- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Madras Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Shalimar Works Ltd.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Jenkins, C.J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
On 4 June 1910 Shalimar Works Ltd. instituted a suit in rem against the vessel Clan Macintosh claiming an amount alleged to be due for what the plaint described and had been treated as maritime necessaries. The vessel was arrested on the same day. The Clan Macintosh remained under arrest until she was released on 31 January 1912; the suit in rem had been dismissed two days earlier. On 4 June 1912 the present action was instituted in the ordinary original side of the Court by the (plaintiff) company, claiming damages for wrongful arrest.
In its plaint the plaintiff alleged that it was the owner of the ship and that the defendant company instituted the suit in rem "falsely alleging therein that a sum of Rs. 89,187-12-0 was due" for maritime supplies and "maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause procured a warrant of arrest" which led to the vessel's arrest and detention from 4 June 1910 until its release. The plaint also alleged that the suit in rem was dismissed for want of jurisdiction and that the warrant of arrest was issued without jurisdiction, void and of no effect in law; the plaintiff claimed damages of Rs. 5,85,630-6-0.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in the absence of proof of malice or its legal equivalent, a plaintiff may maintain an ordinary action in trespass for the arrest of a ship which had been made in the course of Admiralty (suit in rem) proceedings.
- Whether the arrest order, made in the suit in rem which was later dismissed for want of jurisdiction, was coram non judice (i.e., a nullity) and therefore not "under legal process".
- Whether the plaintiff's cause of action (if based on wrongful seizure) is governed by Article 29 of the Limitation Act (and so time-barred), or by some other article such as Article 36 or Article 49.
- Whether the High Court had Admiralty jurisdiction over claims for necessaries supplied to a ship in the circumstances of this case, particularly in view of the owner's alleged domicile outside the jurisdiction (Burma), and the effect of the requirement that such foreign domicile be shown "to the satisfaction of the Court".
- Whether possession or detention by the Marshal (an officer of the Court) can be treated as detention by the defendant company for purposes of claiming damages.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's (Shalimar Works Ltd.) Contentions
- The plaintiff alleged ownership of the ship and that the defendant instituted the suit in rem falsely alleging a debt of Rs. 89,187-12-0 for maritime supplies, and maliciously procured an arrest warrant without reasonable or probable cause.
- On that basis, the plaintiff pleaded that the warrant of arrest was issued without jurisdiction and was void and inoperative, which led to wrongful arrest and detention from 4 June 1910 until release, causing damages of Rs. 5,85,630-6-0.
- The plaintiff argued (or contended) that because the suit in rem was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, the order for arrest was coram non judice and therefore not an exercise of legal process.
- It was also advanced (by or for the plaintiff) that Article 36 might apply to this alleged trespass to goods (though the Court considered this point and rejected applying Article 36 in preference to Article 29).
Defendant's Contentions
- The defendant contended that the owner (plaintiff company) was domiciled in Burma, and that if the owner's domicile at the institution of the suit was in Burma this would take the suit out of the jurisdiction of the Court under the statutory provisions governing Admiralty jurisdiction.
- The defendant also pointed to the procedural position that the domicile exception must be shown to the satisfaction of the Court at the relevant time (i.e., before judgment) and that it had not been so shown when the arrest was ordered.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Redway v. McAndrew (1873) 9 QB 74 | Cited as an illustration of an action for malicious abuse of process and for reference to a declaration (and demurrer) in such cases; an example of pleading practice where the declaration was demurred to. | The Court used it to show that the present plaint was in form one for malicious abuse of process; and to highlight pleading requirements (O.7 R.1(e)) about stating facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose. |
| The Walter v. D. Walter (1893) P.202 | Authority where an action was brought for alleged trespass on a vessel and for wrongful arrest; Sir Francis Jeune held that the claim for trespass could not be maintained. | The Court noted the decision and that the reason for it does not appear; the Court observed that it may have no application here but used it as the only clear reference to a suit for trespass against an arrested vessel. |
| The Evangelismos Yenos v. Aldersley (1858) 12 MPC 352 (and The Strathnaver) | Principle that, even in strong cases where the wrong vessel was seized, absent proof of mala fides or malicious negligence, damages should not be awarded against parties arresting the ship. | The Court invoked this line to support the proposition that arrestment is a judicial act and that damages for wrongful arrest are not given without proof of malice or equivalent fault. |
| Peruvian Guano Co. v. Dreyfus Brothers & Co. (1892) AC 166 | Considered whether wrongful possession by defendant continued after appointment of a Receiver so as to give a claim for damages; held detention by company ceased once Court's receiver was appointed and possession became that of the Court. | The Court relied on Lord Watson's and Lord Macnaghten's reasoning to hold that custody by the Marshal (officer of the Court) could not be regarded as detention by the defendant company, and loss from continued custody was due to the law's delay, not to wrongful acts of the opponent. |
| The Two Ellens; Johnson v. Black (1872) 4 PC 161; The Heinrich Bjorn, Northcote v. Heinrich Bjorn, Owners (1886) 11 AC 270 | Authorities for the proposition that prior to 3 & 4 Vict. c.65 the Court of Admiralty had no jurisdiction in cases of necessaries supplied to a ship. | Used to explain the historical background to Admiralty jurisdiction in relation to necessaries and to frame discussion of whether extended statutory powers applied to the Indian High Court. |
| Murray v. Longford (1842) Fulton 95; Murray & Strachan v. Longford (1843) Fulton 131; The Asia, In re | Authorities reflecting the same general view (as the English cases) that Admiralty jurisdiction in relation to necessaries was restricted before the statutory extensions. | Quoted to show that the same view existed in India and to lead into the Court's discussion about whether later statutes vested expanded jurisdiction in the Indian High Court. |
| Ex parte Michael (reference to Blackburn J.; Cockburn C.J.) | Statement interpreting S.5 of 24 Vict. c.10 that the Court has jurisdiction unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the owner is domiciled in England or Wales — and that such domicile must be alleged and proved to the satisfaction of the Court before judgment. | The Court relied on these judicial observations to conclude that the domicile exception must be shown to the satisfaction of the Court at the relevant stage and observed that in the present case the owner's domicile in Burma had not been so shown when the arrest was ordered. |
| Other English and colonial authorities mentioned (e.g., The Portugal; In re matter of the Ship; Bardot v. The Augusta) | Referenced in the discussion of whether extended Admiralty powers under statutes became vested in Indian High Courts by virtue of Letters Patent. | The Court noted a difference of opinion in authorities on that question and for the purposes of the case assumed (without deciding) that the extended powers did not vest; it therefore turned to the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 as the source of jurisdiction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded through a sequence of legal and factual inquiries, each limited to matters presented in the record:
- Nature of the pleaded cause: The plaint was in form an action for malicious abuse of Court process (malicious prosecution/tort of malicious abuse), but at trial and on appeal the plaintiff abandoned any attempt to prove malice or absence of reasonable and probable cause. The plaintiff's case before the Court was confined to a claim in trespass (trespass to the ship by wrongful arrest).
- Pleading sufficiency: The Judge observed that the plaint was defective in an important particular required by O.7 R.1(e) — it did not specifically allege when the cause of action arose. This omission matters because the date differs depending on whether the claim is for malicious prosecution or for trespass.
- Availability of an ordinary trespass action for arrest of a ship: The Court expressed doubt whether an ordinary action for trespass lies for the arrest of a ship, noting scarce authority for such a suit. The only notable authority found (The Walter v. D. Walter) held that a claim for trespass could not be maintained, though the Court admitted uncertainty about that decision's reasoning and applicability.
- Character of an arrest in Admiralty proceedings: The Court treated arrest of a ship in rem as a judicial act and an ordinary step in Admiralty proceedings. Accordingly, where an arrest constitutes a legal grievance, it is typically regarded as part of Admiralty proceedings (action in rem) rather than an independent tort, unless malice or its equivalent is established entitling compensation.
- Custody and possession after arrest: The Court applied the principle from Peruvian Guano Co. v. Dreyfus that where custody passes to a Court officer (e.g., a Receiver or Marshal), detention by the private party ceases; loss from continued custody is attributable to the law's delay rather than the defendant's wrongful acts. The Court held the Marshal's custody was possession of the Court, not detention by the defendant company.
- Admiralty jurisdiction and domicile point: The Court surveyed the statutory background (Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890; Interpretation Act 1889) and authorities discussing whether expanded English Admiralty powers applied in India. For present purposes the Judge assumed those expanded powers did not vest and relied on the 1890 Act's provisions (S.5 and S.35) to frame jurisdiction. Under S.5 the Court's jurisdiction exists unless it is shown satisfactorily that an owner is domiciled in England or Wales (read, for this case, as British India/Burma by operation of the Interpretation Act). The Court cited Ex parte Michael and held that the domicile exception must be shown to the satisfaction of the Court at the relevant time; such proof was not made when the arrest was ordered here.
- Legality of the arrest order and coram non judice argument: The plaintiff argued the arrest was coram non judice because the suit in rem was later dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Court rejected that contention: at the time the arrest warrant was issued the Court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the domicile exception had not been established, so the arrest order could not be treated as coram non judice or as a nullity.
- Limitation and choice of article: The Court considered that if the seizure was unlawful the plaintiff's action would be governed by Article 29 of the Limitation Act (a specific article covering seizure under legal process). The Court rejected applying the broader Article 36 (or Article 49) because Article 29 was specific and appropriate; accordingly, if a trespass action were maintainable it would be subject to Article 29 and would be time-barred in the circumstances of this case.
- Conclusion from the foregoing: Because the plaint was, in form and substance, based on malice or its equivalent (even if the plaintiff tried to confine the case to trespass), and because no proof of malice or its equivalent was offered, the plaintiff's case failed. Moreover, even if a trespass action lay, it would be governed by Article 29 and barred. Finally, custody by the Marshal/Court meant the defendant company had not continued wrongful detention after the Marshal's custody began.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
Appeal dismissed.
The Court dismissed the appeal (the action for damages) with costs.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the plaintiff's suit for damages for wrongful arrest as pleaded failed and was dismissed; the plaintiff receives no relief on the claim referred to in this opinion.
- The Court found no proof of malice or its legal equivalent, held that detention by the Marshal was custody of the Court (not detention by the defendant), and held that, even if a trespass action were maintainable, Article 29 of the Limitation Act would bar the claim in the circumstances presented.
- The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal precedent beyond applying existing authorities and statutory provisions to the facts; the decision rests on established principles cited in the opinion (including the treatment of court custody and the requirement to show domicile to oust Admiralty jurisdiction), and no broader new rule of law is articulated as having been laid down in this judgment.
Judgment delivered by Jenkins, C.J.; Stephen, J. concurred.
Jenkins, C.J:— On 4th June 1910, a company called the Shalimar Works Ltd. instituted a suit in rem against the vessel, Clan Macintosh, for an amount alleged to be due to them for that which is described in the plaint in this suit, and has throughout been treated, as maritime necessaries. On the same day the vessel was arrested, and she thenceforth remained under arrest until her release on 31st January 1912, the suit in ram having been dismissed two days earlier. On 4th June 1912, the present suit was instituted on the ordinary original aide of this Court claiming damages for the wrongful arrest. In the plaint it is alleged that the plaintiff company is the owner of the ship, that the defendant company instituted the suit in rem
“falsely alleging therein that a sum of Rs. 89,187-12-0 was due to the defendant company for maritimes supplied to the said vessel and maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause procured a warrant of arrest from the said Court”
and that
“therefore in pursuance of the said order the defendant company caused to be sued out of the said Court and in the said action the said warrant of arrest directed to the Marshal of Calcutta and caused the said vessel, her tackle, apparel and furniture to be wrongfully arrested and detained from the said 4th June 1910 until the time hereinafter mentioned.” (para. 2).
2. The plaintiff company then alleges the dismissal of the suit in rem for want of jurisdiction (para. 3) and submits
“that the said warrant of arrest was issued without, jurisdiction …. and was absolutely void and inoperative and of no effect in law and that by reason of wrongful and malicious arrest and detection of the said vessel …. the plaintiff company his been deprived of the use and of the possession of the said vessel from the said 4th June 1910 till the said 81st January 1912 and has suffered damages to the extent of Rs. 5,85,630-6-0.” (para, 4).
3. In form the suit is essentially one for the malicious abuse of the process of the Court: see Bullen and Leake's Precedents, Edn. 3, pp. 353-356, and Redway v. Mo Andrew . 1873 9 QB 74. But no attempt was made at the trial to prove malice, and before us this aspect of the case has been deliberately abandoned from the outset, for no mention or even suggestion has been made of malice, or the absence of reasonable and probable cause, or crassa negligentia or bad faith. The only case made before us was trespass pure and simple; I will therefore limit myself to that. It may be a question whether a plaint, framed as this is, fairly supports a claim based on trespass, more especially as the plaint is defective in an important particular; See the declaration in Redway v. Mo Andrew, to which there was a general demurrer. It is imperative under O. 7, R. 1(e), that the plaint should contain, in addition to other particulars, “the facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose.” There is no specific allegation in the plaint when the cause of action arose; and yet if the plaint is to be treated as permitting an alternative claim on the ground of trespass there would be a different date according as it was treated as a suit for malicious prosecution or a suit for trespass. But a part from that, I am not at present prepared to hold that an ordinary suit for trespass lies for the arrest of a ship. There is no trace of any such suit in the books, and yet the occasion for it must have frequently arisen. The only reference to such a suit that I have been able to find is in The Walter v. D. Walter . 1893 P 202, where an action was brought for an alleged trespass on a vessel and for its wrongful arrest. Sir Francis Jeune in disposing of the case said that the claim for trespass clearly could not be maintained. The reason of this decision however does not appear, and it may be it has no application in the circumstances of this case. The arrestment of the ship is a judicial act of the Court and an ordinary step in an action in rem, so where it constitutes a legal grievance, it is not an independent wrong, but an integral part of an action in rem in which there was malice or its equivalent entitling the aggrieved person to seek compensation either in the Admiralty proceedings or by separate action. In the case of The Evangelismos Yenos v. Aldersley . 1858 12 MPC 352, a ship was arrested and in The Strathnaver4 the result of that case was summed up as follows:
“Their Lordships came to the conclusion though the case was certainly a very strong one, inasmuch as the wrong vessel had been seized, that in the absence of proof of mala fides and malicious negligence they ought not to give damages against the parties arresting the ship.”
4. The principle enunciated in Peruvian Guano Co. v. Dreyfus Brothers & Co. . 1892 AC 166 may fairly be cited in this connexion. One of the questions there considered was whether the wrongful possession of the defendant continued after the appointment of a Receiver so as to give a claim for damages. It was held it did not, and Lord Watson in the course of his judgment said:
“The order of 17th December 1880 for the appointment of a receiver had the immediate effect of making the company bare custodiers for the Court; and the appointment of 23rd February 1881 transferred the actual possession of the cargoes or their proceeds from the company to an officer of Court. In my opinion, detention by the company, whether it had been legal or illegal, ceased at the first of these dates. That circumstance would not affect the quantum of damages due by the company, if it could be shown that the law regards loss arising to the party ultimately successful from the possession of the Court es stake holders as loss directly and naturally resulting from the previous wrongful acts of his adversary. I know of no principle, and of no authority, for that proposition. It appears to me that from the time when the order of 17th December 1880 was made the company and Dreyfus Brothers stood towards each other in the same position in which they would have been placed if the eleven cargoes had never come into the possession of the company and had been thrown into Court by the captains of the carrying vessels. When possession of the subject of controversy is with the Court, competing parties are simply preferring their claims in the ordinary course of law; and any damages which the successful party may suffer from the continuance of litigation are due to the law's delay, and not to any legal wrong perpetrated by his unsuccessful competitor.”
5. Lord Macnaghten too remarked:
“But it appears to me tint the detention of these cargoes by the company came to an end when the order was made for the appointment of a Receiver, from the date of that order possession was taken out of the hands of the company.
Thenceforth the possession was the possession of the Court. I do not think that the possession of the Court can be regarded as detention by the company, nor do I think that any loss or diminution of profit which may be attributable the circumstance that the property in question in the action was placed in the custody of the Court is the direct or natural result of the detention by the company.”
6. Here too it may fairly be said that under the arrest the custody and possession was with the Marshal as an officer of the Court, and cannot be regarded as a detention by the defendant company. The damage, if any, suffered from the continuance of the officer's custody and possession was due not to default of the defendant company, but to the law's delay. The English decisions must be our guide in dealing with maritime matters here, and, therefore, I feel justified in citing them. This Court's general Admiralty jurisdiction rests on Cl. 32 of the Letters Patent of 1865, which continues Cl. 31 of the Letters Patent of 1862; and the effect of these clauses is to vest in the High Court such civil and maritime jurisdiction as might be exercised by the Supreme Court as a Court of Admiralty, or by any Judge of that Court as Commissary of the Vice-Admiralty Court. The Admiralty jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is defined as follows in the Charter of 1774, Cl. 26:
“And it is our further will and pleasure, and to do hereby grant, ordain, establish and appoint, that the said Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal shall be the Court of Admiralty, in and for the said provinces, countries or districts of Bengal, Bihar and Orisa and all other territories and islands adjacent thereunto, and which now are or ought to be dependent there upon; and we do hereby commit and grant to the said Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal full power and authority to take cognizance of, hear, examine, try and determine all causes, civil and maritime, and all pleas of contracts, debts, exchanges policies of assurance, accounts, charter-parties, agreements, loading of ships and all matters and contracts, which in any manner whatsoever relate to freight or money due for ships hired and let out, transport-money, maritime usury or bottomry, or to extortions, trespassess, injuries, complaints, demands and matters, civil and maritime, whatsoever between merchants, owners and proprietors of ships and vessels employed or used within the jurisdiction aforesaid, or between others contracted, done, had or commenced in, upon, or by the sea or public rivers, or ports, creeks, harbours and places overflown within the ebbing and flowing of the sea and high water mark, within, about and throughout the said three provinces, countries or districts of Bengal. Bihar and Orissa and all the said territories or islands adjacent thereunto and dependent thereupon, the cognizance whereof doth belong to the jurisdiction of the Admiralty, as the same is used and exercised in that part of Great Britain called England, together with all and singular their incidents, emergent and dependencies annexed and connexed causes whatsoever, and to proceed summarily therein, with all possible despatch, according to the course of our Admiralty of that part of Great Britain called England, without the strict formalities of law considering only the truth of the fact and the equity of the case.”
7. It was ultimately settled to be the law in England that previous to the passing of 3 and 4 Vict. 65, the Court of Admiralty had no jurisdiction in the case of necessaries supplied to a ship, though perhaps it occasionally purported to exercise the jurisdiction where not prohibited. The Two Ellens, Johnson v. Black . 1872 4 PC 161, The Heinrich Bjorn, Northcote v. Heinrich Bjorn, Owners . 1886 11 AC 270.
8. The same view has obtained in India Murray v. Longford . 1842 Fulton 95, Murray & Strachan v. Longford . 1843 Fulton 131, The Asia, In re10; but there is a difference of opinion as to whether the extended powers under 3 and 4 Vict., c. 65, and 24 Vict., c. 10, became vested in the Indian High Court by virtue of the several Letters Patent: The Portugal; In re matter of the Ship11, The Asia, In re Bardot v. The Augusta12, For the purposes of this case I will assume they did not. If this be the true view, then this Court's jurisdiction in relation to necessaries rests on the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, which vesta in it (among other things) the powers described in S. 5 of 24 Vict., c. 10. That section provides that the High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction over any claim for necessaries supplied to any ship elsewhere than in the port to which the ship Court belongs, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that at the time of the institution of the case any owner or part-owner of the ship is domiciled in England or Wales. Under S. 35 the jurisdiction conferred by the Act may be exercised either by proceedings in rem or by proceedings in personam. By the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, S. 2(3)(a), it is provided that any enactment in an Act of the Imperial Parliament referring to the Admiralty jurisdiction in England, when applied to a Colonial Court of Admiralty in a British possession, shall be read as if the name of that possession were therein substituted for England and Wales. By the Interpretation Act 1889, S. 18(2), it is provided that the expression “British possession” shall mean any part of Her Majesty's dominions exclusive of the United Kingdom, and where parts of such dominions are under both a central and local Legislature, all parts under the central Legislature shall for the purposes of this definition be deemed to be one British possession.
9. British India and Burma thus take the place of England and Wales for the purposes of this case. It is conceded that when the suit in rem against the Clan Macintosh was instituted, the ship was elsewhere than in the port to which the ship belonged. To that extent then the suit was in order. It is, however, contended that the owner was domiciled in Burma, and that the suit was thus beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. But to take away jurisdiction it is not enough that the owner was so domiciled; this domicile had to be shown to the satisfaction of the Court. Blackburn. J., Sealing with S. 5 of 24 Vict., Cap, 10, in Ex parte Michael13 said:—
“That seems clearly enough, to enact that the Admiralty Court shall have jurisdiction when the necessaries are supplied in England, just as if they had been supplied abroad; but then it is added, unless it be shown to the Court that the owner be domiciled in England; but that must be alleged and proved to the satisfaction of the Court before judgment; and it is too late afterwards.”
10. In the same case Cockburn, C.J, thus described the position:
“It is conceded that the County Court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit, and the only ground on which the Court could be called upon to proceed no further is the exception in the section which gives the jurisdiction, that it be shown to the satisfaction of the Court, that is, the Court in which the suit is pending, that the defendant is domiciled in England or Wales.”
11. When the arrest in this case was made it had not been shown to the Court that the owner was domiciled in Burma at the time of the institution of the suit; it was, to use the language of Blackburn, J., neither alleged nor proved, and so that exception which would have made it imperative on the Court to proceed no further had not been established at that stage. No doubt the plaintiff company contends that by paragraph 1, T.W.F Bremner's affidavit, the owner's domicile was shown to the satisfaction of the Court; but the fact is that it was not so shown, and the statement in that paragraph is taken from the agreement and is not an independent allegation of the state of affairs at the institution of the suit and here I may point out that the rule, which prescribes what the affidavit leading to arrest a warrant of should state, does not require any statement of the owners's domicile. Had the present plaintiff company be desired, it could have made such a statement and have procured the release of the ship at any time. It, however, did nothing of the kind, and Counsel for the present plaintiff company has admitted before us, that even in its written statement in that suit it did not specifically allege that its domicile was in Burma. It is true that the suit in ram was dismissed, and the decree contains a recital of the Court's opinion that it had no jurisdiction. Bui on what materials this result was reached does not appear. Assuming for the purpose of the case that a person aggrieved by the arrest of his ship is entitled to compensation even in the absence of proof of malice or its equivalent. It remains to be seen what would be the nature of his suit: it would be for a seizure under legal process. But if the seizure was lawful, no suit would lie; if unlawfnl it would be governed by Article 29, Limitation Act, and that in the circumstances of the case would be a bar to this suit. It has been argued that the seizure was not under legal process, for that as the suit was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, the order for arrest was coram non judice. But the order for arrest was an unusual step in a suit in rem, and at the time when it was made the Court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the exception had not been established. Therefore the order of arrest cannot (in my opinion) be treated as coram non judice or a nullity. It has been further contended that as this was a trespass to goods, Article 36 should be applied; but Article 29 is specific and fits the case, and it is a rule of construction of long application that a general article does not govern where there is a particular article which covers the case. Nor do I think can Article 49 be treated as governing this case rather than Article 29. It was the seizure, if wrongful, that was the cause of action and the plaintiff cannot treat the suit as one for trespass apart from the seizure for the purpose of evading Article 29. The conclusion then to which I come is, that this suit as framed is based on malice or its equivalent: that in the absence of proof of malice or its equivalent the suit, if treated as one for trespass, will not be in the circumstances of this case; and that if such a suit did lie, it would fall under Article 29 and would be barred. I therefore would dismiss this appeal with costs.
Stephen, J.:— I agree.
V.B/R.K
12. Appeal dismissed.
Alert