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Balmer Lawrie And Co. v. Jadunath Banerjee

Calcutta High Court
Apr 6, 1914
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Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns a Rule challenging an order of a Subordinate Judge that refused an application for rateable distribution under Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The opposite party (a decree-holder who had obtained a decree for money against Dasarathi Mukherjee) had, at his instance, the Municipal Corporation of Calcutta place two Government securities (promissory notes) and a sum of money (a cheque for Rs. 523) at the disposal of the lower Court for satisfaction of his decree. While proceedings for rateable distribution between the opposite party and other execution creditors of Dasarathi Mukherjee were pending, the present petitioner (who held a decree for money against D. Mukherjee & Company, a firm of which Dasarathi Mukherjee was a partner) made an application for rateable distribution on 15 January 1914. The Subordinate Judge refused that application on the ground that the assets had already been received by the Court. The petition challenges that refusal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order of the Subordinate Judge refusing rateable distribution under Section 73 is appealable under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. What is the meaning of "assets" in Section 73 — whether assets must be realised (converted into cash or an equivalent form) before they can be treated as "held" by the Court for the purposes of rateable distribution.
  3. Whether the decrees relied on by the rival decree-holders were "passed against the same judgment-debtor" within the meaning of Section 73, particularly where one decree was against an individual (Dasarathi Mukherjee) and the other against a firm (D. Mukherjee & Company) of which he was a partner.
  4. Whether, on the facts, the petitioner's application for rateable distribution was in time (i.e., made before the assets were received/held by the Court).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (represented by Babu Sajani Kanta Sinha)

  • The Rule (challenge) was in order and an order under Section 73 refusing rateable distribution is not appealable under Section 47 because the question arises between different decree-holders rather than between a decree-holder and the judgment-debtor.
  • The case of Sorabji Coovarji v. Kala Raghunath is distinguishable because that case involved a question between the judgment-debtor and executing creditors; the present case is between rival decree-holders and therefore Sorabji is inapplicable.
  • Under the new Code (Section 73), "assets" must be "realised" or otherwise be in a form available for immediate distribution; reliance was placed on Arimuthu Chetty v. Vyapuripandaram (1911) as supporting the view that assets must be realised under the new Code.
  • The Government promissory notes and the cheque are negotiable instruments and their realisation is governed by Order XXI rules 51 and 76; more remained to be done under Order XXI, rule 76, so the Court below had not realised the property and therefore did not "hold" assets within Section 73 before the petitioner's application.
  • Endorsement of the Government promissory notes over to one of the decree-holders was irregular or illegal, and therefore the Court had not properly realised the property for distribution.
  • Dasarathi Mukherjee, as a partner, may be personally liable for partnership debts; the real test (cited Gonesh Das Bagria v. Shiva Lakshman Bhakat) is whether the person whose money is sought is liable under each of the decrees.

Opposite Party's Arguments

  • Assets in Section 73 should be given their ordinary meaning; the "assets" of the judgment-debtor were received by the executing Court on the day the promissory notes and the cheque were sent by the Secretary, Municipal Corporation, to the Court.
  • Because the instruments were placed at the disposal of the lower Court long before the petitioner applied for rateable distribution, the petitioner is out of time.
  • The promissory notes had been endorsed over to the opposite party (Jadunath) on the very day the rule was issued; although the cheque had not been cashed, the opposite party had taken the money and was entitled to it.
  • At any rate, an order for rateable distribution (or an order relevant to distribution) had been passed earlier (mentioned as passed in December), supporting the view that assets had already been dealt with.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sorabji Coovarji v. Kala Raghunath (1908) I.L.R. 36 Bom. 156 Considered on whether an order refusing rateable distribution was appealable under Section 47; involved a case where the judgment-debtor had brought money into Court and the question affected the judgment-debtor. Distinguished. The court held Sorabji involved a question between the judgment-debtor and decree-holders and therefore fell within Section 47; the present case was a dispute between rival decree-holders only and so Sorabji was inapplicable to render the order appealable.
Ramanathan Chettiar v. Subramania Sastrial (1902) I.L.R. 26 Mad. 179 Under the old Code, "realisation" meant conversion into cash or such form as to be available for immediate distribution; used to define when assets are "realised". Referred to for the proposition that under the old Code assets had to be realised (converted to cash or equivalent) before distribution could occur; used to explain prior authority on "realisation".
Hafiz Mahomed v. Damodar Pramanick (1891) I.L.R. 18 Calc. 242 Similar to Ramanathan: held that realisation means conversion into cash or a form available for immediate distribution. Referred to alongside Ramanathan to support the principle that distribution requires realisation under the old Code.
Arimuthu Chetty v. Vyapuripandaram (1911) I.L.R. 35 Mad. 588 Decision of a single Judge of the Madras High Court indicating that under the new Code "assets" must be realised before they can be said to be held by the Court. Relied upon by counsel for the petitioner to support the argument that under the new Code assets must be realised; the court recorded the citation but ultimately decided the case on other grounds (decrees not passed against same judgment-debtor).
Gonesh Das Bagria v. Shiva Lakshman Bhakat (1903) I.L.R. 30 Calc. 583 Applied for the test whether different decrees are effectively against the same person — whether the person whose money is sought under different decrees is liable under each decree. Cited by petitioner to argue that a decree against a firm can be executed against a partner if personally liable; the court found it unnecessary to resolve whether that case was affected by the new Section 73 and decided on the ground that the petitioner's decree was not shown to be executable against the individual Dasarathi Mukherjee.
Jagadish v. Kripa Nath (1908) I.L.R. 36 Calc. 130 For the proposition that an order under Section 73 is an order in execution proceedings but is not a decree unless conditions of Section 47 are met. Applied to support the conclusion that the order of the Subordinate Judge refusing rateable distribution is not appealable under Section 47 because it is not a decree for the purposes of that section.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed two preliminary and related matters: appealability and the substantive entitlement to rateable distribution.

On appealability (Section 47): The court examined whether the Subordinate Judge's order refusing rateable distribution under Section 73 could be treated as a decree appealable under Section 47. It distinguished Sorabji Coovarji v. Kala Raghunath on the basis that Sorabji involved rights and questions arising between the judgment-debtor and decree-holders (and therefore could fall within Section 47), whereas the present dispute was strictly between rival decree-holders and did not affect the judgment-debtor. Relying also on Jagadish v. Kripa Nath, the court held that an order under Section 73 is an order in execution proceedings but is not a decree unless the specific conditions of Section 47 are present. Consequently, the court overruled the preliminary objection and held that the Subordinate Judge's order was not appealable under Section 47.

On the substantive question of entitlement under Section 73: The court analysed the language of Section 73 (noting the insertion of the word "passed" in the new Code) and stressed the statutory condition that the assets must be held by the Court and that more than one person must have, before receipt of such assets, applied for execution of decrees for payment of money passed against the same judgment-debtor and not obtained satisfaction. The court concluded that it is essential for Section 73 to apply that the decrees be against the same judgment-debtor.

Applying that principle to the facts, the court observed that the opposite party's decree was against Dasarathi Mukherjee individually, whereas the petitioner's decree was against the firm D. Mukherjee & Company. The petitioner had not shown that his decree was capable of execution against Dasarathi Mukherjee individually. Therefore, the two decrees could not be deemed to have been passed against the same judgment-debtor. Because of this conclusion, the court did not find it necessary to decide whether earlier authorities concerning "realisation" under the old Code had been affected by the rephrasing in the new Code, nor did it decide whether the petitioner's application had been made before the assets were received by the Court below.

Holding and Implications

Holding: THE RULE IS DISCHARGED. The court held that the Subordinate Judge's order refusing rateable distribution under Section 73 was not appealable under Section 47, and on the merits the petitioner was not entitled to rateable distribution because the decrees relied upon were not shown to have been passed against the same judgment-debtor.

Implications and Consequences: - The petitioner's application for rateable distribution was rejected; the Rule challenging the Subordinate Judge's refusal was discharged. The court ordered costs to be paid to the decree-holder (and not to the judgment-debtor).

The court explicitly refrained from deciding certain subsidiary questions: it did not decide whether earlier decisions on "realisation" under the old Code were affected by the rewording in Section 73 of the 1908 Code, and it deemed it unnecessary to determine whether the petitioner's application had been made before the assets were received by the lower Court.

Show all summary ...

1. How do you say there is an appeal?

2. As the question is between parties to the suit, the order should fall under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, and hence there Section an appeal.

3. "Assets" in the present section has the ordinary meaning attached to the word and therefore the " assets" of the judgment-debtor in the present case were received by the executing Court on the day on which the promissory notes and the cheque for Rs. 523 were sent by the Secretary, Municipal Corpora-lion, to the Court. This was long before the petitioners applied for rateable distribution, and hence they are out of time.

Beachcroft, J.

4. Have the promissory notes been endorsed over to the opposite party, and has the cheque been cashed?

5. [Babu Sajani Kanta Sinha, for the petitioner. No, the cheque has not been cashed, but the Government promissory notes have been endorsed over to the opposite party Jadunath on the very day on which this rule was issued by your Lordships. There appears to have been an undue haste about it.]

6. They are entitled to the money and they have taken it. At any rate the order for rateable distribution was passed in December.

Beachcroft, J.

7. How could that be? How could the Court have distributed the Government promissory notes without, selling them? Suppose the property was immoveable property instead of Government promissory notes.

8. At any rate, the decree was not against the same judgment-debtors. One was against the firm and the other against Dasarathi Mukherjee.

9. Babu Sajani Kanta Sinha, in support of the Rule. The Rule is in order. No appeal lies from an order under Section 73 refusing rateable distribution. It is not an order under Section 47, the question not being between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor bat between different decree-holders against the same judgment-debtor. The case of Sorabji Coovarji v. Kala Raghunath (1908) I. L. R. 36 Bom. 156. is distinguishable. There the question was whether the sale held of the properties of the judgment-debtor, in spite of the payment of the whole of the decretal amount for which the properties had been attached, was valid or not. This was a question undoubtedly between the judgment-debtor and the executing creditor. The case here is entirely different. Hence the ruling is quite inapplicable.

10. "Assets" to be held by a Court must be realised before they are assets within the meaning of Section 73 of the new Code or Section 295 of the old Code. There can be no distribution of the properties of a judgment-debtor amongst creditors before they are " realised;" and " realisation" has been held to mean "converted into cash or such form as to be available for immediate distribution": Ramanathan Chettiar v. Subramania Sastrial (1902) I. L. R. 26 Mad. 179., Hafiz Mahomed v. Damodar Pramanick (1891) I. L. R. 18 Calc. 242.

Mookerjee, J.

11. But the old Section 295 has been considerably changed. In the old Code, the words were, when "assets are realised", whereas in the new Code, they are, "assets are held." Therefore the real question is about the meaning of " assets."

12. No doubt "assets" in the broad sense of the won I would mean property of a person that can-be made liable for Ins debts, but this must be taken with the word held, i.e., held in such a form as can immediately be distributed to the creditors in satisfaction of a decree for money.

Mookerjee, J.

13. Your contention is that it must be converted into cash.

Yes, or some form which is equivalent to cash.

Mookerjee, J.

14. What is that?

Currency notes or some such thing.

Mookerjee, J.

15. Suppose the assets brought into Court are paddy. Is that something available for immediate distribution?

16. No, the decree sought to be executed must be one for money and therefore the satisfaction must be in money. This is the import of the decisions in Ramanatham v. Subramania (1902) I. L. R. 26 Mad. 179. and Hafiz v. Damodar (1891) I. L. R. Calc. 242.

Mookerjee, J.

17. Those are cases under the old Code. Have you got any case decided after the passing of the new Act?

18. Yes: Arimuthu Chetty v. Vyapuripandaram (1911) I. L. R. 35 Mad. 588. It is a decision of a single Judge of the Madras High Court and shows that Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim thought that "assets" under the new Code must be realised before they can be held by a Court. The Government promissory notes and the cheque are negotiable instruments and there are special provisions in the Civil Procedure Code for their realisation: see Order XXI rules 51 and 76. The Government promissory notes and the cheque were brought into Court, but there was something more to be done under Order XXI, rule 76. The endorsement of the Government promissory notes over to one of the decree-holders is illegal, at any rate irregular. Hence the Court below never realised the property brought into Court under attachment. So it did not hold the assets within the meaning of Section 73 before the application for execution and rateable distribution by my client. Therefore, the order complained of is wrong.

19. As for the decrees not being against the same judgment-debtor, Dasarathi Mukherjee is the sole partner of D. Mukherjee & Co., at any rate is a partner who is personally liable for the debts of the Company, therefore the contention, of my learned friend is groundless. The real test is, whether the person, whose money is sought by different creditors under different decrees for money, is liable under each of the decrees: Gonesh Das Bagria v. Shiva Lakshman Bhakat (1903) I. L. R. 30 Calc. 583.

Mookerjee, J.

20. But the word "passed" is an addition in the new Code.

21. No doubt, but it is an addition necessary under the new framing of the section. It does not affect the sense of the old Section 295 with regard to the judgment-debtor. A decree against A, B and C, jointly and severally is a decree passed equally against A, B and C. Therefore, a decree against D. Mukherjee and Co. is a decree passed against Dasarathi Mukherjee as well as against any other member of the firm, if any.

Mookerjee and Beachcroft, JJ.

22. This Rule is directed against an order by which the Subordinate Judge has refused an application for rateable distribution under Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908. The opposite party obtained a decree for money against his judgment-debtor by name Dasarathi Mukherjee, while the petitioner obtained a decree for money against D. Mukherjee & Company, a firm of which Dasarathi Mukherjee was a partner. At the instance of the decree-holder opposite party, the Municipal Corporation of Calcutta, which held two Government securities and a sum of money payable to Dasarathi Mukherjee, placed the properties at the disposal of the lower Court for satisfaction of the decree held by him. During the pendency of a proceeding for rateable distribution as between the opposite party and the other execution creditors of Dasarathi Mukherjee, at whose instance the properties in the custody of the Corporation had been attached through the Calcutta Small Cause Court, the present petitioner, on the 15th January 1914, made an application for rateable distribution. This application has been refused by the Subordinate Judge on the ground that it was made after the receipt of the assets by the Court. The question for consideration is, whether this order has been rightly made.

23. A preliminary objection has been taken to the Rule on the ground that the order of the Subordinate Judge was in essence made under section 47 of the code and was appealable as a decree. In support of this view, reference has been made to the case of Sorabji Coovarji v. Kola Raghunath (1911) I. L. R. 36 Bom. 156. That case, however, is clearly distinguishable. There the decree-holders bad attached the property of their common judgment-debtor. Other execution creditors of the judgment-debtor applied for rateable distribution of the assets which might be realised by sale of the property. The judgment-debtor brought into Court a sum sufficient to satisfy the two decree-holders at whose instance the property had been attached. Thereupon the other decree-holder applied for rateable distribution of the sum so deposited, and the Court, without notice to the judgment-debtor, allowed this application. The result was that there was not a sufficient sum left to the credit of the decree-holders, at whose instance the attachment had been effected, to satisfy their dues, and the Court accordingly directed that the property attached be sold in order that their decrees might be satisfied in full. The judgment-debtor appealed against this order, on the ground that no rateable distribution was permissible under the law in respect of the money brought by him into Court, and that as the sum deposited was sufficient to satisfy the decrees held by the two execution creditors who had taken out processes of attachment, their decrees must be deemed in law to have been satisfied, so that there was no execution proceeding left in which an order for rateable distribution might be made. An objection that the appeal was incompetent as the question raised was not within the scope of Section 47, was overruled on the ground that the question did arise between parties to the decree. It is not necessary for our present purpose to decide whether, in circumstances like these, the question which arose not merely between the rival decree-holders but also between the judgment-debtor on the one hand and the decree-holders on the other, could be deemed to fall within the scope of Section 47. But it is plain that, in the case before us, the question which calls for decision is not within the scope of that section. This is not a question which arises between the patties to the suit in which the decree, under execution was passed; it is on the other hand a question between two rival decree-holders, which does not affect or interest the judgment-debtor. An order made under Section 73 is an order in execution proceedings but is not a decree unless all the conditions enumerated in Section 47 are present: Jagadish v. Kripa Nath (1908) I. L. R. 36 Calc. 130. We must consequently hold that the order of the Subordinate Judge is not appealable and overrule the preliminary objection.

24. As regards the merits, it is plain that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. Section 73 provides that, where assets are held by a Court and more persons than one have, before the receipt of such assets, made application to the Court for the execution of decrees for the payment of money passed against the same judgment-debtor and have not obtained satisfaction thereof, the assets, after deducting the costs of realisation, shall be rateably distributed among all such persons, it is essential for the application of the section that the decrees should have been passed against the same judgment-debtor. This has been made clear beyond possibility of dispute by the introduction of the word "passed" which did not find a place in Section 295 of the Code of 1882. But, as already stated, the decree held by the opposite party, in execution of which the properties have been brought into Court, was passed against Dasarathi Mukherjee, while the decree held by the petitioner was obtained against the firm of which Dasarathi Mukherjee was a partner, and is not shown to be capable of execution against him individually. Consequently, the two decrees cannot be deemed to have been passed against the same judgment-debtor, and it is thus needless to consider whether Gonesh Das v. Shiva Lakshman (1903) I. L. R. 30 Calc. 583. has been affected by Section 73 of the Code of 1908 which reproduces Section 295 of the Code of 1882 in an altered form. In this view, it is also unnecessary to discuss the question, whether the application for rateable distribution by the petitioners was made before the assets had been received by the Court below.

25. The result is that the Rule is discharged with costs to the decree-holder (and not to the judgment-debtor) opposite party.