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Rajnarain Bhadury And Ors. v. Ashutosh Chuckerbutty
Factual and Procedural Background
Kristo Lall Bhadury executed a will in Bengali dated 2 June 1862. He died many years before the decision and was survived by his widow, Bhubunessari Dabee, but left no issue. After his death the widow took possession of his property and remained in possession until her death on 17 January 1898, dying intestate. She left the defendant, Ashutosh Chuckerbutty, as her sole heir. The plaintiffs are grandsons of Roodnarain Bhadury (a collateral relative) and claim to be the reversionary heirs of Kristo Lall Bhadury.
The central dispute before the court was the construction of Kristo Lall Bhadury's will: whether the will gave his widow an absolute, heritable and alienable interest in his immoveable property, or only the limited estate of a Hindu widow (i.e., a life-interest or restricted estate without power of alienation), so that upon her death the plaintiffs, as reversionary heirs, would be entitled to the property.
It was noted that the testator died before the passing of the Hindu Wills Act (which incorporates Section 82 of the Indian Succession Act), and therefore construction of the will was not affected by those enactments.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under the will of Kristo Lall Bhadury, his widow Bhubunessari Dabee took an absolute, heritable and alienable interest in his immoveable property (malikatwa) or merely the ordinary/restricted estate of a Hindu widow.
- Whether extraneous documents executed by the testator for registration purposes (specifically a mukhtearnamah/power-of-attorney reciting that the will was made "for the preservation" of the house) or surrounding circumstances qualify or control the dispositive words of the will.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The plaintiffs contended that, under the will, the widow only took the ordinary (restricted) estate of a Hindu widow in the immoveable property and that on her death the property passed to the reversionary heirs (the plaintiffs).
- Counsel for the plaintiffs relied heavily on prior authorities (including Harilal Pranlal v. Bai Rewa) that, in cases of ambiguity or having regard to Hindu notions of succession, courts have construed similar testamentary language as creating a life or restricted interest rather than an absolute estate.
- The plaintiffs further relied on a mukhtearnamah (power-of-attorney) executed by the testator on 23 June 1862, which contained the recital: "I have made a will in favour of my wife Srimati Bhubunessari Dabee for the preservation of my said house, &c, in Calcutta." They argued that this showed the testator's object was preservation and thus an absolute gift was not intended.
Defendant's Arguments
- The record indicates the defendant asserted that the plaintiffs had released their claim to the immoveable property; this contention was raised by the defendant but the court found that the evidence did not satisfy it.
- The opinion does not contain a fuller, detailed account of affirmative arguments by the defendant on the construction point beyond the issue of the alleged prior release.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court in This Case |
|---|---|---|
| Soorjeemoney Dossee v. Denobundoo Mullick (1857) | Principle that intention governs construction of wills; words of the will are primary but surrounding circumstances and the law of the country may be considered. | The court cited this Privy Council statement to set out the general rule of construction (focus on intention and consideration of surrounding circumstances and local law) but applied it to conclude that clear dispositive words in the will should not be controlled by vague surrounding statements in this case. |
| Mahomed Shumsool Hooder v. Shewukram (1874) | It is proper to consider ordinary Hindu notions about devolution of property; presumption that Hindus generally desire to retain estates in the family and that women generally do not take absolute estates. | The court acknowledged this rule but held that, notwithstanding the general presumption, the dispositive words in the present will were sufficiently clear to confer an absolute estate and therefore the general presumption did not control the clear language used by the testator. |
| Harilal Pranlal v. Bai Rewa (1895) | Example where similar language ("my wife is the owner after me") was held to give only a life-interest; courts lean against construing Hindu wills to give widows unqualified control unless intention is clear. | Plaintiffs relied strongly on this case. The court reviewed it but observed that the intention must be gathered from the whole instrument; it treated Harilal Pranlal as an authority where the will's scheme showed the primary objects were protection of property and maintenance, supporting a restricted interest—facts distinguishable from the present will. |
| Punchoomoney Dossee v. Troylucko Mohiney Dossee (1884) | Use of the term "malik" applied to a widow does not necessarily mean an absolute estate; internal directions (e.g., for adoption) may indicate intention for widow to have a limited estate. | The court cited this to show that the word "malik" alone is not always decisive; in the present matter, however, the court found other language and context supported an absolute estate rather than a limited one. |
| Koonjbehari Dhur v. Premchand Dut (1880) | Internal evidence in a will may show the testator did not intend an absolute estate; proposition that a Hindu wife takes by will no more than she would by a gift during husband's lifetime unless express heritable right is given. | The court noted this decision but emphasized that in Koonjbehari Dhur the court relied on internal evidence of intention; in the present case the court found no internal evidence negating the clear words used by the testator. |
| Bhobo Tarini Debya v. Pyari Lall Sanyal (1897) | Where a will gives immoveable property to widows without express words of inheritance, under Dayabhaga widows take a restricted interest and property may pass to husband's heirs on their death. | The court cited this case as an example where the will showed a restricted interest. It distinguished that case from the present will because here the wording and context led the court to conclude the gift to the widow was absolute. |
| Lalit Mohun Singh Boy v. Chukkun Lal Roy (1897) | Words such as "become malik of all my estates and properties" are ordinarily sufficient to confer a heritable and alienable estate unless the context indicates a different intention. | The court relied upon this authority to support the view that the phrase appointing the wife to "malikatwa" could, in ordinary meaning, create an absolute, heritable and alienable estate; applied this principle to interpret the testator's words as conferring absolute ownership. |
| Lala Ramjewan Lal v. Dal Koer (1897) | Prima facie a gift using the term "maliks" is absolute; courts should not cut down unqualified language on the basis of a general notion that Hindu females should only obtain life-estates unless there is contrary authority. | The court cited this case to reinforce that where dispositions are plainly absolute in language, they should be construed as such, unless other provisions in the will or Hindu law demonstrate a different intention. |
| Kollany Koer v. Luchmee Pershad (1875) | When words plainly indicate an absolute gift to widow and daughter, the gift must be construed as absolute unless Hindu law requires a limited meaning for gifts to females. | The court used this as another authority supporting the proposition that clear testamentary language conferring ownership (malik/maliks) will ordinarily be treated as creating absolute gifts. |
| Ram Narain Sing v. Peary Bhugut (1883) | If a Hindu husband gives immoveable property to his wife with express power of alienation, or where such power is implied by terms of gift, the wife acquires an absolute estate; words of limitation (technical words of inheritance) are not always necessary. | The court cited this to underscore that a power of alienation, express or implied, indicates an intention to create an absolute estate; it supported the conclusion that the testator's language implied equivalent ownership to his own. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded methodically from general principles to the specific language of the will:
- Preliminary legal context: The court observed the testator died before the Hindu Wills Act (and Section 82 of the Indian Succession Act) and therefore the construction of the will is unaffected by those enactments.
- Principle of construction: The court quoted and applied established Privy Council authorities emphasizing that the intention of the testator is the controlling element in will construction, that the words of the will are primary, and that surrounding circumstances and the law of the country may be considered.
- Survey of authorities: The court reviewed multiple English and Indian decisions where courts have construed similar testamentary language. These decisions illustrated two competing lines: (a) authorities suggesting that, as a general rule and in keeping with Hindu notions, women often take only restricted interests unless the language is plain (Mahomed Shumsool Hooder; Harilal Pranlal; Punchoomoney, Koonjbehari, Bhobo Tarini Debya), and (b) authorities holding that unqualified expressions of ownership (such as "malik" or "become owner") are ordinarily sufficient to confer an heritable and alienable estate (Lalit Mohun Singh Boy; Lala Ramjewan Lal; Kollany Koer; Ram Narain Sing).
- Analysis of the dispositive language: The court closely examined the operative clause of the will, which appoints the wife "to the malikatwa (ownership) after my demise as exercised (literally done) by myself" in respect of the family dwelling and listed items. The court asked whether this gift conferred an absolute heritable and alienable estate or merely the limited estate of a Hindu widow.
- Interpretation of the phrase "as exercised by myself": The court found that rather than limiting the gift, these words tended to extend it, indicating the testator's intention to confer the same absolute rights of ownership that he himself enjoyed.
- Absence of contrary indications: The court noted there was no expression of intention elsewhere in the will to control or qualify the dispositive words. Unlike several cases where internal evidence pointed to a restricted gift, here no such internal evidence existed. The testator named no other objects of bounty (e.g., children or nearer heirs) that would suggest a limited or protective purpose alone.
- Consideration of the mukhtearnamah: The court addressed the plaintiffs' reliance on the mukhtearnamah recital that the will was made "for the preservation of my said house." It held that even if admissible to explain or control the will, the phrase "preservation of his house" was too vague to determine whether preservation was intended for the widow and her heirs or for the widow and subsequently the testator's reversionary heirs; thus it did not assist the plaintiffs' argument.
- Weighing precedent and context: Applying the authorities that uphold plain dispositive language, and given the wording of this will and the combined gift of moveable and immoveable property, the court concluded that the testator intended to grant his wife an absolute, heritable and alienable estate.
- Additional factual points: The court observed that the property known as Shampooker House formed part of the testator's estate and expressed that it was unnecessary to decide other issues because of the view formed on construction. The court further found that the evidence did not satisfy the defendant's allegation that the plaintiffs had released their claim.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court declared that upon the true construction of the will of Kristo Lall Bhadury, his widow became absolutely entitled to his immoveable property. The action by the plaintiffs was dismissed with costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The widow (during her lifetime) held an absolute, heritable and alienable estate in the immoveable property under the will, and upon her death the property passed to her heirs (the defendant, as her sole heir), defeating the plaintiffs' claim as reversionary heirs of the testator.
- On precedent: The court applied established authorities distinguishing cases where internal evidence or the scheme of a will pointed to a restricted interest. The decision rests on the application of existing rules of construction rather than announcing a novel legal principle; the opinion does not state that a new precedent is created.
This summary is based exclusively on the contents of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that text.
1. The main question in this case is, whether under the will of Kristo Lall Bhadury, his widow Bhubunessari Dabee took an absolute interest in his immoveable property or merely the ordinary estate of a Hindu widow.
2. Kristo Lall Bhadury died many years ago, leaving an only widow, but no issue surviving. He made a will in Bengali, dated the 2nd of June 1862, of which the translation is as follows. (Beads will: see ante, page 45.)
3. After the testator's death his widow took possession of his property and remained in possession of it until her death on the 17th of January 1898. She died intestate leaving the defendant Ashutosh Chuckerbutty her sole heir. The plaintiffs are grandsons of Roodnarain Bhadury, who was brother of Joynarain Bhadury, the grandfather of the testator Kristo Lall Bhadury, and as such are the reversionary heirs of Kristo Lall Bhadury. They contend that under the will of Kristo Lall Bhadury Bhubunessari Dabee only took the ordinary estate of a Hindu widow in his immoveable property, and that upon her death they became entitled to this property as reversionary heirs.
4. The testator having died prior to the passing of the Hindu Wills Act, which incorporates Section 82 of the Indian Succession Act;, the construction of his will is not affected by these enactments.
5. The rule as to the construction of the will of a Hindu is thus stated by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Soorjeemoney Dossee v. Denobundoo Mullick (1857) 6 Moore's I.A., 526 (550):
"The Hindu law, no less than the English law, points to the intention as the element by which we are to be guided in determining the effect of a testamentary disposition; nor, so far as we are aware, is there any difference between the one law and the other as to the materials from which the intention is to be collected. Primarily the words of the will are to be considered. They convey the expression of the testator's wishes; but the meaning to be attached to them may be affected by surrounding circumstances, and where this is the case those circumstances, no doubt, must be regarded. Amongst the circumstances thus to be regarded, is the law of the country under which the will is made and its disposition is to be carried out. If that law has attached to particular words a particular meaning, or to a particular disposition a particular effect, it must be assumed that the testator, in the dispositions which he has made, had regard to that meaning or to that effect, unless the language of the will or the surrounding circumstances displace that assumption."
6. Again in the case of Mahomed Shumsool Hooder v. Shewukram (1874) 14 B.L.R., 226 (231, 232): L.R., 2 I.A., 7 (14), their Lordships observed:
"In construing the will of a Hindu it is not improper to take into consideration what are known to be the ordinary notions and wishes of Hindus with respect to the devolution of property. It may be assumed that a Hindu generally desires that an estate, especially an ancestral estate, shall be retained in his family, and it may be assumed that a Hindu knows that, as a general rule, at all events, women do not take absolute estates of inheritance which they are enabled to alienate."
7. It is a well settled rule of construction that clear and unambiguous dispositive words are not to be controlled or qualified by any general expression of intention. Here there is Do expression of intention discoverable in the will to control or qualify the dispositive words; consequently the plaintiffs are compelled to rely upon the view affirmed by their Lordships of the Privy Council that in construing a will one of the circumstances to be regarded is "the law of the country in which the will is made, and its dispositions are to be carried out," and that "in construing the will of a Hindu it is not improper to take into consideration what are known to be the ordinary notions and wishes of Hindus with regard to devolution of property." The plaintiff's also relied upon the language used by the testator in a mukhtearnamah executed by him on the 23rd of June 1862 for the purpose of having his will registered as showing that the property was given to his widow for the purpose of its preservation only. In this document the following passage occurs: "Owing to ill-health * * * I have made a will in favour of my wife Srimati Bhubunessari Dabee for the preservation of my said house, etc., in Calcutta." I shall presently refer to this document.
8. Counsel for the plaintiffs has strongly relied upon the case of Harilal Pranlal v. Bai Rewa (1895) I.L.R., 21 Bom., 376. In that case one Pranlal by his will directed that after his death his wife Ujam should take possession of and enjoy his property as owner. Then after making certain provisions for his daughters he again directed his wife to take possession after his death and added: "Just as I am the owner of the property at present in the same way after my death my wife Ujam is the owner." It was held by Farran, C.J., and STEACHEY, J., that the widow took only a life-interest in the property. After referring to the scheme of the will FARRAN, C.J., in delivering judgment, adds: "His (the testator's) main objects appear to be the protection of his property and the maintenance of his wife and children. His wife is to take possession of and enjoy the property, but he adds to this no words of inheritance, nor does he directly give her any power of disposition over it. The Courts have always leaned against such a construction of the will of a Hindu testator as would give to his widow unqualified control over his property. By the use of such expression as 'my wife is the owner after me' or 'my wife is the heir,' it is usually understood that the testator is providing for the succession during the life-time of the widow and not altering the line of inheritance after her death. In the present case the testator is no doubt very emphatic in his declarations that his wife is to be the owner after his death, in one passage stating that just as he is the owner so she is to be the owner. The phrase is however ambiguous. It may mean that he intended emphatically to protect her peaceable possession and management during her life-time against the claims of the husbands of his daughters and their own, or it may be intended to confer as full ownership and power over the property as he had." It is unfortunate that only extracts from the will appear in the report of this case. The intention of a testator is to be gathered from a perusal of the entire instrument and not from passages here and there. From the judgment however it would appear that the main objects of the testator were apparent, and that they were the protection of his property and the maintenance of his wife and children.
9. In Punchoomoney Dossee v. Troylucko Mohiney Dossee (1884) I.L.R., 10 Cal., 342, one Narain Dutt had two wives, one of whom died in his lifetime, leaving a daughter, the plaintiff, and Kristo Kaminey Dossee, the mother of the defendant, who survived him. Narain Dutt made a will, the material portion of which ran as follows: 'Whatever I have of immoveable and moveable property and ready money anywhere my wife Srimati Kristo Kaminey Dossee is the malik or proprietress thereof. She will deal with my debts and dues agreeably to the particulars below; she will pay whatever debts exist and recover and receive whatever dues there are receivable, and I have given commandment (permission) to my wife she will adopt a son; when the adopted son attains his age he will become the malik or proprietor of the whole of my property and will perform the shrad and tarpan of my father and father's father, and in the event of any good or evil befalling the said adopted son, in that case she will again adopt a son." It was held by Sir Richard Garth, C.J., and Cunningham, J., overruling the decision of Wilkinson, J., that the use of the word, malik as applied to the widow did not necessarily mean that she should take an absolute estate, and that the directions in the will for the adoption of a son indicated an intention that the widow was only to take a limited estate.
10. In the earlier case of Koonjbehari Dhur v. Premchand Dut (1880) I.L.R., 5 Cal., 684, there was also internal evidence in the will itself that the testator did not intend to give his wife an absolute estate in his immoveable property. No doubt, however, the learned Judges, Jackson and Tottenham, JJ., did in their judgment lay down the wide proposition that a Hindu wife takes by the will of her husband no more absolute right over the property bequeathed than she would take over such property, if conferred upon her by gift during the life-time of her husband, and whether in respect of a gift or a will it is necessary for the husband to give her in express terms a heritable right or power of alienation. The Court, however, did not rest its judgment upon the rule so stated, but rather upon the finding that there was internal evidence in the will of the testator's intention that the property should not pass to the widow absolutely.
11. In the case of Bhobo Tarini Debya v. Pyari Lall Sanyal (1897) I.L.R., 24 Cal., 646, a clause in a will of a Hindu testator ran thus: "My first and second wives shall together be entitled to twelve annas of all the properties left by me and Doorga Nath Chuckerbutty and Rajoni Nath Chuckerbutty, sons of my father's sister's son Badha Nath Chuckerbutty, deceased, who have been living in commensality from the time of my predecessor, shall be entitled to a four annas share in equal shares according to the following rules." Then followed the rules, but according to the judgment there was nothing in the will either in what followed or in what preceded expressly stating that the widows were to take an absolute estate. It was held by Banerjee and Rampini, JJ., that the will only gave the widows a restricted interest. In the course of their judgment after reading the terms of the gift the learned Judges say: "If this stood alone and Section 82 of the Indian Succession Act was not applicable to the case, then as the bequest (which in this respect follows the same rule as a gift) was one of immoveable property by the husband to his wives, they would take a limited estate under the Dayabhaga. They would take the property without having any power to alienate it; and property over which they have not the power of alienation cannot constitute their stridhana or absolute property (see Dayabhaga, chapter IV, Sections 1, 18, 19 and 23), and must on their death pass to the heirs of their husband--(see Colebrooke's Digest, Book V., 515, Commentary)." The learned Judges in that case found that it amply appeared from the will that only a restricted interest was intended to be created in favour of the widow.
12. There is nothing in the will which is now the subject of consideration, either in what precedes or in what follows the gift to his wife, which throws much, if any, light upon the meaning of the language used by the testator. It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine what is the legal effect of the appointment by a Hindu testator of his wife to the malikatwa (ownership) of his immoveable property. The words are
"I appoint (literally, 'make) my wife Srimati Bhubunessari Dabee to the malikatwa (ownership) after my demise as exercised (literally done) by myself, in respect of the family dwelling house, wearing apparel, utensils, etc., whatever there is, that is in respect of all the properties aforesaid, I of my own free will make (this) will."Did this gift confer upon the testator's widow an absolute estate heritable and alienable in his immoveable property, or merely the limited estate of a Hindu widow?
13. In the case of Mahomed Shumsool Hooder v. Shewukram (1874) 14 B.L.R., 226: L.R., 2 I.A., 7, a Hindu by a petition to the Collector of Patna recited the deaths of his son, of his brother, without leaving issue, of his brother's wife and his own wife and then proceeded to dispose as if by testament of his property as follows: "Only Mussamut Rani Dhun Kowar, widow of Roy Kalika Pershad, my deceased son, above mentioned, who, too, excepting her two daughters born of her womb Mussamut Bibi Sitatoo and Bibi Dulari, has no other heirs, is my heir. Except Mussamut Rani Dhun Kowar aforesaid none other is nor shall be my heir and malik," Later on occur the words: "Furthermore to the said Mussamut Rani too these very two daughters named above together with their children, who after their marriage may be given in blessing to them by God Almighty, are and shall be heir and malik." Sir Robert Collier, in delivering the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council, says that the expressions in which the gift is made to Mussamut Rani Dhun Kowar if they stood alone would in their Lordships' opinion show that the testator intended to make an absolute gift to Rani Dhun Kowar; but that the latter expressions qualified the generality of the former, and that the will taken as a whole must be construed as intimating the intention of the testator that Rani Dhun Kowar should not take an absolute estate, but that she should be succeeded in her estate by her two daughters. The gift in this case, it is to be observed, was made not to the testator's widow but the widow of his son.
14. In Lalit Mohun Singh Boy v. Chukkun Lal Roy (1897) I.L.R., 24 Cal., 834 (849), Lord Davey, in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, states as follows: "The words became malik of all my estates and properties would, unless the contest indicated a different meaning, be sufficient for that purpose (i.e., to confer an heritable and alienable estate) even without the words "enjoy with son, grandson and so on, in succession," which latter words are frequently used in Hindu wills and have acquired the force of technical words conveying a heritable and alienable estate. The gift in this case was not to the testator's widow but to his sister's son.
15. In Lala Ramjewan Lal v. Dal Koer (1897) I.L.R., 24 Cal., 406, in which a testator provided (inter alia), by his will that his daughters and brother's daughters "shall be maliks, and come in possession in equal shares of all the moveable and immoveable properties," Trevelyan and Beverley, JJ., say "prima facie there can be no question, but that a gift where there are no controlling words is an absolute gift and the expression maliks used here would ordinarily imply an absolute gift. But it is contended that we must introduce into this will what is said to be the prevalent Hindu idea, that a female ought not to obtain anything beyond an estate for her lifetime, and therefore, although the word maliks is used, we must cut down the estate to the extent of an estate given to a Hindu daughter. There is no authority for such a proposition. The words are absolute, and if they stood by themselves without anything to the contrary it would be impossible for us to say that they did not give an absolute estate."
16. This decision is in consonance with the earlier decision of Glover and Mitter, JJ., in the case of Kollany Koer v. Luchmee Pershad (1875) 24 W.R., 395, in which the effect of the language used by a Hindu in a petition whereby he directed that after his death his widow and daughter should be "maliks" and his entire estate, real and personal, should devolve upon them was considered. It was held that it was plain that the testator intended to make an absolute gift, and that where it was plain, as far as the words of a will went, that the testator intended to make an absolute gift of his property in favour of his widow and daughter the gift must be construed as absolute, unless it could be shown that by the Hindu law a gift to a female meant a limited gift.
17. Where a Hindu husband gives immoveable property to his wife with express power of alienation, or where the giving of such power is implied the terms of the gift, she will acquire an absolute estate in the property. Words of limitation, such as are ordinarily used to convey an estate of inheritance, are not necessary. The intention of the husband may be expressed in other ways and is a matter of construction. Ram Narain Sing v. Peary Bhugut (1883) I.L.R., 9 Cal., 830.
18. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Lalit Mohun Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy (1897) I.L.R. 24 Cal., 834, above referred to, at p. 849 of the report, state that the words "become owner (malik) of all my estate and properties" would, unless the context indicated a different meaning, be sufficient for the purpose of conferring a heritable and alienable estate.
19. I find nothing in the will before me to qualify or control the language in which the gift to the testator's wife is expressed. The testator appoints his wife "to the malikatwa, as exercised by myself in respect of the family dwelling house." The words as exercised by myself," so far from limiting the gift, seem to me rather to extend it and to indicate an intention on the part of the testator to confer on his wife the same absolute rights of ownership as he himself enjoyed. The intention of the testator was, I think, to give his wife an absolute heritable and alienable estate. If this were not his intention it is remarkable that no reference whatever is made in his will by the testator to any other object of his bounty or of his regard. He was childless and the plaintiffs were but distantly related to him. There was no great object indeed in his making the will if his widow was only to obtain under it the same limited estate, which she would have enjoyed in the event of his dying intestate. It is observable that the gift of the immoveable property is a combined gift. This tends, I think, to show that the testator intended his widow to have the same absolute interest in the realty as under the gift she would take in the moveable property.
20. Upon the whole I see no sufficient reason in this case for attaching a restricted meaning to the expressive words used by the testator in the disposal of his property.
21. I was pressed by Counsel for the plaintiffs with this further consideration. For the purpose of having his will registered the testator executed a power-of-attorney (muktearnamah) on the 23rd of June 1862, in which is the following recital:
"I have made a will in favour of my wife Srimati Bhubunessari Dabee for the preservation of my said house, &c, in Calcutta."
22. It is contended that the object of the testator being expressed in this instrument to be the preservation of his house an absolute gift was not intended to be made by the will. Even if this document is admissible in evidence to explain or control the language of the will there is nothing in the use of the words "preservation of his house," so far as I can see, which helps the plaintiffs' contention. The question, for whom was the house to be preserved, would still remain. Was it to be preserved for the widow and her heirs, or for the widow and after her the reversionary heirs of the testator? It is too vague and general an expression to be relied on one way or the other.
23. Having regard to the view which I have formed as to the true construction of the testator's will, it becomes unnecessary for me to determine the remaining issues raised in the case. It may, however, be well for me to state that, in my opinion, the house and premises, known as Shampooker House in Calcutta, were purchased with the proceeds of the sale of the testator's house No. 41, Kally Prosad Dutt's Lane, and so formed part of his estate. Further that the evidence has not satisfied me that the plaintiffs ever released their claim to the immoveable property of Kristo Lall Bhadury as alleged by the defendant.
24. I shall declare that upon the true construction of the will of Kristo Lall Bhadury, his widow became absolutely entitled to his immoveable property and dismiss the action with costs.
Section 82 of the Indian Succession ActAlert