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Kali Prosad Singh And Anr. v. Anundo Rai And Ors.

Calcutta High Court
Apr 21, 1884
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Bhagulpore in a suit instituted by the plaintiffs-respondents to recover possession of a ghatwali mehal named Kharna. The defendants-appellants (or their predecessors) purchased the property in 1868 at a sale held in execution of a decree against the then ghatwal, Tekait Meghraj Singh, who was the father of plaintiff No. 1.

Plaintiffs alleged that by reason of the nature of the ghatwali tenure and the principles of the Mitakshara law governing the Tekait's family, the sale (alienation) was invalid and that plaintiff No. 1, as eldest son, was entitled to possession on his father's death. Plaintiff No. 2 joined as a purchaser from plaintiff No. 1 of five-eighths of his interest. The lower Court found a mixed set of facts and law, awarding two-thirds of the property to the plaintiffs and one-third to the defendants. Both sides appealed (appeal and cross-appeal).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale of the Kharna ghatwali in execution of a decree against the ghatwal was invalid by reason of the tenure being in its nature inalienable.
  2. If the alienation was bad, whether the present plaintiffs were entitled to recover the property (a question that also involved limitation).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The ghatwali tenure by its nature is inalienable and impartible; accordingly the sale to satisfy the ghatwal's debts was invalid.
  • Primarily relied on the Mitakshara law as modified by a family custom that the eldest son alone succeeds to possession; plaintiff No. 1, being the eldest son and an adult when the debt was incurred, should have been required to consent to any alienation.
  • Asserted a vested interest by birth in the ghatwali (implying an interest enforceable on the death of the ghatwal), and also invoked the special nature of the tenure to affect limitation (i.e., to count limitation from the death of Meghraj Singh rather than from the date of sale).

Defendants' Arguments

  • Denied that plaintiff No. 1 acquired any right in the property by birth under the Mitakshara law, contending the father was sole proprietor and competent to alienate the tenure.
  • Raised a plea of limitation: the right to sue, they said, accrued on the date of sale, and the suit was instituted more than twelve years later.
  • Alleged that the ghatwali tenure had long ago been abolished, so that the property became the absolute property of Meghraj Singh, thereby negating any claim of inalienability.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajah Nilmoni Singh v. Bakranath Singh, L.R. 9 I.A. 104 The Judicial Committee decided ghatwali lands could not be seized in execution of a decree for the debts of a former ghatwal as assets by descent in the hands of his successor; their Lordships also expressed the view that the indivisibility of a ghatwali would make it inalienable. The Court noted the decision but distinguished it: that case related to a jagir in West Burdwan and was considered analogous to Beerbhoom ghatwalis. The appellate Court did not treat it as controlling for Kharukpore ghatwalis.
Division Bench, Second Appeal No. 2451 of 1880 (reported concerning a Shikmi ghatwali) Held that a Shikmi (Beerbhoom) ghatwali could not be seized in execution of a decree for debt (objection taken before any decree was obtained). The Court acknowledged the decision but observed it also concerned a Beerbhoom ghatwali and thus did not dictate the result for Kharukpore ghatwalis.
Rajah Lelanund Singh v. Doorgabutty, W.R. 1864, 249 Used as precedent for propositions concerning transfers of certain ghatwalis and recognition where transfers occurred with assent of the zamindar. The Court relied on this and related decisions to support the proposition that Kharukpore ghatwali transfers have occurred and been recognized when the zamindar assented to and accepted the transferee.
Lalla Gooman Singh v. Grant, 11 W.R. 292 Another decision cited as precedent regarding recognition of transfers in the relevant class of ghatwalis where transfers were made with assent. The Court cited it alongside Rajah Lelanund Singh to show established practice of recognizing transfers with zamindar assent for Kharukpore-type ghatwalis.
Raja Lelanund Singh Bahadoor v. The Government of Bengal, 6 Moore's I.A. 101 Described the status of Kharukpore ghatwals, noting the zamindar retained power to appoint and dismiss ghatwals for non-performance of duties; indicating they were not necessarily held in perpetuity by descendants. The Court used this description to distinguish Kharukpore ghatwalis from Beerbhoom ghatwalis (which had statutory protection), aiding the conclusion that Kharukpore ghatwalis could be transferable subject to zamindar assent.
Regulation XXIX of 1814 (statutory/regulatory provision) Provides that Beerbhoom ghatwals and their descendants shall be maintained in possession in perpetuity so long as they pay revenue and fulfill tenure obligations. The Court contrasted this statutory protection for Beerbhoom ghatwalis with the absence of such a provision for Kharukpore ghatwalis, supporting a distinction between the two classes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate Court first criticized the lower Court's reliance upon the Mitakshara law and family customs to resolve the dispute. The Court emphasized that a ghatwali is a tenure created for a specific public purpose, possessing its own legal incidents independent of any particular personal law or family custom. Therefore, the proper inquiry was the nature and legal rules attaching to the ghatwali tenure itself rather than the application of Mitakshara principles applicable to ancestral joint property.

The Court identified two material questions to decide: (1) whether the sale in execution was invalid because the ghatwali was inalienable, and (2) if the alienation was invalid, whether the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the property (including consideration of limitation).

On the first question the Court surveyed authorities and distinctions between classes of ghatwalis. It acknowledged cases supporting inalienability for certain ghatwalis (notably Beerbhoom) but noted key differences for Kharukpore ghatwalis: there was no statutory provision like Regulation XXIX of 1814 securing hereditary, in-perpetuity tenure, and prior decisions and practice showed transfers of Kharukpore ghatwalis had occurred and been recognized when made with the zamindar's assent. The Court also relied on the description in a Privy Council judgment that the zamindar retained power to appoint and dismiss Kharukpore ghatwals, which negatived a hereditary, unassailable status.

The Court further considered the evidence of many such transfers, the long silence of plaintiff No. 1 and of his father while he lived, and the fact that the zamindar made no objection within twelve years of the sale. The Court treated this long acquiescence by the zamindar as constituting assent. On this basis the Court concluded the transfer was one the Court ought to recognize and that the purposes for which the Kharukpore ghatwalis were created no longer existed so as to compel a contrary conclusion.

On the second question (entitlement to recover), the Court held that the plaintiffs' case failed because their asserted right depended upon formal establishment as ghatwals duly appointed by the zamindar; they did not allege such appointment. The Court reiterated that the claim of a vested interest by birth under Mitakshara was untenable for this tenure-based dispute.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appellate Court allowed the defendants' appeal and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit, with costs of both Courts.

Implications:

  • The sale held in execution in 1868 of the Kharna ghatwali was held valid and not invalidated by a general rule of inalienability applicable to all ghatwalis; the Court treated Kharukpore ghatwalis as transferable where the zamindar assents and accepts the transferee.
  • The plaintiffs could not recover because they did not allege appointment as ghatwals by the zamindar and a claimed vested interest by birth (relying on Mitakshara) was held inapplicable to this tenure dispute.
  • Direct effect: defendants' title by the 1868 sale (recognized by the zamindar's acquiescence) stands; plaintiffs' suit for recovery failed and was dismissed with costs.
  • No broader, novel principle of law was framed by the Court beyond applying and distinguishing existing authorities and statutory provisions to the particular class of ghatwali involved (the Court grounded its decision in earlier cases and the particular facts of zamindar assent and acquiescence).

Prepared from the text of the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion has been added.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an appeal from a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Bhagulpore made in a suit brought by the plaintiffs-respondents to recover possession of a ghatwali mehal named Kharna from the defendants-appellants who, or their predecessors, purchased it in 1868 at a sale held in execution of a decree against the then ghatwal, Tekait Meghraj Singh, father of the plaintiff No. 1.

2. The plaintiffs' case was that from the nature of the tenure in question and under the principles of the Mitakshara law governing the Tekait's family, the alienation was invalid, and that plaintiff No. 1 as eldest son of Meghraj Singh was entitled to hold the estate on the death of his father. Plaintiff No. 2 joined in the suit as purchaser from, plaintiff No. 1 of five-eighths of the latter's interest.

3. The case is in many respects a peculiar one, and the decision of the lower Court partakes also of that character. Both sides have objected to it by way of appeal and cross-appeal.

4. In a case of this kind it might have been expected that the plaintiffs would have relied simply on the inalienable character of a ghatwali tenure, the purpose for which it was created necessitating its being protected from seizure and sale for debt, as well as its impartibility.

5. But the plaint shows that the plaintiffs rely chiefly on the Mitakshara law modified by a family custom that the eldest son alone succeeds to possession. It is alleged that the late holder, though by family usage sole possessor, was precluded by the Mitakshara law from encumbering or alienating the tenure, except for family necessity, without the consent of his son, the plaintiff, who was adult at the time the debt was incurred which formed the basis of the decree under which the sale took place.

6. The plaintiffs, therefore, evidently rely chiefly on the Mitakshara law, but further appeal to the nature of the tenure as rendering the sale invalid.

7. The peculiarity of the defence is that while it denies that plaintiff No. 1 acquired any right in the property under the Mitakshara law by his birth, and contends that the father was sole proprietor fully competent to deal with it, still it raises the plea of limitation on the ground that the right to sue accrued on the date of sale, whereas the suit was not instituted until more than twelve years afterwards.

8. And to get over the difficulty in regard to the seizure and sale of a ghatwali tenure, the defence alleges that the ghatwali tenure was long ago abolished, and so the property became Meghraj Singh's absolutely.

9. The somewhat mixed character of the pleadings may be accounted for thus. Plaintiff's must have felt some diffidence in trusting simply or chiefly to the nature of the ghatwali tenure as being indivisible and inalienable, for upon their own showing one of them had sold, and the other had bought, five-eighths of it just before the plaint was filed; and they were doubtless fully aware that in fact numerous similar ghatwalis of Kharukpore, to which class the one in question belongs, had actually been sold. It was convenient, therefore, to put forward the Mitakshara law which does allow alienations for necessity, and moreover the chief inducement to bring the suit was probably the success of other suitors in recent years in recovering property sold for their fathers' debts by the application of the Mitakshara law. It was necessary, however, to fall back upon the nature of the tenure as a ghatwali in order to allow the plaintiffs to count the period of limitation from the time of Meghraj Singh's death, rather than from the date of sale, in the event of plaintiffs being unable to establish their allegation that plaintiff No. 1 was dispossessed only in 1287==(1879).

10. The defendants would naturally wish to eliminate the Mitakshara law, except in so far as it might help their plea of limitation, and to contend that plaintiff No. 1 had no interest whatever in his father's lifetime, and could not object to any alienation effected during that period.

11. The lower Court evidently took infinite pains with the case, and recorded an extremely long and elaborate judgment. It found that the ghatwali had not been abolished: yet that it was transferable; also that it was a joint ancestral property subject to the Mitakshara law, modified only by the custom which operated in this case to make the period of limitation run from the death of Meghraj Singh, and not from the date of sale or of the adverse possession of the defendants, and finally that it was indivisible, and upon these findings it proceeded to give the plaintiffs two-thirds of the property, and the defendants one-third, which the Subordinate Judge held wras the extent of Meghraj Singh's interest in the ghatwali tenure.

12. It appears to us that both parties are justified in objecting to the manner in which the case has been decided, for it seems clear either that the plaintiffs should have recovered the whole tenure, or that the suit should have been dismissed altogether. The tenure being undoubtedly a ghatwali, the lower Court we think made a mistake in attempting to apply to the case the rules of the Mitakshara law.

13. For we concur with the learned Counsel for the appellants in his contention that in dealing with a ghatwali the Court must have regard to the nature of the tenure itself and to the rules of law laid down in regard to such tenures, and not to any particular school of law or to the customs* of particular families. The incidents of a ghatwali tenure are the same whether the ghatwal be a Hindu or a Mussulman or a follower of any other system of religion, and the same ghatwali might be held successively by persons governed as to other property by totally different rules of law. A ghatwali is created for a specific purpose, has its own particular incidents, and cannot be subject to any system of law affecting only a particular class or family.

14. We think, therefore, that the lower Court was misled in its recourse to authorities bearing upon the effect of the Mitakshara law on ancestral joint property whether partible or impartible; and as to the obligation of sons to pay the debts of their fathers, and the authorities cited on these points seem, therefore, to us to afford no assistance in disposing of this case.

15. The real and only material questions for us to decide are--first, whether the sale of this ghatwali in execution of a decree against the ghatwal was invalid and liable to be set aside by reason of the tenure being in its nature inalienable; and, secondly, if the alienation was bad, are the present plaintiffs entitled to recover the property? The second question also involves one of limitation.

16. As to the first question there is doubtless authority for holding that ghatwali lands are not alienable either at the pleasure of the ghatwal for the time being, or for the payment of his debts at the pleasure of his creditors. For the nature of the tenure and the reason of its existence render it necessary that the holder of the office of ghatwal be secured in his enjoyment of the tenure.

17. The principal case cited to us by the learned Advocate-General for the plaintiffs-respondents is that of Rajah Nilmoni Singh v. Bakranath Singh L.R. 9 I.A. 104. But in that case the particular point decided by the Judicial Committee, Privy Council, was that ghatwali lands could not be seized in execution of a decree for the debts of a former ghatwal as assets by descent in the hands of his successor. Their Lordships, however, expressed an opinion that the same considerations on which the ghatwali should be held to be indivisible would make it inalienable. That case related to a jagir in West Burdwan to which Police services were attached, and it was considered to be analogous to one of the Beerbhoom ghatwalis governed by Regulation XXIX of 1814. Another case was cited to us in wThich a Division Bench of this Court held in a Second Appeal No. 2451 of 1880 that a Shikmi ghatwali could not be seized in execution of a decree for debt. That too was a Beerbhoom ghatwali, and the objection was taken by the Shikmi ghatwal before any decree was obtained.

18. The ghatwali in the present case is one of the Kharukpore ghatwalis, and as regards them the Judicial Committee noted, without expressing dissent, that transfers have taken place and have been recognized if made with the assent of the zamindar, while without that consent the Court has not recognized them. Precedents for these propositions are to be found in two eases mentioned by the lower Court. Rajah Lelanund Singh v. Doorgabutty W.R. 1864 249 and Lalla Gooman Singh v. Grant 11 W.R. 292.

19. These decisions have not been overruled, but the Judicial Committee point out this distinction between the ghatwals of Beerbhoom and of Kharukpore, that the former are appointed by Government and the latter by the zanlindar.

20. As to the Beerbhoom ghatwals, Regulation XXIX of 1814 expressly provides that they and their descendants in perpetuity shall be maintained in possession of the lands so long as they pay their revenue, and fulfil the other obligations of their tenure.

21. It has been argued that the Kharukpore ghatwals are on the same footing as those of Beerbhoom, but this does not appear to be the case; for besides there being no statutory provision in their favour, it appears from a description given of their status in the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Raja Lelanund Singh Bahadoor v. The Government of Bengal 6 Moore's I.A. 101 that the zamindar retained in his hands the power of appointing and dismissing the ghatwals in case of their not performing the duties. This seems to negative a right to hold from generation to generation on payment of the rent reserved. Be that as it may, we think that we must hold, upon the authority of the cases and upon the evidence of many such transfers having been effected and unquestioned, as well as in consideration of the long silence of the present plaintiff No. 1, and the silence too of his father while he lived, that a Kharukpore ghatwali is transferable, if the zamindar assents and accepts the transferee; and in the present case we think the lower Court was justified in holding that the zamindar by making no objection within twelve years of the sale acquiesced in it, and that the transfer was, therefore, one which the Court ought to recognize, and looking to the fact that the purposes for which the Kharukpore ghatwalis were created no longer exist, we should greatly regret being compelled to come to a contrary conclusion. We accordingly decide the first question in favour of the defendants-appellants, and hold that the sale was not invalid by reason of the inalienability of the ghatwali tenure.

22. And upon the second point, too, we think the plaintiffs must fail.

23. For only as ghatwals duly appointed by the zamindar could they establish any claim to possession of the tenure, and they nowhere allege that they have been appointed ghatwals. Their case was that plaintiff's had a vested interest by his birth in the ghatwali, but this we have shown to be untenable.

24. The result is that we decree the appeal of the defendants, and dismiss the plaintiff's' suit with costs of both Courts.