Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Gopal Chunder Manna And Ors. v. Gosain Das Kalay

Calcutta High Court
Jan 25, 1898
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff obtained, on 21 May 1886, a decree in the first Court for possession of certain immoveable property and for damages against all defendants. All defendants except No. 1 appealed; the Appellate Court on 2 July 1887 reversed that part of the decree making the appellants liable for damages but affirmed the decree in all other respects. A second appeal to the High Court was dismissed on 9 July 1888.

The decree-holder made multiple applications for execution: the first application for execution was filed on 7 July 1891 in the Court of the first Munsif of Howrah but was returned for want of jurisdiction and presented to the proper Court on 21 August 1891. That application sought notice for delivery of possession and attachment/sale of immoveable properties to realize costs and damages. A notice under Section 248 of the Code was issued on 8 September 1891; the application was allowed to be amended on 11 January 1892 but that amendment was reversed by the Appellate Court which directed the Munsif to deal with the application as originally made. The execution case was dismissed by the Munsif on 13 July 1892 for want of prosecution.

A second application for execution made on 15 August 1893 was rejected on 4 April 1894 for incorrectness in the statement of necessary particulars. The present application was made on 19 June 1894. The judgment-debtors contended that execution was barred by limitation; the first Court upheld that objection but the Lower Appellate Court reversed and ordered execution to proceed, leading to the present appeal by the judgment-debtors.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether execution is barred by limitation against all defendants because the application of 7 July 1891 was not an application "according to law" within the meaning of Article 179, Clause 4 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act.
  2. Whether, even if the 7 July 1891 application is treated as one according to law, execution is barred as regards defendant No. 1 because time runs from the date of the first Court's decree (21 May 1886) rather than from the date of the final decree on appeal (9 July 1888), given that defendant No. 1 did not appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The application for execution of 7 July 1891 was defective because many particulars required by Section 235 of the Code were incorrectly stated (omitting correct suit number, date and amount of decree), and therefore it was not "an application made according to law" within Article 179, Clause 4 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act; consequently limitation ran and execution is barred.
  • The appellant relied on authorities (including Asgar Ali v. Troilokya Nath Ghose and Gopal Sah v. Janki Koer) where materially defective applications were held not to be applications according to law.
  • Even if the 7 July 1891 application were valid, as regards defendant No. 1 limitation should run from the date of the decree of the first Court (21 May 1886) because there was no appeal by or against him; authorities such as Hur Proshad v. Enayet Hossein and Raghu Nath v. Abdul Hye were cited in support.
  • The appellants contended generally that applications in aid of execution must be made strictly in accordance with the statutory provisions (citing Section 235 of the Code and cases such as Sujan Singh v. Hira Singh and Dalichand v. Bai Shivkor) and that a mere notice under Section 248 would not save limitation if the application itself were not according to law.

Respondent's Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Asgar Ali v. Troilokya Nath Ghose (1890) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 631 Application materially defective where a required list (section 237) was not attached; therefore not an application according to law. The Court distinguished this authority on the ground that in that case a material requirement (the list) was entirely absent; the present case lacked no such material defect.
Gopal Sah v. Janki Koer (1895) I.L.R. 23 Cal. 217 Application held not according to law when it materially failed to comply with Sections 235–238 (including misstating decree amount). The Court treated it as distinguishable: it illustrates that only material defects will vitiate an application; the present defects were not material.
Bal Kishen v. Bedmati (1892) I.L.R. 20 Cal. 388 Supports the proposition that not every informality in an execution application will vitiate it; substantial compliance suffices. Cited by the Court to support the view that trivial defects should not defeat the saving of limitation where the application is bona fide and substantially complies with the law.
Rama v. Varada (1892) I.L.R. 16 Mad. 142 Support for the same principle that substantial compliance is sufficient. Cited to reinforce the Court's approach that applications must be judged with reference to the circumstances and that not every informality will take an application outside Article 179, Clause 4.
Behari Lal v. Salik Ram (1878) I.L.R. 1 All. 675 An application to take some step in aid of execution (for example to issue a notice under Section 248) can be sufficient to keep a decree alive. Cited as authority that the issuance of a notice under Section 248 pursuant to the 7 July 1891 application was sufficient to keep the decree alive for limitation purposes.
Dhonkal v. Phakkar (1893) I.L.R. 15 All. 84 Similar principle: steps in aid of execution can preserve the decree for limitation purposes. Cited alongside Behari Lal to show that the notice issued under Section 248 pursuant to the application could save limitation.
Hur Proshad v. Enayet Hossein (1878) 2 C.L.R. 471 Cited for the proposition that limitation runs from the date of the decree of the first Court (supporting the appellants). The Court noted this authority but found it to be in conflict with other authorities and did not follow it; the case contributed to the conflict necessitating a Full Bench reference.
Raghu Nath v. Abdul Hye (1886) I.L.R. 14 Cal. 26 Cited in support of the proposition that limitation should run from the first Court's decree where there was no appeal by or against a particular defendant. Not followed by the Court here; it was noted as part of conflicting authorities on the second issue.
Gunga Moyce v. Shib Sunker (1878) 3 C.L.R. 430 Authority supporting the view that, where there has been an appeal, time runs from the date of the final decree of the Appellate Court. The Court expressed a preference for and followed this decision as being more in conformity with the language of the statute; used to hold that time runs from the date of the final order of the Appellate Court.
Mashiat-un-nissa v. Rani (1889) I.L.R. 13 All. 1 Authority in conflict on the point of when limitation runs; noted to have a marked difference of opinion among the judges. The Court distinguished the facts of that case (separate decrees against defendants) and observed that key dicta supporting the appellants were obiter; the Court did not follow that decision for the present facts.
Chowdhry Paroosh Ram Das v. Kali Puddo Banerjee (1889) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 53 Cited by the appellants in support of the argument that the execution application was defective. The opinion records the citation but does not elaborate further on this case; specific application by the Court is not detailed in the provided text.
Sujan Singh v. Hira Singh (1889) I L.R. 12 All. 399 Cited for the proposition that an application in aid of execution must be made according to law to preserve execution proceedings. Listed among authorities relied on by appellants; the Court records the citation but does not provide further detail as to its application in the present decision.
Dalichand v. Bai Shivkor (1890) I.L.R. 15 Bom. 242 Cited by appellants for the need for applications to be in accordance with law. The Court notes the citation; no further specific application of the authority is detailed in the opinion.
Harkant Sen v. Biraj Mohan Roy (1895) I.L.R. 23 Cal. 876 Referenced among cases cited by the appellants concerning limitation. The opinion lists the case in the appellant's references but does not state the precise rule drawn from it in this opinion.
Muthu v. Chellappa (1889) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 479 Listed among cases cited in the context of limitation. The opinion mentions the case but does not detail its rule or use in the Court's reasoning.
Rughu Nath Singh v. Pareshram Mahata (1882) I.L.R. 9 Cal. 635 Listed among cited authorities on limitation. No specific rule or application from this case is set out in the provided opinion.
Mullick Ahmed Zumma v. Mahomed Syed (1880) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 194 Referenced in the appellant's list of authorities on limitation. The opinion records the citation but does not explain how the case was applied or its principle in this decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the two central contentions in sequence.

On the first contention (whether the 7 July 1891 application was "according to law" under Article 179, Clause 4):

  • The Court held that whether an execution application or any step in aid of execution is "according to law" must be decided with reference to the circumstances of each case.
  • The Court adopted a balancing principle: an application must substantially comply with statutory requirements to fall within Clause 4, but not every informality or trivial defect should vitiate an application; only material defects will do so. The Court stated that invalidating applications for trivial defects would frustrate bona fide attempts to preserve rights, a result unlikely intended by the Legislature.
  • Authorities (Bal Kishen v. Bedmati and Rama v. Varada) were relied upon to support the proposition that not all formal defects will destroy the protective effect of an application under Article 179, Clause 4.
  • The Court distinguished the cases relied upon by the appellants (Asgar Ali and Gopal Sah) on the basis that those contained material defects—e.g., absence of a required list or failure to comply with Sections 235–238—whereas in the present case the defects were not material. The present application did include a list of immoveable property (complying with Section 237), and asked for delivery of possession (which could be executed), and the Appellate Court's remand to deal with the application as originally made indicated that the Appellate Court did not consider it to be an application not made according to law.
  • Further, even if informal, the application at least constituted an application "to take some step in aid of execution" (namely issue of a notice under Section 248 because the decree had been passed more than a year previously). The Court cited Behari Lal v. Salik Ram and Dhonkal v. Phakkar for the proposition that such steps can be sufficient to keep the decree alive for limitation purposes.
  • Conclusion on first point: the Court held that the first contention (that the 7 July 1891 application was not according to law and therefore did not save limitation) must fail because the defects were not material and the application and the notice were sufficient to preserve the decree.

On the second contention (whether time as regards defendant No. 1 runs from the first Court's decree or from the final decree on appeal):

  • The Court recognised a conflict in previous decisions. The appellants relied on authorities (Hur Proshad v. Enayet Hossein; Raghu Nath v. Abdul Hye) that supported the proposition that time runs from the first Court's decree where there was no appeal by or against a particular defendant.
  • The Court expressed a preference for the decision in Gunga Moyce v. Shib Sunker, finding it more in conformity with the language of the Limitation Act. The Court noted that Explanation I to Article 179 distinguishes between joint decrees and separate reliefs and that the statutory language (Article 179, Clause 2) indicates that where there has been an appeal the date of the final decree of the Appellate Court should be taken as the time from which limitation runs.
  • Because of the conflict of decisions, the matter was referred to a Full Bench. The Full Bench (opinion delivered by Maclean, C.J., with concurring judges) concluded that the time runs, as to defendant No. 1, from the date of the final order of the Appellate Court (the High Court decree dated 9 July 1888). The Full Bench preferred a plain reading of Article 179, Clause 2 and found convenience and statutory language supported that view; it also distinguished the Allahabad decision (Mashiat-un-nissa) on the basis of differing facts and the fact that some supporting statements in that case were obiter.
  • On the combined analysis, the Full Bench found that the application of 7 July 1891 was not out of time as against defendant No. 1 and that the first contention therefore failed; the appeal was dismissed.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED (the Full Bench concluded that limitation did not bar execution and that time, as regards defendant No. 1, runs from the date of the final decree of the Appellate Court).

Implications and direct consequences stated in the opinion:

  • The 7 July 1891 execution application and the notice issued under Section 248 were sufficient to keep the decree alive; the defects in that application were not material and did not take it outside Article 179, Clause 4.
  • As regards defendant No. 1, time for limitation runs from the date of the final order of the Appellate Court (High Court decree dated 9 July 1888), not from the date of the first Court's decree (21 May 1886), where there has been an appeal.
  • The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs, including the costs of the Full Bench reference.

The opinion resolved a conflict of authorities by preferring Gunga Moyce v. Shib Sunker and by construing Article 179 (Clause 2) according to its ordinary meaning; the decision of the Full Bench settled, for the purposes of this case, that an appeal to an Appellate Court fixes the date from which limitation runs as the date of the final appellate decree.

Additional Notes from the Opinion

Counsel for the appellant: Babu Prosonno Gopal Roy. Counsel for the respondent: Babu Nil Madhub Bose and Babu Shib Chunder Palit (the latter were noted as appearing; the respondent's counsel "was not called upon" during argument in the Court below).

Show all summary ...

1. This appeal arises out of an application for execution of a decree for possession of certain immoveable property and for damages. The first Court, on the 21st May 1886, gave the plaintiff a decree for possession and for damages against all the defendants. Against that decree all the defendants, except No. 1, preferred an appeal, and the Appellate Court, on the 2nd July 1887, reversed so much of the decree as made the appealing defendants liable for damages, but it affirmed the decree in every other respect. And a second appeal from the decree of the Appellate Court was dismissed by the High Court on the 9th of July 1888.

2. The first application for execution was made in the Court of the first Munsif of Howrah on the 7th of July 1891; it was returned by the first Munsif on the 21st of August following for want of jurisdiction; and it was presented on the same day to the proper Court. The application asked for issue of notice on the judgment-debtor for delivery of possession and for attachment and sale of certain immoveable properties for realization of the costs and damages decreed. Notice under Section 248 of the Code was issued on the judgment-debtors on the 8th September 1891, and on their objection that the particulars required by Section 235 were incorrectly stated, the application was, by an order of the Court, dated the llth January 1892, allowed to be amended. This last-mentioned order was reversed by the Appellate Court, and the Munsif was directed to deal with the application for execution as originally made; and the execution case was dismissed by the Munsif, on the 13th July 1892, for want of prosecution. A second application for execution made on the 15th August 1893 was rejected on the 4th April 1894 for incorrectness in the statement of necessary particulars, and then the present application was made on the 19th of June 1894. The judgment-debtors urge that it was barred by limitation; the first Court gave effect to this objection, but the Lower Appellate Court has reversed the decision of the first Court, and ordered execution to proceed; and hence this appeal by the judgment-debtors.

3. Two contentions have been raised in this appeal:

First--That execution is barred against all the defendants, as the application of the 7th of July 1891 was not one according to law ; and as there was no other application within three years even from the date of the decree of the High Court; and Second---That even if the application of the 7th of July 1891 be held to be one according to law, still execution is barred against defendant No. 1, as time runs in his case, not from the date of the decree of the High Court, but from the date of the decree of the first Court, that is, the 21st of May 1886, there having been no appeal by or against him from that decree.

4. In support of the first contention, it is argued by the learned Vakil for the appellants that many of the particulars required by section 235 of the code were incorrectly stated in the application of the 7th of July 1891, and that it cannot therefore be regarded as an application made according to law within the meaning of Article 179, Clause 4 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act; and the cases of Asgar Ali v. Troilokya Nath Ghose (1890) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 631 and Gopal Sah v. Janki Koer (1895) I.L.R. 23 Cal. 217 are relied upon. It was conceded, however, and very properly conceded, that the decree-holder was entitled under Section 14 of the Limitation Act to exclude from computation the time from the 7th July to the 21st August 1891.

5. That being so, and the decree-holder being admittedly entitled to reckon time as against at least some of the judgment-debtors from the date of the final decree in appeal, that is, the 9th of July 1888, execution is not barred against them, if the application of the 7th July 1891 is one within the meaning of Clause 4 of Article 179, that is, if it is an application according to law within the meaning of that Clause.

6. Now the question whether an application for execution or for taking some step in aid of execution is one according to law within the meaning of Article 179, Clause (4), has to be determined with reference to the circumstances of each case; and while on the one hand an application must be in substantial compliance with the law in order that it may be regarded as one coming within the meaning of Clause 4, on the other hand, it is not every informality that would vitiate an application and take it out of that Clause. Were it otherwise, bond fide applications for execution would fail to save limitation owing to trivial defects of form,---a result which I do not think the Legislature could have intended. The view I take is amply supported by the authority of decided cases of which I need only refer to Bal Kishen v. Bedmati (1892) I.L.R. 20 Cal. 388 and Rama v. Varada (1892) I.L.R. 16 Mad. 142.

7. The two cases cited by the learned Vakil for the appellants are clearly distinguishable from the present. In Asgar Ali v. Troilokya Nath Ghose (1890) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 631 while the decree-holder, as I gather from the judgment of Prinsep, J., asked for the sale of the immoveable property of the judgment-debtor "as per list," no list was attached to the application, so that the application did not comply with section 237 of the code, and no execution could be taken out thereon owing to this material defect. So also in Gopal Sah v. Janki Koer (1895) I.L.R. 23 Cal. 217 the application, which was considered to be one not according to law, was found to be materially defective in not complying with Sections 235 to 238. Mr. Justice Prinsep in his judgment in this last mentioned case observes : "One of the errors committed by the decree-holder was in misstating the amount of his decree in a lesser sum than he was given, and the Subordinate Judge has consequently limited the execution to that smaller sum. If that had been the only defect the decree would have been capable of being executed for the smaller sum. But in other respects, which it is unnecessary to mention, the application failed to comply with the requirements of Sections 235, 236, 237 and 238 applicable to the case." These observations go to some extent to support the view I take, that it is only material defects that can vitiate an application. In the present case, the defects in the application of the 7th of July 1891, as the Lower Appellate Court has shown, were not of a material character. The application asked for delivery of possession of the property covered by the decree, and the decree could well have been executed so far as this part of the prayer was concerned. It is admitted again that the application contained a list of the immoveable property sought to be attached and sold for the realization of the money decreed, so that there was no want of compliance with the provisions of Section 237 of the Code here. Moreover, though the amendment allowed by the first Court was set aside on appeal, the Appellate Court did not treat the application as one not made according to law, but remanded the case to the first Court to deal with the application as originally made--a course which it could not have taken if the application had been considered as not made according to law. Lastly, granting that the application of the 7th of July 1891 was informal and defective as an application for execution of decree, it was at any rate, as pointed out by the learned Vakil for the respondent, an application 'o take some step in aid of execution, that is to say, to issue a notice under Section 248 of the Code which was here necessary, the decree having been passed more than one year before. A notice was issued according to the prayer made in this application, and the application and the notice were sufficient to keep the decree alive. See Behari Lal v. Salik Ram (1878) I.L.R. 1 All. 675 and Dhonkal v. Phakkar (1893) I.L.R. 15 All. 84.

8. The first contention of the appellants must therefore fail.

9. In support of the second contention that time runs as regards defendant No. 1 from the date of the decree of the first Court, the cases of Hur Proshad v. Enayet IIossein (1878) 2 C.L.R. 471 and Raghu Nath v. Abdul Hye (1886) I.L.R. 14 Cal. 26 are relied upon. These cases are in conflict with that of Gunga Moyce v. Shib Sunker (1878) 3 C.L.R. 430 which I am inclined to follow, as the decision in this last mentioned case appears to be more in conformity with the language of the law, than that in the two cases cited for the appellants. Moreover, Explanation I to Article 179 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act makes a distinction between a joint decree against several defendants and a decree in which separate reliefs are granted against different defendants, with reference to Clause 4 while no such distinction is made with reference to Clause 2; and this to my mind is a clear indication that the Legislature intended that time should run from the date of the final decree of the Appellate Court where there has been an appeal irrespective of the question whether the appeal related to the whole decree or not.

10. In this conflict of decisions in this Court, a reference to a Full Bench becomes necessary, and as this is an appeal from an Appellate order having the force of a decree, the whole case must be referred to a Full Bench.

Maclean, C.J.

11. I agree that this case should be referred to a Full Bench reserving my opinion upon the question raised.

12. Babu Prosonno Gopal Roy, for the Appellant.

13. Babu Nil Madhub Bose and Babu Shib Chunder Palit, for the Respondent.

14. Babu Prosonno Gopal Roy.---The application for execution is barred by limitation. It is a defective application, as it does not give the right number of the suit, the date, and the amount of the decree. That being so, the application is not one made in accordance with law. See Section 235 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the cases of Gopal Sah v. Janki Koer (1895) I.L.R. 23 Cal. 217 (223) and Chowdhry Paroosh Ram Das v. Kali Puddo Banerjee (1889) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 53. If it is an application not made in accordance with law, the issue of a notice under Section 248 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not save limitation. Application in aid of execution must be made according to law, in furtherance of the execution proceedings under a decree. See Sujan Singh v. Hira Singh (1889) I L.R. 12 All. 399 (402) and Dalichand v. Bai Shivkor (1890) I.L.R. 15 Bom. 242. The execution as against defendant No. 1, at least, has been barred by limitation. Limitation as against him would run either from the date of the decree of the first Court, or of the Appellate Court, as there was no appeal by or against him. See the cases of Hur Proshaud Roy v. Enayet Hossein (1878) 2 C. L. R. 471; Harkant Sen v. Biraj Mohan Roy. (1895) I.L. R. 23 Cal. 876; Mashiat-un-nissa v. Rani (1889) I.L.R. 13 All 1; Muthu v. Chellappa (1889) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 479: Rughu Nath Singh v. Pareshram Mahata (1882) I.L.R. 9 Cal. 635; Mullick Ahmed Zumma v. Mahomed Syed (1880) I. L. R. 6 Cal. 194

15. Babu Nil Madhub Bose, for the Respondent, was not called upon.

16. The opinion of the Full Bench was delivered by Maclean, C.J. (Macpherson, Trevelyan, Banerjee, and Jenkins, JJ., concurring).

Maclean, C.J.

17. Although in the reference I have reserved my opinion on the point referred to the Full Bench, I had the advantage of hearing the arguments addressed to Mr. Justice Banerjee and myself in the Court below, and of discussing the matter with him, and I am in entire agreement with the opinion he has expressed upon the question of whether the application for execution of the 7th July 1891 was or was not one according to law. I concur both in the reasoning and in the conclusion expressed by Mr. Justice Banerjee; and as regards the point which has been referred to the Full Bench, namely, whether the time from which the period is to begin to run is, as regards the defendant No. 1, the date of the decree pronounced on the appeal or the date of the decree of the first Court, I am of opinion that it begins to run from the date of the decree on appeal. I only propose to add one or two brief remarks to what Mr. Justice Banerjee has said. With respect to the case decided in the Allahabad High Court, the case of Mashiat-un-nissa v. Rani (1889) I.L.R. 13 All. 1 the first comment I make is that in that case there was a marked difference of opinion amongst the Judges who heard and decided it, and, in the next place, the facts were clearly distinguishable from those of the present case, inasmuch as here the decree was a joint one, whilst in the Allahabad case the decrees were separate, or any way tantamount to separate decrees against each of the defendants. There is no doubt a dictum of C.J. Edge which supports the present appellant's view, but it was obiter and not necessary for the purposes of that particular decision. I allude to the passage as to the application of Clause 2, article 179 on page 13. For myself I prefer the reasoning and the conclusion of the two learned Judges who were in the minority in that case, and to read the language of sub-Section 2 of Article 179 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act according to the ordinary signification of the words used. That article says that, where there has been an appeal, the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court shall be taken to be the time from which the period is to begin to run. There is no such qualification in the article as is suggested by the majority of the Judges in the Allahabad case, and which must be read into the article in order to support their view, n(sic) is there anything to lead me to suppose that any such qualification or modification was intended by the Legislature. The language of the article is reasonably clear, and in my opinion the safer course is to construe it according to the ordinary meaning of the words used. Again, upon the question of convenience, the convenience seems to me to be all in favour of the view which I take. In my opinion, the answer to the question submitted to us should be, that the time runs, as against the defendant No. 1, from the date of the final order of the Appellate Court, which was that of the High Court, dated the 9th July 1888; and that being so, the application for execution of the 7th July 1891 was not out of time. The appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs, including the costs of this reference.

Article 179, Clause 2: