Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Tuponidhi Dhirj Gir Gossain v. Sriputi Sabani

Calcutta High Court
Apr 8, 1880
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (White, J. and Maclean, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1871 the defendant's tehsildar brought a rent suit in the Collector's Court under Act X of 1859 against the tenant Anund Behary to recover rent for years 1276–1277 Amli and damages in respect of 10 gunts and 9 biswas of land that formed part of a 13-anna share of Mouzah Nagpore claimed by the defendant as heir of the deceased Mohunt. The plaintiff intervened under section 77 of Act X of 1859, seeking to show he had been in actual receipt and enjoyment of the rent, but the intervention failed and on 9 October 1871 the Collector decreed in favour of the defendant's tehsildar for Rs. 12-3-4-8.

On 16 December 1871 the plaintiff filed suit No. 40 of 1872 in the Moonsiff's Court at Puri against the tenant Anund Behary and also against the defendant and his tehsildar, alleging ancestral title and possession of the 13-anna share and seeking to "set aside the order of the Collector of the 9th of October 1871 by determination of his, the plaintiff's, title to the 10 gunts 9 biswas of land." The plaintiff valued this claim by combining an approximate land value and the Collector's decree.

The defendant denied the plaintiff's title and heirship (cheelaship), and the Moonsiff tried the issue of whether the plaintiff was cheela and in receipt of rent or whether the defendant was in possession as heir. The Moonsiff found for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to the Officiating Judge of Cuttack, who on 8 August 1872 examined the evidence and found that the plaintiff was not the cheela, dismissing the suit. The plaintiff then preferred a special appeal to this Court which was dismissed with costs on 17 June 1873.

The present suit was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge of Cuttack on the ground that the question of heirship had been finally decided against the plaintiff by the earlier litigation and, relying on Krishna Behary Roy v. Brojeswari Chowdhranee (L.R 2 I.A, 283), that the matter was res judicata. The appeal to the High Court is the subject of the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the present suit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the issue of the plaintiff's heirship (cheelaship) was directly and substantially in issue and finally decided in earlier proceedings (the Moonsiff's Court and the Appellate Court).
  2. Whether the Moonsiff's Court (a court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction) was a "Court of competent jurisdiction" within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (section 13 as amended and related provisions), so that its decision on heirship can operate as a conclusive adjudication in subsequent suits for a larger estate.
  3. Whether the plaintiff's previous suit, brought shortly after the Collector's decision under section 77 of Act X of 1859, put the question of heirship only collaterally or indirectly in issue, or whether heirship was directly and substantially in issue such that estoppel applies to the later suit concerning the larger estate.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The suit in the Moonsiff's Court (the earlier suit) was only to establish title to rent for a small portion (10 gunts 9 biswas) under section 77 of Act X of 1859, and therefore the question of his heirship was only indirectly or collaterally in issue there.
  • The present suit relates to the entire estate and seeks confirmation of possession of a portion and khas possession of the remainder; consequently the earlier limited proceeding should not bar a suit for the whole estate, which exceeds the pecuniary limits of the Moonsiff's jurisdiction.

Respondent's (Defendant's / Subordinate Judge's) Arguments

  • The earlier litigation between the plaintiff and defendant had finally decided the question of heirship adversely to the plaintiff and therefore the present suit is barred by res judicata.
  • The Moonsiff's Court was a Court of competent jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the issue of heirship (as construed under section 13 of the Code), and the Privy Council authority in Krishna Behary Roy v. Brojeswari Chowdhranee supports treating that earlier decision as conclusive.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Krishna Behary Roy v. Brojeswari Chowdhranee, L.R 2 I.A, 283 Holds that a Court of inferior jurisdiction (Principal Sudder Ameen) was a "Court of competent jurisdiction" so that its decision on the main issue could bar a subsequent suit in a superior court (application of section 2 of Act VIII of 1859 in that case). The White J. opinion treats this Privy Council decision as binding authority showing that concurrency of jurisdiction is not necessary to raise the estoppel; it is the primary authority relied upon to hold the Moonsiff's decision conclusive and to dismiss the appeal.
Nund Kishore Sing v. Hurree Pershad Mundul, (reported as 13 W.R, 64) Principle that a decision on a title held under one single title is conclusive as to every portion of land held under that title. The Court cites Markby, J.'s language and applies the principle to support the view that a decision on the title in the Moonsiff's Court is conclusive between the parties as to every portion of land held under that title.
Mohidin v. Muhammad Ibrahim, 1 Mad. H.C.R, 245 Authority cited on related questions of title and prior decisions (Madras case); described as involving suits apparently on the Original Side of the High Court. The Court notes this case among authorities relied upon in other judgments, but observes that its facts differ (both suits there seem to have been before the High Court) and thus that its persuasive value for the concurrency-of-jurisdiction question in the present facts is limited.
Bemolasoondery Chowdkrain v. Punchanun, (I.L.R, 3 Calcutta, 705) Illustrates a situation where intervention in a rent suit led to a decision binding in later possession suits; relied upon for the proposition that earlier intervention/decision can bar a later suit on the same title. The Court cites this decision as one of two cases where an inferior court's finding was treated as conclusive in a later superior court suit; the opinion notes limitations in reliance upon it but accepts its general bearing.
Saroda Gobind Chowdhry v. Komul Ghose (cited within Bemolasoondery case) Used in Bemolasoondery to show prior adjudication recognising the defendants' title barred later suit; connected to the principle of estoppel under the new Code, s.18 exp. II. Referenced by the Court via the Bemolasoondery decision to show application of estoppel principles to interventions and subsequent suits.
Gobind Chunder Koondoo v. Taruck Chunder Bose (I.L.R 3 Cal., 145) Full Bench ruling relied upon in Bemolasoondery as supporting estoppel and the explanation in the new Code (s.18, expl. II). Mentioned as an authority recognized in Bemolasoondery; the Court notes its existence and connection to the explanation in the Code but treats its applicability as limited to its facts.
Edun v. Mussamut Bechun, 8 W.R, 175 (opinion of Peacock, C.J.) Judgment asserting that concurrency of jurisdiction in two courts is necessary for the rule of estoppel (res judicata) to operate between them; cautions against treating jurisdiction concurrency as immaterial. White J. describes this reasoning and its persuasive force but says he is bound by the Privy Council decision (Krishna Behary Roy) and therefore cannot adopt Peacock C.J.'s broader rule in this case.
Duchess of Kingston's case (historical reference cited by Peacock, C.J.) Used historically in reasoning about jurisdiction and res judicata (as cited by Peacock, C.J.). The Court notes Peacock, C.J.'s reliance on that case in the discussion of concurrency of jurisdiction; it does not adopt Peacock's conclusion over the Privy Council precedent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

White, J. — The opinion traces the procedural history: the Collector's Court rent suit, the plaintiff's intervention under section 77 of Act X of 1859 (which permits intervention where the intervenor was actually and in good faith receiving the rent), the Moonsiff's suit to set aside the Collector's order, the Moonsiff's decree for the plaintiff on the question of cheelaship and possession, the Appellate Court's reversal on the question of cheelaship, and the dismissal of the plaintiff's special appeal to this Court.

White, J. frames the key analytical issue as whether the earlier suit(s) finally decided the question of heirship (cheelaship) so as to estop the plaintiff from litigating the same issue in the present suit for the larger estate. He observes that, as regards the specific 10 gunts 9 biswas previously litigated, the plaintiff concedes that he is concluded by the earlier litigation. The question is whether the residue of the estate is likewise barred by the earlier decision.

The appellant argued that the earlier suit in the Moonsiff's Court only sought the rent and therefore heirship was only collaterally raised. White, J. examines the plaint, the issues framed by the Moonsiff and the manner in which the claim was pleaded, and concludes that whether the suit sought rent or possession it necessarily turned on the same issue — whether the appellant was cheela and heir. He finds that the issue of heirship was directly and substantially in issue in the Moonsiff's suit.

White, J. then addresses the objection that the Moonsiff's Court lacked competence to decide title to the whole estate (given pecuniary limits). He considers Peacock, C.J.'s reasoning in Edun v. Mussamut Bechun that concurrency of jurisdiction is a necessary part of res judicata, but concludes he is bound by the Privy Council decision in Krishna Behary Roy v. Brojeswari Chowdhranee which held an inferior court to be a "Court of competent jurisdiction" for the purposes of the section in question. Consequently White, J. holds the Moonsiff's decision to be conclusive as between the parties on the issue of heirship and dismisses the appeal with costs.

Maclean, J. — Concurs. He emphasizes that the plaintiff chose to litigate his title in a court of limited jurisdiction (the Moonsiff), putting his cheelaship actively in issue for a small portion of the estate. Maclean, J. agrees that the question of title was directly and substantially in issue in the earlier suit and that a decision on that issue is conclusive as to every portion of land held under the same title (citing Nund Kishore Singh v. Hurree Pershad Mundul). He also accepts Krishna Behary Roy as applicable and concurs that the suit cannot be maintained. Maclean notes that although a plea under section 7 of Act VIII of 1859 might have sufficed, the present determination is based on estoppel/res judicata.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed with costs; the plaintiff's suit is barred by res judicata under the applicable provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (section 13 as considered), and the earlier decisions concerning the plaintiff's cheelaship/heirship are conclusive between the parties.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff is precluded from relitigating the question of his heirship to the deceased Mohunt's estate and therefore cannot maintain the present suit for possession of the larger estate; the earlier adjudications on the point operate as conclusive between the parties.
  • Scope of precedent: The Court relies principally on prior authorities (particularly Krishna Behary Roy v. Brojeswari Chowdhranee) rather than announcing a new rule; the decision applies estoppel/res judicata to bar re-litigation of the same title issue even though the earlier decision was by a court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction in the circumstances described.
  • No new legal doctrine was created by this opinion; the Court applied existing principles of res judicata and the competent-court requirement as interpreted in precedent to the facts before it.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed with costs (per White, J.; Maclean, J. concurring).

Show all summary ...

White, J. (after stating the facts):— It appears that in 1871 the defendant's tehsildar brought a suit on behalf of his master in the Collector's Court under Act X of 1859, against one Anund Behary, to recover from him rent for the years 1276-1277 Amli, and also damages for its detention in respect of 10 gunts and 9 biswas of laud, occupied by Anund Behary, and forming part of a 13-anna share of Mouzah Nagpore, claimed by the defendant as a portion of the estate belonging to him as heir of the deceased Mohunt. In that suit the plaintiff intervened under section 77 of the foregoing Act, which allows an intervention where the intervening party ass actually, and in good faith, received and enjoyed the rent before and up to the time of the commencement of the suit. The Collector has no authority under that section to enquire into the title of the rival claimants to the suit, but must decide the suit, so far as they are concerned, according to the result of his enquiry as to whether the intervening party was before, and at the commencement of the suit, in actual receipt and enjoyment of the rent. But the section also contains a proviso that the decision of the Collector shall not affect the right of either party who may have a legal title to the rent to establish his title by suit in the Civil Court, if instituted within one year from the date of the decision. The plaintiff's intervention was unsuccessful; and the Collector, on the 9th of October 1871, passed a decree against Anund Behary in favour of the defendants' tehsildar for Rs. 12-3-4-8.

On the 16th of December 1871 the plaintiff filed in the Moonsiff's Court at Puri a plaint against the tenant Anund ??? and also against the present defendant and his tehsildar, alleging that the 13-anna share of Mouzah Nagpore was his ancestral property and in his possession, and that after the death of his guru, viz., the deceased Mohunt, he had collected the rents from the ryots in that mouzah, and stating that the suit was brought “to set aside the order of the Collector of the 9th of October 1871 by determination of his, the plaintiff's, title to the 10 gunts 9 biswas of land,” the subject of the rent suit. He valued the last-mentioned land at Rs. 17-7-10-2, which, as appears from his schedule of valuation, was made up of Rs. 5-4-6 stated to be the approximate value of these lands, and of Rs. 12-3-4-8 the amount of the Collector's decree.

The present defendant, on the 7th of February 1872, put in his written statement to that suit, in which he denied that the plaintiff ever was in possession of the 13-annas share of the mouzah, or had any title to the same, and alleged that the title and possession was in himself. The defendant also specifically denied that the plaintiff was the cheela and heir of the deceased Mohunt, and alleged that he the defendant was the cheela and heir, and as such was in possession. On the 13th of March 1872 the Moonsiff settled several issues, and amongst them this:— “Was the plaintiff, as the cheela and heir of Mohunt Jugroop, deceased, in possession as proprietor and in receipt of rent of the 10 gunts and 9 biswas through the tenant Anund Behary; or is the present defendant in possession of the entire 13 annas of Mouzah Nagpore as heir and cheela of the deceased Mohunt, and as such collected rent from the tenant Anund?

Upon this issue the Moonsiff found that “it was satisfactorily proved that the plaintiff was the real cheela and heir of the deceased Mohunt, and was also in possession as proprietor of the 13-annas of Mouzah Nagpore, which included the land in dispute, and was also in receipt of rent from the tenant Anund Behary, and accordingly made a decree in the plaintiff's favour. The defendant appealed from this decree to the Officiating Judge of Cuttack, who, on the 8th of August 1872, after examining the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, found that the plaintiff was not, as he alleged the cheela of the deceased Mohunt Jugroop, and accordingly dismissed the suit.

Although the Officiating Judge limits his finding to the cheelaship of the plaintiff, yet I think it must be treated as a finding against the plaintiff's heirship as well. The Judge, in commencing his examination of the plaintiff's evidence, expressly states that he is dealing with the issue on the merits, which is the issue in the Moonsiff's Court recited above. The plaintiff had also in his plaint based his heirship on the allegation that he was a cheek, and his claim was resisted by the defendant on the ground that he was not a cheela.

Against this decision the plaintiff preferred to this Court the only appeal which he could prefer, viz., a special appeal which, on the 17th of June 1873, was dismissed with costs. Inasmuch as the decree of the lower Appellate Court was based on its finding upon the evidence against the plaintiff, it was a decree which could not be disturbed in special appeal, unless the plaintiff could show that the decision was had on one or other of the pounds set forth in section 372 of the old Code Act of 1859, which he must have failed to do.

In the present suit the Subordinate Judge of Cuttack, considering that the result of the above litigation between the plaintiff sad the defendant had finally decided the question of heirship to the deceased Mohunt adversely to the plaintiff, and also that upon the authority of Krishna Behary Roy v. Brojeswari Chowdhranee, L.R 2 I.A, 283, the matter was res judicata, his dismissed the plaintiff's suit.

The plaintiff does not appear to have excluded from his present suit the 10 gunts and 9 biswas of land which formed the subject of the litigation commenced in the Moonsiff's Court. As regards that portion of the deceased Mohunt's estate he must unquestionably be held to be concluded by the issue of that litigation; and that this was so was not disputed on behalf of the appellant. But as regards the residue of the estate the appellant argues, 1st that under Act X of 1877 (the Civil Procedure Code, as amended by Act XII of 1879) the question of the heirship of the appellant was not directly in issue in the suit in the ??? Court. That suit, he contends, was only to establish his title to the rent of a small portion of the deceased's estate, ??? the present suit relates to the entire estate, and seeks for confirmation of his possession of a portion of that estate, and for khas possession of the remainder, and that in the former suit the question of heirship came only indirectly and collaterally before the Court.

The prayer of the appellant's plaint in the Moonsiff's Court appears to claim, under his alleged title as heir, possession of the 10 gunts and 9 biswas of land; but reading the prayer by the light of the statements in the body of the plaint, and of the issue settled by the Moonsiff, to which reference has been made, I think that what the appellant really sought was to establish his legal title to the rent. The suit was brought within a little more than two months after the decision of the Collector, and may fairly be considered as a suit of the class mentioned in the proviso of section 77 of Act X of 1859. Whether that suit, however, was brought to establish his title to the land or the rent, appears to me to make no difference. His title to either rested on the same basis, and the same issue would have to be tried, viz. whether the appellant was cheela and heir of the Mohunt.

In the present suit also the right to any relief depends entirely upon his having this issue determined in his favour. The ground work of the decision in the suit in the Moonsiff's Court is the same as what, if the present suit succeeds, must be the ground work of the decision in the Subordinate Judge's Court, and the same evidence to establish the appellant's heirship as was given in the Moonsiff's Court, must be given again before the Subordinate Judge of Cuttack.

I am unable, therefore, to see that the matter directly in issue in this suit was not also directly in issue in the suit in the Moonsiff's Court.

The next objection taken is, that the Moonsiff's Court was not a Court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of section 13 of the Code as amended. It is argued that, as the Moonsiff was not competent to try a suit for the recovery of the whole estate of the deceased Mohunt, or to entertain a suit for a declaration of the appellant's title to the whole estate heir of the deceased Mohunt, by reason of the estate exceeding in value the Moonsiff's jurisdiction, the Moonsiff's Court ought therefore, not to be treated as competent to decide finally the question of the plaintiff's heirship.

It is to be observed that the Moonsiff decided the suit in favour of the appellant, and found that he was the real cheela and heir, and that it is the Court of the District Judge which, reversing that decree on appeal, has in effect found that the appellant was not the heir. If, therefore, this suit could be considered as one instituted in the District Judge's Court, there is no question but that Judge was competent to try a suit for the entire estate, and the question now raised would fall to the ground. But in considering the competency of a Court ??? the purpose of deciding upon a question of res judicata, we must, I think, look to the powers of the Court in which the suit was instituted, and not to the powers of the Court by which that suit was decided on appeal.

I must confess that, if I were unfettered by authority, I should be inclined to hold that the Moonsiff's Court, although competent to try the issue of heirship for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion upon a matter wholly within its jurisdiction, viz., the right to rent of the 10 gunts 9 biswas of land, was yet not competent to find upon that issue, so as to make it res judicata in a suit instituted in a Court of ??? jurisdiction and relating to a large estate whose value is far beyond the pecuniary limits of the Moonsiff's jurisdiction. I am much impressed with the judgment of Peacock, C.J, in ??? Edun v. Mussamut Bechun, 8 W.R, 175, 179. The learned Chief Justice there lays it down that concurrency of jurisdiction in the two Courts is a necessary part of the rule which creates the estoppel “known as res judicata” and that order to make the decision of one Court final and conclusive another Court, it must be the decision of a Court which ??? have had jurisdiction over the matter in the subsequent ??? in which the first decision is given in evidence as ???. One exception no doubt exists, but it was probably ??? for the case cited, because it was thought to be ??? for the purposes of the judgment. The exception ??? that the judgment of the inferior Court is conclusive upon ??? matter actually decided by that Court. The learned Chief ??? in the case cited bases his judgment upon the answers ??? by the Judges in the Duchess of Kingston's case, and he points out that, if the question of the concurrency of the jurisdiction of the two Courts is treated as immaterial, the whole procedure as regards appeals might be entirely changed.

In the present case the appellant succeeded in the Moonsiff Court, but had his suit dismissed in the Appellate Court; and if the issue of heirship is treated as res judicata, the title which he claims to a large estate, asserted to be of the value of more than a lakh of rupees, will have been finally decided without his being able to have the opinion of the High Court upon the merits of his title, and without having a right to appeal to the Privy Council. No doubt little sympathy will be felt for the plaintiff, inasmuch as he brought himself into the difficulty in which he is placed, by choosing to sue in the Moonsiff's Court, to establish his legal title to the rent of an insignificant portkm of the deceased Mohunt's estate instead of bringing a suit in the District Court in the first instance to recover the whole estate. But I can easily suppose the case of a party who is in actual possession of a large estate, but is dragged into the Moonsiff's Court as a defendant in a suit brought by a rival claimant who sues a tenant of the estate for the rent of a few fields, and is met by the defence that the rent is payable to the party who is in possession of the rest of the estate. If the rival claimant succeeds in the Moonsiff's and District Judges Courts, or fails in the first and succeeds in the second Court, upon an issue of title to the estate, the rival claimant can, by availing himself of the doctrine of res judicata, force the other party out of the remainder of the estate, and the defeated party will be thus deprived of a large property—it may be of the value ??? several lakhs of rupees—without being able to procure the judgment either of this Court, or of the Privy Council on the ??? of his title.

There are numerous decisions of this Court relating to ??? question of res judicata, but in none of these, except two ??? the Court, as far as I can gather the facts from the ??? dealing with the judgments of Courts, other than a Court concurrent jurisdiction.

In two cases, however, the judgments of an ??? deciding an issue, which was the foundation of the ??? in their suits brought in a superior Court, were ??? held to be conclusive in the latter. The first case is of Nund Kishore Sing v. Hurree Pershad Mundul, 13, ??? 64. It is not a case easy to understand, as reported, appears to have been a regular appeal against a decree Subordinate Judge declaring that the plaintiff had a ??? right in an entire village, and directing that he should session. The defendants, who were the appellants before High Court, amongst other defences, contended that the suit res judicata and therefore barred by section 2 of the Code 59, because in a former suit brought by the plaintiff Moonsiff's Court against the appellants for cutting some and dispossessing him of some jungle land, pertaining mouzah, an issue was raised as to the plaintiff's title to ??? as putneedar, which issue the Moonsiff declined but the Judge, on appeal, tried and decided against the ???. Markby, J., in giving the judgment of the Court,—“At the same time we wish it to be clearly understood even had the plaintiff been able to show that he had ??? of action separate and distinct from that in the ??? suit, we do not think it at all follows that the plaintiff not have been concluded by the previous decisions, ??? heard the agument on that point, we desire to express ??? concurrence in the decision of the High Court of as in the case of Mohidin v. Muhammad Ibrahim, 1 H.C.R, 245, which is in point. The land now claimed, he land which the plaintiff sought to recover in the ??? suit, is all held under one title. The whole question of plaintiff's putnee title was raised, and decided in the former and we consider that decision conclusive between these ??? as to every portion of land held under that title. On ground also, therefore, we think the suit ought to be ???.”

??? second case is reported in I.L.R, 3 Calcutta ??? 705,—Bemolasoondery Chowdkrain v. Punchanun ???, in which a similar decision is given. There the ??? had successfully intervened in a rent suit brought Moonsiff's Court by the plaintiff against a tenant of a portion of the land in dispute in the second suit and the defendants succeeded in establishing their right as against the plaintiff. The second suit was brought by the plaintiff against the same defendants, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, to get possession of a half share of several villages which the plaintiff claimed under the same title as he had put forward in the Moonsiff's Court. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit brought in his Court This Court, to which the plaintiff had appealed, affirmed the decision of the lower Court, and in the course of their judgment said:— “Another bar to the entertainment of this suit is the prior adjudication recognising the title of the defendants in the suit of Saroda Gobind Chowdhry v. Komul Ghose. In that suit the plaintiffs chose to intervene, and the question of title, as between them and the defendants, was distinctly raised and determined. They are, therefore, estopped under the ruling of the full Bench in Gobind Chunder Koondoo v. Taruck Chunder Bose (reported in I.L.R 3 Cal., 145) from setting up this title now. This principle is also recognized in the new Code of Civil Procedure, s. 18, expl. II.” In both these cases a decision on the question of res judicata appears to have been unnecessary, as the Courts considered that there were other sufficient grounds in the one case for reversing, and in the other case for affirming, the decrees appealed against. In each case the Court, in passing their decision on the foregoing question, relied upon authorities which, when examined, appear not to touch the question of concurrency of jurisdiction. In the Madras case, cited by Mr. Justice Markby, Mohidin v. Muhammad Ibrahim, 1 Mad. H.C.R, 245, both the suits seem to have been brought on the Original Side of the High Court. In the Full Bench case cited by Kemp, J., both the suits appear to have been instituted in the Moonsiff's Court.

These circumstances diminish the authority of these cases, but there remains the Privy Council decision referred to by the Subordinate Judge of Cuttack, which shows that concurrency of jurisdiction is not necessary to raise the estoppel, in Krishna Behary Roy v. Brojeswaree Chowdhranee, L.R ??? I.A, 283, the appellant and plaintiff had brought a suit in the District Judge's Court of Rajahahye to set aside the adoption of the respondent. The appellant had previously intervened in a suit which the respondent had brought in the Court of the Principal Sudder Ameen to set aside certain putnee leases granted by his adoptive mother. The ground of the intervention was, that the appellant was the heir, and that the respondent had no title as adopted son. The issue was tried and found against the intervenor, and in favour of the adoption. The District Judge held that the appellant's suit was barred by reason of the judgment in the former one. A special appeal was preferred to the Court which, upon such an appeal, was not competent to go into the evidence, and the decree was affirmed. The Judicial Committee upheld the decision of this Court, thus holding that the Court of the Principal Sudder Ameen, although a Court of inferior jurisdiction to that of the District Court, was a Court of competent jurisdiction. The case in the Privy Council was decided upon section 2 of Act VIII of 1859 (the first Code of Civil Procedure); but the words in that section, relating to the Competency of the Court in which the former suit is heard, remain the same in the new Code; and the amending Act has made no attention in this respect.

The doctrine laid down by Peacock, C.J, was not referred to in any of the cases which I have cited, nor, so far as anything appears in the reports, was brought to the notice of the Courts I which decided their cases. Notwithstanding this, I think I am bound by the decision of the Privy Council which, having the facts before it, expressly decides the appeal of Krishna Behary Roy on the ground that the main issue which he sought to have tried in his suit had already been determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction.

I must hold, therefore, that the Moonsiff's Court was a Court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of section 13 of the Code as amended. This case was argued on both sides on the hypothesis that the Code, as amended by Act XII of 1879, ??? the case. The decree appealed from was passed on the ??? of August 1878. It is not necessary to determine whether ??? case is really governed by the Code, as amended, or by the ??? as it stood in 1878; inasmuch as the 13th section as amended, if it really differ in meaning from the 13th section as it stood before the amendment, is the more favorable of the two to the appellants' contention, and inasmuch as I hold that even under the section as amended the appellant's suit cannot be maintained.

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Maclean, J.:—

I concur in dismissing this appeal, and in holding that the suit is barred under section 13 of Civil Procedure Code, X of 1877.

The suit No. 40 of 1872 was brought by the present plaintiff in consequence of an unfavourable decision in a rent suit under Act X of 1859, and instead of bringing it to establish his right to the rents, as provided by section 77 of that Act, he brought it to establish his possessory right to the lands. He valued the suit at Rs. 5-4-6 for the land, and Rs. 12-3 for the rent, and he based his claim upon his position as cheela and heir of a deceased Mohunt who died in 1868. A dispute had at that time arisen between the plaintiff and defendant as to the succession to the Mohunt-ship, and various proceedings, of which the rent suit was one, had taken place between them relative to the succession. In his plaint in the present suit the plaintiff alleges that since 1868 he has been “gradually” dispossessed by the defendant of most of the properties held by the former Mohunt; and I have no doubt that when the suit No. 40 of 1872 was brought, the plaintit had a cause of action for a considerable portion of the property. He chose, however, to confine that suit to a small portion of the property, and to put in issue his title as cheela and heir of Jugroop Gir Gossain. The defendant objected to the suit proceeding, but joined issue with him upon the question of title, and I am satisfied that question was one which, in the words of section. It of Act X of 1877, exp. II, ought, under the circumstances in which the defendant was placed, to have been made “ground of defence,” ??? and it was, therefore, directly and substantially in issue in the ??? No. 40 of 1872.

It may be that the Court in which that suit was ??? was a Court which could not have tried the suit, brought ??? assert a title to the entire estate of Jugroop Gir Gossain; ??? I have stated the plaintiff elected to put his title in issue in a Court of limited jurisdiction, and to sue for a small portion of the estate when, in point of fact, his title and possession of much more than that suit involved had been challenged and disturbed; and, for my part, I believe that the plaintiff was endeavouring to obtain, as hinted by the District Judge, a cheap decision as to his claim to a very large estate. It is very probable, therefore, that a plea under section 7 of Act VIII of 1859 would have been a sufficient answer to this suit. No such plea, however, has been raised, and we are only dealing with the plea of estoppel, and I have stated my opinion that the issue now raised was raised and decided in the unit of 1872.

As to the competency of the Moonsiff to deal with a question of title to land worth Rs. 5-4 there can be no question; and I concur in the opinion that the decision on that title is conclusive between the parties as to every portion of land held under that title—Nund Kishore Singh v. Hurree Pershad Mundul, 13 W.R, 64. Were it otherwise a number of suits might be brought in Courts of limited jurisdiction for portion of an estate, and the party in possession, who may have success fully defended his title in each or all of them, might be harassed by a further suit for the whole estate in a Court of exclusive jurisdiction.

In my opinion the decision relied upon by the Subordinate Judge, reported in L.R, 2 I.A, 283,—Krishna Behary Roy v. Brojeswari Chowdhranee applies to this case, and the suit cannot be maintained.

Appeal will be dismissed with costs.