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Koer Hasmat Rai And Anr. v. Sunder Das And Ors.

Calcutta High Court
Mar 6, 1885
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Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs, sons of Raja Dunput Rai, brought a suit on 18th July 1881 to recover possession of a two-thirds share (10-anna 8-pie) of certain mouzahs sold by their father on 14th April 1874 for Rs. 10,000. The plaintiffs alleged that the sale was invalid as it lacked a valid necessity, particularly since the sale was made while they were minors. The suit was challenged on the basis that it did not include the entire family property, which could affect equitable partition. The defendants did not raise this objection but defended the sale as justified under Mitakshara law due to necessity. The lower Court dismissed the suit in favor of the defendants, but the appellate court disagreed with the lower Court’s conclusion regarding necessity.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale of the disputed mouzahs by the father to the defendants was justified by valid necessity under Mitakshara law.
  2. Whether the plaintiffs can recover possession of the property without refunding the purchase-money paid to the defendants.
  3. Whether the plaintiffs proved that the purchase-money was raised for immoral purposes under Hindu shastras, which would affect liability.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The sale was invalid because there was no valid necessity justifying the father’s sale of family property while the plaintiffs were minors.
  • They sought recovery of possession of a share of the mouzahs sold.
  • They intimated willingness to accept a decree conditioned on refunding the purchase-money, but ultimately were unwilling to do so.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The sale was justified by necessity under Mitakshara law, as stated in their written statement: the income from the disputed properties was insufficient to cover revenue and expenses, and the father wished to invest the consideration money advantageously.
  • Evidence was later presented to prove the money was required for the marriage expenses of the vendor’s daughter, a case not pleaded in the written statement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Modhoo Dyal Singh v. Golbur Singh, 9 W.R. 511 Principle regarding liability for debts contracted by the father under Mitakshara law. Cited by plaintiffs’ counsel but considered virtually overruled by a later ruling.
Girdharee Lall v. Kanto, L.R. 1 I.A. 321 Under Mitakshara law, sons are liable to pay debts contracted by their father unless debts were for immoral purposes. Applied by the Court to hold that plaintiffs must refund purchase-money to recover property unless they prove immoral purpose.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the validity of the sale under Mitakshara law, focusing on whether there was a valid necessity justifying the father’s alienation of family property. The Court found that the necessity case pleaded in the written statement—that the income was insufficient and the father wished to invest the money—was not supported by the evidence, which instead pointed to a different necessity (marriage expenses) not pleaded in the written statement or conveyance. The Court held that such unpleaded evidence should not be accepted without explanation, which was not provided.

Despite disagreeing with the lower Court on this point, the Court upheld the dismissal of the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs could not recover the property without refunding the purchase-money. The Court relied on the principle from Girdharee Lall v. Kanto that the sons are liable for debts contracted by their father unless for immoral purposes, and since the plaintiffs failed to prove the money was raised for immoral purposes, they must refund the purchase-money to recover the property.

The Court noted the plaintiffs’ willingness to accept a decree conditioned on refunding the purchase-money but found that since the suit did not claim the entire property sold, such a decree could not be granted. Ultimately, the plaintiffs were unwilling to accept the decree on that condition, leading to dismissal of the suit.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

The Court upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ suit to recover possession of the disputed property without refunding the purchase-money paid to the defendants. The ruling clarifies that under Mitakshara law, sons cannot recover ancestral property sold by their father without reimbursing the purchase-money unless they prove the debt was incurred for immoral purposes. No new precedent was established; the decision directly affects the parties by confirming the lower Court’s dismissal on this basis.

Show all summary ...

1. The plaintiffs in this case are the sons of Raja Dunput Rai. It appears that, on the 14th April 1874, Raja Dunput Rai sold the whole of the disputed mouzahs to one of the defendants, and the ancestor of the other defendants, for Rs. 10,000. One of the plaintiffs in this case is an adult, and the other plaintiff is still a minor. The present suit was brought on the 18th July 1881 to recover possession of a 10-anna 8-pie, that is, a two-thirds share of the mouzahs sold, on the allegation that there was no such valid necessity as would justify the sale of the family property by the father while the plaintiffs were minors. If this suit be treated as one for partition, the plaint was open to the objection that the whole of the family property was not included in it. This is not a mere technical objection because on partition of the whole of the joint family property the mouzahs in dispute might under certain circumstances fall entirely to the father's share. For example, if there be any other property belonging to the joint family, the value of which is equal to a 10 anna 8 pie share of the disputed mouzahs, a Court dealing whith the question of partition might think it equitable to allot the whole of the disputed mouzahs to the father's share, assigning the other property of equal value to the sons.

2. This objection, however, was not taken by the defendants in the written statement. The defendants defended the suit upon the ground that the sale was made under such circumstances as would justify the sale by the father under the Mitakshara law.

3. The lower Court dismissed the suit, finding in favour of the defendants' plea taken in the written statement. But upon the evidence adduced in the lower Court we are not satisfied that there was any valid necessity for the sale, and we are unable to agree in the lower Court's conclusion upon this point.

4. The main ground upon which we are of opinion that that conclusion is not correct is, that the ease of necessity, which was attempted to be proved upon the evidence, was not the case which was put forward in the written statement. In the 11th paragraph the defendants said: "The real cause of alienation is "that the income derived from the disputed properties was very small, and "that the revenue and other necessary expenses could not be paid out of the "same, and as the residence of the father of the plaintiffs was at a great "distance from this district, there was no hope of enhancing the jumma also. "The consideration money offered on behalf of your petitioners was very large, "considering the amount of income derived therefrom. He considered it to be "advantageous to invest that money in another business, and consequently sold "the said properties in lieu of Rs. 10,000 inclusive of all expenses." But upon the evidence the defendants attempted to prove that this money was required for meeting the expenses of celebrating the marriage of the vendor's daughter. This case of necessity was neither recited in the conveyance nor set up in the written statement in this case. Under these circumstances it seems to us that the evidence adduced by the defendants to establish it should not be accepted as true until its omission from the written statement is satisfactorily explained. No such explanation has been offered.

5. But although we are unable to agree in the opinion of the lower Court upon this point, still we think upon another ground the decree made in the case is correct.

6. In this case there is no dispute that Rs. 10,000 was paid by the vendor for the property in suit to the plaintiff's father; and supposing that that sale is not binding upon them, under the circumstances of this case, they, in our opinion, cannot recover the property without refunding the purchase-money to the defendants.

7. The learned vakeel for the plaintiffs, appellants, cited on this point the Full Bench decision in Modhoo Dyal Singh v. Golbur Singh 9 W.R. 511 but it seems to us that this Full Bench Ruling has been virtually overruled by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Girdharee Lall v. Kanto hall L.R. 1 I.A. 321. It was laid down in that case that under the Mitakshara law the son is bound to pay out of the ancestral property in his hand the debts contracted by his father, unless he can show that these debts were contracted for immoral purposes mentioned in the Hindu shastras. Now, if the sale be set aside in this case, it is clear that the purchaser would be entitled to recover the purchase-money from Raja Dunput Rai, the father of the plaintiff's. It would be, therefore, their father's debt, and unless they show that it was contracted for immoral purposes mentioned in the Hindu shasters the whole of the joint family property, including the disputed mouzahs in their hands, would be liable for it.

8. It follows, therefore, tha.t the plaintiffs in this case cannot recover the whole or any portion of the property sold without refunding the whole of the purchase-money to the purchasers, defendants, unless they show that this money was raised by the father for immoral purposes. Upon this point they adduced some evidence in the lower Court, and we agree with that Court that it is not reliable.

9. The plaintiffs, through their vakeel, intimated that they were willing to take a decree for the whole of the disputed mouzahs on the condition of their refunding the purchase-money, but the suit being not for the whole of the property sold, we cannot award a decree in their favour for it. In this suit they are entitled to a decree for the share claimed if they would agree to pay the whole of the purchase-money to the defendant purchasers. But the learned vakeel who appeared for them informed us that his clients were unwilling to take a decree upon this condition.

10. We are, therefore, of opinion that the plaintiffs' suit should be dismissed. Although we do not agree with the lower Court in the reasons given in the judgment, we think that upon the ground mentioned above the suit was rightly dismissed.

11. The appeal is dismissed with costs.