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Kolavakolanu Seetanna v. Poddri Narayanamurthi Somayajulu
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute concerns interests in ancestral (undivided family) property and events spanning 1898–1916. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and a woman named Krishnamma were members of an undivided family; Krishnamma died leaving a son Narainswamy. In 1898 the 1st defendant sold his one-third share to the plaintiff (Exhibit A). In 1899 the plaintiff conveyed that share to Subbarayudu (Exhibit B). Subbarayudu sued to recover that one-third share; defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and Narainswamy were made parties. The 2nd defendant contended that family debts had not been apportioned and raised other pleas. The parties agreed to arbitration during the suit; the 1st and 2nd defendants and Narainswamy participated. The arbitrators issued an award in 1900 (Exhibit E1) and a decree (E2) followed, but the portion of the award dealing with inter se family rights was recorded rather than embodied in the decree. Paragraph 10 of the award allocated debts (notably placing the burden of certain debts on the 2nd defendant) and paragraph 11 put the 1st defendant's share in the plaintiff's possession. Subbarayudu later reconveyed the share to the plaintiff (Exhibit F, 1901).
In 1901 K. Venkata Reddy sued, claiming a mortgage debt owed by the 2nd defendant (Original Suit No. 481 of 1901). A decree led to Venkata Reddy purchasing the mortgaged property. The plaintiff had sold the property to Veerasawmi in 1902, and Veerasawmi was a party to later litigation. Venkata Reddy obtained judgment (1909) and took possession in 1911; Veerasawmi lost possession and sued the plaintiff for breach of covenant, obtaining a decree in 1915, which compelled the plaintiff to pay about Rs. 838 in satisfaction.
The plaintiff instituted the present suit in 1916 against the 2nd defendant for damages for breach of the obligation imposed on the 2nd defendant by the arbitration award and for losses incurred in compensating Veerasawmi. Two principal questions were framed: (1) whether the plaintiff had a cause of action against the 2nd defendant; and (2) whether the suit was barred by limitation. The trial Court dismissed the suit holding it barred by limitation and finding no cause of action. The Subordinate Judge reversed and awarded the plaintiff's claim. The present (second) appeal is from the Subordinate Judge's decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether there existed a cause of action in favour of the plaintiff against the 2nd defendant based on the arbitration award (Exhibit E1).
- Whether the plaintiff's suit against the 2nd defendant was barred by limitation.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Somasundaram)
- The plaintiff has no cause of action against the 2nd defendant because the covenant in Exhibit E1 is a personal covenant; only the 1st defendant (or persons in privity) could take advantage of it, and an assignee cannot sue on that covenant (relying on the principle in Tweddle v. Atkinson and the decision in Mannath Veettil Itti Panku Menon v. Dharman Achan).
- The award merely conferred a benefit and that alone does not give a third party a right of suit against the obligor.
- On limitation, the appellant argued (relying on Dorasinga Tevar v. Arunachalam Chetti and related decisions) that if there was an obligation under the award it was broken as soon as it was made (or within a reasonable time thereafter) so that a suit should have been brought within three years of the award or promise.
- On quantum, the appellant contended that the 2nd defendant's undertaking was only to pay the debts themselves with interest, and that damages awarded by the lower Court were excessive.
Respondent's Arguments (Mr. Narayanamurthi)
- Implicitly disputed that the covenant was merely a personal benefit; contended the plaintiff could enforce the undertaking (argument reflected in Court's acceptance that assignees could benefit).
- On limitation and quantum the respondent pointed out that under Section 124 of the Indian Contract Act the costs incurred in meeting litigation are part of the damages recoverable from an indemnifier, supporting the damages awarded.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mannath Veettil Itti Panku Menon v. Dharman Achan (43 Ind. Cas. 625) | Follows Tweddle v. Atkinson: a mere benefit to a third party does not give a right of suit against a contracting party. | Cited by appellant to argue the plaintiff had no privity; Court considered but held the present case was not one of mere benefit and distinguished it. |
| Tweddle v. Atkinson (1861) 124 R.R. 610 | Law that a third party who merely benefits by a contract cannot sue on it in the absence of privity. | Relied on by appellant; Court acknowledged principle but found the award created a covenant binding the 2nd defendant and benefiting assignees, so Tweddle did not defeat plaintiff's cause of action here. |
| Raghubar Rai v. Jaij Rai (14 Ind. Cas. 244) | Authority for the proposition that a mere benefit secured by a document does not give a cause of action against an obligor. | Referenced to show general principle; Court treated the present arbitration award differently and held a covenant existed enforceable by the plaintiff. |
| Gopala Aiyar v. Ramaswami Sastrigal (10 Ind. Cas. 320) | Also cited for the principle that mere benefit alone does not confer a right of action. | Referred to among authorities on privity and benefits; Court distinguished and concluded award constituted an enforceable covenant benefiting assignees. |
| Dorasinga Tevar v. Arunachalam Chetti (23 M. 441) | Held that where a relationship is akin to principal and agent, the principal may sue promptly without waiting to be damnified; thus limitation may run from promise or reasonable time thereafter. | Appellant relied on it to argue limitation ran from the award; Court held this case was on a different footing (not an absolute personal undertaking) and therefore Dorasinga Tevar was not directly applicable. |
| Baghttnatha Chariat v. Sadagopa Chariar (12 Ind. Cas. 353) | Authority in the same class as Dorasinga Tevar regarding principal-agent type obligations and limitation. | Noted by the Court in discussing limitation; Court found these cases inapplicable because the award in the present case was an indemnity-type undertaking. |
| Bhavani v. Anantha Kamthi (35 Ind. Cas. 789) | Discusses covenants that are absolute undertakings to do an act within a period, for breach of which a cause of action arises immediately. | Used to contrast types of covenants; Court held the present undertaking was not of that absolute kind and thus Bhavani did not govern limitation here. |
| Battley v. Faulkner (1820) 3 B. & Ald. 288 and related English authorities (Howll v. Young; Smith v. Fox; East India Co. v. Oditchurn Paul) | English authorities setting out two classes of covenants: (a) those giving immediate cause of action on breach; (b) stipulations for quiet enjoyment where cause of action arises on actual breach. | Court classified the present clause, concluding it did not fall into those two covenant categories but was in the nature of an indemnity clause. |
| Parvataneni Venkataramayya v. Lanka Rambrahman (47 Ind. Cas. 92) | Holds that indemnity cases differ from covenant cases: in indemnity actions cause of action arises only when damage is sustained (i.e., when the indemnified party is damnified). | Cited by the Court to support the view that the award's clause was an indemnity, so the plaintiff's cause of action arose only when he was actually damnified (1915), making the suit within the three-year limitation. |
| Jacob v. Down (1900) 2 Ch. 156 | Supports the proposition that in indemnity clauses a mere breach does not necessarily start the cause of action; the indemnified party may wait until damage is sustained. | Adopted by the Court in treating the award clause as indemnity: plaintiff could wait until he suffered loss before suing, and limitation therefore began on the date of damage. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in two stages, corresponding to the two primary legal questions.
1. Cause of action: The Court examined whether the arbitration award (Exhibit E1) created an enforceable covenant against the 2nd defendant that benefited the plaintiff (an assignee of the 1st defendant's share). The Court acknowledged the general principle (from Tweddle and related authorities) that a mere benefit to a third party does not create a right of suit in the absence of privity. However, the Court found that the facts here differed from a mere-benefit scenario: the 2nd defendant had expressly raised the question of apportionment of family debts in the partition suit, and the parties referred all disputes (including liabilities) to arbitration. The award contained explicit terms (paragraphs 10 and 11) allocating debts and putting the 1st defendant's share in the plaintiff's possession. The Court held that the award, though not embodied in the decree as to family equities, was binding on the parties to the reference "as if it were a decree of Court" and constituted a covenant to which the 2nd defendant had submitted. The Court further held that this covenant "enured to the benefit not only of the 1st defendant but to all persons claiming under the 1st defendant" and therefore the plaintiff had a cause of action against the 2nd defendant.
2. Limitation: The Court then considered whether the action was time-barred. It analyzed the nature of the undertaking in the award: is it an absolute personal undertaking giving rise to an immediate cause of action (as in Bhavani) or is it different? The appellant relied on authorities (Dorasinga Tevar and similar cases) where, on a principal-agent footing, a principal could sue without waiting for evidence of damage. The Court concluded that the present undertaking was not an absolute obligation to perform an act within a particular time but was "in the nature of an indemnity clause." Relying on Parvataneni Venkataramayya and Jacob v. Down, the Court held that indemnity obligations give rise to a cause of action only when the indemnified party is actually damnified (i.e., has suffered loss). Here the plaintiff was not actually damnified until Veerasawmi brought suit and obtained a decree in 1915, compelling the plaintiff to pay. The present suit (instituted in 1916) was therefore within three years of the date on which damage occurred. The Court applied Article 53 (Article S3 as described in the opinion) to hold the suit timely.
3. Quantum of damages: The Court addressed the appellant's contention that damages were excessive, being limited to the debt and interest only. It observed that under Section 124 of the Contract Act the costs incurred in meeting litigation form part of recoverable damages in an indemnity. Thus the award of damages by the lower Appellate Court was not excessive.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court agreed with the lower Appellate Court and DISMISSED the second appeal with costs.
Direct effect on the parties: The Subordinate Judge's decree in favour of the plaintiff is upheld: the plaintiff had a cause of action against the 2nd defendant based on the indemnity-like covenant in the arbitration award, the plaintiff's suit was within the period of limitation (because the cause of action arose when the plaintiff was actually damnified in 1915), and the damages awarded (including litigation costs) were appropriate under Section 124 of the Contract Act.
The opinion does not discuss or announce any broader legal precedent beyond the court's application of existing principles to the facts of this case.
1. The facts are somewhat complicated and, therefore, we must state them before dealing with the questions of law arising in the case. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and one Krishnamma were members of an undivided family. Krishnamma died leaving a son, Narainswamy. The 1st defendant sold his share in the family property to the plaintiff by Exhibit A in 1898. The plaintiff conveyed that share to one Subbarayudu by Exhibit B in 1899. Subbarayudu brought a suit to recover the one-third share belonging to the 1st defendant. To that suit defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and Narainswamy were made parties. The 2nd defendant in that suit pleaded that there were family debts and without apportioning the debts the share of one of the brothers purchased from the 1st defendant should not be partitioned. There were other pleas also raised by him. In there circumstances the parties agreed to refer their disputes to arbitration during the pendency of the suit. To this reference the 1st and 2nd defendants and Narainswamy were all parties. An award was given by the arbitrators, Exhibit EI, in 1900. Thereupon a decree E2 was passed in the suit. Naturally the decree only related to that portion of the claim which Subbarayadu wanted to enforce. The portion of the award which dealt with the rights of the members of the family inter se was not embodied in the decree but was simply recorded. One of the terms of the award, which is the clause we have to consider, is in those terms, "that the 2nd defendant do himself bear all the debts alleged to have been incurred by him for family purposes, that the debts incurred by defendants Nos. 1 and 3 be borne by themselves, that the 2nd defendant himself do bear the debts he had agreed to pay, the debts which he undertook in writing and the debts referred to by him in his statement and lists A, B, C and D filed by him and defendants Nos. 1 and 3 shall have nothing to do with them." That is in paragraph 10. Another portion of the award which must be referred to is in paragraph 11 and it is in these terms: "The share of the 1st defendant must be put in possession of the plaintiff in the place of the 1st defendant," and this award was given in 1900. Subbarayadu subsequent to this award and decree after obtaining possession of his one-third share reconveyed the property to the plaintiff by Exhibit F--that was in the year 1901.
2. In 1901 one K. Venkata Reddi, alleging that there was a mortgage debt due to him from the 2nd defendant who had contracted the debt on behalf of the family, brought a suit, Original Suit No. 481 of 1901. To that suit the mortgagor, 2nd defendant, was a party. A decree was obtained and in pursuance of that decree Venkata Reddy purchased the property and became the owner. Meanwhile the plaintiff had recourse to another of the transactions with which this case has been complicated, namely, he sold the property to one Veerasawmi in 1902. After the purchase by Venkata Reddy of the property mortgaged he brought a suit for the delivery of the one-third share of the mortgagor, the 2nd defendant. This was in 1905. To this suit Veerasawmi, the purchaser from the plaintiff, was a party. Venkata Reddy obtained a decree in 1909 and obtained possession in April 1911 and in consequance of that decree Veeraswami was deprived of possession and thereupon Vearasawmi brought a suit against the plaintiff for damages for breach of covenant and he obtained a decree in 1915. Plaintiff had to pay Rs. 838 and odd in satisfaction of the decree. The present suit was instituted by the plaintiff against the 2nd defendant in 1916 for damages for breach of the obligation imposed on the 2nd defendant by the award and for damages which have been caused to him by being obliged to compensate Veerasawmi. Two questions arise for decision under these circumstances. The first is, is there a cause of action to the plaintiff against the 2nd defendant? The second is, is the suit against 2nd defendant barred by limitation? The first Court dismissed the suit, holding that the suit was barred by limitation and that there was no cause of action to the plaintiff against the 2nd defendant. The Subordinate Judge reversed that decree and decreed the plaintiff's claim. This second appeal is against the decision of the Subordinate Judge.
3. Mr. Somasundaram in a very elaborate argument contended that the plaintiff has no cause of action against the 2nd defendant. His contention is that the covenant, if there is one, in Exhibit E1, the award, is a personal one, that the 1st defendant alone is entitled to take advantage of it, that it would not pass to an assignee of the 1st defendant and that, consequently, there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant. He relies on Mannath Veettil Itti Panku Menon v. Dharman Achan 43 Ind. Cas 625 : 41 M. 488 : 22 M.L.T. 543 : (1918) M.W.N. 98 : 34 M.L.J. 193 : 8 L.W. 118, in which a majority of Judges of this Court have held following Tweddle v. Atkinson (1861) 124 R.R. 610 : 1 B. & S. 393 : 30 L.J. Q.B. 265 : 8 Jur. (N. s.) 332 : 4 L.T. (N.S.) 468 : 9 W. K.781 : 121 E.R. 762 that the mere fact that a benefit is accrued is not a ground for giving a third party a right of suit on a contract to which he was no party. There is no doubt that the principle is well recognised that a mere benefit secured by a document would not give the party to whom the benefit is given a cause of action against a person who is placed under an obligation : vide also Raghubar Rai v. Jaij Rai 14 Ind. Cas. 244 : 34 A. 429 : 9 A.L.J. 534 and Gopala Aiyar v. Ramaswami Sastrigal 10 Ind. Cas 320 : 22 M.L.J. 207 : 10 M.L.T. 496. But in the present case it is not a case of mere benefit being secured to the plaintiff as against the 2nd defendant. The 2nd defendant expressly pleaded in toe suit that without apportioning the family debts to the various members of the family a decree for the share of the 1st defendant should not be given to the plaintiff. It was in these circumstances that the matter was referred to the decision of arbitrators. It was not denied by Mr. Somasundram that, if there was a suit for partition to which the alienees were made parties and if under the decree in that suit the equities between the alienees and the members of the family were adjusted by embodying a covenant of this kind, the aliences would be entitled to bring a suit for the breach of it. We fail to see why, because a portion of the award could not be embodied in the decree of the Court for the reason that the subject matter of the suit was not dealt with in that portion, there should be any difference in principle. The award of the arbitrators is as binding on the parties to the reference as if it were a decree of Court. No doubt, if it, becomes a decree of Court it could be executed Barring that, an award is binding on the parties as if there has been a decree of Court. In these circumstances we are of opinion that there was covenant in this case to which the 2nd defendant has submitted himself and that covenant enured to the benefit not only of the 1st defendant but to all persons claiming under the 1st defendant. The plaintiff in terms was given the share of the 1st defendant by the award. For these reasons we are of opinion that there was a cause of action to the plaintiff against the 2nd defendant.
4. The 2nd question is whether the suit is barred by limitation. The learned Vakil for the appellants mainly relied upon Dorasinga Tevar v. Arunachalam Chetti 23 M. 441 : 8 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 709 and the decisions following it, and argued that if there was an obligation under the award it was broken as soon as it was made or within a reasonable time after the promise and that the suit ought to have been brought within three years of the promise or three years after the lapse of a reasonable time from the date of the award. As was pointed out already, this class of cases stands, upon a peculiar footing. They must be understood as if there was the relationship of principal and agent between the contracting parties and it must be taken that it was held in the decisions referred to that where an agent does not carry out the terms of the contract the principal is entitled to recover the money. Therefore, if without waiting to see whether he was damnified the principal brings a suit, such a snit should not be regarded as premature. That is the ratio decidendi in Doraisinga Tevar v. Arunachalam Chetti 23 M. 441 : 8 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 709 The same observation applies to Baghttnatha Chariat v. Sadagopa Chariar 12 Ind. Cas. 353 : 36 M. 348 : (1911) 2 M.W.N. 227 : 10 M.L.T. 300 : 21 M.L.J. 983, Gopala Aiyar v. Ramaswami Sastrigal 10 Ind. Cas 320 : 22 M.L.J. 207 : 10 M.L.T. 496. The question for our consideration in this case is what is the nature of the undertaking which the 2nd defendant entered into under this award--is it purely a personal undertaking or a covenant in the language of Sadasiva Iyar, J. in Bhavani v. Anantha Kamthi 35 Ind. Cas. 789 : 31 M.L.J. 556 : 20 M.L.T. 263 : (1916), 2 M.W.N. 244 : 4L.W. 357 undertaking to do any act absolutely within a particular period? In the latter case it was held that if the absolute obligation was not fulfilled, there would be a cause of action immediately and a suit should be brought within three years. But in our opinion the undertaking given in this case is not an undertaking to do an act absolutely and within a particular time. Therefore, Dorai-singa Tevar v. Arunachalam Chetti 23 M. 441 : 8 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 709 and Gopala Aiyar v. Ramamami Sastrigal 10 Ind. Cas 320 : 22 M.L.J. 207 : 10 M.L.T. 496 have no direct bearing upon the case. Then it was argued by citation of English authorities that the moment there was a breach of the covenant the liability to pay compensation arose and that the plaintiff was not entitled to wait until he was damnified. To the first place the English cases refer to two classes of covenants, one a covenant which is in the nature of a contrast for the breach of which there would be a cause of action at once : the second which is in the nature of a stipulation for quiet enjoyment, in which case the cause of action would arise not at the moment when the covenant is entered into but only when the breach of the stipulation occurs. Battley v. Faulkner (1820) 3 B. & And 288 : 106 E.R. 668 : 22 R.R. 390, Howll v. Young (1826) 108 B.R. 97 : 8 D. & R. 14 : 5 B. & C. 259 : 4 L.J. (O.S.) K.B. 160 : 2 C. & P. 238 : 29 R.R. 237 : Smith v. Fox (1848) 6 Hare. 386 : 17 L.J. Ch. 170 : 12 Jur. 130 : 77 R.R. 152 : 67 E.R. 1216. and East India Co. v. Oditchurn Paul (1849) 7 Moo. P.C. 85 : 14 Jur. 253 : 18 E.R. 811 : 5 M.I.A. 43 : 1 Sar P.C. J. 394 : 18 E.R. 810 are all cases belonging to this class. But the present covenant does not come under either of the above two categories. It is really in the nature of an indemnity clause : and as was pointed out in Parvataneni Venkataramayya v. Lanka Rambrahman 47 Ind. Cas. 92 : 35 M.L.J. 134 : 8 L.W. 142 : 24 M.L.T. 104, the cases of indemnity differ materially from cases of covenants : in the former case it is only when the parties are damnified or when damage is sustained a cause of action arises. It was also pointed out in that case, following Jacob v. Down (1900) 2 Ch. 156 : 69 L.J. Ch. 493 : 83 L.T. 191 : 45 W.R. 441 : 64 J.P. 552, that a mere breach of one of the terms in the indemnity clause does not start the cause of action at once but that it is open to the party to waive the right and to wait till he is damnified. In the present case the covenant was entered into to relieve the 1st defendant and his assignees from all liability for debts contracted on behalf of the family. It is only when a suit was brought by the creditor to enforce an obligation which is binding on the family that the cause of action can be said to have arisen. Beading the clause in questions an indemnity clause, it is only when the plaintiff actually suffered damages he became entitled to sue for reparation. It was not, therefore, until Veeraswami brought a suit to recover damages and the plaintiff was compelled to meet that decree that, he was damnified. That was in 1915 and the suit was brought within 3 years from that date. The Article applicable to this case is Article S3 and the suit having been brought within 3 years of the damages, it is within time.
5. Mr. Somasundaram raises lastly the question of quantum of damages and contends that what was awarded by the lower Court was excessive. His argument is that as the 2nd defendant's undertaking was to pay the debts, he was only bound to pay the amount of debt and interest thereon. But as Mr. Narayanamurthi points out, under Section 124 of the Contract Act the costs which a man incurs in meeting a litigation are a portion of the damages which he is entitled to recover from the party who is bound to indemnify him. Therefore, the amount of damages awarded is not excessive in this case.
6. For all these reasons we agree with the lower Appellate Court and dismiss the second appeal with costs.
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