitation and exceptions acknowledged by the Court: the Court noted established exceptions (for example, where the tenant had possession before the lease) and distinguished authorities dealing with a lessor's title having determined; those circumstances were treated as factually different from the present case.

Note: This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

Sanderson, C.J:— In this case the suit was brought for ejectment.

In the first Court the Plaintiff was successful and obtained a decree.

In the first Appellate Court, however, the Plaintiff's suit was dismissed, and was dismissed on the ground that the Defendant had succeeded in proving that he was entitled to the land. The learned Subordinate Judge further found, on my reading of his judgment, on the second issue which was “whether the land was settled with the Defendant by the Plaintiff in barga,” that the Plaintiff had settled the land with the Defendant as alleged by the Plaintiff, but that inasmuch as the tenancy had come to an end, sec. 116 did not apply, and therefore the Defendant was entitled to set up his own title against that of the Plaintiff.

It appears that the Plaintiff alleged that the land was hers and she had obtained it by succession and settled it with Defendant on the 14th of January 1910, for a year's tenancy, which would of course come to an end on the 14th of January 1911. The rent was payable in kind, being half share of the profits of the land. The half share of the jute cultivated on the land was delivered to the Plaintiff, but the half share of the other crop was not so delivered: and, on the 25th of February 1911, after the tenancy had expired, this suit was instituted.

Now, in my judgment the Plaintiff, was entitled to obtain a decree for possession of the land, because the learned Subordinate Judge had found in favour of the Plaintiff in respect of the tenancy of 1910; and, in view of that finding. In my judgment, the Defendant was not entitled to set up his title against that of the Plaintiff without in the first instance going out of possession and restoring possession which the Plaintiff had delivered to him by means of the tenancy of 1910. This principle was laid down so long ago as 1832 by Chief Justice Tindal in the case of Doe dem Manton v. Austin(1) in these words, “The principle is that a tenant shall not contest his landlord's title; on the contrary, it is his duty to defend it. If he objects to such title, let him go out of possession.”

Now, this was the law of India before the Evidence Act was passed. It is contended, however, that by reason of sec. 116 of the Evidence Act, this principle of law to which I have referred does not apply. Sec. 116 says, “No tenant of immoveable property or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immoveable property; and no person who came upon any immoveable property by the license of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such license was given.” It is argued on behalf of the Respondent in this case that section is exhaustive with regard to the point with which it deals and that the intention of the Legislature was to alter the law to which I have just referred. In my judgment, that is clearly not so. It has been decided by this Court in Ganges Manufacturing & Co. v. Sourujmull(2) that secs. 115 to 117 of the Evidence Act are not exhaustive and the judgment of the late Chief Justice Sir Richard Garth, to which I wish to draw attention is at p. 678. There he is reported to have said, “It has been further contended by the Appellants, that secs. 115 to 117 contained in Chap. VIII of the Evidence Act lay down the only rules of estoppel which are now intended to be in force in British India; that those rules are treated by the Act as rules of evidence; and that by sec. 2 of the Act, all rules of evidence are repealed, except those which the Act contains. But if this argument were well-founded, the consequences would indeed be serious. The Courts here would then be debarred from entertaining any questions in the nature of estoppel which did not come within the scope of secs. 115 to 117, however important those questions might be to the due administration of the law.” I desire to point out that the principle of law which was laid down by Chief Justice Tindal to which I have referred is a matter of great importance.

It is not a matter of mere question of form whether the person who has been a tenant should be the Plaintiff or the Defendant, in a suit to establish the title of one or the other; it is a matter of substance, and in order to show that, one may take as an example a case, which is by no means unfrequent, where two parties are claiming title to certain land, and both parties have considerable difficulty, in producing strict proof of their title to the land: in such a case as that, possession is of great importance because the party who is in possession of the land has great advantage in such a suit; for, unless the party, who is out of possession, can satisfy the Court and discharge the burden which lies upon him to prove that he has got good title to the land, the person who is in possession, remains in possession of the land.

Therefore in my judgment it is a matter of great importance that the principle of law to which I have referred should be affirmed.

In the Court of first instance and also in the first Appellate Court another question was enquired into and a decision was arrived at upon it, namely, whether the Plaintiff was in reality the owner of the land, or whether the Defendant was in reality the owner of the land. In my judgment, that question was quite immaterial, as soon as it had been decided by the learned Judge that the Defendant had been let into possession of the land under a tenancy granted by the Plaintiff. This case must be decided as if that other question, which in my opinion was immaterial, had not been decided at all.

For these grounds I am of opinion that the appeal from the learned Judge's judgment ought to be allowed, and the result is that the Plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the land, and she is also entitled to such damages as the Munsif awarded her—(that I understand to be Rs. 5) for the Defendant wrongfully retaining possession.

The Plaintiff is entitled to her costs in all the Courts.

Mookerjee, J.:— The facts material for the determination of the question of law raised before us are not in controversy. On the 14th January 1910, the Plaintiff let out the land in suit to the Defendant for a term of one year and placed him in possession. The tenancy expired on the 14th January 1911; but the Defendant refused to deliver up possession to the Plaintiff; the result was the institution of this suit for ejectment on the 4th February 1911. The Defendant resisted the claim on the allegation that the Plaintiff had no exclusive title to the property at the date of the lease in his favour; his case was that the Plaintiff had inherited the property not from her mother, as she alleged, but from her husband who was the brother of the Defendant; consequently, upon the death of her husband, the property would, under the Mahomedan Law, descend, not to her alone but to her along with the Defendant and other possible heirs. The Court of first instance made a decree in favour of the Plaintiff. Upon appeal, that decree was reversed. On appeal to this Court, the decree of the Court of Appeal below has been affirmed by Mr. Justice Mullick, who has overruled the contention of the Plaintiff that the Defendant was bound by the doctrine of estoppel and could not challenge the title of the Plaintiff. Reliance was placed by the Plaintiff on sec. 116 of the Indian Evidence Act which provides that “No tenant of immoveable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immoveable property.” To this, the Defendant answered that as the tenancy here had terminated, the rule of estoppel was no longer applicable. This contention found favour with Mr. Justice Mullick and the result was that the suit was dismissed.

It has not been disputed before us that according to the law of England a person who has been let into possession as tenant by the Plaintiff is estopped from denying his lessor's title without first surrendering possession. Reference may be made to Doe v. Smythe(3) decided in 1815 where the tenant in possession paid rent to the lessor and then disclaimed. Bayley, J., observed that “the tenant should have given up the possession to Knight (the lessor), and then the Defendant, if she has title, might have maintained her ejectment.” Mr. Justice Dampier added: “It has been ruled often that neither the tenant, nor any one claiming by him can controvert the landlord's title: He cannot put another person in possession, but must deliver up the premises to his own landlord. This, I believe, has been the rule for the last 25 years and I remember was so laid down by Buller, J., upon the Western Circuit.” [Doe v. Pegge(4)]. This exposition of the law has been repeatedly re-affirmed. [Alchorne v. Gomme(5), Doe v. Austin and Tadman v. Herman(6)]. There is an instructive discussion on this subject in Bayley v. Bradley(7), to which reference may usefully be made. In the course of the argument in that case, Wilde, C.J, observed: “Does the lease operate as an estoppel except during the term?” Serjt. Byles answered “A tenant is at all times estopped from disputing the title of his landlord” and referred to a long line of cases, including Doe v. Smythe. At a later stage of the argument, Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams repeated the question, “whether the estoppel does not end with the term.” Serjt. Byles answered “the estoppel is limited in point of extent; but there is no authority for saying that it is limited in point of time.” Wilde, C.J, then intervened with the following observation: “In Co. Litt. 47b, it is said that ‘if a man take a lease for years of his own land by deed indented, the estoppel doth not continue after the term ended; for, by the making of the lease, the estoppel doth grow, and consequently, by the end of the lease the estoppel determines.’ The only qualification I am aware of that has been engrafted upon that rule, is, that if the tenant came into possession under the lessor, he must restore the possession before he disputes the title.” The position is different, as Erle, C.J, pointed out in Accidental Death Insurance Co. v. Mackenzie(8), when the tenant had possession before he took the lease.

Enjoyment by permission is the foundation of the rule that a tenant shall not be permitted to dispute the title of his landlord. Two conditions, then, are essential to the existence of the estoppel, first, possession, secondly, permission; when these conditions are present, the estoppel arises, and the estoppel prevails so long as such possession continues. That this was unquestionably, the law in this country before the Indian Evidence Act was passed, is clear from a long line of decisions. The doctrine was expressly formulated in Mohesh Chandra Biswas v. Guru Prosad Bose(9) and Vasudeb Daji v. Babaji Ranu(10) and was impliedly recognised in Banee Madhab v. Thakoor Das(11), Gouree Das v. Jugurnath(12), Burn & Co. v. Rushomoyee(13) and Jainarain v. Kadambini(14). We have further the weighty opinion of Sir Subramanya Ayyar, C.J, expressed in the case of Muthumaiyan v. Sinna Samavaiyan(15) that the law has not in this respect been altered by the Indian Evidence Act, and that now, as before, a tenant who had been let into possession was estopped from denying the landlord's title without first surrendering possession (see also Ram Chandra v. Gulam Zilani(16). The Respondent, however, has contended that this view is erroneous and that the law as embodied in sec. 116 of the Indian Evidence Act is an intentional departure from the English law on the subject. In my opinion, there is no foundation for the contention that the Legislature in 1872 intended to revive and introduce into this country the archaic rule prevalent in England in the days of Lord Coke. Sec. 116 does not, by its very terms, affect the present case. That section merely provides that, during the continuance of the tenancy, a tenant of an immoveable property or persons claiming through such tenant, cannot be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant, at the beginning of such tenancy, had no title to the immoveable property. This does not imply that after the expiration of the tenancy the tenant is free to dispute the title of the landlord. There is no conceivable reason why we should read into the Section such an implication; if the Legislature had intended to lay down the rule indicated by the Respondent, the Section might easily have been differently framed. Besides, as laid down in Ganges Manufacturing & Co. v. Sourujmull and Rup Chand v. Sarbeswar Chandra(17), secs. 117 and 116 of the Indian Evidence Act are not exhaustive, and there may be rules of estoppel applicable other than what is contained in those sections. Reference was finally made to the decisions in Ammu v. Ramakrishna Sastri(18) and Subbaraya v. Krishnappa(19) which are clearly distinguishable, as they merely affirm the principle that a tenant is not estopped, either before or after the expiration of the term, from showing that the title of his lessor had determined. In the case before us, the defence is, not that the title of the lessor had determined, but that the lessor had no title at the time the lease was granted. This defence was clearly not available to the Defendant so long as he retained the possession which he had obtained by permission of the Plaintiff.

I agree on these grounds that this appeal must be allowed and a decree made in the terms proposed by the Chief Justice.

N.G
Appeal allowed.