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Lutchmeeput Singh v. Sadaulla Nushyo And Ors.

Calcutta High Court
Dec 6, 1882
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff is the patnidar (proprietor) of Pergunnah Batasone. Defendants Nos. 1–9 are inhabitants of Roopsi, Nos. 10–11 inhabitants of Joroollahpore, and Nos. 12–13 inhabitants of Manipore; these villages belong to the zamindari of Pergunnah Batasone.

The plaintiff sued for an injunction restraining the defendants from fishing in specified bhils (ponds) listed in the plaint schedule and sought a declaration that the defendants had no right of fishing in those bhils. The plaint alleged that the bhils appertained to the zamindari and that the plaintiff held the fishery (julkur) right; certain bhils had previously been let in ijara for three years (1283–1285 Hijri / 1876–1878) to ijaradars who brought a suit for damages when defendants fished during the term. In that earlier suit the Courts had held that the defendants, with other inhabitants, had a prescriptive right to fish using specified traps.

The defendants in their written statement denied plaintiff's julkur right, asserted that neither the plaintiff nor his predecessors ever held possession of the julkur, and pleaded long adverse user (more than twelve years) by the defendants and tenants of the relevant pergunnahs, claiming time‑immemorial exercise of fishing rights.

The lower Courts framed substantial issues including limitation, plaintiff's title to the julkur, defendants' rights in common with tenantry, and prescriptive rights. The lower Courts dismissed the plaintiff's suit; their judgments admitted plaintiff's ownership of the bhils but relied on findings about non‑payment of revenue (supported by reference to a Punchsona paper) and on limitation and prescriptive user.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Is the suit barred by limitation?
  2. Has the plaintiff any right in the disputed julkur (fishery right)?
  3. Have the defendants, in common with the tenantry of the pergunnahs (Batasone, Koondi, etc.), any right to fish in the disputed julkur?
  4. Whether the defendants, in common with the tenantry of those pergunnahs, have any prescriptive right to fish in these bhils?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The bhils belong to the zamindari of Pergunnah Batasone and the plaintiff is the patnidar (owner).
  • The plaintiff is in possession of the fishery (julkur) right in the bhils.
  • Certain bhils were let in ijara to ijaradars (Kholie Mahomed and Deve Nushyo) for the period 1283–1285, and during that term the defendants fished without permission; the ijaradars sued for damages.
  • The plaintiff sought an injunction and a declaration that the defendants had no right of fishing in the specified bhils (i.e., the julkur right is the plaintiff's exclusively).

Defendants' Arguments

  • The plaintiff did not possess any julkur right in these bhils; neither he nor his predecessors ever held possession of the julkur.
  • The defendants and other tenants of Pergunnah Batasone (and tenants of Pergunnahs Koondi and others) had been in possession of the julkur right under an adverse title for more than twelve years.
  • The tenants of these pergunnahs had exercised the right of fishing in these bhils from time immemorial for generation after generation (claimed prescriptive/customary right).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Parbutty Nath Roy Chowdhry v. Mudho Paroe, I.L.R. 3 Cal. 276 Held that when ascertained persons, claiming a right, continuously exercised the right of taking fish from a bhil for over twelve years, they were in possession of an interest in land and the owner's claim could be barred by limitation. The court distinguished this authority from the present case: in Parbutty the adverse possessor(s) were definite and ascertained, whereas in the present case no defined and ascertained persons were shown to be in continuous possession. Therefore Parbutty does not support a finding of limitation here.
Chundee Churn Roy v. Shib Chunder Mundul, I.L.R. 5 Cal. 945; 6 C.L.R. 269 Established that a right of fishery is treated as an easement under the Limitation Act (and thus falls under provisions such as Section 26). The court relied on this to treat the fishery as an easement and therefore to apply Section 26 of the Limitation Act, which requires that an easement claimed by prescription be shown to have been peaceably and openly enjoyed by the same person(s) for the requisite period.
Lord Rivers v. Adams, L.R. 3 Ex. D. 361 Authority addressing customs/prescriptive rights and their validity where they conflict with natural justice; used on questions of whether a custom permitting wide user is reasonable. The court found this case "exactly in point" and followed its reasoning on grounds of natural justice to reject a custom that would allow an unlimited number of persons to take the entire profits of a private property. The court observed the reasoning was broadly applicable and consistent with natural justice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded step‑by‑step, applying the facts and legal principles expressly set out in the record:

  1. Ownership: The lower Courts had admitted the plaintiff's ownership of the disputed bhils. The appellate court accepted this admitted fact and dismissed the second issue (whether the plaintiff had any right in the julkur) from further consideration.
  2. Limitation: The Subordinate Judge based dismissal largely on limitation, relying on evidence that many witnesses (aged 50–70) testified that defendants and neighbourhood people had fished in the bhils since infancy and described a communal "bowaet" system of fishery. The appellate court examined those witnesses and found their evidence described a general habit of tenants fishing, not possession by defined, ascertained persons.
  3. Distinction between trespass and adverse possession: The court explained that repeated acts of misappropriation by varying and unascertained persons amount only to successive trespasses, not to dispossession of the owner. The owner is not out of possession unless it can be shown that a third party (or defined persons) are in wrongful possession. Even if the fluctuating body of tenants were treated as in wrongful possession, the owner must be excluded from participation of enjoyment for dispossession to be established—this was not shown.
  4. Prescriptive right / Section 26: Treating fishery as an easement (per Chundee Churn Roy), Section 26 requires that the same person or persons must be shown to have exercised the easement for the statutory period. The court found that in this case no such same person(s) exercising the right could be identified; thus prescriptive title could not be established under Section 26.
  5. Presumption of grant: From the length of user found by the lower Courts, the appellate court held that no presumption of a grant by the Sovereign could be made because there was no ascertained grantee or grantees in whose favour a grant could be presumed.
  6. Corporate/body assumption rejected: The Subordinate Judge had treated the tenants of several pergunnahs as forming a unit or corporate body. The appellate court found no evidence or tangible ground to support that assumption; therefore the defence based on a corporate or collective status failed.
  7. Custom: Even if the alleged custom (allowing tenants to fish in the described communal manner) were established by evidence, the court found it unreasonable and therefore invalid. The custom, as pleaded, placed no limit on the number of persons entitled to fish; an unlimited number could take all the fish, depleting the owner's property and leaving nothing for the proprietor. Such a custom was rejected as being contrary to reason.
  8. Reliance on authority: The court cited Lord Rivers v. Adams and found its reasoning rooted in natural justice and applicable to the present question of custom; accordingly the court followed it in rejecting the custom-based defence.
  9. Conclusion as to lower courts' errors: Because (a) the findings showed only successive trespasses rather than adverse possession by ascertained persons, (b) prescriptive title under Section 26 could not be established, (c) no presumption of grant could be made, and (d) the alleged custom was unreasonable and invalid, the appellate court concluded the lower Courts erred in dismissing the plaintiff's suit.

Holding and Implications

REVERSED — The decisions of the lower Courts are reversed and the plaintiff's suit is decreed with costs in all the Courts.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff obtains the relief sought — the suit was decreed in his favour and the lower Courts' dismissals were overturned; costs were awarded to the plaintiff in all Courts.
  • Limitation and prescriptive claims by the defendants were rejected on the specific factual and legal bases stated (no adverse possession by ascertained persons; Section 26 not satisfied; no presumption of grant; custom unreasonable and invalid).
  • No broader precedent beyond the application of existing authorities was announced by this opinion; the court relied on cited authorities (Parbutty, Chundee Churn Roy, Lord Rivers) to distinguish or follow principles appropriate to the facts. The opinion does not state that it establishes a new rule beyond its conclusions on the facts before it.

This summary reflects only the information and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No information has been invented or inferred beyond the text of the opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. The plaintiff is the patnidar of Pergunnah Batasone. The defendants Nos. 1 to 9 are the inhabitants of Roopsi, the defendants Nos. 10 and 11 are the inhabitants of Joroollahpore, and the defendants Nos. 12 and 13 are the inhabitants of Manipore. The villages of Roopsi, Joroollahpore and Manipore appertain to the zamindari of Pergunnah Batasone.

2. The plaintiff brought this suit praying for an injunction against the defendants to restrain them from fishing in certain bhils set out in the schedule to the plaint, and for a declaration that they had no right of fishing in the aforesaid, bhils.

3. The grounds of action stated in the plaint are, that the bhils in question appertain to the zamindari of Pergunnah Batasone, of which the plaintiff is the patnidar; that the plaintiff is in possession of the fishery right in the said bhils; that out of these bhils, bhils Kendra and others, named in the second paragraph of the plaint, were let out in ijara to Kholie Mahomed and Deve Nushyo for three years, from 1283 to 1285 (1876 to 1878); that during the term of this ijara lease the defendants, in the months of Falgoon and Cheyt 1283 (February and March 1877), without the permission of the ijaradars, having caught and taken away fish from these bhils, the said ijaradars brought a suit for damages against them; that in that suit it was held by the Courts that the defendants, in common with the inhabitants of the villages mentioned above, had a prescriptive right to catch fish in these bhils, using for the purpose certain specified fish traps; that the defendants are still continuing to fish in these bhils in the manner stated above; that they have no right of fishing in these bhils, the julkur right in which is owned and held by the plaintiff.

4. The prayers mentioned above were based upon these allegations.

5. The defendants in their written statement stated that the plaintiff did not possess any julkur right in these bhils; that neither he nor his predecessor in title ever held the possession of julkur right in them; that the defendants and other tenants of Pergunnah Batasone and the tenants of Pergunnahs Koondi and others had been in possession of the aforesaid julkur right under an adverse title for more than twelve years; that the tenants of these pergunnahs had exercised their right of fishing in these bhils from time immemorial for generation after generation.

6. Upon these allegations the lower Courts substantially raised the following issues: (1st), Is the suit barred by limitation; (2nd), Has the plaintiff any right in the disputed julkur; (3rd), Have the defendants in common with the tenantry of pergunnahs Batasone, Koondi, etc., any right to fish in the disputed julkur; (4th), Whether the defendants, in common with the tenantry of Batasone, Koondi, and other pergunnahs have any prescriptive right to fish in these bhils.

7. The lower Courts have dismissed the plaintiff's suit. It is clear from the judgments that the plaintiff is the owner of the disputed bhils. This fact was admitted. The lower Courts, however, have laid some stress upon the fact which they find, viz., that the plaintiff does not pay the revenue of these bhils; but the fact that these bhils appertain to his zamindari being admitted, it seems to us incomprehensible how the lower Courts could come to the conclusion that no revenue was being paid for these bhils. The Sub-Judge refers to a Punchsona paper in support of this finding. We have referred to that paper, and it is clear to us that it does not afford any ground whatsoever for the conclusion based upon it. We must, therefore, decide this case, taking it as an admitted fact that the plaintiff is the owner of these bhils. The second issue may be, therefore, dismissed from our consideration.

8. The lower Courts, it seems to us, have dismissed this suit upon the first and the fourth issues. The Sub-Judge based his decision simply upon the plea of limitation; but the lower Appellate Court, while concurring with the decision of the Sub-Judge on the question of limitation, has based his judgment also upon the ground of the defendants having established their right of fishing by prescription.

9. We are of opinion that the decisions of the lower Courts upon both these questions are erroneous. In order to determine whether the plaintiff's claim is barred by limitation or not, we must see what the finding of the lower Court upon this point is. The Sub-Judge says:

10.

"They (the defendants) have examined six witnesses, almost all of whom are aged between 50, 60, and 70 years, and prove beyond doubt that the defendants, including the people of the neighbourhood, have been fishing in the bhils from their infancy, their knowledge extending since they came to sense when they were seven or eight years old. It is also amply in evidence that there are shingadars in some of the villages adjacent to the bhils, who, by the sound of their instruments called shinga, would invite the people in the vicinity, who would then assemble together and join in a body to catch fish in the bhils, which the witnesses in this case have styled in the colloquial language the bowaet system of fishery."
In order to ascertain clearly what this finding really amounts to, we have referred to the witnesses upon whom the Sub-Judge relies. They, without any special reference to the defendants in this case, prove that the tenants of the pergunnahs mentioned above have been in the habit of fishing in these bhils in the manner stated in the passage cited above. This does not, in our opinion, amount to a dispossession of the plaintiff, the owner of the bhils. It cannot be said that the defendants, upon the facts stated, above, are in wrongful possession of the bhils. Unless it can be shown that the acts of misappropriation of the fish were done by a person or defined number of persons, the acts of misappropriation, even if they have the effect of depriving the owner of a property wholly of its profits, would not constitute dispossession of the owner. Suppose from a field belonging to A, B and C carry away the crops raised by him in one particular year, D and E in the next year, and so on for any number of years--these acts can be only looked upon as mere trespasses, giving to A a right of action for damages against the successive trespassers, but in the eye of the law, the possession of A is not discontinued, because, it cannot be said that any ascertained persons, viz., B and C or D and E, are in wrongful possession of the property in question at any given time. You cannot say that an owner is out of possession unless you can say that a third party is in wrongful possession.

11. Moreover, supposing that such a fluctuating body, as the tenants of certain pergunnahs, can be said to be in wrongful possession of a property, still, until it is shown that the owner is excluded from the participation of the enjoyment of it, he cannot be said to be out of possession.

12. For these reasons we are of opinion that the facts deposed to by the witnesses, upon whom the lower Courts rely, amount only to successive acts of trespass, and do not amount to a complete ouster of the plaintiff.

13. A question similar to this was raised in Parbutty Nath Roy Chowdhry v. Mudho Paroe I.L.R. 3 Cal. 276; but in that case the defendants were ascertained persons who, under a claim of right, continuously exercised the right of taking fish from a bhil; and it was held that they were in possession for more than twelve years of an interest in land. Accordingly the claim of the plaintiff, who was the owner of the bhil, to restrain the defendants from exercising that right, was held to be barred by limitation. It is obvious that the distinction between that case and the present is,--that in the former some ascertained persons were proved to have been in adverse possession for more than twelve years of an interest in an immoveable property; in the present case, it has been already shown that no defined and ascertained persons have been in continuous possession of the fishery right in these bhils. The plaintiff's claim is, therefore, not barred by limitation.

14. The next question is, whether the defendants have established a prescriptive right to this fishery right. The learned pleader for the respondents upon this point has relied upon Section 26 of the present Limitation Act. That section requires that any easement which is claimed (a right of fishery has been held now to be an easement under the present Limitation Act)--see Chundee Churn Roy v. Shib Chunder Mundul I.L.R. 5 Cal. 945; 6 C.L.R. 269 must be shown to have been peaceably and openly enjoyed by any person claiming title thereto, etc., etc. For the reasons given above, it cannot be said that in this case that right was exercised by any person or persons. The section evidently requires that the same person or persons must be shown to have exercised that right for a particular length of time. Then, again, from the length of user (a fact found by the lower Courts in favour of the defendants), it cannot be presumed that there was a grant by the Sovereign Power. It seems to us that the presumption of a grant is impossible; because in this case it cannot be shown that there was some ascertained grantee or grantees. The Subordinate Judge was of opinion that the tenants of the several pergunnahs, in whose favour the right in question is claimed, must be considered to constitute a unit,--that is to say, he considers that they form a corporate body. We fail to see any tangible ground for this assumption. For instance, it may be that such a grant may be presumed in favour of a village community if such community be shown to possess all the essentials of a corporate body; but we do not see any reason suggested by any evidence on the record which can support the conclusion that the tenants of the different pergunnahs, in whose favour the right in question is claimed, form anything like a corporate body. This point in the defence must, therefore, also fail.

15. This disposes of the grounds upon which the lower Courts' decisions are based. There remains to consider whether the right, set up by the defendants, can have for its basis a valid existing custom. It seems to us that it is unnecessary to enquire whether such a custom as the one set up by the defendants, has been established by the evidence. Because, supposing that it has been established, in our opinion, it cannot be treated as a valid custom on the ground of its unreasonableness. According to the custom set up, there is no limitation to the number of persons entitled to enjoy it. The tenantry may increase to any number, so that according to this custom, an unlimited number of persons can take away the profits of a private property, and that nothing may be left to the owner. If the defendants are entitled to exercise the right of fishery in the way stated by them, they may take away the whole of the fish stocked in the bhils, leaving nothing for the plaintiff, who is admittedly the owner of them. Such a custom as this does not seem to be reasonable. We are, therefore, of opinion that it ought to be rejected as invalid.

16. Upon these questions of custom and prescriptive right, there is the case of Lord Rivers v. Adams L.R. 3 Ex. D. 361 which is exactly in point. It is true that we are not absolutely bound by the authority of this ease, but if the grounds upon which the decision is based be founded upon natural justice; we would be fully justified in following it. On an examination of the reasons given by the Court in that case it will appear that they are not peculiar to any country or any particular state of society, but they are in conformity with the dictates of natural justice.

17. We are, therefore, of opinion that the decisions of the lower Courts are erroneous and should be reversed. We reverse them accordingly and decree the plaintiff's suit with costs in all the Courts.