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Hurri Pershad Chowdhry v. Nasib Singh And Ors.

Calcutta High Court
Jan 31, 1894
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Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant sought execution of a decree obtained on 18 April 1888, based on a compromise of a suit on a bond under which the decretal sum was made payable by instalments. The first instalment was payable on 26 April 1888. The appellant applied to the Munsif on 9 February 1892 for execution of the decree. More than three years had elapsed since the date when the first instalment fell due; however, the dates for the other instalments fell within three years of the application for execution. The decree included a clause providing that on non-payment of an instalment the plaintiff would "have the power to cancel the instalments and realize the entire amount with interest."

The appellant alleged that the first instalment had been paid and sought execution in respect of the remaining instalments. The judgment-debtors denied payment of any instalment and contended that execution in respect of the remaining instalments was barred by limitation. The Munsif found for the judgment-debtors on both points, and the District Judge of Bhagalpur affirmed that judgment. The present appeal followed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Munsif wrongly refused to admit in evidence an account book tendered by the decree-holder to prove payment of the first instalment.
  2. Whether, given the terms of the decree (which gave the decree-holder the power to make the whole sum due on default of an instalment), the execution of the decree in respect of instalments that fell within three years of the application was barred by limitation when the first instalment had allegedly fallen due more than three years earlier.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Munsif should have admitted an account book into evidence when the decree-holder's first witness was under examination, because the book was relevant to disprove the judgment-debtors' plea of non-payment of the first instalment.
  • Because the decree provided that on non-payment of an instalment the decree-holder had the power (and not an obligation) to treat the whole sum as due, the decree-holder could choose to waive his right to realize the full amount and instead sue only for the instalments that were not barred by limitation; therefore, whether the first instalment was unpaid should not bar execution of later instalments.
  • The appellant relied on a number of precedents (including Chandra Kamal Das v. Bissessurree Dassia and others) to support the contention that the proviso for making the whole amount due was a protective provision that could be waived so as to prevent limitation from running from the first default.

Judgment-Debtors' Arguments

  • They denied that any instalment had been paid; accordingly, execution in respect of instalments that fell more than three years before the application was barred by limitation.
  • They argued that under the last clause of Section 258, Civil Procedure Code, because the payment in question had not been certified to the Court, the decree-holder was not entitled to prove that payment.
  • The judgment-debtors relied on the Munsif's rulings and authorities cited by him (including Judhistir Patro v. Nobin Chandra Khela and Mon Mohun Roy v. Durga Churn Gooee) to support the view that limitation began to run from the first default and that a creditor's mere abstinence from suing did not amount to a waiver preventing limitation from running.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Judhistir Patro v. Nobin Chandra Khela, I.L.R. 13 Cal. 73 Cited by the Munsif among authorities dealing with instalment clauses and limitation. The Court noted it as one of the cases considered in forming the rule applied in Mon Mohun Roy v. Durga Churn Gooee; no independent departure from that treatment was made.
Mon Mohun Roy v. Durga (Darya) Churn Gooee, I.L.R. 15 Cal. 502 Holds that when a decree makes money payable by instalments and provides that on default of one instalment the whole becomes due, limitation runs from the first default; recognizes an exception where the penalty is waived by subsequent payment and receipt of the overdue instalment. The Court relied on this decision as stating the correct rule and treated it as authoritative in rejecting the appellant's contention that mere abstinence or an optional proviso prevents limitation from running.
Chandra Kamal Das v. Bissessurree Dassia, 13 C.L.R. 243 Purported to hold that even where defaults occurred and no subsequent payment was made, the creditor could treat the proviso (making the whole sum payable on default) as only for his protection and could waive it, affecting limitation. The Court declined to follow this decision, describing it as standing alone and contrary to the current of decisions; it considered the decision irreconcilable with the authorities represented by Mon Mohun Roy and Chenibash Shaha.
Asmutullah/Asmatullah Dalal v. Cally/Kally Churn Mitter, I.L.R. 7 Cal. 56 Cited among older authorities on instalment clauses and limitation; in Mon Mohun Roy it is treated as authority inconsistent with Chandra Kamal Das and supportive of the view that limitation runs from first default. The Court accepted the treatment of this case as supporting the general rule that limitation commences at first default, and used it to undermine the reasoning of Chandra Kamal Das.
Nilmadhub Chuckerbutty v. Ramsodoy Ghose, I.L.R. 9 Cal. 857 One of the cases considered in the body of authorities dealing with when limitation begins under instalment decrees. Referred to as part of the body of authorities that Mon Mohun Roy considered; applied as part of the consistent current of cases on the point.
Ram Culpo Bhattacharji v. Ram Chunder Shome, I.L.R. 14 Cal. 352 Another authority considered with respect to the rule that limitation runs from the first default under an instalment clause. Considered within the series of authorities supporting the rule that limitation commences when the first default occurs.
Chenibash Shaha v. Sridam Mandal, I.L.R. 5 Cal. 97 Earlier decision inconsistent with the view in Chandra Kamal Das; part of the jurisprudential current relied on in Mon Mohun Roy. Used by the Court to show inconsistency of Chandra Kamal Das with established decisions; helped support the conclusion that waiver requires payment and acceptance, not mere abstinence.
Bir Narain Panda v. Darpa Naram Prodhan, I.L.R. 20 Cal. 74 Involved a bond with terms similar to the present case; the First Instance judgment treated an application to execute the whole decree as barred; the High Court observed but did not approve a waiver argument that was not raised below. The Court observed that Bir Narain Panda did not support the present appellant's waiver contention; the High Court in that case declined to express approval of the doctrine of waiver by abstinence.
Fakir Chand Bose v. Madan Mohan Ghose, 4 B.L.R. F.B. 130 (Full Bench) Full Bench authority holding that a decree-holder may prove payment (even if not certified to the Court under the relevant provision) for the purpose of showing when limitation began to run. The Court relied on this Full Bench decision to hold that the decree-holder could produce the account book to prove payment for the limited purpose of demonstrating that limitation had not begun to run from the first instalment.
Mitthu Lal v. Khairati Lal, I.L.R. 12 All. 569 A decision by Tyrrell, J., which held that changes in the wording of the relevant section rendered the Full Bench ruling (Fakir Chand Bose) inapplicable. The Court disagreed with Mitthu Lal, concluding that the Full Bench ruling remained persuasive and that the decree-holder could prove payment notwithstanding the wording of Section 258.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed the question whether the wording of the decree (giving the decree-holder the "power" to make the whole sum due on default) permitted the decree-holder to waive the consequence of a default by mere abstinence from suing, thereby preventing limitation from running from the date of the first default.

The Court examined prior authorities and found that Mon Mohun Roy v. Durga Churn Gooee (I.L.R. 15 Cal. 502) stated the governing rule: where a decree makes money payable by instalments and provides that on default the whole shall become due, limitation commences to run when the first default occurs. Mon Mohun Roy also recognized a limited exception — where the creditor and debtor have waived the penalty by payment and receipt of the overdue instalment, the parties are restored to a position as if no default had occurred.

The Court considered Chandra Kamal Das v. Bissessurree Dassia (13 C.L.R. 243), which had been cited by the appellant as authority for the proposition that the proviso was merely protective and could be waived by the creditor's abstinence. The Court rejected Chandra Kamal Das, characterizing it as an outlier inconsistent with the prevailing line of decisions (including Chenibash Shaha) and with Mon Mohun Roy. The Court concluded that mere abstinence from suing does not amount to a waiver capable of affecting limitation and that waiver, for the purposes relevant to limitation, requires payment and acceptance of an overdue instalment.

The Court also rejected any distinction between clauses that make the whole amount "shall" become due and clauses that make the whole amount "may" be sued for: the Court found no reason why limitation should run differently in the two formulations and interpreted the clause in the present decree (which conferred power to realize the whole) as effectively being the usual condition that on non-payment the whole amount would become exigible.

Turning to the admissibility of the account book, the Court held that the Munsif erred in refusing to admit it while the decree-holder's first witness was under examination. The decree-holder could not reasonably be expected to anticipate the denial of payment at the time of filing the execution application and should not be required to pre-file every document that might be needed if the judgment-debtors later raised an objection. The Court observed that, although Section 258 of the Civil Procedure Code may prevent recognition of such a payment as an adjustment of the decree, it does not prevent the decree-holder from proving that a payment was made for the specific purpose of showing when limitation began to run. The Court relied on the Full Bench decision in Fakir Chand Bose v. Madan Mohan Ghose as supporting this approach and rejected the narrower view taken in Mitthu Lal v. Khairati Lal.

On the basis of these conclusions the Court directed that the matter be remanded to the Court of First Instance with instructions to admit the account book into evidence, allow it to be proved, and then reach findings on whether the first instalment had in fact been paid. The Court then set out the immediate consequences to follow depending on that factual determination.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal was allowed in part: the case is remanded to the Court of First Instance with directions to admit and allow proof of the account book and, after giving opportunity for proof, to determine whether the first instalment was paid. If the alleged payment is proven, the decree-holder's application for execution in respect of instalments not barred by limitation should be allowed; if the alleged payment is not proven, the application for execution should be rejected.

Consequences for the parties:

  • If the account book is found to be genuine and proves payment of the first instalment, the decree-holder's application for execution in respect of the subsequent instalments (those falling within three years of the execution application) should be allowed.
  • If the alleged payment is found not to have been made, execution in respect of the remaining instalments is barred by limitation and the application should be rejected.

The Court expressly declined to follow Chandra Kamal Das v. Bissessurree Dassia and affirmed the rule, as stated in Mon Mohun Roy v. Durga Churn Gooee, that limitation runs from the first default unless the creditor and debtor have waived the penalty by payment and receipt of the overdue instalment. The opinion does not announce or characterize any novel, binding precedent beyond applying and reconciling the authorities already in the record.

Costs: Costs to abide the result.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an appeal against a decree of the District Judge of Bhagalpur, affirming the judgment of the Munsif of Banka. The appellant before us applied to the Munsif on the 9th February 1892 for execution of a decree obtained by him against the respondents on the 18th April 1888. He had sued the respondents on a bond, and a compromise had been effected, making the sum claimed payable by instalments. This compromise was given effect to in the decree of the 18th April 1888. The first instalment was payable on the 26th April 1888, and admittedly more than three years have elapsed between that date and the date of the application to the Munsif for execution. But the dates of payment of the other instalments are within three years of the date of the application to the Munsif. The decree of the 18th April 1888 provides that if the instalments are not paid on the dates fixed for their payments, then

"the plaintiff will have the power to cancel the instalments and realize the entire amount with interest."

2. The appellant when he applied to the Munsif for execution alleged that the first instalment had been paid, and applied for execution of his decree in respect of the other instalments. The judgment-debtors, however, denied that they had paid any instalment, and contended that the execution of the decree was accordingly barred by limitation.

3. The Munsif found both these points in favour of the judgment-debtors, and as already said, the District Judge affirmed his findings. Hence this appeal. Before us, it is urged (1) that the Munsif wrongly refused to admit in evidence an account book which the decree-holder wished to file in support of his plea of payment of the first instalment; and (2) that as by the terms of the decree of the 18th April 1888, on non-payment of any instalment he has the power, but is not obliged to treat the whole decretal amount as due, the rulings cited by the Munsif, viz., Judhistir Patro v. Nobin Chandra Khela I.L.R. 13 Cal. 73 and Mon Mohun Roy v. Durga Churn Gooee I.L.R. 15 Cal. 502 are inapplicable, and therefore, that whether the first instalment has been paid or not, the execution of the decree for the remaining instalment is not barred.

4. We will deal first with the second of these contentions. In support of this plea, the learned pleader for the appellants relies on the case of Chandra Kamal Das v. Bissessurree. Dassia 13 C.L.R. 243, and has also cited the cases of Asmutullah Dalal v. Cally Churn Mitter I.L.R. 7 Cal. 56, Nilmadhub Chuckerbutty v. Ramsodoy Ghose I.L.R. 9 Cal. 857, and Ram Culpo Bhattacharji v. Ram Chunder Shome I.L.R. 14 Cal. 352. But all these cases have been considered in the second of the cases referred to by the Munsif, viz., Mon Mohun Roy v. Darya Churn Gooee I.L.R. 15 Cal. 502. In this case it is said that the rule to be deduced from all the cases is that when a decree or order makes a sum of money payable by instalments on certain dates, and provides that on default of payment of one of the instalments, the whole of the money shall become due and payable, and be recoverable in execution, then under a 179 of the Limitation Act, as under corresponding articles in earlier Acts, limitation commences to run when the first default is made." It is further said "that there has been engrafted on this general rule an exception to the effect that if the right to enforce payment of the whole sum due upon default being made in the payment of an instalment has been waived by subsequent payment of the overdue instalment on the one hand and receipt on the other, then the penalty having been waived, the parties are remitted to the same position as they would have been in if no default had occurred. The authorities are quite consistent with one another. The only case which seems to me to conflict in any way with these cases is the case of Chandra Kamal Das v. Bissessurree Dassia 13 C.L.R. 243." (This is the case relied on by the learned pleader for the appellant before us)--"There it does appear to me to have been held that although in a case similar to the present defaults had occurred and no subsequent payment had been made in respect of the kists in default, it was still open to the creditor to say that the provision making the whole sum payable on default of payment of one instalment was one only for his protection, and that he might afterwards waive it and put it out of the way as regards the period of limitation. This seems to me irreconcilable, if I correctly understand it, with the current of decisions on the subject, and especially inconsistent with the decision in Chenibash Shaha v. Sridam, Mandal I.L.R. 5 Cal. 97. I am disposed to think that there must have been some peculiarity in the case beyond what appears in the report, because the learned Judges cite as an authority in support of their view the case of Asmatullah Dalal v. Kally Churn Mitter I.L.R. 7 Cal. 56 which appears to me, as I understand it, to be an authority for the contrary view."

5. It is clear then that the learned Judges who decided Mon Mohun Roy v. Durga Churn Gooee I.L.R. 15 Cal. 502 did not approve of the decision in Chandra Kamal Das v. Bissessurree Dassia 13 C.L.R. 243 and dissented from the view therein expressed as strongly as it was possible for them to do. As the ruling in this case stands alone and is contrary to the current of decisions in respect of this matter, we are unable to follow it. We cannot hold that mere abstinence from suing can amount to waiver, or that there can be any waiver so as to affect limitation save by payment and acceptance of an overdue instalment. Nor do we think that any distinction can be drawn, as has been attempted in this case to be drawn, between a case in which it is provided that on non-payment of an instalment the whole amount shall become due, and one in which it is provided that on non-payment of an instalment the whole amount may be sued for. There seems no reason why limitation should begin to run in the one case and not in the other. Finally, we may say that the clause in the decree on which the appellant relies in this case to the effect that on nonpayment of an instalment it shall be in the power of the decree-holder to realize the full amount appears to us to have probably never been intended to give the decree-holder the option of waiving the default if he pleased, and that it implied nothing more than the usual condition that on non-payment of an instalment the whole decretal amount would become exigible.

6. Another case has been cited before us, viz., Bir Narain Panda v. Darpa Naram Prodhan I.L.R. 20 Cal. 74. The terms of the bond sued on in that case are very similar to those of the present appellant's decree, for the bond provided that on default of payment of one instalment, the plaintiff should be competent to take out execution and realize the full amount. The decree-holder, as in this case, alleged payments, which were found not to have been made, and applied for execution of the whole decree. He did not, as pointed out in the judgment in this case, "make any application to be allowed to execute the decree in respect of the instalments that fell due within three years before the date of his application. But the Court of First Instance," it is said, "in its judgment noticed the point as to whether such application, if it had been made, would not be barred, and it held upon the authority of the case of Mon Mohun Roy v. Durga Churn Gooee I.L.R. 15 Cal. 502 that an application of that kind would be barred." The contention was, however, raised in the High Court, and the pleader for the appellant in this case has pressed upon our attention the passage in that judgment in which it is said--" But it has been argued that though that was so, yet, as the proviso authorising the decree-holder to execute the decree in the event of default in the payment of any instalment was a provision for his benefit, it was competent to him to waive the benefit of the proviso and claim execution only in respect of the instalments that were not barred." But this can scarcely be said to be in favour of the present appellant, for though no doubt the Court did not say that this plea would not be a good one, if raised, but merely contended itself with observing that it had not been raised in the Courts below and could not have been raised in the circumstances of the case, yet it did not in any way express approval of this doctrine. Hence, taking into consideration the state of the authorities on this point, we are not prepared to admit that there is any force in the contention of the appellant that, owing to the terms of the decree, he had a right to waive any default that may have been made in payment of the first instalment and that even if he merely abstained from taking out execution on such a default being made limitation did not necessarily begin to run against him.

7. We now turn to the first of the appellant's pleader's contentions. We are of opinion that the Court of First Instance should not have refused to admit in evidence the account book which the decree-holder wished to produce, and prove, when his first witness was under examination. He wished to produce this account book to disprove the plea of non-payment set up by the judgment-debtors. He could not be expected to have anticipated this plea at the time of his presenting his application for execution, and there is nothing which makes it necessary for him to file with his application all documents which on an objection to execution being raised by the judgment-debtors it may be necessary for him to produce in Court to repel that objection. The learned pleader for the judgment-debtors argues that under the last clause of Section 258, Civil Procedure Code, as the payment in question was not certified to the Court, the decree-holder was not entitled to prove it. We are, however, of opinion that though under the provisions of Section 258, Civil Procedure Code, the payment in question, if made, could not be recognized as a payment or adjustment of the decree, yet it was and is competent to the decree-holder to prove this payment for the purpose of showing that the period of limitation did not begin to run in this case until the default made in respect of the second instalment. See the Full Bench case of Fakir Chand Bose v. Madan Mohan Ghose 4 B.L.R. F.B. 130. It is true that this case refers to the provisions of Section 206 of Act VIII of 1859, but they do not appear to us to be on this point materially different from those of section 258 of the present code. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the ruling in the case of Mitthu Lal v. Khairati Lal I.L.R. 12 All. 569 decided by Tyrrell, J., who appears to have considered that in consequence of the alteration in the wording of the section, the Full Bench ruling of this Court cited above ceases to have any weight.

8. We, therefore, consider that this case must be remanded to the Court of First Instance with directions to admit in evidence the account book, which the decree-holder wished to produce, and after giving an opportunity for its being proved that it will come to a finding as to the alleged payment of the first instalment. It may be that if the account book be found genuine, the evidence as to the payment already given will present a different aspect.

9. If the alleged payment be found not to have been made, then in accordance with our decision on the appellant's first contention, the application for execution should be rejected. If the alleged payment be found to have been made, the decree-holder's application should be allowed.

10. Costs to abide the result.