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Kathirayasami Naicker v. Ramabadra Naidu
Srinivasa Aiyangar, J.:— The plaintiff's father Kadiriyasami on 15th September 1893 mortgaged to Sabapathi Chetty, defendant 2, what may generally be termed the Zamindari Estate of Doddappanaikanur. The mortgagee sued to enforce his security in Original Suit No. 3 of 1901 on the file of the District Court of Madura and obtained a decree for sale on 1st October 1901. He transferred the decree on 28th May 1906, to Mr. Ramabhadra Naidu, defendant 1, who executed the decree, brought what presumably were the mortgaged properties to sale and purchased them himself after obtaining the necessary sanction from Court. Kadiriyasami Naicker, the mortgagor judgment-debtor however died before the final execution and sale. Defendant 1, after his purchase obtained a sale-certificate from Court and got possession of the properties which it was assumed he purchased. The Zamindari of Doddappanikanoor consists of the two villages of Doddappanaikanoor and Sempatty together with their hamlets. In the said two villages there are ayan punja garden lands of about 9462 kulis (a kuli is about 5/7th of an acre) besides waste lands, hills and forests which the mortgagor owned as Zamindar. Besides these, there were pannai (home-farm) lands in which the Zamindar was entitled to both the warams. The total extent of such pannai lands in the Zamindari is in dispute and it is difficult to ascertain it from the evidence on the record.
2. The question in dispute in appeal is about the extent of pannai lands purchased by defendant 1 in the Court sale. According to the plaintiff, an extent of 226 kulis, which at the time of the mortgage; Sabapathi Chetti was admittedly in the possession of one Kamalammal, the widow of the predecessor of Kadiriyasami, was not included in the mortgage or the suit or the decree or the execution sale and did not pass to defendant 1, as purchaser; while according to defendant 1, the said lands and in fact all the pannai lands within the geographical limits of the Zamindari, whether in the possession of Kadiriyasami, the Zamindar, or not, were included in the mortgage and were thereafter included in the suit and the decree and were sold. (His Lordship next discussed the evidence and concluded:) I therefore come to the conclusion that the sale did not include the 226 kulis, though it is true that defendant 1 and the mother of the plaintiff were under the mistaken impression that they were so included. It remains now to deal with another contention of respondent 1. Though the sale-certificate did not include the 226 kulis, it appears to be true that the lands on which there were encumbrances were placed in the possession of defendant 1 under Section 319 of the old CPC, by an order of Court: see Ex. 3(a) at p. 86, printed papers. Among the properties so delivered are 68 odd kulis out of the 226 kulis subject to encumbrances created by Bommuthayi after the date of the mortgaged decree for the purpose of raising money to pay the mortgagee decree-holder as stated above. Respondent 1's contention is, whether the sale certificate included these lands or not, inasmuch as by an order of Court defendant 1 was placed in possession (though such possession was symbolical) of a portion of these lands in the purported execution of the sale-certificate, the only Court which can determine whether the lands so delivered were included in the sale certificate or not, was the Court which was executing the previous decree; and that can be done only on an application to that Court and not by a separate suit. I think we must give effect to this contention. It has been held in several cases in this Court that questions arising between the decree-holder purchaser and the judgment-debtor as regards the properties directed to be sold by the decree and purchased in execution sale are questions relating to the execution of the decree and must be determined under S. 47 of the Code. The latest of such cases is Gunniah Vencataehalapathy Aiyar v. Perumal Iyer(1). Mr. K.V Krishnasamy Aiyar for the appellant contends that there is no case in which the question as to what passed under the sale, apart from the question of the validity of that sale, was held to be a matter relating to execution under S. 47.
3. That may be so, but I see no reason to think that questions such as we have here are not questions relating to execution. The series of sections relating to obstruction by judgment-debtors, to possession being given to a decree-holder or to a purchaser in execution of a decree all assume that the judgment-debtor is to come in by way of an application in execution-proceedings if he was not satisfied with either the delivery of possession or with the order directing the sale. The order directing delivery of possession to a purchaser under S. 319, of the old Code, which corresponds to O. 21, R. 96, of the present Code, is a judicial order—see Pran Krishna Dhar v. Juramoni Chowkidar(2). The appellant asked that his present suit should be converted into an application under S. 47 of the Code.
4. But it is to be observed that any application on the date, when the present suit was instituted, to rectify any error in the proceedings in execution of the mortgage decree would be barred by limitation, as more than three years had elapsed since the date of the order of the delivery of possession, and the Limitation Act of 1908 does not extend the time for making the application on the ground of minority, though under the Limitation Act of 1877 such a disability would be taken into account in computing the period of limitation. In Chidambaram Chetty v. Karuppan Chetty(3) this Court decided that the new Limitation Act applied to applications of this sort and that a person, who by reason of minority would have an extended period of limitation under the old Act for making an application, cannot after the new Act came into force claim the benefit of the exemption under the old Act.
5. Following that decision I hold that the plaintiff is not entitled now to ask us to convert his suit into an application. A technical objection was taken to the frame of the suit by respondent 1. It was said that the plaintiff did not ask for possession of these 226 kulis of land but asked only for an injunction, and inasmuch as he was not in possession at the date of the suit, his suit should be dismissed as he has not prayed for the proper relief. No such objection was taken in the lower Court and we are not inclined to uphold his contention. If necessary, the plaintiff should be given permission to amend the prayer in the plaint and we think he is in the circumstances of the case entitled to a decree for possession of the lands not covered by the sale to defendant 1, except the 68-6-3 kulis which the plaintiff is not entitled to recover by a separate suit. The lands so excepted are those described in Sch. D of the plaint. The plaintiff will also be entitled to mesne profits on the lands now decreed to him. That will be the decree in the appeal. The plaintiff and defendant 1 will pay and receive proportionate costs both here and in the Court below. I ought to draw attention to the fact that the translation of the portion of Ex. 2(f) which contains the description of the properties mortgaged, which is the most important portion for the purpose of this appeal, is incorrect.
Abdur Rahim, J.:— I agree.
6. (The appeal having been posted to be spoken to on 4th April 1917 and the Miscellaneous Petition: coming on for haring on the same day before Abdur Rahim and Srinivasa Aiyangar, JJ., the Court made the following)
7. We think it better to have a report after inquiry by the lower Court on the point in dispute between the parties raised in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 1008 of 1917, namely, whether “No. 2802” in Sch. C of the plaint is a mistake for “No. 2801” and whether what is claimed in Sch. E is really “No. 2801.” Time for the submission of the report will be till the re-opening of this Court after the ensuing summer recess.
8. (In compliance with the above order, the Temporary Subordinate Judge of Ramnad at Madura submitted the following)
REPORT
9. I have been directed by the High Court to report whether No. 2802, in Sch. C of the plaint is a mistake for No. 2801 and whether what is claimed in Sch. E is really No. 2801.
10. On the above evidence, therefore I have no hesitation in saying that the paimash No. 2802 in plaint Soh. C is a clear mistake for paimash No. 2801.
11. The land claimed in Sch. E is water-spread or the tank-bed and the extent given is 20 kulis. D.W 1, the Karnam, says that the paimash no of the tank-bed is 2802 and its extent is 20 kulis. So, his evidence places the matter beyond all doubt, and therefore what is claimed in Sch. E is really not paimash No. 2801 but paimash No. 2802. I find the point accordingly. (The Appeal and Civil Miscellaneous Petition coming on for hearing after the return of the report of the Temporary Subordinate Judge of Ramnad at Madura, in compliance with the order of Court dated 4th April 1917, the Court delivered the following)
JUDGMENT
12. We accept the finding and the plaint will be amended in accordance with it and the decree will follow. The appellant will bear the costs of respondent 1 in this petition.
S.N/R.K
13. Decree modified.
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