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Bir Chunder Manikya v. Raj Mohun Goswami And Ors And Nil

Calcutta High Court
Jan 15, 1889
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Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, the zamindar of Chuckla Rashinabad, instituted a suit on 28 December 1861 in the Collector's Court against Choituno Mohun Adhicary seeking resumption and a declaration of the plaintiff's right to assess rent upon certain lands which the defendant held as lakheraj. An ex parte decree was passed in January 1863 stating: "The suit be decreed, and the land in dispute be declared to be shukur." The decree itself does not state under which law it was passed nor whether the grant relied on by the lakherajdars was anterior or subsequent to December 1790.

Subsequent to Bengal Act VII of 1862 (which transferred suits instituted under Section 30, Regulation II of 1819 from the Collector's Court to the Civil Court), the suit was transferred to the Civil Court. No further action was taken pursuant to the 1863 decree until 1886, when the zamindar served notice on the defendant's representatives and then brought a new suit on 12 July 1886 to have the lands assessed at a stated jumma and to recover rent at that rate.

The lower Courts dismissed the 1886 suit as barred by limitation. The plaintiff appealed; the present opinion addresses that appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff's claim in the 1886 suit is barred by limitation under Article 130 of the Limitation Act.
  2. Whether the effect of the 1863 resumption decree was to re-annex the lands to the zamindar's mal estate and thereby create the landlord-tenant relationship such that Article 130 would not apply (i.e., whether the decree itself obviated the need for a fresh suit within twelve years to assess the lands).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (represented by Mr. O'Kinealy) contended that although more than twelve years had elapsed since the 1863 decree, limitation should not bar the 1886 suit because the decree re-annexed the land improperly alienated after 1790 to the mal estate of the zamindar and thereby created the landlord-tenant relation between the parties.
  • Consequently, Article 130 of the Limitation Act would have no application in the appellant's view because the necessary legal relationship (landlord and tenant) had already been established by the decree.
  • The appellant relied upon several prior rulings of the Court (Madhusudan Sagory v. Nipal Khan; Saudamini Debi v. Sarup Chandra Boy; Pratap Chunder Chowdhry v. Shukhee Soondaree Dassee) to support the contention that the decree had the effect asserted by the plaintiff.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The opinion records that the respondent's vakil brought to the Court's attention an unreported Divisional Bench decision in Second Appeal No. 1605 of 1885 (MITTER and Grant, JJ.), decided 13 May 1886, which held facts very similar to the present case and concluded the plaintiff's claim was barred under Article 130 of the Limitation Act. The respondent relied on that decision to support dismissal for limitation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sonatun Ghosa v. Abdvol Farrar, B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 109 : 2 W.R. 91 The majority held that Section 30, Regulation II of 1819 related only to resumption of lakheraj existing prior to 1790. The Court relied on this principle to infer that the post-1862 transfer of the suit to the Civil Court indicated the original suit was brought under Section 30 (i.e., likely concerned a grant anterior to 1790), which was material to the limitation analysis.
Madhusudan Sagory v. Nipal Khan, 8 B.L.R. Ap. 87 (note) : 15 W.R. 440 Held that for decrees passed before the Full Bench decision in Sonatun Ghose it could not be assumed, merely because the procedural steps of Section 30 were followed, that the grant was anterior to December 1790; the question of limitation was not raised in that case. The Court observed this decision does not contradict its conclusion here and distinguished the facts: the resumption case before the Court in that decision had an express finding that the defendant had failed to prove that lakheraj existed before 1790, whereas in the present case there is no such finding in the decree.
Saudamini Debi v. Sarup Chandra Boy, 8 B.L.R. Ap. 82 : 17 W.R. 363 The decision did not raise the question of limitation. The Court noted there is nothing in this decision that militates against the view that the present plaintiff's claim is barred by limitation.
Pratap Chunder Chowdhry v. Shukhee Soondaree Dassee, 2 C.L.R. 569 The judgment in that case proceeded mainly upon the construction placed upon the resumption decree before the Court there: that decree was construed to declare the land part of the permanently-settled estate and to re-annex it to the zemindar's estate. The Court stated that it did not have the terms of the decree in that case before it and could not adopt the same construction here because the present decree's terms did not enable the same conclusion.
Madhub Chandra Bhadory v. Mahima Chandra Mazumdar, 8 B.L.R. Ap. 83 (note) : 12 W.R. 442 Established that a decree for resumption of a lakheraj grant anterior to December 1790 does not by itself create the landlord-tenant relationship; that relationship arises only after the decree is followed by proceedings to assess revenue and when the lakherajdar agrees to pay the assessed revenue. The Court relied on this principle to hold that, because the 1863 decree's words do not show assessment or agreement, the decree alone did not establish a landlord-tenant relationship for limitation purposes.
Shamasunden Debi v. Sital Khan, 8 B.L.R. Ap. 85 (note) : 15 W.R. 474 Same principle as above regarding the necessity of assessment and agreement after a resumption decree for creation of landlord-tenant relation where grant is anterior to 1790. Cited together with Madhub Chandra Bhadory to support the proposition that the decree alone, without subsequent assessment, does not create the landlord-tenant relation.
Second Appeal No. 1605 of 1885 (unreported; MITTER and Grant, JJ.), decided 13 May 1886 Held that a plaintiff's claim under similar facts was barred under Article 130 of the Limitation Act. The Court considered this unreported Divisional Bench decision to be closely analogous and expressly concurred in its ruling, using it to support the dismissal of the appeal for being barred by Article 130.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis centers on the construction and legal effect of the 1863 resumption decree. The reasoning proceeds in these principal steps, as expressed in the opinion:

  1. The decree's language does not specify under which statute it was passed nor whether the grant asserted by the lakherajdars was anterior or subsequent to December 1790. Because that factual or legal detail is absent from the decree, the Court cannot assume that the decree, by its terms alone, established the landlord-tenant relationship for limitation purposes.
  2. The timing of procedural events is significant: the suit was transferred from the Collector's to the Civil Court immediately after Bengal Act VII of 1862 (which transferred suits instituted under Section 30, Regulation II of 1819). The Court regarded this transfer, made without any special reason stated, as indicating the original suit was likely brought under Section 30 and therefore concerned a grant anterior to 1790 (as per the Sonatun Ghosa decision).
  3. The Court applied prior authority (Madhub Chandra Bhadory and Shamasunden Debi) to the effect that where a resumption decree relates to a grant anterior to 1790, the decree itself does not by itself create the landlord-tenant relation. That relation arises only if the decree is followed by proceedings to assess revenue and the lakherajdar's agreement to pay the assessment. Since the decree at issue does not show any such assessment or agreement, it cannot be read (on its bare words) as having created the landlord-tenant relation.
  4. Because the 1863 decree, read literally, merely pronounces that the lakheraj is not valid and that the lands are liable to pay revenue or rent "as the case might be," but does not declare that the lands belong to the mal estate or evidence subsequent assessment, the plaintiff remained obliged to bring a suit for assessment within twelve years of the decree.
  5. The Court examined the cases relied upon by the appellant and concluded that two of them (Madhusudan Sagory and Saudamini Debi) did not address limitation and do not conflict with the present conclusion; the facts of the other decisions (notably Pratap/Protap Chunder Chowdhry) involved different decree language or factual findings that justified a different construction in those cases.
  6. An unreported Divisional Bench decision (Second Appeal No. 1605 of 1885) with closely similar facts had held the plaintiff's claim barred under Article 130; the Court expressly concurred with that ruling and adopted it as supporting the lower Courts' dismissal.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is dismissed with costs. The Court upheld the conclusions of the lower Courts that the plaintiff's 1886 suit was barred by limitation under Article 130 of the Limitation Act.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The Court held that, on the face of the 1863 decree, the landlord-tenant relationship was not established for the purposes of limitation because the decree does not disclose the law under which it was passed nor whether the grant was anterior or subsequent to December 1790, nor does it show subsequent proceedings of assessment and agreement to pay revenue.
  • Accordingly, the plaintiff was bound to bring a suit for assessment within twelve years from the date of the 1863 decree; having failed to do so, the 1886 suit was properly dismissed as barred by Article 130.
  • The Court expressly concurred with an earlier unreported Divisional Bench decision with similar facts and applied that reasoning to dismiss the appeal.
  • Appeal Nos. 2219, 2230 and 2233 were governed by this decision and were likewise dismissed with costs. In one of those cases the Court noted additionally that the predecessor of the present defendant was no party to the resumption decree, further establishing that the plaintiff's suit in that instance was barred by limitation.
  • No novel legal principle was announced that departs from the authorities cited; the decision applies existing principles to the facts and does not purport to set a new precedent beyond its application to the appeals before the Court.
Show all summary ...

1. The question involved in this appeal is one of limitation under Article 130 of the second schedule of Act XV of 1877; and it arises in this way:

The plaintiff, who is the zamindar of Chuckla Rashinabad, instituted a suit on the 28th of December 1861 against one Choituno Mohun Adhicary in the Collector's Court for the purpose of resuming, and for having his right declared to assess rent upon, certain lands within the ambit of his. zemindari which he, the defendant, held as lakheraj. It does not appear from the decree pronounced in that suit, and which we may here mention is the only proceeding before us in connection with it, whether it was a suit under the provisions of Section 30, Regulation II of 1819, or Section 28,1 Act X of 1859, or under any other law; but we have it that subsequently to the passing of Bengal Act VII of 1862, which provided for the transfer of suits instituted under Section 30, Regulation II of 1819, from the Collector's Court to the Civil Court, that suit was transferred from the Collector's to the Civil Court; and there can be little doubt that, as this transfer was made immediately after the passing of that Act, and no special reason is assigned for its transfer, it was made in consequence, and that, therefore, the suit had been brought under Section 30, Regulation II of 1819. And we may here observe that if it had been a suit under Act X of 1859, there was nothing to prevent the Collector from proceeding with it. In the Full Bench case of Sonatun Ghosa v. Abdvol Farrar B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 109 : 2 W.R. 91, the majority of the Judges who constituted that Bench held that Section 30, Regulation II of 1819, related only to resumption of lakheraj existing prior to 1790. And if this suit be regarded as one brought under that law, it would seem that it was barred under the law of limitation then in force (XIV of 1859, Section 14).2 But however that may be, an ex parte decree was passed in January 1863 in these words: "The suit be decreed, and the land in dispute be declared to be shukur." These words, taken with the recitals of the claim given in the decree, mean, as we take it, that the prayer for resumption of the lakheraj be allowed, and the lands be declared liable to pay revenue or rent, as the case might be, with reference to the grant set up being either anterior or posterior to December 1790.

2. Nothing was done in furtherance of that decree, until the year 1886, when a notice was served by the zemindar upon the defendants, who are the representatives of Choituno Mohun Adhicary, calling upon them to agree to hold the lands at a certain jumma; and he subsequently brought the present suit on the 12th of July 1886 for the purpose of assessing the lands at the rate mentioned in the notice, and for recovery of rent at that rate.

3. This suit has been dismissed by both the lower Courts as barred by limitation.

4. The main contention that was raised before us by Mr. O'Kinealy, the learned Counsel for the appellant, was that, although more than 12 years have elapsed from the date of the decree of 1863, still no limitation would apply, because the effect of the decree was to re-annex the land that had been improperly alienated after 1790 to the mal estate of the zemindar, and to create between the parties the relationship of landlord and tenant. Mr. O'Kinealy further contended that the land having been already declared to be mal, Article 130 of the Limitation Act had no application. And he relied upon the rulings of this Court in Madhusudan Sagory v. Nipal Khan 8 B.L.R. Ap. 87 (note) : 15 W.R. 440, Saudamini Debi v. Sarup Chandra Boy 8 B.L.R. Ap. 82 : 17 W.R. 363, and Pratap Chunder Chowdhry v. Shukhee Soondaree Dassee 2 C.L.R. 569.

5. The validity of the contention raised before us depends entirely upon what may be the true interpretation and effect of the resumption decree passed in January 1863. That decree, as already mentioned, does not show under what law it was passed, nor is there anything stated in it as to whether the grant set up by the lakherajdars was a grant subsequent or anterior to December 1790. Unless this be shown, we cannot say that the effect of the decree was to establish, as contended for the appellant, the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It has been held in certain cases by this Court that a decree for resumption of a lakheraj grant before December 1790 does not by itself create such a relation; that it is after the decree has been followed up by a proceeding assessing the revenue payable by the lakherajdar, and when the latter agrees to pay the revenue assessed, that such a relationship is created; while in the case of a grant subsequent to the year 1790, the decree declaring the zemindar's right to assess rent does establish such a relation. See Madhub Chandra Bhadory v. Mahima Chandra Mazumdar 8 B.L.R. Ap. 83 (note) : 12 W.R. 442, and Shamasunden Debi v. Sital Khan 8 B.L.R. Ap. 85 (note) : 15 W.R. 474.

6. Taking the law as thus laid down we think that, in the absence of anything being shown by the plaintiff as to the law under which the above decree was passed, and whether the alienation was anterior or subsequent to the year 1790, we cannot say for him, upon the bare words of the decree, that it established the relationship of landlord and tenant; while, on the other hand, the fact of the suit being transferred after the passing of bengal act vii of 1862 from the Collector's to the Civil Court indicates to our mind that it was a suit under Section 30, Regulation II of 1819, which related to the resumption of grants made before the year 1790. If the alienation was made before that year, there can be no doubt that the decree was in respect of lands falling within section 6, regulation xix of 1793, and it follows that the zemindar was bound to have adopted the procedure laid down by sections 8 and 9, regulation xix of 1793, for the assessment of revenue upon those lands. And if this had been done, the relationship of landlord and tenant would have been established between the parties. But so far as the words of the decree of 1863 are concerned, they merely amount to this, that the lakheraj is not a valid one, and that the lands are liable to pay revenue or rent, as the case might be. It does not declare that the land* belong to the mal estate of the zemindar.

7. If this decree did not establish the relationship of landlord and tenant, and if it did not declare that the lands were the mat land of the zemindar, it seems to us to be clear that the plaintiff was bound to have brought his suit within twelve years from the date thereof for the assessment of the lands.

8. As to two of the cases relied upon by Mr. O'Klnealy, viz., Madhvsudan Sagory v. Nipal Khan 8 B.L.R. Ap. 87 (note); 15 W.R. 440 and Saudamini Debi v. Sarup Chandra Boy 8 13. L.R. Ap. 82 : 17 W.R. 363, we may observe that the question of limitation was not raised in either of them; and there is nothing in those decisions, as we understand them, which militates against the view we have expressed. It was no doubt laid down in the first of these two cases that, in regard to decrees passed before the Full Bench decision in the case of Sonatun Ghose v. Abdool Farrar B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 109 : 2 W.R. 91, it could not be said that merely because the procedure laid down in Section 30, Regulation II of 1819, was followed, it must be inferred that the grant was anterior to December 1790. But it is to be observed that it was found in the judgment delivered in the resumption case, which was before the Judges in the above case, that the defendant had failed to prove that the lakheraj existed prior to 1790; while so far as the resumption decree with which we are concerned, there was no such finding: and, in the second place, as already remarked, there are other facts before us which lead us to infer that the grant which was the subject-matter of the decree of 1863 was one anterior to 1790.

9. As regards the other case relied upon by Mr. O'KINEALY, viz. Protap Chunder Chowdhry v. Shukhee Soondarte Dassee 2 C.L.R. 569, it is sufficient to state that the judgment proceeds mainly upon the construction which the learned Judges put upon the resumption decree that was before them. That decree was construed to have the effect of declaring

"that the land in the possession of the defendant had been part of the permanently-settled estate, and had been separated by an invalid grant, and thereon to resume the same and re-annex the land to the zemindar's estate."
We have not before us the terms of the decree in that case, nor do we know what were the facts from which this construction was arrived at. The terms of the decree in the suit of 1886, now before us, do not however enable us to come to the same conclusion.

10. Our attention has been called by the learned vakil for the respondent to an unreported decision by another Divisional Bench of this Court (MITTER and Grant, JJ.) in Second Appeal No. 1605 of 1885, decided on the l3th May 1886, which altogether supports the view adopted by the lower Appellate Court, holding that the plaintiff's claim was barred under Article 130 of the Limitation Act. The facts of that case were very similar to this, and we may say that we quite concur in that ruling.

11. The appeal will accordingly be dismissed with costs.

12. Appeal Nos. 2219, 2230, 2233 will be governed by the decision in No. 223. And so far as the latter of these cases is concerned, it being found that the predecessor of the present defendant was no party to the resumption decree, there can be no question whatever that the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation. These appeals are accordingly dismissed with costs.

1 Application to dispossess grantees of land exempt from revenue.

[Section 28: So much of Section X, Regulation XIX, 1793, Section X, Regulation XLI, 1795, Section VI, Regulation XXXI, 1803, Section XXI, Regulation VIII, 1805, and Section XXIV, Regulation XII, 1805, as authorises and requires proprietors and fanners of estates and dependent talooka, in cases in which grants for holding land exempt from the payment of revenue have been made subsequent to the dates specfied in the said sections, of their own authority to collect the rents of such land and to dispossess the grantees of the proprietary right in the land and to re-annex it to the estate or talookln which it may be situate, is repealed; and any proprietor or farmer who may desire to assess any such land or to dispossess any such grantee shall make application to the Collector, and such application shall be dealt with as a suit under the provisions of this Act. Every such suit shall be instituted within the period of twelve years from the time when the title of the person claiming the right to assess the land or dispossess the grantee, or of some person claiming under him, first accrued. If such period has already elapsed or will elapse within two years from the date of the passing of this Act, such suit may be brought at any time within two years from such date.] 2 computation of period of limitation in case of suit prosecuted bona fide but in wrong court.

[Section 14: In computing any period of limitation prescribed by this Act, the time during which the claimant, or any person under whom he claims, shall have been engaged in prosecuting a suit upon the same cause of action against the same defendant, or some person whom he represents, bond fide and with due diligence, in any Court of judicature which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause, shall have been unable to decide upon it, or shall have passed a decision which, on appeal, shall have been annulled for any such cause, including the time during which such appeal, if any, has been pending, shall be excluded from such computation.]