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Ledu Coachman v. Hiralal Bose
Judgment Summary: Mookerjee and Richardson, JJ.
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff sued the defendant (the Nazir of the Court of the District Judge of Barisal) for recovery of money paid under an alleged contract. The plaintiff's case, as pleaded, was that he agreed to pay the defendant Rs.150 if the defendant provided his son with the post of permanent peon within two years; if the appointment was not obtained the defendant was to return the money. The plaintiff says he paid sums aggregating Rs.100 and that the two-year period elapsed without the appointment being secured. The defendant denied the allegations and pleaded that the suit was not maintainable because it was based on an illegal and void contract. The court below dismissed the suit as not maintainable on the face of the plaint without investigating the facts. The present Rule invites the Court to set aside that decree of dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the agreement (payment to procure a public office or appointment) is void as opposed to public policy within the meaning of section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.
- Whether, given the alleged illegality, the plaintiff can recover the money paid under the agreement.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiff alleged there was a valid contract: payment on condition of securing a permanent peon appointment within two years, and that he made payments totaling Rs.100 under that contract.
- The plaintiff sought recovery of the sums paid because, he alleges, the condition (appointment) was not fulfilled.
Defendant's Arguments
- The defendant denied the plaintiff's factual allegations.
- The defendant maintained the suit was not maintainable because the contract was illegal and void, being opposed to public policy.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| D. Blackford v. Preston | One of the authorities affirming that sale of recommendation or influence for public office is illegal and void. | Listed among authorities supporting the general rule that trafficking in public office is against public policy. |
| Hartwell v. Hartwell | Authority illustrating the doctrine that contracts to influence appointments are illegal. | Relied on as part of the body of precedent condemning sale of influence in appointments. |
| Thomson v. Thomson | Illustration of the rule against trafficking in public office. | Included among high authority cases establishing the prohibition. |
| John Card v. William Hope | Authority supporting the illegality of recommendations or influence for appointments. | Referenced to show long-established principle against such contracts. |
| Hopkins v. Prescott | Case cited as part of the authorities condemning sale of recommendation or influence. | Used to corroborate the general rule against contracting over public appointments. |
| The Queen v. Charretie | Another high authority affirming illegality of sale/influence in public office matters. | Placed alongside other leading cases to establish principle of public policy. |
| Parson v. Thompson | Authority on the illegality of selling or procuring public office by payment. | Used to support the court's view that such agreements are void. |
| Richardson v. Mellish | Authority cited in the collection of cases condemning trafficking in offices. | Relied on as part of the established common law position. |
| Gardner v. Grant | Ancient authority referenced for the proposition that recommendations for office sold for money are void. | Included among the authorities supporting the public policy rule. |
| Providence Town Co. v. Norris (U.S. Supreme Court) | Statement that public offices are trusts for the public good and agreements for compensation to procure appointments are inconsistent with public policy and void. | Quoted at length to demonstrate the reasoning that such agreements introduce improper elements and the law refuses recognition of them. |
| Gray v. Hooke | Referenced by the Providence Town Co. opinion as supporting the view that agreements to procure offices are immoral and against public policy. | Cited indirectly via the Providence Town Co. decision to bolster the point about general tendency of such agreements to corrupt. |
| Mcguire v. Corwine | Condemnation of contracts of this class as "an unmixed evil" and contrary to public welfare. | Quoted to emphasize the broader condemnation of trafficking in offices and its threat to public welfare. |
| Marshall v. B. & O.R.R Company | One of the U.S. decisions cited as to similar principles. | Mentioned to show consistent condemnation in U.S. jurisprudence of contracts affecting public appointments or administration. |
| Coppell v. Hall | Another U.S. decision addressing analogous agreements. | Referred to as part of the body of authorities refusing to uphold such contracts. |
| Trist v. Child | Decision cited among authorities condemning trafficking in offices. | Used as supportive authority in the collection of cases. |
| Pichakutty v. Narayarnappa | Held that a contract to obtain a more favourable revenue assessment was not vitiated where there was no understanding to use corrupt/illegal means; treated as making a presentation to authorities and contingent remuneration. | Distinguished by the Court: the present case involved sale/appointment to public office and was therefore incompatible with the Pichakutty fact-pattern; the Court did not accept Pichakutty as controlling here. |
| Tappenden v. Randall | Authority for refusing to allow recovery where there is moral turpitude in the contract. | Quoted for the proposition that where moral turpitude exists the Court will not permit recovery of money advanced under the contract. |
| Collins v. Blantern | Establishes that parties to an unlawful contract who have paid money under it cannot recover that money with the Court's assistance. | Applied to show the plaintiff cannot recover money paid as part of an unlawful scheme (here, a bribe) because both parties are participes criminis. |
| Howson v. Hancock | Illustrates that where money has been actually paid under an illegal contract between participes criminis, an action to recover will not be maintained. | Used to emphasize the long-standing rule barring recovery by one who has paid money under an illegal agreement. |
| Taylor v. Chester | Case illustrating the rule where the consideration was immoral. | Referenced to support the point that immoral consideration prevents recovery. |
| Kearley v. Thomson | Example where defendants were bribed and recovery was barred. | Used to show application of the principle to bribery contexts. |
| Harse v. Pearl L.A Co. | Another supportive authority cited in relation to the principle barring recovery under immoral/illegal agreements. | Mentioned as further illustration of the rule. |
| Bai Vijli v. Nansa Nagar | Applied in this jurisdiction where money paid to secure a divorce and remarriage was not recoverable. | Referenced as a local application of the principle against recovery in morally tainted contracts. |
| Bakshi Das v. Nadu Das | Case concerning marriage-brokage contracts noted to be on a special footing. | Mentioned to explain that marriage brokage cases are sui generis and not analogous to the present case. |
| Gulab Chand v. Ful Bai | Another marriage-brokage related authority. | Noted as standing on a special footing and not analogous to the facts before the Court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court approached the question by identifying and applying the public policy principle contained in section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. The analysis proceeded in the following steps, as set out in the opinion:
- Legal principle: The Court observed the well-settled rule that contracts whose object is to influence appointments to public offices, or to restrict the discretion of public officers in appointments, are illegal and void because they tend to deprive the appointing officer of the duty to select the best candidate. Such contracts are contrary to public policy and tend to official corruption.
- Supporting authorities: The Court collected and relied on a series of English and American authorities that consistently condemn the sale of recommendation, nomination or influence in procuring public office. It quoted from United States decisions (notably Providence Town Co. v. Norris) that describe offices as trusts for the public good and hold agreements for compensation to procure appointments void as inconsistent with sound morals and public policy. The Court also quoted Mcguire v. Corwine to underline the pernicious effect of such frauds on public welfare and free government.
- Distinguishing contrary authority: The Court considered Pichakutty v. Narayarnappa, where recovery was allowed in a case concerning obtaining favourable revenue assessment because there was no evidence that corrupt or illegal means were contemplated and the defendant had merely agreed to present a claim before revenue authorities. The present case was held distinguishable because it concerned securing a public appointment — the Court was not persuaded that Pichakutty rested on sound principles for the facts here.
- Application to the facts pleaded: The Court found that, on the face of the plaint, the substance of the plaintiff's case was that he offered what amounted to a bribe to the defendant to secure an appointment for his son and made part payments accepted by the defendant. The agreement therefore had an unlawful consideration and was opposed to public policy under section 23.
- Consequences of illegality: The Court applied the well-known principle that when a contract is illegal and tainted by moral turpitude or public policy, the courts will not assist either party (both being in pari delicto). It reviewed exceptions where money paid under an illegal agreement might sometimes be recoverable (for example where nothing else was done in performance), but held these exceptions do not apply where the agreement is actually criminal or immoral or void ab initio. The instant agreement was void on its face and therefore the plaintiff could not recover.
- Section 65: The Court rejected an argument founded upon section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, observing that that section deals with obligations of persons who have received advantages under agreements which are discovered to be void or become void later. The Court stressed the present agreement was void ab initio (on its face) and not merely discovered or rendered void by subsequent events, so section 65 did not aid the plaintiff.
- Final procedural directions: On the procedural side, the Court affirmed the decree of the Small Cause Court Judge and discharged the Rule with costs. It also directed that a copy of the judgment be sent to the District Judge with instructions to inquire into the plaintiff's allegations against the Nazir and to report back the results of that investigation as early as practicable.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court affirmed the decree of the Small Cause Court Judge dismissing the suit and discharged the Rule with costs (hearing fee assessed at one gold mohur).
Implications:
- The Court held that the contract alleged by the plaintiff — payment in consideration of securing a public appointment — was void as opposed to public policy under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act and therefore the plaintiff could not recover sums paid under that agreement.
- Because the agreement was void on its face and involved conduct amounting to bribery or trafficking in office, both parties were considered in pari delicto and the law would not extend its aid to either party in respect of the illegal bargain.
- Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act was held inapplicable because the agreement was void ab initio rather than subsequently discovered or rendered void.
- Procedurally, beyond affirming dismissal and awarding costs, the Court directed an inquiry by the District Judge into the plaintiff's allegations against the Nazir and requested a report of the investigation to be furnished to this Court.
This summary is confined to the statements and conclusions set out in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond the text.
Mookerjee and Richardson, JJ.:— We are invited in this Rule to set aside a decree of dismissal in a suit for recovery of money on the basis of a contract. The defendant is the Nazir of the Court of the District Judge of Barisal. The case for the plaintiff' is that there was a contract between him and the defendant that if the latter provided his son with the post of a permanent peon within two years, the plaintiff would give the defendant Rs. 150, and that if the defendant failed to secure the appointment, he would return the money paid by the plaintiff. The plaintiff asserts that in accordance with the terms of the contract, he has from time to time paid the defendant several sums aggregating Rs. 100 and that the defendant has failed to provide his son with the appointment, though the two years have elapsed. The plaintiff consequently sues to recover the money. The defendant denied the truth of the allegations of the plaintiff and also pleaded that the suit was not maintainable as it was based on an illegal and void contract. The Court below has not investigated the facts, but has dismissed the suit as not maintainable on the face of the allegations contained in the plaint. The question for determination is, whether the agreement was void, as its object was opposed to public policy within the meaning of section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.
It is well settled that contracts which have, for their object, the influencing of appointments to public offices and the restricting of the discretion vested in public officers in the selection of persons to be appointed, are illegal and void. The principle is that an officer, who has the power of appointment, should make the best, appointment possible, and it is contrary to public policy that such officer be deprived of this discretionary power by a contract previously made or an obligation previously assumed; in other words, public policy forbids that a public office be made the subject, of contracts, for the contrary view would inevitably tend to official corruption. Illustrations of this doctrine will be found in cases of high authority [D. Blackford v. Preston, Hartwell v. Hartwell, Thomson v. Thomson, John Card v. William Hope, Hopkins v. Prescott, The Queen v. Charretie(6), Parson v. Thompson(7), Richardson v. Mellish(8), Gardner v. Grant(9)] which all affirm the rule that the sale of a recommendation, nomination or influence in procuring a public office is illegal and void. The question has frequently come up for judicial consideration in the Courts of the United States, which have emphatically condemned contracts of this nature. Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Providence Town Co. v. Norris(10), observed as follows: “These offices are trusts, held solely for the public good and should be conferred from considerations of the ability, integrity, fidelity and fitness for the position of the appointee. No other considerations can properly be regarded by the appointing power. Whatever introduces other elements to control this power, must necessarily lower the character of the appointments, to the great detriment of the public. Agreements for compensation for procuring these appointments tend directly and necessarily to introduce such elements. The law, therefore, from this tendency alone adjudges these agreements inconsistent with sound morals and public policy: Gray v. Hooke(11). Other agreements of an analogous character might be mentioned, which the Courts, for the same or similar reasons, refuse to uphold. It is unnecessary to state them particularly; it is sufficient to observe generally, that all agreements for pecuniary considerations to control the business operations of the Government, or the regular administration of justice, or the appointments to public offices, or the ordinary course of legislation, are void as against public policy, without reference to the question whether improper means are contemplated or used in. Their execution. The law looks to the general tendency of such agreements; and it closes the door to temptation, by refusing them recognition in any of the Courts of the country.” Equally explicit is the condemnation of such contracts by Mr. Justice Swayne in Mcguire v. Corwine: “frauds of the class to which the one here disclosed belongs are an unmixed evil. Whether forbidden by a statute or condemned by public policy, the result is the same. No legal right can spring from such a source. They are the sappers and miners of the public welfare and of free government as well. The latter depends for its vitality upon the virtue and good faith of those for whom it exists and of those by whom it is administered; corruption is always the forerunner of despotism.” To the same effect are the decisions in Marshall v. B. & O.R.R Company, Coppell v. Hall and Trist v. Child. But it is needless to multiply authorities on the subject of trafficking in offices, which will be found collected in Greenhood on Public Policy, pp. 338-349. Our attention, however, has been drawn to the decision in Pichakutty v. Narayarnappa. There the defendant had agreed, in consideration of a sum of money received by him, to obtain a more favourable assessment upon certain villages in respect of waste and cultivable lands, and in case of failure to repay the amount received. In a suit to recover the amount paid to the defendant, Scotland, C.J and Frere, J., held that the contract was not vitiated by illegality. The reason assigned in support of this view was that there was nothing to show an understanding between the parties that the defendant was to have recourse to corrupt or illegal means of any kind or that he would use personal influence which he professed to possess with any public servant. The case was thus treated as one where the defendant undertook the task of preparing and presenting before the Revenue authorities the case of the tenants and made his claim to remuneration contingent upon his success. The case is consequently distinguishable, though we are by no means convinced that the decision is based on sound principles. We affirm without hesitation the rule that any contract to appoint one to a public office or involving the sale of a public office or securing an office for the promisor or recommending him for such office is opposed to public policy and is consequently void. It is plain, therefore, that the contract, which is the foundation of this suit, is based on an unlawful consideration, is opposed to public policy and is void. It follows that, under such circumstances, when the illegality of the contract has been made to appear, the law will not extend its aid to either of the parties who will be left to abide the consequences of their own act. We are not unmindful that there are exceptions to the general rule that money paid or personal property transferred in accordance with the terms of an illegal contract cannot be recovered, notwithstanding the other party refuses to perform his part of the agreement. It is plain that although where money has been paid under an unlawful agreement, but nothing else done in performance of it, the money may be recovered back, yet this exception will not be allowed if the agreement is actually criminal or immoral; where the contract is illegal because contrary to positive law or against public policy, an action cannot be maintained to enforce it directly or to recover the value of services rendered under it or money paid on it. Lord Alvanley, C.J, observed in Tappenden v. Randall that where there is moral turpitude in the contract, the Court will not allow the party, who has advanced money on such a contract, to recover it back. In the case before us, the substance of the matter is that the plaintiff, if his allegation is true, offered a bribe to the defendant to secure an appointment for his son, and made part payments which were accepted by the latter. The parties are clearly in pari delicto and the Court will not assist either of them. In Collins v. Blantern where money had been paid for the purpose of stifling a prosecution for perjury, Wilmot, C.J said: “Whoever is a party to an unlawful contract, if he hath once paid the money stipulated to be paid in pursuance thereof, he shall not have the help of the Court to fetch it back again.” To the same effect is the observation of Kenyon, C.J in Howson v. Hancock where money deposited upon an illegal wager had been paid over to the winner by the consent of the loser: “there is no case to be found where, when money has been actually paid by one of two parties to the other upon an illegal contract, both being participes criminis, an action has been maintained to recover it back again.”. The same principle is illustrated, in Taylor v. Chester where the consideration was immoral and, in Kearley v. Thomson where the defendants were in substance bribed not to appear at the public examination of a bankrupt [see also Harse v. Pearl L.A Co., ]. The principle has been applied in this country in a case where the money had been paid to a married woman to enable her to obtain a divorce and marry the plaintiff: Bai Vijli v. Nansa Nagar. The cases mentioned at the Bar related to marriage brokage contracts, which, as is clear from the decision in Bakshi Das v. Nadu Das and Gulab Chand v. Ful Bai, stand on a special footing of their own and have no analogy to the case before us. The principle that the Court will not assist a party who has entered into a contract tainted by moral turpitude, should be strictly applied in the circumstances of the case now before the Court. If the Court were to assist the plaintiff to recover his money, bribery and corruption would be encouraged; every person in the position of the plaintiff will be tempted to say, let me offer a bribe to get an appointment for my son, for I can do so with impunity and without risk or loss; if he secures the appointment, the end is achieved, if he does not, I can such recover back my money. No Court of Justice will tolerate such a position.
We may add that, in the course of argument, reliance was to some extent placed on section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, but that section is of no real assistance to the plaintiff, as it relates to the obligation of a person who has received an advantage under an agreement which is discovered to be void or under a contract which becomes void. The case before us is, however, not that of an agreement “discovered” to be or “becoming” void. The agreement is void on the face of it, and it was void ab initio, while the words of the section can only be aptly applied in such cases as that of an agreement which is subsequently found to be void on account of some latent defect or of circumstances unknown at the date, of the agreement or of an agreement which is afterwards made void by circumstances which supervene.
The result is that the decree of the Small Cause Court Judge is affirmed and this rule discharged with costs. We assess the hearing fee at one gold mohur.
We direct that a copy of our judgment be forwarded to the District Judge with instruction to make a thorough inquiry into the allegations made by the plaintiff against the defendant who is the Nazir of the District Court. The District Judge will report to this Court, as early as practicable, the result of his investigation.
G.S
Rule discharged.
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