Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Mahomed Hamidullah P... v. Zohurunnessa Bibee A...

Calcutta High Court
Apr 5, 1897
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

A suit was brought on a promissory note that had been executed by two makers. One maker died before the suit commenced. The plaintiff sued the surviving maker and the heirs (legal representatives) of the deceased maker. Two of those heirs were purdahnashin women upon whom the necessary summons was not served. A decree was passed ex parte against those two heirs and in favour of the plaintiff, ordering payment of Rs. 468 and stating that the liabilities of Defendants 1 to 3 were to the extent of property inherited from the deceased debtor.

The two heirs against whom the decree had been obtained ex parte applied under section 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure to have the decree set aside. The lower Court granted the application and set aside the decree not only as to those applicants but also as to the other defendants who had appeared and defended. The present proceedings challenge whether the decree ought to have been set aside as to all defendants or only as to the applicants who had been proceeded against ex parte.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the application to this Court properly fell within section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., whether the subordinate Court exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law).
  2. Whether, under section 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a decree passed ex parte against one or more defendants may be set aside only so far as it was ex parte, or whether the Court is required (or justified) to set aside the entire decree in the suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by the learned vakil for the Petitioner)

  • The order of the lower Court was wrong in setting aside the entire decree; the Court was authorized under section 108 only to set aside that part of the decree which was passed ex parte.
  • If the lower Court set aside parts of the decree that were not ex parte, it thereby exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it (a point tied to section 622).
  • The learned vakil relied on precedents decided under Act X of 1859 (specifically Durga Persad Ghose v. Girish Chunder Bose and Brojo Nath Surma v. Anund Moyee Debia Chowdhurani) as supportive of the contention that only the ex parte portion should be reopened (these cases applied a provision under Act X, 1859, sec. 58, which the vakil treated as corresponding to sec. 108 of the Code).

Arguments (or considerations) supporting setting aside the entire decree

  • The language of section 108 is imperative: if the applicant satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served, "the Court shall pass an order to set aside the decree ... and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit." The phrase "the decree" was argued to refer to the whole decree made in the suit.
  • Permitting the original decree to stand as against those defendants who had appeared while reopening the decree only as to those who had not appeared could produce complications and potential injustice (e.g., hard results for certain defendants who had appeared but whose rights were tied to those of the absent defendants).
  • Decisions under the earlier Act X of 1859 (sec. 58) were argued to be distinguishable because the earlier provision left revival or rescission to the discretion of the Collector, whereas section 108 of the Code contains imperative language and specifically directs setting aside the decree upon satisfaction of its requirements.
  • A prior decision of this Court (Dookhee Khan v. Rajessuree Ram) was cited to show that a judge may set aside a decree as to all defendants if justice requires it (for example, where the objection is common to all defendants).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Brij Mohutt Thakur v. Rai Uma Nath Chowdhuri Seen as supporting the view relevant to jurisdictional interference under section 622 (i.e., interfering where a subordinate Court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it). The decision was cited by Banerjee, J. as being in accordance with the Petitioner's contention regarding jurisdiction under section 622; it was not used to overturn the lower Court's order but to frame the jurisdictional issue.
Jogodanund Singh v. Amtit Lal Sirkar Also cited in relation to the jurisdictional question under section 622 (supporting the notion that interference is permissible where a subordinate Court acts without jurisdiction). Cited alongside Brij Mohutt Thakur to indicate the Petitioner's potential jurisdictional argument; the Court nonetheless proceeded to interpret section 108 and upheld the lower Court's order.
Durga Persad Ghose v. Girish Chunder Bose Decision under Act X of 1859 (section 58); interpreted as permitting revival or rescission by the Collector upon showing good cause and failure of justice. The Court observed that these cases arose under Act X of 1859 and that the corresponding provision differed from section 108 of the Code; therefore these decisions were held not to be directly in point for interpreting section 108.
Brojo Nath Surma v. Anund Moyee Debia Chowdhurani Another case under Act X of 1859, sec. 58, relied on by the Petitioner for the proposition that only the ex parte portion should be revivified/rescinded. The Court distinguished these decisions on the basis that the earlier statutory provision was discretionary, whereas section 108 uses imperative language; the decisions were held not to govern cases under section 108.
Dookhee Khan v. Rajessuree Ram Held that it was competent for a judge to set aside a decree as to all defendants if justice so required (e.g., where an objection is common to all defendants). The judgment was cited as supporting the proposition that a Court may set aside an entire decree where justice requires; Banerjee, J. relied on this to justify the lower Court's treatment of the decree as a whole.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Maclean, C.J.:

  1. He stated he was not satisfied the case fell within section 622 but found it unnecessary to decide that point because his construction of section 108 resolved the controversy.
  2. He framed the factual question: a suit against two sets of defendants with one maker dead, two heirs (purdahnashin) not served, and an ex parte decree entered as to them while other defendants had appeared and defended.
  3. He examined the language of section 108. The section's first clause might favour the applicants, but the latter clause uses imperative language: "the Court shall pass an order to set aside the decree ... and the Court shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit."
  4. He analysed the meaning of "the decree" and concluded that, in its ordinary signification, it refers to the whole decree made in the suit, not merely the part affecting the applying defendant. The imperative phrasing supports setting aside the whole decree.
  5. He advanced policy reasons: permitting only partial setting aside could create complications and possible injustice in multi-defendant suits; the legislature likely intended to avoid piecemeal decrees and the difficulties that would follow.
  6. He observed that the plaintiff, who proceeded ex parte against some defendants, ran the risk of having his decree set aside, and that the appearing defendants could not reasonably complain because they were aware others were not present and could have drawn the Court's attention to non-service.
  7. He concluded the lower Court's decision to set aside the entire decree was correct on the proper construction of section 108 and discharged the rule attacking that decision.

Banerjee, J.:

  1. He identified two questions: (a) whether the application fell under section 622, and (b) whether the lower Court's order was correct.
  2. He acknowledged that if the Petitioner's contention (that only the ex parte part could be set aside) were right, the case might fall under section 622 as involving exercise of unauthorized jurisdiction by the subordinate Court; he cited Brij Mohutt Thakur and Jogodanund Singh in that context.
  3. He then analysed section 108's language: it contemplates setting aside "the decree" and directing the Court to appoint a day for proceeding with the suit, which speaks to reopening the whole suit.
  4. He rejected the argument that section 108 authorizes only partial setting aside, noting the section makes no such distinction and that partial reopening could be unjust or produce impractical results—illustrated by the present facts where one appearing defendant was an executant and another was sued as heir of the deceased.
  5. He distinguished decisions under Act X of 1859 (sec. 58) because that provision gave discretionary power to the Collector to revive or rescind "according to the justice of the case," whereas section 108 of the present Code is imperative. Consequently, earlier Act X decisions were not applicable to section 108.
  6. He cited Dookhee Khan v. Rajessuree Ram as authority that a judge may set aside a decree as to all if justice requires and reiterated that although in some cases a decree may in reality comprise several separate decrees as to different parties, in the present case the decree was "one and undivisible."
  7. He concluded the lower Court was correct to set aside the entire decree under section 108 and discharged the rule seeking to reverse that order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the order of the Court below setting aside the ex parte decree in its entirety was correct and the rule attacking that order was discharged. Rule discharged.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The ex parte decree was set aside in its entirety under section 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the Court is to appoint a day for proceeding with the suit (i.e., the suit is to be reopened and reheard consistent with section 108's mandate).
  • The Court emphasized that section 108's language and policy considerations justify setting aside the whole decree where a defendant satisfies the Court that summons was not duly served; the opinion distinguished earlier decisions under Act X of 1859 as not governing section 108 because of differences in statutory wording.
  • No statement was made in the opinion claiming the setting aside in this case created a novel legal precedent beyond the interpretation of section 108; the decision rests on statutory construction and application to the facts (the opinion did not assert that it was laying down a new, broad precedent beyond that construction).
S.C.S
Rule discharged.
Show all summary ...

The Judgments of the Court were as follows:—

Maclean, C.J:— I am for my own part, not satisfied that this case comes within sec. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but, in the view I take of the construction of sec. 108 of that Code, to which I will revert in a moment, it becomes unnecessary for me to decide that question. The question we have to decide arises under these circumstances. A suit was brought against two sets of Defendants upon a promissory note which had been made by two persons, one of whom died before the suit was brought. The suit was brought against the surviving maker of the note, and the heirs of the other maker of the note, who had, as I have said, died in the meantime. Two these heirs were purdanashin women, and it appears that the necessary summons was not served upon them, and that the decree as against them was made ex-parte in these terms:— “In the result, a decree for Rs. 468 be passed in Plaintiff's favour, together with costs at ex-parte scale. The liabilities of the Defendants 1 to 3 shall be to the extent of the property inherited by them from the deceased debtor.”

The two Defendants against whom the decree had been made ex-parte, made an application under sec. 108 of the Code to have the decree set aside. The application was granted, and the decree, not only as against the applicants, but also as against the other Defendants, who had appeared and defended, was set aside. The question is whether it ought to have been set aside as against all the Defendants, or only as against the applicants, the purdanashin women, against whom, admittedly, the trial had proceeded ex-parte, Apparently the point was not mentioned to the Munsif, any way he has not referred to it. The question turns upon the true construction of sec. 108 of the Code, the language of which is perhaps not so clear upon the point as it might be. The first clause of the section somewhat favours the present applicant's contention, but then the latter clause, after stating that the applicant must satisfy the Court that he was not properly served, goes on to say:— “The Court shall pass an order to set aside the decree” * * * The language is imperative—“Shall set aside the decree.” Now, what does “the decree” mean? It must, I think, mean the decree, the whole decree made in the suit. It does not say, part of the decree. It does not say that part of the decree which affects the interest of the applying Defendant alone, but it uses the words “the decree”—read according to their ordinary signification and natural meaning, the words must mean, and I think that the Court shall set aside the whole decree; and that view is strengthened, I consider, by the last words of the section, viz., “and the Court shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit”. The suit would appear to mean the whole suit, not merely the suit as against or so far as it affected the particular Defendant's making the application, but the whole suit.

There seems to me reason in this view of the section. If the original decree were allowed to stand as against the original Defendants who had appeared and defended the suit, and the suit were only allowed to proceed on the second hearing, if I may call it so, as against the Defendants whom, in the first instance, the decree had deen made ex-parte, I can conceive cases in which complications and possibly injustice might result, and it may well be that the Legislature, seeing that difficulties might ensue from making, in suits in which there were several Defendants, a decree against them piecemeal, may have deemed it better that the decree should not be set aside partially, but that the whole decree should be set aside. And I may point out that the Plaintiff can hardly be heard to complain for when the suit came on for hearing, he knew perfectly well that he was proceeding against some of the Defendants ex-parte and that he was incurring the risk, a fairly certain risk of having his decree set aside, if he knew, as he must be taken to have known, that he was proceeding against certain of the Defendants who had not been served. Nor can the Defendants who appeared be heard to complain. They must have known that the other Defendants were not in Court to defend, and a very little inquiry would probably have satisfied them that they had not been served. If, then, those Defendants had pointed out to the Court that their co-Defendants were not persent, and that it was questionable whether they had been served with the requisite summons, and that they were purdatiashin women, it is highly probable that the Court would have adjourned the case to give the other Defendants an opportunity of being persent, or at any rate of being duly served. If, then, the whole decree be set aside, I do not think that either the Plaintiff or the other Defendants have much real ground for complaint.

Holding this view, on the best construction that I am able to place, on the language of the section, I think that the Judge in the Court below arrived at a right conclusion, and that the rule must be discharged.

Banerjee, J.:— I also am of opinion that this rule ought to be discharged. We are asked 10 reverse an order of the Court below made under sec. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure, setting aside an ex-parte decree, so far as that order relates to the two Defendants who had entered appearance, and against whom, it is contended, the original decree was not an ex-parte decree.

Two questions arise for consideration, first, whether the application to this Court comes properly within sec. 622 of the Code of Civil procedure, and, second, whether the order made by the Court below is a right order or not.

If the contentions of the learned vakil for the Petitioner, viz, that the order made by the Court below was wrong, were correct, I am inclined to think that the case would come under that clause of sec. 622 of the Code, which authorizes this Court to interfere in cases in which a subordinate Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law. For the contention raised on behalf of the Petitioner is this, that the Court below, by sec. 108 of the Code, was authorized to set aside only that part of the decree which was passed ex-parte, and if, in making the order that it has made, it has set aside also that part of the decree, that was not passed ex-parte; I think that the Petitioner may contend that it has, in so doing exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law. This view is in accordance with the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Brij Mohutt Thakur v. Rai Uma Nath Chowdhuri and with the decision of this Court in Jogodanund Singh v. Amtit Lal Siirkar . But then is the decision of the Court below wrong, or was the Court below right in reversing the entire decree as it has done, notwithstanding that some of the Defendants had entered appearance. Sec. 108 of the Code says:— “In any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against a Defendant, he may apply to the Court by which the decree was made for an order to set it aside, and if he satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served,” as was the case here, “the Court shall pass an order to set aside the decree upon such terms as to costs, payment into Court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.”

The section, therefore, evidently con-r templates the setting aside of the decree made in the suit, and it directs the Court to appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.

It was argued that the decree in this case should be treated as a decree partly ex-parte and partly not an ex-parte decree, and that the section authorizes the Court to set aside only so far as it was an ex-parte decree. The section, however, makes no such distinction; and as pointed out in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice, there may be very good reason why the section did not make any such distinction. It may often happen that the setting aside of the decree as regards some of the Defendants renders it uecessary in the interests of justice, that the whole decree should be re-opened, and the present case is an ins tance in point. Here, of the two parties who entered appearance, one was one of the executants of the promissory note on which the suit is based, and the other was one of the three persons who are now sued as the legal representatives of another executant of the note, now deceased; and if the decree were to stand as against the Defendant who entered appearance, and be set aside only as regards the Defendants who did not enter appearance, then, in the event of the suit being dismissed as against the latter, the result would be obviously hard as against the Defendant who is sued as one of the heirs of the deceased executant of the note and who had entered appearance at the original hearing. It is to avoid complications like this that the legislature may have thought it fit to allow a decree made ex parte as against some of the Defendants to be set aside in its entirety upon their application if the requirements of sec. 108 of the Code are satisfied.

Two cases were relied upon by the learned vakil for the Petitioners—Durga Persad Ghose v. Girish Chunder Bose and Brojo Nath Surma v. Anund Moyee Debia Chowdhurani as lending support to his contention. They were cases under Act X of 1859, and sec. 58 of that Act, which corresponded to sec. 108 of the Code contained this provision, that if the Petitioner “shall show good and sufficient cause for his previous non-appearance, and shall satisfy the Collector that there has been a failure of justice, the Collector may, upon such terms and conditions as to costs or otherwise as he may think proper, revive the suit and alter or rescind the decree, according to the justice of the case.”

That, I think, was different from the provision in the law now under consideration, which is imperative and requires that the Court shall pass an order to set aside the decree upon such terms as to costs, &c, as it shall think fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit. I therefore think that decisions under Act X of 1859 cannot be in point in cases coming under sec. 108 of the Code, and the view I take receives some support from the decisioin of this Court in the case of Dookhee Khan v. Rajessuree Ram ; in which it was held that “it was competent to the judge of the Small Cause Court, on hearing the objections by one of several Defendants to set aside the decree as to all, if justice seems to require it; as, for instance, if the objection is one which is common to the case of all.” * * *

Cases may arise in which a decree, though nominally one, really consists of several decree against different parties, the relief granted against each being separately specified, in such cases the contention urged by the Petitioner's vakil may hold good. But here the decree is one and undivisible, and I think that the Court below was right in setting it aside in its entirety under sec. 108 of the Code, notwithstanding that some of the Defendants had entered appearance in the original hearing.

S.C.S
Rule discharged.