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Jogodanund Singh v. Amrita Lal Sircar And Ors.
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The Full Court was asked to decide two referred questions about the correctness of three prior Full Bench decisions concerning whether certain statutory provisions applied where executions or sales arose under laws or proceedings begun prior to the enactment of those provisions. The three earlier cases were: Lal Mohun Mukerjee v. Jogendra Chunder Boy (I.L.R. 14 Cal. 636), Uzir Ali v. Ram Komal Shaha (I.L.R. 15 Cal. 383) and Girish Chundra Basu v. Apurba Krishna Dass (I.L.R. 21 Cal. 940).
Broadly, the questions concerned: - Whether Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act could be applied to sales in execution where the decree or execution proceedings began before that Act came into force; and - Whether Section 310A of the Code of Civil Procedure (added by Act V of 1894) could be applied to a sale held after that Act came into operation where the execution had been applied for and sale proclamation issued before that date.
The opinion analyzes the reasoning and correctness of the earlier Full Bench decisions and resolves the referred questions, and (in the context of the specific case that gave rise to the reference) concludes that the Court below failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law, rendering its order open to revision under Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the decision in Girish Chundra Basu v. Apurba Krishna Dass (I.L.R. 21 Cal. 940) was rightly decided with regard to the retrospective application of Section 310A of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Whether the decisions in Lal Mohun Mukerjee v. Jogendra Chunder Boy (I.L.R. 14 Cal. 636) and Uzir Ali v. Ram Komal Shaha (I.L.R. 15 Cal. 383) were rightly decided with regard to the retrospective application of Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Auction-purchaser's Arguments
- It was argued for the auction-purchaser that Section 310A of the Code of Civil Procedure is distinguishable from Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act because Section 310A is less favourable to the decree-holder (for instance, it does not provide for immediate payment by the judgment-debtor of costs and interest accruing after the sale proclamation and not entered in it).
- It was contended on behalf of the auction-purchaser that, regardless of the Court's decision on the correctness of the earlier authorities, the Court could not interfere under Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure with the order complained of in the case which gave rise to the reference.
Judgment-debtor's Position (as reflected in the opinion)
- The judgment-debtor sought to have the sale set aside under Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (and analogous relief under Section 310A of the Civil Procedure Code in the later case), by depositing a sum in Court and invoking the statutory procedure to prevent confirmation of the sale and secure repayment of the purchase-money with compensation.
- The opinion treats the judgment-debtor's application as invoking a right created (or a procedural mechanism provided) by the later enactment to set aside sales held after the enactment came into force.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Girish Chundra Basu v. Apurba Krishna Dass (I.L.R. 21 Cal. 940) | Held that Section 310A of the CPC (added by Act V of 1894) was not applicable where execution had been applied for and sale proclamation issued before the Act came into operation; treated Section 310A as conferring a right (not merely procedural). | The Court in the present opinion holds that Girish Chundra Basu was not rightly decided, because it followed the principle (from earlier tenancy cases) that such provisions create a new substantive right; the present opinion rejects that principle as stated. |
| Lal Mohun Mukerjee v. Jogendra Chunder Boy (I.L.R. 14 Cal. 636) | Full Bench held Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act could not apply retrospectively where execution had been applied for before the Act came into operation, on the ground that Section 174 conferred a new right and proceedings had commenced before the new Act. | The present opinion examines the two-part reasoning in that judgment, rejects the first part (that Section 174 creates a new right making it inapplicable to prior decrees), but abstains from pronouncing on the second branch of that judgment which relied on proceedings being pending under the old law and the General Clauses Act, Section 6. |
| Uzir Ali v. Ram Komal Shaha (I.L.R. 15 Cal. 383) | Held that Section 174 did not apply to sales under execution applied for after the Act came into operation where the decree was passed under the old Act; based on the same principle as Lal Mohun Mukerjee (that Section 174 creates a new right). | The present opinion states that Uzir Ali was not rightly decided because it rests wholly upon the first ground of Lal Mohun Mukerjee, which the present opinion finds unsound. |
| Urquhart v. Urquhart (1 Macq. H.L.C. 662) | Authority for the ordinary proposition that a new law should affect only future transactions and not past ones. | The Court notes this ordinary proposition but distinguishes it: the general rule is principally concerned with laws that create new obligations or interfere with vested rights, not with all laws that may create rights. |
| Reid v. Reid (L.R. 31 Ch. D. 408) | Illustrates that the rule against retrospective operation applies chiefly when vested rights or obligations would be affected. | The Court cites Reid to support the narrower view of the rule against retrospectivity and to show it is not universally applicable to every law creating a right. |
| Gardner v. Lucas (L.R. 3 App. Cas. 582 and L.R. 3 App. Cas. 603) | Used in the opinion to show distinctions between substantive impositions and procedural rules; L.R. 3 App. Cas. 603 cited regarding procedural changes affecting enforcement of vested rights provided no injustice is done. | The Court relies on these authorities to justify that a provision which is procedural in substance may be given immediate effect even if it affects enforcement of vested rights, "provided ... that no injustice is done." |
| Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger (L.R. 3 Ch. D. 69) | Mellish, L.J.'s statement that a statute operative prospectively, though affecting past events as requisites, may be applied "provided ... that no injustice is done." | The Court quotes this principle and says the condition is satisfied in the present context, supporting application of Section 174/310A to sales held after the statute came into force. |
| Queen v. The Inhabitants of St. Mary Whitechapel (12 Q.B. 127) | Lord Denman's distinction that a statute is not "properly called retrospective" where part of its requisites are drawn from antecedent time, i.e., direct operation may be prospective even if some conditions predate the statute. | The Court uses this to argue that applying Section 174 to sales held after the Act's commencement is prospective in operation even where antecedent events (like the decree) predate the Act. |
| Pardo v. Bingham (L.R. 4 Ch. App. 740) | Authority for the proposition that the general scope and purpose of an enactment may show legislative intent as to retrospective application. | The Court cites Pardo to support the argument that, given Section 174's remedial purpose, the Legislature likely intended it to apply to all sales of tenures or holdings held after the passing of the Act irrespective of the decree date. |
| Deb Narain Dutt v. Narendro Krishna (I.L.R. 16 Cal. 267) | Referenced regarding the question whether an execution-proceeding is to be treated as a proceeding in a suit for the purposes of the General Clauses Act, Section 6. | The Court notes the doubt indicated by this authority but proceeds on the view that an execution-proceeding was a proceeding "commenced before the repealing Act" in the Lal Mohun Mukerjee context; nevertheless the Court refrains from finally deciding the point here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The opinion proceeds by examining the three earlier decisions separately, beginning with Lal Mohun Mukerjee (the earliest and, in the opinion, the strongest case supporting the decree-holder and auction-purchaser). The Full Bench decision in Lal Mohun Mukerjee rested on two distinct grounds which the present opinion analyses in turn:
-
First branch of Lal Mohun Mukerjee's reasoning: that Section 174 created a "new right" in favour of the judgment-debtor and, because a law creating a new right ought not to have retrospective operation, Section 174 could not be applied where the decree was passed before the section became law.
- The Court dissents from this broad premise. It explains that the general rule against retrospectivity is principally aimed at laws which create new obligations or affect vested rights, not at every enactment which may be said to create a right.
- The opinion draws on authorities (e.g., Maxwell and the cited cases) to explain that where a provision confers a right but does not impose new obligations on or interfere with vested rights of others, the rule against retrospective operation loses its force.
- The Court analyses Section 174 itself and concludes that: (a) the section expressly conditions relief on payment by the judgment-debtor of the full amount due under the decree (with costs) and compensation to the purchaser; (b) the decree-holder's right to satisfaction remains unaffected and may even be advantaged; and (c) the auction-purchaser, if bidding after the new law has come into force, is taken to have bought with knowledge of the new law. Thus, the section does not, in substance, impair vested rights in a way that would trigger the non-retrospectivity rule.
- Furthermore, the Court treats Section 174 as essentially procedural in substance: it prescribes a post-sale procedure (deposit, realization by decree-holder out of deposited sum, non-confirmation of sale and repayment to purchaser with compensation). Because it is procedural, its immediate application to sales held after the statute came into effect is permissible provided no injustice results.
-
Second branch of Lal Mohun Mukerjee's reasoning: that proceedings commenced under the old law ought not to be affected by a change in law, and since the execution in that case had been commenced under the old rent-law, Section 174 should not apply.
- The opinion recognises the operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which provides that repeal shall not affect proceedings commenced before the repealing Act came into operation, and notes a distinction between repeal and mere addition to a law.
- The Court observes that it may not be clear that Section 174 is merely an addition; it is part of a group of provisions in an enactment that repeals the old law and takes its place. Because the point was not argued fully and does not affect the ultimate decision in the reference, the Court refrains from pronouncing a final view on this second branch.
Applying these analyses to the other cases:
- The Court finds that Uzir Ali was decided wholly on the first ground (that Section 174 created a new right) and therefore was incorrectly decided for the reasons given above.
- Girish Chundra Basu was decided by a majority following the principle of the earlier tenancy cases and holding that Section 310A (like Section 174) created a right; the present opinion rejects that principle and concludes Girish Chundra Basu was incorrectly decided.
The opinion also addresses the auction-purchaser's argument distinguishing Section 310A from Section 174 on the ground of lesser favour to decree-holders, but finds that the decree-holder's rights to realize costs and interest remain unaffected by Section 310A, rendering that distinction immaterial for the present purpose.
Finally, applying the view that Section 310A (and by parity Section 174 as construed here) should be applicable where a sale is held after the enactment came into force, the Court holds that the lower Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law by not setting aside the sale on the judgment-debtor's application. Consequently the lower Court's order was open to revision under Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Court answers the referred questions as follows:
- Girish Chundra Basu v. Apurba Krishna Dass (I.L.R. 21 Cal. 940) was not rightly decided.
- Uzir Ali v. Ram Komal Shaha (I.L.R. 15 Cal. 383) was not rightly decided.
- Lal Mohun Mukerjee v. Jogendra Chunder Boy (I.L.R. 14 Cal. 636) was not rightly decided so far as it laid down the principle that Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act created a new right in judgment-debtors and was therefore inapplicable to cases in which the decree was passed before that Act came into operation.
The Court expressly pronounces no opinion upon the separate question whether the order made in Lal Mohun Mukerjee was right under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act by reason of the execution-proceeding having been commenced under Bengal Act VIII of 1869.
Direct consequences on the case which gave rise to the reference:
- The opinion states that, because the Court below failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law (by not setting aside the sale under the applicable statutory provision), that order was open to revision under Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Accordingly, the judge delivering the opinion states: "I would, therefore, make the Rule absolute." (i.e., the Court would grant the revision sought.)
Note: The Court's opinion limited itself as to certain issues (notably the effect of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act on pending execution-proceedings) and declined to express a final view on those points because they were not fully argued and did not affect the decision in the present reference.
End of summary.
1. The questions which have been referred to the Full Court for decision in this case are:
First.-Whether the case of Girish Chundra Basu v. Apurba Krishna Vass I.L.R. 21 Cal. 940 was rightly decided?
Second.-Whether the cases of Lal Mohun Mukcrjee v. Jogendra Chunder Boy I.L.R. 14 Cal. 636 and Uzir Ali v. Ram Komal Shaha I.L.R. 15 Cal. 383 were rightly decided?
2. In the case of Lal Mohun Mukerjee v. Jogendra Chunder Boy I.L.R. 14 Cal. 636, the earliest of the three cases referred to above, the question was whether Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was applicable to a sale hold after that Act had come into operation, when the execution had been applied for, and sale proclamation issued, under Bengal Act VIII of 1869. The Full Bench answered the question in the negative, holding that Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act could not have any retrospective operation, as it conferred upon judgment-debtors a new right which they did not possess under the old Act, and as the proceedings had commenced before the new Act came into force.
3. In the next case in order of time, Uzir Ali v. Ram Komal Shaha I.L.R. 15 Cal. 383, the question was whether Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act applied to a sale held under an execution applied for after that Act had come into operation, when the decree was patted under the old Act. The Full Bench answered the question in the negative, holding that the case was not distinguishable in principle from that of Lal Mohun Mukerjee v. Jogendra Chunder Roy I.L.R. 14 Cal. 636.
4. In Girish Chunra Basu v. Apurba Krishna Dass I.L.R. 21 Cal. 940, the last of the three cases referred to above, the question was whether Section 310 A of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was added to the code by act v of 1894, was applicable to a sale held after the date on which that Act came into operation, when the execution had been applied for, and sale proclamation issued, before that date. The majority of the Bench which heard the case answered the question in the negative, following the two earlier cases relating to Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and holding that Section 310A of the Civil Procedure Code, like Section 174 of the Tenancy Act, was a provision conferring a right and not relating merely to procedure.
5. These decisions, no doubt, are all based upon the general ground that a provision of law like that contained in Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, or Section 310A of the Civil Procedure Code, confers a new right on judgment-debtors, and should not, therefore, be held applicable to any case in which the decree was passed before such provision came into force; but as the three cases differ from one another in certain points, and as it remains to be seen whether, even if the general ground mentioned above be not a sound one, those points of difference may not afford ground for justifying the decision in one case, though not in another, it is convenient to consider the cases separately.
6. I shall consider first the case of Lal Mohun Mukerjee v. Jogendra Chunder Boy I.L.R. 14 Cal. 636 as being the earliest of the three cases and the strongest one for the decree-holder and the auction-purchaser in whose favour the decision was given. In this case MITTER, J., who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench, said:
"We are of opinion that an application under Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act cannot be entertained in respect of sales held in execution of decrees made before the date when that Act came into operation, the execution of the decree having been applied for before the aforesaid date. Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act confers upon the debtors a new right which they did not possess under the old Act. Therefore the presumption is (in the absence of express legislation or direct implication to the contrary) that its operation is not intended to be retrospective its provisions cannot, therefore, be applied to proceedings commenced before the Act came into operation."The reasoning in this judgment consists of two distinct and independent parts.
7. The first part is to the effect that, since a law which creates a new right ought not to have retrospective effect, and since Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act creates a new right in favour of judgment-debtors, therefore Section 174 ought not to have retrospective effect, that is, effect in cases in which the decree by which the applicant became a judgment-debtor was made before that section became law.
8. And the second part is to the effect that, since proceedings commenced under any law ought not to be affected by any change in that law, and since the proceedings in this case were commenced under the old rent-law, therefore they ought not to be affected by Section 174.
9. These two branches of the reasoning require separate examination.
10. I must respectfully dissent from the conclusion in the first part of the above reasoning, as 1 am unable to accept the premises upon which it is based as correct.
11. In the first place, to my mind, the broad general proposition, which this reasoning adopts as its major premise, namely, that a law creating a new right ought not to have retrospective effect, is not universally true. Ordinarily, no doubt, a new law should affect only future transactions and not past ones: Urquhart v. Urquhart 1 Macq. H.L.C. 662. But the rule against retrospective operation is intended to apply not so much to a law creating a new right as to a law creating a new obligation or interfering with vested rights : See Reid v. Reid L.R. 31 Ch. D. 408, Gardner v. Lucas L.R. 3 App. Cas. 582. This is how the rule has generally been understood and laid down in text-books. Maxwell in his treatise on the interpretation of statutes says:
"It is chiefly when the enactment would prejudicially affect vested rights, or the legal character of past transactions, that the rule in question operates. Every statute, as has been said, which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already £778] passed, must be presumed, out of respect to the Legislature, to be intended not to have a retrospective operation"(2nd edition, p. 257). [See also Wilberforce on Statute Law, page 157; Sedgwick on Statutory Law, 2nd edition, 160.]
12. As the creation of a new right in one class of persons is generally attended with the imposition of new obligations on, or the interference with vested rights of, other classes, a law creating a new right would, in general, be subject to the rule against retrospective operation. But where, as in this case, the new right (conceding for the moment that it is a new substantive right) is created expressly under conditions which prevent its imposing any new obligation on, or its interfering with any vested right in, others, the reason for the rule ceases to exist, and the rule must, therefore, cease to be operative. The only persons who can possibly be affected by a provision like that contained in Sub-sections 1 and 2 of Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, in favour of the judgment-debtor, are the decree-holder and the auction-purchaser; and the section expressly provides that the judgment-debtor is entitled to have the sale set aside only upon payment, not merely of compensation to the purchaser, but also of the whole amount due under the decree with costs to the decree-holder. Thus the vested right of the decree-holder, which is to obtain satisfaction of his decree, is left unaffected by this provision, except so far as it is to his advantage; for the sale may not always pay him in full, but the application of Section 174 in every case will. As regards the auction-purchaser, five per con turn on the purchase-money, though ordinarily a sufficient compensation, may not be so when he makes a vary favourable bargain; but as the sale took place after the new law came into operation, and he must be taken to have made his bid with full knowledge of the law, it cannot be said that any vested right of his is affected by it.
13. Then, in the second place, I do not think that Section 174 creates any new substantive right in the judgment-debtor. It embodies in substance a rule of procedure, which provides that, after a sale in execution of a decree has taken place and before it is confirmed, if the judgment-debtor deposits a certain sum in Court, the decree-holder shall realize his dues out of the amount so deposited, and not out of the sale proceeds, and the auction-purchaser, whose right does not become perfect until the sale is confirmed by the Court, shall not be entitled to have the sale confirmed, but shall receive back the purchase-money with a certain compensation out of the money deposited. It being thus really a matter of procedure, there can be no objection to its having effect immediately, even though it should affect past transactions and the mode of enforcement of vested rights, [see Gardner v. Lucas L.R. 3 App. Cas. 603], "provided, of course," as Mellish, L.J., said in the case of the Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger L.R. 3 Ch. D. 69, "that no injustice is done." And I have shown above that this condition is here fully satisfied.
14. Then, again, it is assumed, in the above reasoning, that the operation which the applicant under Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act sought to give to that section was retrospective in its nature, and it is further assumed that there is nothing implied in the scope and purposes of the section to shew that it was intended to have any retrospective effect: assumptions the correctness of which I am by no means prepared to admit.
15. When the sale which was sought to be set aside in this case was held after the new Act had come into operation (and I may add that the same was the state of facts in the other two cases and also in the case which has given rise to this reference), the assumption that the application of the Act to such a sale would be to give it retrospective effect is, in my opinion, not a correct assumption. In setting aside, under Section 174, a sale held after that section had become law, the direct effect of the section would be prospective only, though the sale might depend upon a decree and execution-proceedings of dates antecedent to that of its becoming law. This distinction is well pointed out by Lord Den-man in Queen v. The Inhabitants of St. Mary Whitechapel 12 Q.B. 127, in which his Lordship, speaking of a statute which is in its direct operation prospective, said:
"It is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing;"and this observation applies with peculiar force to a case like the one now under consideration, where the facts antecedent to the passing of the new law go so little to determine the person who is really affected by the application of the new law, I mean the purchaser.
16. Then, as regards the second assumption, no doubt it is true that the bengal tenancy act contains no express words to indicate that Section 174 is to have any retrospective effect. But though there may not be any express words to that effect, still it may be shown by the general scope and purpose of the enactment that it is intended to have retrospective effect. See Pardo v. Bingham L.R. 4 Ch. App. 740. And if we look to these, there can remain very little doubt as to what the Legislature intended in the present instance. Under the old law, if a tenure or holding was sold in execution of a decree for rent, and the sale was for inadequate value, the tenant could get the sale set aside only if he could prove that the inadequacy of price was due to some irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale; and, if there was no such irregularity, but the sale nevertheless resulted in loss, however great the loss might be, the tenant was obliged to bear it as a necessary evil. It was this evil which Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was intended to remedy, and it is difficult to imagine that the Legislature intended to limit the remedy to those cases in which the sales were held in execution of decrees made subsequently to the passing of the Act, and to allow the evil to continue for years to come, during which decrees made under the old Act might go on being enforced by the sale of tenures or holdings, when the application of the new law to sales in execution of decrees passed under the old law could not possibly have resulted in any hardship or injustice. As a remedial provision, it ought to be liberally construed so as to apply to every sale of a tenure or holding in execution of a decree for arrears of rent, held after the passing of the Act, irrespective of the date of the decree.
17. The second branch of the reasoning in Lal Mohun Mukerjee's case I.L.R. 14 Cal. 636 requires separate examination. The sale was held in the course of execution-proceedings instituted under the old Act (Bengal Act VIII of 1869), which was repealed by the Bengal Tenancy Act. Now, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act I of 1868 provides that the repeal of any Act shall not affect any proceeding commenced before the repealing Act shall have come into operation, and whatever doubt there may be as to whether a proceeding in execution is a proceeding in a suit [as to which point see Deb Narain Dutt v. Narendro Krishna I.L.R. 16 Cal. 267, and Code of Civil Procedure, Section 647, Explanation], there can be no room for doubt that the execution-proceeding in this case was a proceeding "commenced before the repealing Act came into operation." It might be said, therefore, that the execution-proceeding in this case was unaffected by the repeal of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, and, therefore, unaffected by the provisions of section 174 of the repealing Act. No doubt the operation of Section 6 of Act I of 1868, in making pending proceedings continue to be regulated by the old procedure, is limited to cases in which the change in the law is the result of repeal of the old enactment, and does not extend where it is due merely to an addition to it. But it may not be clear that Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is purely a provision of this latter description. It is one of a group of provisions in an enactment which repeals the old law and takes its place. If the matter had been unaffected by the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, I should have felt little hesitation in saying that this part of the decision in Lal Mohun Mukerjee's case I.L.R. 14 Cal. 636 was also incorrect. As it is, and as this point was not discussed in the argument before us, and does not affect the decision of the case which has given rise to this reference, I do not think it desirable to pronounce any decided opinion upon it; though I may add that the object of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act may be simply to leave proceedings commenced under the old Act unaffected by the repealing Act, only so far as they have proceeded, leaving their further progress to be regulated by the procedure in force after the repeal; upon which view the second branch of the reasoning will not have any greater force than the first,
18. In my opinion, therefore, the decision in Lal Mohun Mukerjee's case I.L.R. 14 Cal. 636, so far as it holds that Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act creates a new right in a judgment-debtor, and is, therefore, inapplicable to a case in which the decree was passed before that Act became law, is wrong; but I abstain from pronouncing any opinion upon the correctness of the other ground of the decision, namely, that the section was inapplicable to the case by reason of its being a pending proceeding instituted under the old law.
19. The case of Uzir Ali v. Bam Komal Shaha I.L.R. 15 Cal. 383 need not detain me long. It is based wholly upon the first of the two grounds upon which the decision in Lal Mohun Mukerjee's case I.L.R. 14 Cal. 636 is based, namely, that Section 174 creates a new right in favour of the judgment-debtor; and, as I have shown above that that ground is not sound, I must say that this case was incorrectly decided.
20. It remains now to examine the case of Girish Chundra Basu v. Apurba Krishna Dass I.L.R. 21 Cal. 940. The majority of the learned Judges, who decided that case, were of opinion that it was governed by the principle laid down by the Full Bench decisions in the cases of Lal Mohun Mukerjee I.L.R.14 Cal. 636 and Uzir Ali I.L.R. 15 Cal. 383. But as I have, for the reasons given above, said that the principle laid down in those cases that a provision like that in Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act creates a new right, is not a correct one, I must say that the case of Girish Chundra Basu v. Apurba Krishna Dass I.L.R. 21 Cal. 940 was incorrectly decided. Though here the execution-proceedings were instituted under the old law, [the case is unaffected by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, as the change in the law was brought about, not by the repeal of the old Act, but by the addition to it of a new section, namely, Section 310A. And all that, I have said above with reference to Lal Mohun Mukerjee's case I.L.R. 14 Cal. 636 excepting so much as relates to the effect of Section 6 of Act I of 1868, applies with full force to this case.
21. It was argued for the auction-purchaser that Section 310A of the Code of Civil Procedure differs from Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, in being less favourable to the decree-holder than the latter provision, as it does not provide for the immediate payment by the judgment-debtor of the costs and interest accruing after the issue of the sale proclamation, and not entered in it. I do not consider this a material point of distinction at all, as the decree-holder's right to realize these costs and interest remains unaffected by Section 310A.
22. I would, therefore, answer the questions referred to us as follows:
1. The case of Girish Chundra Basu v. Apurba Krishna Dass I.L.R. 21 Cal. 940, was not rightly decided.
2. The case of Uzir Ali v. Ram Komal Shaha I.L.R. 15 Cal. 383, was not rightly decided; nor was the case of Lal Mohun Mukerjee v. Jogendra Chunder Roy I.L.R. 14 Cal. 636 rightly decided, so far as it laid down the principle that Section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act created a new right in judgment-debtors, and was, therefore, inapplicable to a case in which the decree was passed before that Act came into operation.
23. But upon the question whether the order made in the last-mentioned case was right under Section 6 of General Clauses Act, by reason of the execution-proceeding having been commenced under Bengal Act VIII of 1869, I pronounce no opinion.
24. It was contended on behalf of the auction-purchaser that whatever may be the decision of the Court upon the questions referred to it, it could not interfere, under Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with the order complained of in the case which has given rise to this reference. But if I am right in the view I take of Section 310A of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court below was bound, upon the application of the judgment-debtor in this case, to set aside the sale under that section, and, not having done so, it has "failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law," within the meaning of Section 622, so as to make its order open to revision by this Court.
25. I would, therefore, make the Rule absolute.
Beverley, J.
26. I concur in the able judgment of Mr. Justice Banerjee, with this reservation, that it does not appear to me from the report of the case of Lal Mohun Mukerjee v. Jogendra Chunder Boy I.L.R. 14 Cal. 636, that the learned Judges who decided that case intended to base their judgment in any way on Section 6 of the General Clauses Act I of 1868.
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