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Bukronath Sing And Another v. Rajah Nilmoni Singh .
Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit was brought by Bukronath Sing (plaintiff) seeking confirmation of possession and a declaration of title in respect of Mouzahs Dekhia and other mouzahs, which he alleged he held as his jageer mehal subject to public duties. The plaint alleged that the plaintiff's father had held the same mehal similarly, and that the defendant (the Rajah), who had an unsatisfied decree against the father, attached the mehal as property of the judgment-debtor and caused it to be sold in execution despite the plaintiff's objection. The Government was made a pro forma defendant and, in substance, supported the plaintiff's position.
The suit began in the Court of a Moonsiff in West Burdwan, was transferred to the District Judge on grounds of under-valuation, and was tried before Mr. Tweedie, Judge of West Burdwan, who treated Government as the real plaintiff and entered judgment for the plaintiff. A Division Bench considered the matter on appeal; Mr. Justice Mitter and Mr. Justice Markby took differing views on important points about the nature of the tenure, the right of appointment, and the saleability of the interest. A subsequent Letters Patent Appeal was heard by a larger Bench (including Jackson, Ainslie and White JJ.), which delivered the opinions summarized in the record.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Mouzahs Dekhia and the other disputed mouzahs, as held by the plaintiff, constituted "property of the deceased judgment-debtor" that could be attached and sold in execution of a decree obtained against the deceased (i.e., whether the interest was saleable on execution for the predecessor's debts).
- Whether the execution sale that took place in 1874 conveyed a title to the Rajah sufficient to oust the plaintiff from possession (i.e., did the sale pass the service/jageer tenure described in the pleadings and proclamation).
- Whether the right of appointment to the jageerdar lay with the Government or with the zemindar (the Rajah), insofar as that question bears on the character of the tenure and its alienability.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff and Government (as supporting party)
- The plaintiff asserted that he held the mouzahs as a jageer mehal (a tenure with attached public duties) and that his father had similarly held them; this interest was not a simple inheritable ownership that could lawfully be sold in execution for the father's debts.
- The plaintiff contended that the mehal was not obtained by ordinary inheritance from his father as owner, and therefore could not be treated as the deceased's heritable assets on which execution could proceed.
- The Government's written statement maintained that the mouzahs were police/service lands (not alienable in the ordinary way), that the Rajah's sale had been effected without specification of the jageer character of the lands, and that the Rajah, having bought in execution of his own decree, had acquired no title.
Defendant (the Rajah)
- The Rajah maintained that the mouzahs were not jageer but part of his "mal" estates, settled with the plaintiff's father as remuneration for services of a private character and held at varying rents.
- He alleged that the plaintiff's ancestor had been granted the land as a service tenure which was liable to sale to satisfy debts, and he sought to support the execution sale as passing title to him.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 10 W.R. 255 (judgment by Jackson, between the same parties) | Held in that judgment that the tenure was not liable to be sold for the debt of the late jageerdar (debt being arrear of rent due from the mehal). | Referenced by Jackson C.J. as a prior decision between these parties but treated as not presenting an insurmountable difficulty for the present appeal; he regarded it as not determinative of the present question whether the tenure was property of the deceased when it came into plaintiff's possession. |
| Raja Lelanund Singh v. Government of Bengal, 6 Moore, Indian Appeals 101 | Discussed the character of ghatwali tenures; Privy Council concluded that the Khurukpur ghatwalis formed part of the permanently-settled estate and were included in the assessment (not police lands). | Quoted by Ainslie J. and used to distinguish statutory treatment of certain ghatwali tenures (Beerbhoom) from other tenures; used as authority in discussing character and treatment of ghatwali/jageer tenures. |
| 6 W.R. 121 (High Court decision) and 18 W.R. 321 (Privy Council) | Affirmations in prior litigation that the services on which certain mouzahs were held were of a public nature and not private or personal to the Rajah. | Referred to by White J. to show that earlier findings — that the services were public and not merely personal to the Rajah — had been affirmed by the High Court and the Privy Council; used to support the conclusion about the public character of the services attached to the mouzahs. |
| 8 Weekly Reporter, p. 178 | A decision (as cited in the record) holding that a statutory provision gave each successive tenant an estate unencumbered by his predecessor (quoted in the course of discussing Regulation XXIX implications). | Referred to by Ainslie J. in the course of examining the effect of the specific statutory language of Regulation XXIX (Beerbhoom) on succession and the saleability of interests; used to show how specific statutory wording may affect the result. |
| Mussamut Kustoora v. Monohur Deo (W.R. Gap. Vol., p. 39) | Held that a female can succeed and that personal service is not an essential condition of the holding under the statute discussed. | Quoted by Ainslie J. to support the proposition that statutory provisions for certain ghatwali tenures do not make personal service an essential component and that the statutory scheme contemplates sale for arrears by public sale in some contexts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Jackson, Officiating Chief Justice (leading opinion)
Jackson C.J. began by acknowledging a difficulty arising from earlier conflicting Division Bench decisions concerning the two parts of Turuff Dekhia but regarded that conflict as not decisive for the present appeal. He stated that for present purposes it was unnecessary to resolve whether the right of appointment rested with Government or with the zemindar, because it was admitted that the plaintiff's father had been the duly appointed jageerdar and the plaintiff had succeeded.
He framed the principal legal question as whether the mouzahs were "property of the deceased" within the meaning of the execution provisions (citing section 210 and section 203, Act VIII of 1859). He examined the nature of the jageer tenure and emphasized that the holder was bound to perform duties of a public nature and that the grant (as was common) left the exact nature of the services elastic rather than precisely defined.
Jackson concluded that the reserved one-third of the assets (set aside at the permanent settlement as the jageerdar's emolument) indicated a governmental reservation and that the incoming jageerdar took the land subject to appointment/approval and an attached burden of public duty. These characteristics, he held, showed the interest was not simply heritable property of the deceased judgment-debtor that had come into the plaintiff's possession. On that ground he held the creditor had no warrant to attach and the Moonsiff's sale was unauthorized; therefore the plaintiff was entitled to be retained in possession notwithstanding the sale. Jackson also acknowledged a secondary, shorter ground: that the sale itself may not have passed the tenure actually held by the plaintiff (but he expressed some doubt whether that point had been properly raised earlier).
Ainslie, J.
Ainslie J. rehearsed the factual background and surveyed the historical and statutory materials concerning ghatwali and jageer tenures, distinguishing Beerbhoom ghatwalis (which are the subject of Regulation XXIX of 1814) from other ghatwali tenures. He noted previous litigation (including Raja Lelanund Singh v. Government of Bengal) and the different statutory treatment of some ghatwalis.
Ainslie reasoned that because the zemindar (the Rajah) is responsible to Government for the land revenue and in the absence of special law to the contrary must have the same means for enforcing his demands as other zemindars, the zemindar could recover rents and sell the tenure for arrears of rent. He concluded that the presence of public services attached to the tenure did not, by itself, prevent transfer by sale; the permanent settlement conferred rights corresponding to obligations, and those rights could not be curtailed except by legislation. He thus reached the view that such tenures could be saleable for other debts of the holder.
White, J.
White identified two central questions: (1) whether the lands in the plaintiff's possession were liable to be sold in execution of the decree against the deceased father, and (2) whether the Rajah had acquired a title by the sale sufficient to oust the plaintiff. He focused his reasoning on the effect and operation of the execution sale.
White analysed the sale proclamation and the decree: the proclamation described the tenure as an ordinary rent-paying one and stated that the sale extended to the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor, describing the subject as "the right of the judgment-debtor to the amount of profits due to him" after a rent deduction. White held that the proclamation materially misdescribed the tenure by ignoring that it was a service tenure with public duties attached. He considered the misdescription to be material and wilful; consequently, a purchaser of the subject as described could not have acquired the actual service/jageer tenure held by the plaintiff. White therefore concluded that the execution sale conveyed no title enabling the Rajah to eject the plaintiff and that the lower court's decree (protecting the plaintiff's possession) should be confirmed. White expressly stated that, because he resolved the appeal on this point, it was unnecessary to decide the distinct and more difficult question whether the interest of the deceased father had been assets liable to attachment when the plaintiff obtained possession.
Holding and Implications
CORE RULING: The court held that the execution sale did not pass the service/jageer tenure in the plaintiff's possession, and therefore the purchaser (the Rajah) acquired no title to oust the plaintiff; accordingly, the decree of the Court below (which protected the plaintiff's possession) was to be affirmed and certain prior judicial conclusions were to be reversed as stated in the record.
The direct consequences for the parties (as stated in the opinion) are:
- The plaintiff is entitled to be retained in possession of the mouzahs despite the execution sale.
- The execution sale of 1874, as proclaimed, misdescribed the tenure (by treating it as an ordinary rent-paying holding) and therefore conveyed no title enabling the Rajah to dispossess the plaintiff.
- The Court indicated one principal legal basis for this result: the characteristic public-service burden and the special structure of the tenure meant the interest was not simply "property of the deceased" that had come into the plaintiff's possession and was therefore not properly liable to be attached and sold in execution in the manner adopted (Jackson C.J.'s reasoning). White J. disposed of the appeal alternatively on the narrower ground that the sale proclamation misdescribed the subject of sale and therefore passed no title.
The opinion does not purport to lay down a sweeping new general rule beyond the resolution of the dispute before the Court; the decision decides the parties' rights in this litigation on the stated grounds and does not announce a novel statutory construction beyond its application to the facts here.
Letters Patent Appeal from the judgment of a Division Bench, in which the opinion of Mr. Justice Markby, as the Senior Judge, prevailed over that of Mr. Justice Mitter, reversing the decision of the Officiating Judge of West Burdwan.
The suit originally commenced in the Court of a Moonsiff in the District of West Burdwan, but was afterwards transferred to that of the District Judge, as it appeared to have been greatly under-valued. Bukronath Sing, the plaintiff, asked for a confirmation of possession and declaration of title in respect of Mouzahs Dekhia and others, which he alleged himself to be holding as his jageer mehal subject to, and in consideration of, the performance of certain public duties. It appeared that his father had in like manner held these mouzahs; that the defendant, who was the zemindar, having an unsatisfied decree against the father, had attached the mehal as the property of the judgment-debtor, and notwithstanding the plaintiff's objection, caused it to be sold in satisfaction of such decree. Plaintiff alleged that he had not obtained the mehal by inheritance from his father, who was not the owner thereof, and that it could not lawfully be sold in execution of a decree made against the deceased jageerdar. The Government, which really supported the plaintiff, was made a pro forma defendant.
The defendant Rajah maintained that the mouzahs in question were no jageer, but a part of his mal estates, which had been settled with plaintiff's father in remuneration for services of a private character, and held at varying rates of rent, and he stated that the original Taruff Dekhia had been divided into two parts, one of which was now in dispute, while, as to the other, his “mal” right had been conclusively established by a decision of the High Court.
The written statement of Government was to the effect that the mouzahs were police service lands and not alienable, and therefore the Rajah, having caused the sale without specification of the jageer character of the lands, and having bough them in execution of his own decree, had acquired no title, and that, although the mehal included lands held by tabedars or subordinate police officers, the plaintiff as Sirdar jageerdar was competent to maintain the suit.
The suit came on for trial before Mr. Tweedie, the Judge of West Burdwan, who treated the Government as the real plaintiff. He found that the tenure was both service and rent-paying; that the performance of the service gave the chief title to the land; that the service was of a public and not of a private nature; that the tenure (or the plaintiff's interest in it) was not ordinarily saleable in satisfaction of a debt of his predecessor, and that the Rajah, in particular, was disabled from purchasing. He consequently held that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment.
On the appeal Mr. Justice Mitter came to the following conclusions:—
1. That inasmuch as one-third share of the assets of the mouzahs had been excluded from account in fixing the assessment at the permanent settlement, the Government had not to that extent parted with the ownership, and the jageerdar consequently held both under Government and under the zemindar.
2. That the right of appointment was in the Government.
3. That each successive holder took not by inheritance, but as jageerdar under the conditions of the grant.
4. That the nature of a jageerdar's interest was in all essential particulars like that of a Beerbhoom ghatwal, as defined by Regulation XXIX of 1814.
5. That such interest consequently could not be sold on account of the debts of a predecessor.
Mr. Justice Markby on the other hand agreed with the Court below that the plaintiff did not hold as appointee of the Rajah, but also held that no appointment by the Government would entitle an appointee to hold these lands; that no sale rule of law forbade the alienation of lands of which the holder owed some service to the Government; and that nothing prevented the Rajah himself from becoming a purchaser.
Paul (Advocate-General), and Baboo Annoda Persaud Banerjee, for the Appellants.
Baboo Mahesh Chunder Chowdhry, and Bhowany Charn Dutt, for the Respondents.
The following judgments were delivered by the Court (1):—
Jackson (Offg. C.J) after stating the facts continued as follows:—
A certain element of difficulty has arisen in this case from something like a conflict of decision between two Division Benches of this Court, with regard to the two divided parts of Turuff Dekhia. On the one hand, there is a judgment in 10 W.R, 255, delivered by myself, between these very parties, in which it was expressly held that this tenure was not liable to be sold for the debt of the late jageerdar, the debt being an arrear of rent due from the mehal: on the other hand, there is a decision of the late Mr. Justice D.N Mitter and my brother Ainslie between the Rajah and the other half jageerdar that the right to appoint with a resulting title to enjoyment of the land was not in the Government but in the zemindar. This, it is true, is not the precise point for decision in the present suit, but it was regarded both by the Court of First Instance and by Mr. Justice Markby as having at least an important bearing on the decision.
In these circumstances I feel bound to say that, as a matter of principle, this appears to me to have been a case in which a reference to the Full Bench would have been proper. For myself, however, as will appear from the view which I take of this case, the judgment in question is not a difficulty in my way. For the purposes of the present appeal, it seems to me immaterial whether the right to appoint the jageerdar of these monzahs rests with the Government or with the zemindar. I take it to be admitted that plaintiff's father was, and that plaintiff is, the duly appointed jageerdar.
The Rajah, it appears, brought a suit against the father to recover possession of some lands quite unconnected with the jageer. He got a decree for possession and costs amounting to Rs. 72, and it was in execution for costs that the proceedings took place, which have given rise to the present suit.
The decree being against Beer Singh, and Beer Singh having died before execution fully had, section 210, Act VIII of 1859, authorized an application to execute the decree against his legal representative, and such execution would be permitted in the manner described by section 203. That section permitted attachment and sale of “property of the deceased person” and it seems to me that the principal question which we have to consider is, whether Mouzahs Dekhia and others were property of the deceased which had come into the plaintiff's possession. The jageer in question was not enjoyed by Beer Singh without conditions, nor was it a simple inheritance. The holder of it was bound to perform certain duties of a public nature. Mr. Justice Markby observes that the character of these services was exceedingly indefinite, but that is precisely what might have been expected. It was not the practice of the country and of those times to define exactly the nature of services to be rendered in consideration of a grant. Both parties, grantor and grantee, designedly left it vague and elastic. The grantor trusted that superior power would make the conditions capable of extension in any direction required, and the grantee relied on the indolence or negligence of his superior to make the compliance with these conditions in general easy. The vagueness of the service required, therefore, is not to be taken as denoting insignificance.
The duties then were to be performed and performed as the condition of holding the jageer which the Government had endowed by setting aside a third of the profits of the land, and no one could perform the duties unless he were appointed or approved.
Mr. Justice Markby admits that he did not perform them as appointee of the zemindar, and it seems to me impossible to escape the conclusion at which Mr. Justice Mitter has arrived, viz., that the ultimate right of appointment as of dismissal rested with the Government. In connection with this part of the subject, as we seem to be in some danger of neglecting or forgetting the ancient law of the country, I think it well to fortify myself by the authority of the eminent author of the Analysis of the Regulations, Mr. J.H Harington.
In the judgment of the Division Bench, on which Mr. Justice Markby relies, I find the following passage, which I assume to be in accordance with the evidence to the case:—“On examining the figures given in this statement it appears that no difference whatever was made between what are called jageer villages and the other villages of the estate; while no right is claimed for the Government except the right to exact a certain share of the produce as land revenue. The conclusion, therefore, seems unavoidable that Government, after the decennial settlement, retained no interest in the land, except the right to receive rents from it as from all other lands not especially exempted. The fact that the Government officers encroached upon the rights of the Rajahs by habitually treating these lands as if they belonged to the class of Digwaree jageers is no more evidence of their right than is the document, set out by the respondent at page 127 of the printed book, proof that the Governmeut officers had a right to compel the izaradars of Mouzah Dhekia to furnish rations for their camp, though apparently they did so.”
In the present case Mr. Justice Mitter gives it as the result of an examination of the settlement record that the Government had set aside as the jageerdar's emolument one-third of the assets which accordingly were not included in the jumma which was the basis of settlement with the zemindar.
Now let us turn to Mr. Harington (3 Anal., 509). After mentioning Regulation XXIX of 1814 he goes on:—“Tenures of this description were mentioned generally in a note to the 2nd volume of this analysis as held at a low rent by ghatwals or guards of passes. They exist to a considerable extent in all the hilly districts on the western frontier of Bengal, and appear for the most part to have originated in assignment of lands for the protection of the ghats and villages near the hills. There is, however, a material difference in the tenures of ghatwals. Those of Tirhut and Deogur, in the district of Beerbhoom, to whom provisions of Regulations XXIX of 1814 immediately relate, have a defined and permanent interest in the lands which compose their respective mehals, and which consist of entire villages or more extensive tracts of land; whereas the sirdar and inferior ghatwals in the contiguous zemiudari of Ushenpore have small and specific portions of land in different villages, assigned for the maintenance of themselves and of the Paiks and Chowkeydars acting under them, of a nature analogous to the Chakran assignments of land to village watchman in other districts. The ghatwali tenure, however, as ascertained from the result of enquiries made by the Magistrate of Zillahs Burdwan, Beerbhoom and Jungle Mehals, and communicated to the Court of Nizamut Adawlut in the year 1816, differs essentially from the common Chakran in two respects: First, that being expressly granted for purposes of police, at a low assessment, which has been allowed for in adjusting the revenue payable by the landholders to Government at the formation of the permanent settlement, the land is not liable to resumption, nor the assessment to be raised beyond the established rate at the discretion of the landholder, secondly, that although the grant is not expressly hereditary and the ghatwal is removable from his office and the lands attached to it for misconduct, it the general usage on the death of a ghatwal, who has faithfully executed the trust committed to him, to appoint his son, if competent, or some other fit person in his family to succeed to the office.” He proceeds:—“The above discrimination between the ghatwalee tenure, which being an appropriation of land at a low jumma for a police establishment, may be considered within the 4th clause of section 3, Regulation I of 1793; and the common Chakran assignments in lieu of wages to zemindary servants which have been annexed to the malgoozari lands, and declared responsible for the public assessments by section 41, Regulation VIII, 1793, is taken verbatim from a letter written by order of the Nizamut Adawlut to the Calcutta Court of Circuit, on the 30th October 1816. It is probable that some specific provisions may hereafter be enacted for defining more exactly the rights of the ghatwals referred to. At present, however, those of Zillah Beerbhoom only are included in the enactments of Regulation XXIX, 1814.
The terms of Regulation I of 1793, section 8, clause 4, are as follows:—“The jumma of those zemindars, independent talookdars and other actual proprietors of land, which is declared fixed in the foregoing articles, is to be considered entirely unconnected with, and exclusive of, any allowances which have been made to them in the adjustment of their jumma, for keeping up thannahs, or police establishments, and also of the produce of any lands which they may have been permitted to appropriate for the same purpose; and the Governor-General in Council reserves to himself the option of reserving the whole or part of such allowances or produce of such lands according as he may think proper, in consequence of his having exonerated the proprietors of land from the charge of keeping the peace, and appointed officers on the part of Government to superintend the police of the country. The Governor-General in Council, however, declares that the allowances or produce of lauds, which may be resumed, will be appropriated to no other purpose but that of defraying the expense of the police, and that instructions will be sent to Collectors not to add such allowances or the produce of such lands to the jumma of the proprietors of lands, but to collect the amount from them separately.”
It seems to me, as it evidently did to Mr. Harington, that the reservation is one that would be within the meaning of this clause, and therefore it clearly cannot be said, in this case, that the Government had no interest reserved, although it had bound itself to hold the reserved allowance applicable to certain purposes only, and it seems to follow most plainly that the reserved one-third is held by the jageerdar directly from the Government as it forms no part of the zemindar's jumma.
But, as I have already said, it appears to me needless for the purpose of the present appeal to determine with whom the appointment lay. What is material is this—that the incoming jageerdar took the land subject to either appointment or approval and with an attached burthen of public duty. These two restrictions appear to me conclusively to show that the plaintiff did not hold these mouzahs as “property of the deceased judgment-debtor which had come into his possession,” but that he held them as a quasi-public servant in precisely the same tenure as his father had held them, and that the father's interest was strictly limited to his own life and performance of the functions. However slight the restrictions on succession, and in whosoever hands they rested, they appear to me sufficient to deprive the jageer of the character of simply heritable property.
I am, therefore, of opinion that the creditor acted without warrant of law in attaching, and that the Moonsiff's Court had no authority to sell the tenure then in possession of plaintiff as jageerdar, and that the plaintiff is entitled to be retained in possession thereof, notwithstanding the sale. The claim which be preferred was, perhaps, less a claim under section 246 of the repealed Code than an objection to the procedure adopted. But this is not very important. I have felt myself bound to base my judgment on the reason which I have just stated, although there is another and perhaps a shorter ground, viz., that the sale complained of has not passed the tenure of which the plaintiff is the holder. As to this latter question, I am in doubt whether it has been properly raised in the earlier stages of the case. It was not one of the issues framed, nor is there any reference to it in the judgment of the Court of First Instance, until we find it taking its place as the first of several particulars in which the Judge, “applying the principles adopted in the judgment and the finding on the several issues,” considers the sale to be faulty.
The defendant Rajah, it is true, is not deserving of much consideration. He has sought by this proceeding to compass an end after which he has been striving for many years. He has in his written statement advanced allegations which not only are absolutely untrue, but as to which he is distinctly concluded by the decisions arrived at in previous litigation of his own seeking. But I should not wish him to be able to say that his appeal had been lost upon an issue not raised in either of the previous hearings, and which, perhaps, might be more fitly raised in a suit on his part to obtain possession.
The plaint asks for a declaration of the plaintiff's title and for maintenance in possession. To so much relief, I think, he was entitled. I would, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court below, and restore that of the District Judge in so far as it gave him that relief.
The result is that the judgment of Mr. Justice Markby will be reversed, and the decree of the Court below will be affirmed.
Ainslie, J.:— The plaintiff's case is that he, as a jageerdar performing public duties, holds a jageer comprising Mouzah Dekhia, and other villages under the Government; that the Rajah of Pachete, having obtained a decree for the costs of a certain suit against his (plaintiff's) father, attached these villages in execution thereof; that he thereupon objected to the same being attached under section 246, Act VIII, 1859, but the objection was over-ruled, and hence it has become necessary for him to establish his title by a regular suit.
The Rajah denies the title of the Government to these lands, which he claims as appertaining to his perpetually-settled Estate, and alleges that they were granted to his (plaintiff's) ancestor as a service tenure, and that they are liable to be sold to satisfy debts due by the plaintiff's father.
The subject of the present suit is a portion of that originally formed one holding, which was divided in 1818, between Guru Churn Mozoomdar and Dhurm Das Chuckerbutty.
The Rajah has undoubtedly failed to establish the alleged grant for personal service.
It is established that the jageer is an ancient one of unknown origin.
There was, at the time when the British Government was first established, a chain of ghatwali tenures extending from Bhagulpor southwards to Midnapur. The Bhagulpur ghatwalis have been the subject of much litigation between the Government and the Rajah of Khurukpur which terminated in favor of the latter (see the case of Raja Lelanund Singh v. Government of Bengal, 6 Moore, I.A, 101).
Their Lordships of the Privy Council came to the conclusion that the Khurukpur ghatwalis formed part of the permanently-settled estate of the Rajah, and were included in this assessment, and that they could not properly be described as Thannadari or Police lands.
The Beerbhoom ghatwalis are the subject of express legislation (Regulation XXIX of 1814).
Those to the south of Beerbhoom were not dealt with in this way. The Government has left them unnoticed. One of these is the subject of the present appeal.
This was undoubtedly included in the permanent settlement of Pachete, and the Rajah is responsible to Government for due payment of revenue, and subject in respect thereof to the stringent rules for the realization of Government revenue. It is immaterial for the purposes of this appeal whether the revenue was assessed on the gross income of the land or after a deduction of one-third.
It seems to me that inasmuch as the Zemindar is responsible to Government for punctual payment of the revenue, he must, in the absence of any special law on the subject, have the same means for enforcing his demands against the sub-tenant as any other zemindar: and therefore if the tenant falls into arrears he may recover rents by the same process that is available to other zemindars, and may therefore sell the tenure for arrears of rent accruing due thereon; and the fact that the tenant for the time being may be bound to render certain public services cannot interfere with his right to resort to sale for the recovery of his rents. He may therefore sell the subject to its incidents, and not merely the personal interest of the indebted holder as an interest for life subject to be determined by the action of Government for failure to discharge the duties attaching to the holding of the land: and such right cannot be defeated by the death or dismissal of a ghatwal. The permanent settlement, while imposing certain obligations, conferred corresponding rights which, in the absence of any express agreement at the time or since, can only be curtailed by legislation. If this view is correct, it follows from it, in my opinion, that the tenure is equally saleable for other debts of the holder.
If he incurs debts it makes no difference whether he applies the profits of the estate to paying them while he allows his rent to fall into arrears, or uses them to pay his rent while he allows other debts to accumulate.
It seems to me that the tenure is as much saleable in the one case as the other, though there may be different consequences of a tale according as it may be under the ordinary procedure for realizing decrees for money.
The fact that the Government thought fit to make special provisions for the Beerbhoom ghatwals, and left those to the south unprovided for, shows that they intended to leave the latter to be governed by the general law of Bengal. If the provisions of existing Regulation were not expressly applicable to these as they were declared by the preamble of Regulation XXIX of 1814 not to be to the former, why was the Regulation then restricted in its operation to Beerbhoom and never since extended?
That Regulation fully recognizes the zemindar's rights under the permanent settlement (section III), and gives him a guarantee for punctual payment of the rents due to him (section IV), as the Government undertakes not only to pay surplus over revenue assessed of rents collected, but surplus of rents assessed, and, by section V, any increased rents are to go to the zemindar. In consideration of this the Government thought fit to make a special rule for the succession to those lands, and though this has been held, in 8 Weekly Reporter, page 178, to give each successive tenant an estate unencumbered by his predecessor, this decision was expressly based on the words of the Statute. It has also been held, in the case of Mussamut Kustoora v. Monohur Deo, W.R Gap. Vol., p. 39, that a female can succeed, so that personal service is no part of the condition of the holding; and that this is not a necessary condition even in the Beerbhoom ghatwalies is evident from the provisions of section V for recovering arrears by public sale as in the case of other lands held from the Government.
The fact of certain services being attached to the possession of the tenure in suit is, therefore, clearly no ground for holding that it is not transferable by sale. The fact that the Government can dismiss a ghatwal and so cut off the descent does not destroy the generally hereditary character of the holding or make these lands, when included in the permanent settlement police lands, resumable by Government under clause 4, section 8, Regulation I of 1793. Whether any part of the rent, which may have been allowed to the ghatwal not included in the assets on which the settlement with the Rajah was based, is a resumable allowance for keeping up a Police establishment is immaterial in this appeal. The lands were certainly not appropriated for the purpose of maintaining such establishment, for they were assessed for revenue. See the case of Raja Lelanund Singh v. The Government of Bengal, in 6 Moore's Indian Appeals, page 101, where the character of ghatwali tenures generally is discussed.
It has been doubted whether the order of the Magistrate of the 22nd August 1816, directing the Rajah to appoint after the dismissal of Rup Singh, is evidence that the power of appointment was with the Rajah. The further proceedings of the Magistrate of the 30th March 1822, rescinding his earlier order of the 27th February 1822, and referring the parties (the ghatwal and his tabedars or subordinates) to the Civil Court; for the settlement of their disputes as to the division of the land seem to me to show that at that time the Magistrate looked upon the jageerdar as not subject to his control in the matter of the appropriation of the jageer lands, and this supports the view taken by myself in the former case and by Mr. Justice Markby, in the Court below, in whose judgment I entirely concur.
White, J.:— The appellants before us are the plaintiffs in the Court below, and also the Government whom the plaintiff made what he calls a pro formâ defendant to his suit. The respondent (whom I shall call the Rajah) is the principal defendant in the Court below. The suit is brought by the plaintiff for the purpose of being confirmed in the possession of nine properties consisting of the whole of certain mouzahs and of certain shares in other mouzahs.
Two questions arise in this case: one whether the lands in suit, when they came into the possession of the plaintiff were liable to be sold in execution of a decree obtained by the Rajah against the deceased father of the plaintiff—the other question is whether the Rajah, by virtue of the alleged sale, has acquired a title to the mouzah in dispute under which he can oust the plaintiff.
The Court below has decided the first question in favor of the Rajah, but the second one against him, and consequently relieved the plaintiff against the cloud upon his title occasioned by the sale, and quieted him in the possession of the mouzahs.
The Judge says in paragraphs 41 and 42 of his judgment:—“I find that the interest is saleable for the purposes aforesaid, in satisfaction of a decree for a debt due from the plaintiff or his predecessor to the defendant, provided it be sold subject to this burden of the performance of the jageer service by the purchaser after he has obtained appointment to these duties at the hands of the Magistrate or his representative police authorities, and installation on the land by the same authorities. Applying the principles adopted in this judgment and the finding on the several issues to the particular sale, which is the special subject of interest in the present suit, we find that sale is bad in the following particulars, the first of which is, that the Rajah caused the tenure to be advertized for sale as if it were an ordinary estate to which no burden of a service lieu were attached.”
As regards the two questions raised in the case, I will first consider that which relates to the effect and operation of the sale, for if that question is determined in favor of the appellant, it is unnecessary to pronounce a decision upon the other question.
The sale is made under a decree which the Rajah had obtained on the 24th of July 1866, against the plaintiff's father and others, and which is to be found at p. 131 of the Paper Book. The decree awarded to the Rajah, as his costs of suit, Rs. 72-6-6, with interest at 12 per cent, till realization. After execution proceedings had been commenced for these costs and struck off several times, similar and further proceedings were instituted in 1874, which ultimately resulted in the disputed sale. The amount due under the decree had then swelled, with the costs of execution, to Rs. 228.
Now, what was sold under the decree? And what passed by the sale? The sale certified, which is the usual and primary evidence on these points, has not been produced by the Rajah, and these questions must be answered by a reference to the decree and the sale proclamation, which appear to be the only documents of title that have been put in evidence by the Rajah.
The terms of the decree have just been mentioned. In the sale proclamation, a document which issued on the 11th of June 1874, the present plaintiff is stated to be “the judgment-debtor,” which, I presume, must be intended to mean that he represents his deceased father, the judgment-debtor; for, except in this sense, the sale cannot in any way be supported, as the decree is not against the present plaintiff, and therefore does not warrant execution being taken out against him personally. The proclamation then states that “the sale extends only to the right, title, and interest of the judgment-debtor;” and after enumerating the nine items of property, being the mouzahs in dispute, describes the subject of sale “as the right of the judgment-debtor to the amount of profits due to him, after deduction of Rs. 550-7 as annual rent on account of the mouzahs aforesaid.”
As regards these mouzahs and their tenure, I think it is clear upon the evidence, first, that they were held by the plaintiff's father and are now held by the plaintiff subject not only to the payments of certain rent, but also to the rendering of certain services; secondly, that the rent is a reduced rent, because of the services which the holder is liable to render; thirdly, that the services are of a public nature and such as the Government has an interest in the performance of, and, that although, the rent is payable to the Rajah, the services are not of a private character or personal to the Rajah, or such as he can put an end to at his pleasure.
Independently of the evidence in the case on those points, the Rajah stems, as regards the nature of the services on which the mouzahs are held, to be concluded by the result of some previous litigation which took place between himself and the plaintiff's father. Several years ago, the Rajah brought a suit against the plaintiff's father to resume the Mouzahs in dispute, and recover khas possession, alleging that the services on which they were held were private and personal to himself, and had been dispensed with or had ceased to be performed. It was found by the two lower Courts that the services were not private or personal to the Rajah, but of a public nature. These decisions were affirmed by the High Court (see 6 W.R, 121,) and ultimately by the Privy Council (see 18 W.R, 321.)
In dealing with the question as to what passed by the execution sale, it is immaterial to consider by whom those services are enforceable, whether directly by the Government or intermediately by the Rajah to whom the rent is payable: it is also immaterial upon the question now before me to consider whether the purchaser can enter into possession of the lands without being appointed by Government to perform the services.
The nature of the tenure by which the plaintiff holds, and his father before him held, the mouzahs being such as I have described, is that tenure effectually put up for sale by the proclamation to which I have referred?
The proclamation describes the tenure of the judgment-debtor as an ordinary rent-paying one, and ignores the important fact that it is a service tenure.
The misdescription of the holding is in a most material particular, and having regard to the unsuccessful attempt which the Rajah has made to resume the tenure, it is not too much to say that the tenure was wilfully misrepresented in the proclamation.
A purchase of the subject of sale as described in the proclamation did not, in my opinion, pass the tenure which the plaintiff has, or which his father had in the mouzahs in question.
The plaintiff, being still in possession of the mouzahs, and threatened with expulsion, may properly avail himself of the defect in the Rajah's title, founded on the misdescription of the subject of sale. He may, I think, justly say, that whatever the Rajah has bought, he has not bought the right of myself or my father to the tenure which I have or he had in the mouzahs.
The Government also, which is interested in the performance of the public services attached to the tenure, and whose presence on the record as a defendant has not been objected to by the Rajah, may properly oppose a sale which treats the plaintiff's tenure as a simply rent-paying one, and which, if held to pass the tenure, might be used hereafter as evidence that the tenure was discharged from the services to which it is undoubtedly subject.
It appears to me that the appeal may properly be disposed of on the point which I have mentioned, for both the plaintiff and the Government have in their respective pleadings objected in effect to the operation of the sale on the ground that the mouzahs were sold without declaring the jageer tenure or without specifying that they were service lands. And, moreover, the Court below has based its decree on the sufficiency of the objection.
Being of opinion that the lower Court was right in holding that the execution sale, which took place in 1874, conveyed no title to the Rajah under which he could turn the plaintiff out of possession, it is unnecessary to determine in this suit the other question, which has been raised, and which argued before us at great length, and as to which my brothers Markby and Mitter differed, viz., whether the interest of the plaintiff's deceased father in the mouzahs was such that, when they came into the possession of the plaintiff, they were assets of the father, and, as such, liable to be attached and sold for his debts.
I would allow this appeal, and confirm the decree of the First Court.
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