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Jogul Kishore v. Jotendro Mohun Tagore And Ors.

Calcutta High Court
Apr 29, 1881
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arise from two suits (Nos. 63 and 64) seeking recovery of possession of a share in an ancestral estate originally belonging to Neelcanth Roy. Neelcanth left six sons who lived in commensality and each held a sixth share. The eldest son, Bhoirub Rai, died leaving a daughter Woomamoyee and two grandchildren. Two days before Bhoirub's death it was alleged that he executed a hibanama disinheriting his own daughter and grandchildren and conveying his share to his surviving brothers. The existence of the hibanama was kept secret for some time; disputes surfaced in 1851, the hibanama was produced, and a private partition took place excluding Bhoirub's heirs.

Woomamoyee sued to set aside the hibanama and the partition. The Sadr Dewany Adawlut set aside both the hibanama and the partition, restored Bhoirub's share to Woomamoyee, and awarded her a decree for mesne profits and costs. Execution of that decree led to the sale of Sharodamoyee's share (she was a defendant and widow of Norender Chunder Rai); Woomamoyee purchased the share, conveyed it to her son Gourmohun, who later sold it to Maharajah Jotendro Mohun Tagore (the principal defendant here).

Separately, after Sharodamoyee's death in 1869, her nephew Behari Lall Rai became her reversionary heir. A decree against Behari led to the sale of his right, title and interest, purchased by Ramdhone Chetlanghi and ultimately conveyed to the present plaintiff (in the names of two servants). The present suits were brought by that plaintiff to recover the property from the Maharajah, on the ground that the Maharajah only purchased Sharodamoyee's interest which ceased at her death, leaving the reversion to the plaintiff as purchaser of Behari's rights.

The court below also raised, but considered immaterial for this appeal, whether the plaintiff would be entitled to the whole property claimed or only an eight-anna share.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under the sale of the "right, title, and interest" of Sharodamoyee in her share of the family property, the whole inheritance of Norender Chunder Rai in that share passed to the purchaser, or only Sharodamoyee's life-interest, subject to the reversionary right of Behari Lall Rai.
  2. Whether the plaintiff (as purchaser of Behari's rights) is entitled to recover the whole property claimed, or only an eight-anna share (this question was raised in the Court below and noted as immaterial to the appeal).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The decree ultimately obtained by Woomamoyee and enforced by execution against Sharodamoyee's share was a mere money-decree of a personal nature for mesne profits and costs.
  • Consequently, the sale under that decree could only pass Sharodamoyee's own interest (i.e., her life-interest) and could not affect Behari's rights as reversionary heir after Sharodamoyee's death.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The express object of Woomamoyee's suit was to recover from all defendants, including Sharodamoyee, the whole of Woomamoyee's share in the ancestral property (the share that had been held by Norender under the alleged hibanama).
  • The suit was not brought merely to recover Sharodamoyee's life-interest; the decree against Sharodamoyee for recovery of that share included the interest which Behari would have taken as reversioner had Woomamoyee failed. Thus, the sale passed the whole estate in that share, not only a life-interest.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ishan Chunder Mitter v. Buksh Ali Soudagar (Marsh Rep., 614) Illustrates that the words "right, title, and interest" in an execution-sale must be construed with reference to the nature of the suit and decree; a sale of a widow's "right, title, and interest" passed property that in fact belonged to her infant son (for whom she was guardian). The court cited this case as a striking example that a sale described as of the execution-debtor's "right, title, and interest" can, depending on the circumstances, pass the whole estate even when the nominal execution-debtor had no subsisting proprietary interest.
The General Manager of the Raj Durbhunga v. Maharajah Ramaput Singh (14 Moore's I. A., 605) Shows that where a decree is obtained against a widow in execution for her "right, title, and interest," the property actually vested in the husband's heir may pass to the purchaser under such sale. The court relied on this Privy Council decision to support the principle that sales must be interpreted by reference to the suit and decree, not strictly by the literal wording "right, title, and interest."
Bisto Beharee Sahoy v. Lalla Byjnath Persad (16 W. R., 49) Demonstrates that whether a sale affects only a widow's life-interest or the entire estate may depend on whether the debt was incurred for necessities recognized by Hindu law; if the necessity is established, the entire estate may pass, otherwise only life-interest passes. The court used this authority to show that the nature of the debt and suit can change the interpretation of what estate passes under a sale of "right, title, and interest."
Baijnn Doobey v. Brij Bhookun Lall Awusti (L. R., 2 I. A., 275; S. C., I. L. R., 1 Cal, 133) Sets forth the test whether a decree is personal against a widow or affects the estate of the reversioner; if the decree is personal it passes only the widow's life-interest under sale, otherwise it may affect the estate. The court adopted the test from this case: examine whether the suit/decree was personal to the execution-debtor (widow) or affected the whole inheritance; applied the test to conclude the sale passed the whole inheritance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a series of linked steps grounded in principle and authority expressly cited in the opinion.

  1. Interpretation principle: The court emphasized that the phrase "right, title, and interest" in an execution-sale must not be construed strictly in a literal sense but in light of the circumstances of the suit and the true meaning of the decree under which the sale occurs. This is particularly so because under the old Civil Procedure Code (Section 249) proclamations were for the sale only of the interest of the execution-debtor, and in practice sales were described as of the "right, title, and interest" of the execution-debtor; thus the court must ascertain carefully what was intended to be sold.
  2. Reliance on authorities: The court reviewed authorities (including Ishan Chunder Mitter, Raj Durbhunga, Bisto Beharee Sahoy, and Baijnn Doobey) demonstrating that the effect of a sale of "right, title, and interest" depends on the nature of the suit and decree and that, in certain circumstances, such a sale has passed an interest greater than the nominal execution-debtor's life-interest.
  3. Articulation of the governing test: The court adopted the test from Baijnn Doobey—determine whether the suit was brought upon a cause of action personal to the execution-debtor (in which case the sale would pass only the life-interest) or whether the suit affected the whole inheritance (in which case the sale could pass the entire estate).
  4. Application to the facts: Applying this test, the court concluded Woomamoyee's suit was not a personal suit against Sharodamoyee. The suit sought recovery of Woomamoyee's father's inheritance from the defendants (including Sharodamoyee), and it was defended in the interest of Behari (the reversioner) as well as Sharodamoyee. The defendants defended the suit in their belief in the validity of the hibanama, and the costs decreed against Sharodamoyee were incurred not solely in respect of a personal claim against her but in resisting the claim to the inheritance which affected the reversioner too.
  5. Treatment of mesne profits: The court acknowledged some doubt over the decree for mesne profits but concluded that this portion of the decree necessarily followed the rest of the decree; Woomamoyee recovered mesne profits by the same right and on the same principle as she recovered the remainder of her claim.
  6. Conclusion of analysis: On the basis of these considerations and authorities, the court determined that under the sale of Sharodamoyee's "right, title, and interest" the whole inheritance in that share passed to the purchaser rather than merely her life-interest.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court concluded in favour of the defendants. The final order was that the appeal be decreed and the plaintiff's suit be dismissed with costs in both Courts. In the terms used by the court, the plaintiff's claim failed.

Core Ruling: The sale of Sharodamoyee's "right, title, and interest" under execution passed the whole inheritance in the relevant share (and not merely Sharodamoyee's life-interest), and accordingly the plaintiff's suit to recover the property from the purchaser (the Maharajah) is dismissed.

Implications: The direct consequence is that the plaintiff (as purchaser of the reversionary interest at a later sale) is not entitled to recover the property from the Maharajah, and the Maharajah's title (as purchaser under the earlier execution-sale) stands as interpreted by the court. The opinion does not purport to establish any broader novel precedent beyond applying existing authorities and principles to the facts of this case; it rests on established tests and prior decisions cited in the opinion.

Prepared strictly from the information contained in the provided opinion. No external facts or inferences beyond the text have been added.

Show all summary ...

1. The two suits (Nos. 63 and 64) out of which this appeal arises were brought to recover possession of a share in an ancestral estate which originally belonged to Neelcanth Roy.

2. Neelcanth Roy left six sons, who lived together in commensality and carried on a joint business, each having a sixth of the ancestral property.

3. The eldest of these sons was Bhoirub Rai, who died leaving a daughter, Woomamoyee, and two grandchildren.

4. Two days before Bhoirub's death, it was alleged by his brothers that he executed a hibanama, the effect of which was to disinherit his owe daughter and grandchildren, and to convey his share of the property (subject to certain provisions for the maintenance of his own family) to his surviving brothers.

5. The existence of this alleged hibanama appears to have been kept secret for some time. Bhoirub died in the year 1822, and after his death the family continued to live together as before in commensality, the eldest male member acting as the kurta. In 1851, however, disputes arose in the family. The hibanama was then brought to light, and a private partition took place amongst the brothers, excluding, of course, the heirs of Bhoirub.

6. Upon this a suit was brought by Woomamoyee and others, claiming, under Bhoirub, to set aside the alleged hibanama, and the partition that had been made in pursuance of it; and the ultimate result of this suit before the Sadr Dewany Adawlut, was, that the hibanama and the partition were both set aside, and Bhoirub's share of the property was restored to Woomamoyee, his next heir, who obtained a decree against the defendants for mesne profits and costs.

7. Amongst others of the family who were made defendants in that suit was Sharodamoyee, the widow of Norender Chunder Rai, who was one of Bhoirub's nephews, and after obtaining her decree, Woomamoyee took out execution against Sharodamoyee, and sold her share of the family property in execution to satisfy the amount of mesne profits and costs. Woomamoyee herself became the purchaser at that sale, and having bought Sharodamoyee's share, conveyed it by gift to her son Gourmohun, who again sold it to Maharajah Jotendro Mohun Tagore, who is the principal defendant in the present suit.

8. In the year 1869 Sharodamoyee died; and on her death, Behari Lall Rai, her nephew, became her reversionary heir One Raghub Chunder Banerjee had a decree against Behari, and under that decree he sold the right, title, and interest which Behari had in Sharodamoyee's share of the family property. Ramdhone Chetlanghi purchased this interest at the sale, and conveyed it afterwards to the present plaintiff in the names of two of his servants.

9. These suits have now bean brought by the plaintiff to recover the property from the Maharajah defendant, upon the ground that the Maharajah only purchased the right and interest of Sharodamoyee, which ceased at her death, and that the plaintiff is entitled to the reversion of the property as the purchaser of Behari's rights.

10. Another question was raised in the Court below, which in our view of the case is immaterial to this appeal,---namely, whether, assuming the plaintiff to be entitled to succeed at all, he is entitled to recover the whole property claimed, or only an eight-anna share of it.

11. The defendant No. 2 is patnidar of the Maharajah defendant, and therefore defends the suit in the same right and upon the same grounds as he does.

12. The main question in the case is, whether, under the sale of the right, title, and interest of Sharodamoyee in her share of the family property, the whole inheritance of Norender Chunder Rai in that share passed to the purchaser, or only his widow's interest, subject to the right of the reversionary heir to succeed to the property at her death.

13. It is contended on the part of the plaintiff, that whatever the original object of Woomamoyee's suit may have been, the decree which she eventually sought to enforce by execution as against Sharodamoyee's share of the property, was a mere money-decree of a personal nature for mesne profits and costs; and that, consequently, the sale under that decree could only pass Sharodamoyee's interest, and could not affect Behari's rights as the reversionary heirafter Sharodamoyee's death.

14. On the other hand it is contended by the defendants, that the express object of Woomamoyee's suit was to recover from all the defendants in the suit, and amongst them from Sharodamoyee, the whole of Woomamoyee's share in the ancestral property. It was not brought to recover from Sharodamoyee merely her own life-interest, but the entire estate in share which had been held by her husband, Norender, under the bibanama: and that the decree which was made against Sharodamoyee for the recovery of that share included not only Sharodamoyee's life-interest, but the interest which Behari would have taken as reversioner, if Woomamoyee had failed in her suit.

15. A somewhat nice question is thus raised for our determination, and several authorities have been cited on either side.

16. One point which has been strongly urged upon us on behalf of the plaintiff is this, that, whatever might have been the nature of the decree obtained against Sharodamoyee and the other defendants, as in execution of that decree her right, title, and interest only was sold in the property in question, the sale would only pass her life-interest, and would not affect the interest of Behari after her death.

17. We think, however, that this proposition is opposed both to principle and authority. It has been held over and over again, not only in this Court, but by the Privy Council, that the words "right, title, and interest" of the execution-debtor must not be construed strictly, but with reference to the circumstances under which the suit is brought, and the true meaning of the decree under which the sale takes place. And this was the more necessary in the case of sales which took place under the old Civil Procedure Code, because by Section 249 of the Code, the proclamation in every case was for the sale only of the interest of the execution-debtor. And as a matter of form and practice, all sales under that Act were of the right, title, and interest of the execution-debtor. It is, therefore, the duty of the Court in each ease to ascertain carefully what was intended to be sold.

18. Perhaps the most remarkable instance of the application of this rule occurs in the case of Ishan Chunder Mitter v. Buksh Ali Soudagar (Marsh Rep., 614) which has been more than once cited with approbation by the Privy Council. In that case a widow had been sued upon a bond given by her husband, and it appeared upon the proceedings, that the suit was really brought against her, not in her own right, but as the guardian of her infant son, who was his father's heir. A decree was obtained against her in the suit, and under that decree her right, title, and interest in the property in question was sold to a purchaser. Now here the widow bad in fact no right, title, or interest in the property in question. That property belonged wholly to her son; and yet it was held that, under the sale of her right, title, and interest, the property which belonged to her son passed to the purchaser.

19. Again, as an authority to the same effect, we may refer to the case of The General Manager of the Raj Durbhunga v. Maharajah Ramaput Singh (14 Moore's I. A., 605). There a suit had been brought by A against B for arrears of rent, and B having died pending the suit, a decree was obtained by A against B's widow. In execution under this decree, the right, title, and interest of B's widow in certain property which had belonged to her husband was sold. In point of fact, the widow had no interest in that property, because it belonged to her husband's son and heir: but the Privy Council held, reversing the decree of High Court, that, under that sale, the property which was then vested in the son passed to the purchaser.

20. Again, as an illustration of how the words 'right, title, and interest' may have a different meaning according to the nature of the suit, and of the decree under which the sale takes place, we may refer to the case of Bisto Beharee Sahoy v. Lalla Byjnath Persad (16 W. R., 49). There, a suit had been brought and a decree obtained against a widow for a debt; and in execution of that decree her right, title, and interest in certain property which she had inherited from her husband had been sold. The reversioner then brought a suit to dispute the validity of the sale as effecting his interest; and it was held that the right of the reversioner to the property after the widow's death, depended upon whether the debt had, or had not, been incurred by the widow for any necessity contemplated by Hindu law.

21. The learned Judges say:---

"If such necessity had been established, her right and interest would have included the entire estate which would have passed under the decree to the purchaser in execution; whilst if she had sold without such necessity, then all that would have passed under the sale would have been her life-interest."
Thereby clearly indicating, that, under the sale of her right, title, and interest, a different estate would have passed to the purchaser according to whether her debt had been incurred with or without legal necessity.

22. We think, therefore, that we must look to the nature of the suit, and of the decree against Sharodamoyee, to see whether under the sale of her right, title, and interest in the property in question her own life-interest only, or the whole inheritance, passed to the purchaser.

23. And this, we think, must depend upon whether the suit was brought against her upon a cause of action personal to herself, or one which affected the whole inheritance of the property in suit. This is the principle, as we understand, upon which the case of Baijnn Doobey v. Brij Bhookun Lall Awusti (L. R., 2 I. A., 275; S. C., I. L. R., 1 Cal, 133) was decided. The test applied in that case was, whether the decree for maintenance was a personal one against the widow, or whether it affected the estate of the reversioner; and as the Privy Council considered that the decree was a personal one against the widow, it was held, that, under the sale of her right, title, and interest in the property sold, her own life-interest only passed to the purchaser.

24. Now applying the same test in this case, we think it clear that Woomamoyee's suit was not against Sharodamoyee personally. Her object was to recover back from Sharodamoyee and the other defendants in the suit her father's inheritance in the ancestral property, of which she had been dispossessed by the other members of the family under colour of the alleged hibanama.

25. The suit was defended in the interest of Behari, the reversioner, as well as of Sharodamoyee herself. It was defended successfully in the Court of First Instance; and there is no reason to suppose that the defendants did not all honestly believe that the hibanama was a genuine instrument.

26. The reversioner Behari was just as much interested as Sharodamoyee in the result of the suit. It was defended for his benefit as well as hers; and the costs which were decreed against her were costs incurred by the plaintiff, not in prosecuting the claim against her personally, but also against the reversioner, whose rights she was bound to defend, and did defend, in resisting Woomamoyee's claim to the inheritance.

27. We have had rather more doubt with regard to the decree for mesne profits; but we think that this portion of the decree necessarily followed the other; and that Woomamoyee must be considered as having recovered the mesne profits in the same right and upon the same principle as she recovered the rest of her claim.

28. The appeal will, therefore, be decreed, and the plaintiff's suit will be dismissed with costs in both Courts.