Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Chockalingam Pillai And Ors. v. Mayandi Chettiar

Madras High Court
Aug 13, 1896
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, acting as trustee of a temple at Negapatam, brought suit to recover certain lands which the plaintiff alleged the defendants held as tenants from year to year under a lease identified as Exhibit A. The defendants contended that they (and their ancestors) had permanent occupancy rights in the lands, subject only to the payment of rent to the temple.

The documentary history in the record (as described in the opinion) includes: an early permanent grant (Exhibit I) dated as early as 1813 granting one-half of the lands to Chokkanatha Pillai (an ancestor of some defendants) and the other half to Nalla Pillai; a transfer and confirmation in 1820 (Exhibit II) showing Nalla Pillai's half transferred to Vriddhachala Pillai (son of Chokkanatha Pillai) and a confirmation of permanent tenancy; a petition dated 4 December 1831 (Exhibit H) by Vriddhachala Pillai and Subbayyan offering to cultivate the lands for one year at a fixed payment in kind; Exhibit A, executed 10 January 1832, which is an agreement to cultivate the lands and (in words analyzed in the opinion) describes the executants as "Ulavadai mirasidars"; and a security bond (Exhibit VII) executed the day after Exhibit A reciting the taking of the land "permanently on 'Darkhast izara'." The Collector's correspondence (Exhibit VIII, 14 February 1832) is also referred to.

Both lower courts decreed in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants appealed from those decrees to the court that rendered the opinion summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendants' title to the plaint land is a permanent hereditary right of cultivation created by Exhibits I and II, or whether their rights were limited to a lease from year to year as shown by Exhibit A.
  2. Whether the inference drawn by the lower appellate court — that Exhibit H indicates the defendants' ancestors had lost or abandoned the permanent rights under Exhibits I and II — is a finding of fact binding in second appeal, or a question of law (construction of a document) open to review in second appeal.
  3. Whether Exhibit A, executed in 1832, should be treated as a new yearly lease (a tenancy from year to year) or as a confirmation/modification of an existing permanent grant (Exhibits I and II), particularly in light of the descriptive term "Ulavadai mirasidars" used in Exhibit A and related documents.
  4. Whether a manager of a temple, in the absence of proved necessity, could validly make a permanent alienation of temple lands — and, on the facts of this case, whether necessity for such an alienation may be presumed.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The defendants claimed permanent occupancy rights for the lands, asserting an hereditary right to cultivate grounded in the grants evidenced by Exhibits I and II (including the description "Ulavadai Kani" / "Ulavadai mirasidars").
  • They relied on the documents (Exhibits I, II, A, VII and the long period of uninterrupted possession) to show the tenancy began prior to Exhibit A and that Exhibit A was a confirmation/modification rather than a creation of a yearly tenancy.
  • They implicitly argued that the lower courts' conclusion that the permanent rights had been lost or abandoned (based on Exhibit H) was incorrect as a matter of law when construing the documents collectively and against the background of later conduct and possession.

Respondent's (Plaintiff / Trustee) Arguments and Lower Courts' Positions

  • Both lower courts decreed for the plaintiff, holding (inter alia) that Exhibit H demonstrated that the ancestors of the defendants had lost or abandoned their earlier permanent rights and that the defendants' rights must be held to originate from Exhibit A.
  • The lower Appellate Court applied the decision in Chockalinga Pillai's case (6 M.H.C.R. 164) to hold that Exhibit A was a lease from year to year, terminable at the end of any fasli.
  • The lower Appellate Court further held that, even if Exhibit A were executed in consequence of the earlier grants, those earlier grants would be invalid because a manager of a temple could not make a permanent alienation of temple lands in the absence of proved necessity.
  • The respondent's vakil strongly urged that the lower courts had made a finding of fact (that Exhibit H showed abandonment), and that such a factual finding was binding on the appellate court in a second appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chockalinga Pillai's case, 6 M.H.C.R. 164 (and reference to 6 M.H.C.R. 161) Held that a certain document was a lease from year to year; principle that when tenancy rests on contract only, duration is regulated by the contract and Rent Act/Regulations do not extend its duration (reference to Krishnasami v. Varadaraja). The lower courts relied on this decision to treat Exhibit A as a yearly lease. The present Court acknowledged the authority of the case but distinguished it on the facts: Exhibit A here describes the executants as "Ulavadai mirasidars" and the Court found evidence that the tenancy originated under earlier permanent grants (Exhibits I & II), so Chockalinga Pillai's case was deemed inapplicable to the present factual matrix.
Ramratan Sukal v. Mussumat Nandu, 19 I.A. 1 Principle that findings of fact by the lower court in certain circumstances are binding in a second appeal. The Court stated that if the disputed inference from Exhibit H were truly a finding of fact, the Court in second appeal would be bound by the lower court's finding (citing this authority). However, the Court concluded the inference was a matter of law, not fact, so the authority did not prohibit review.
Ram Gopal v. Shamskhaton, 19 I.A. 231 Authority for the proposition that the soundness of a conclusion drawn from the terms of a document (an inference or legal construction) is a question of law and is open to review in a second appeal. The Court relied on this precedent to justify re-examining the lower court's inference drawn from Exhibit H, treating the issue as one of law (construction of documents) rather than a binding factual finding.
Krishnasami v. Varadaraja, I.L.R. 5 Mad. 354 (referenced) Illustration of the rule that where tenancy begins under a contract, the duration of the tenancy is regulated by that contract (and is not extended by Rent Acts/Regulations). Referenced in discussing Chockalinga Pillai's case to explain that Chockalinga applied where the tenancy began under the lease itself. The Court used this to distinguish the present situation where the tenancy arguably began under earlier grants.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a series of analytic steps, constrained strictly by the documentary record and the legal propositions set out in the authorities cited in the opinion:

  1. Character of the disputed finding (fact vs. law): The Court first considered the respondent's contention that the lower courts' conclusion (that Exhibit H showed loss or abandonment of permanent rights) was a factual finding binding in second appeal. The Court held that the disputed matter — the inference to be drawn from Exhibit II/H and related documents — was a question of law (construction of documents), not a question of fact. Citing Ram Gopal v. Shamskhaton, the Court treated the inference as reviewable in second appeal.
  2. Applicability of Chockalinga Pillai's case: The Court acknowledged the authority of Chockalinga Pillai's decision (which treated a similar document as evidence of a yearly tenancy) but distinguished that case. In Chockalinga the tenancy began under the lease; here the Court found grounds for concluding the tenancy began under earlier documents (Exhibits I and II), and Exhibit A should be viewed in that light.
  3. Construction of the documents as a whole: The Court analyzed the documentary matrix:
    • Exhibit I (c.1813) had granted permanent rights (half share to Chokkanatha Pillai; the other half to Nalla Pillai).
    • Exhibit II (1820) shows transfer of Nalla Pillai's half to Vriddhachala Pillai and confirmation of permanent tenancy.
    • Exhibit H (petition dated 4 December 1831) was a proposal by Vriddhachala Pillai and Subbayyan to cultivate for one fasli at a fixed in-kind payment (51 kalams) — explicitly limited to one year in the document.
    • Exhibit A (10 January 1832) is an agreement to cultivate the lands; crucially, the executants are described as "Ulavadai mirasidars" (persons with an hereditary right to cultivate). The security bond (Exhibit VII) the next day repeats the description and recites that the land was taken "permanently on 'Darkhast izara'." The Collector's letter (Exhibit VIII, 14 February 1832) references a report that the tenants had applied to cultivate for one year at a fixed rent "according to order."
    From these materials the Court reasoned that Exhibit H appears to be a limited proposal in response to a Collector's order urging fixation of rent; Exhibit A, by contrast, was executed shortly after and contained wording indicating an intention to create a long-lasting arrangement and employed the term "Ulavadai mirasidars." The Court inferred that Exhibit A did not displace earlier permanent grants but rather confirmed and modified them by substituting a fixed money rent for the previous share-in-kind arrangement.
  4. Evidence of continuity and possession: The Court relied on the fact that for some decades (the opinion refers to enjoyment of the lands "for the next sixty years" and the original documents remaining in grantees' hands and usage over "eighty years") the grantees and their descendants enjoyed the lands under these documents, with no record that the lands were in other hands. The Court found this history consistent with continuity of the original permanent grants rather than abandonment.
  5. Manager's power to alienate and necessity: The lower Appellate Court had treated the earlier grants as invalid because (it held) a manager of a temple could not permanently alienate temple property absent proved necessity. The present Court accepted the general rule but considered the specific circumstances: there was no suggestion of fraud; the grant was to an outsider who brought cultivators and undertook to build houses and cultivate the temple lands; the country at the time was recovering from depopulation and cultivation required capital and labour which the grantees were to provide; the terms had been confirmed by the Collector in 1820 and again in 1832 and had remained in force for many decades. Given these circumstances and the long acquiescence and possession, the Court held it was reasonable to presume the necessity that would justify the permanent grants rather than to require the defendants to prove it affirmatively after the long lapse of time.
  6. Ultimate synthesis: Combining the textual construction of the documents, the contemporaneous administrative correspondence, the long possession and the presumption of necessity on the facts, the Court concluded that Exhibits I and II created valid permanent grants which were in force and that Exhibit A operated as a confirmation and modification (principally changing the mode of rent payment) rather than as the origin of a yearly tenancy.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The Court held that the grants under Exhibits I and II were valid and remained in force, and that the plaint land was held under those grants as modified by Exhibit A. Consequently, the plaintiff's suit failed on the merits.

Disposition: The Court reversed the decrees of the Courts below and dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs throughout.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties: The defendants prevail and retain their rights to the land under the permanent grants (Exhibits I and II), as modified by Exhibit A; the plaintiff (the temple trustee) loses the recovery claim and is to bear costs.
  • Broader legal implications: The opinion confines itself to construction and application of the documents and to the facts before the Court. The Court distinguishes prior decisions (such as Chockalinga Pillai's case) on factual grounds rather than announcing a new general rule. The opinion does not purport to establish a new broad precedent beyond the application of established principles to the specific documentary and historical context of this case.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not include information or inference beyond the text supplied.

Show all summary ...

1. The plaintiff, as trustee of a certain temple at Negapatam, sued to recover from defendants certain lands which the plaintiff alleged they held under the temple as tenants, from year to year, under a lease (Exhibit A). The defendants claimed to have a right of permanent occupancy in the lands, subject only to payment of rent to the temple.

2. Both the lower Courts have decreed for plaintiff.

3. Against those decrees the defendants now appeal.

4. The defendants claimed to have had permanent occupancy rights for the past two hundred years, but of this no proof was given. It is, however, clear from Exhibit I that, so long ago as 1813, the then manager of the temple gave a permanent lease of one-half of the lands to Chokkanatha Pillai, an ancestor of the defendants 1 to 14, and of the other half of the lands to Nalla Pillai. It is also clear from Exhibit II that in 1820 Nalla Pillai transferred his half share to Vriddhachala Pillai (the son of Chokkanatha Pillai), and that the manager of the temple then confirmed him as permanent lessee of the whole of the lands. On the 4th December 1831, this Vriddhachala Pillai and one Subbayyan, the ancestor of defendants 15 to 26, addressed a petition, (Exhibit II), to the Collector of Tanjore, who was then the manager of the temple. It runs as follows:

To N.W. Kindersley, Esquire, Principal Collector of Tanjore--Darkhast presented by Vriddhachala Pillai and Subbayyan of Vadagudi, who are Purakudies of the Tarap land situated in that village belonging to Kayarohanasawmi of Negapatam attached to the Mahanam of Anthanapettai, Kivalur taluk. We offer to cultivate for fasli 1241 the 20 velis, 5 mahs and 40 kulies of nanja land and 6 mahs and 81 kulies of punja land situated in the aforesaid village and to pay the Sircar kist and 51 kalams of paddy as Svamibhogam to the temple for one year, and also to furnish cash security for the payment. We pray that darkhast izara may be granted to us for one year.

" No reply to this petition is on record, but on the 10th January 1832, Exhibit A was executed by Vriddhachala Pillai and Subbayyan. It is an agreement by them to cultivate the plaint lands, and is in the following terms:"
We, Vriddhachala Pillai and Subbayyan, Ulavadai (act of ploughing or right to cultivate lands) mirasidars of Vadagudi, having agreed to cultivate the said village Vadagudi according to the taram faisal (classification of the lands) thereof, do hereby execute this taram muchilka to N.W. Kindersley, Esquire, Principal Collector of Tanjore, under date 10th January, 1832. We have taken up for cultivation the following lands: Nanja lands yielding one crop a year, consisting of 107 numbers, comprising 134 acres 49/64 kulies, equivalent to 20 velis, 5 mahs and 40 kulies, and punja lands consisting of six numbers, comprising 2 acres and 16 kulies equivalent to 6 mahs and 81 kulies, the total of nunja and punja lands being 20 velis, 12 mahs and 21 kulies. According to the pymash settlement made in fasli 1238, we bind ourselves to pay Sircar in the presence of the pattadar the sum of Rs. 520-7-9 on account of ayan and svamibbogam. If there should fall any arrears in so paying, you shall realize the same by attaching and selling our private property according to law. We shall never pay to any one even a cash in excess of the said tirva fixed for the lands mentioned in this muchilika. If the pattadar, the village karnam and others should demand or collect from us any sum in excess, we shall then and there lodge a complaint to the huzur. If in any year we should plant betel, plantain trees, sugarcane or raise any garden products, such as tobacco, onion, garlic, etc., with the Sircar water in the said village, we shall furnish the Sircar with a true account of the same, and not only pay the taram tirva fixed for so much of the land as is cultivated with the said crops, but also pay tirvajasti in those years. If we should cultivate waste and poramboke lands, etc., in addition to those mentioned in the muchilika, we shall pay the taram tirva fixed on such lands during the years in which they may be cultivated.

5. (Here follow covenants to pay servants, execute repairs, etc.) If we should raise a second crop or the taladi in excess of the second crop lands mentioned in this muchilika, we shall pay the tirva thereof according to the rules of taladi. If perchance loss should be occasioned in any fasli by drought or inundation through accident, the Sircar should inspect the same and grant a reasonable remission according to mamul. We shall pay the melvaram of the nanja lands of the said village according to the permanent taram tirva which has been fixed at 3-1/16 fanams per kalani. If this price should either rise or fall, the gain or loss thereby accruing is ours and the Sircar shall have nothing to do with it. As the permanent tirva has been fixed, and as we have assented thereto as stated above from fasli 1241, we shall pay to the Sircar the taram tirva fixed on each numberwar field. Thus do we execute this taram muchilika.

6. It is to be observed that in this document the executants are described as 'the cultivating mirasidars' of the village. On the day after Exhibit A was executed, the executants executed a security bond (Exhibit VII) in which they are again described as 'the cultivating mirasidars' of the village, and it is recited that they have taken the land permanently on 'Darkhast izara.' The rights of the parties admittedly depend upon the construction of these documents and the inferences that are to be drawn from them. The Courts below have held that Exhibit H shows that for some reason or other, not now known, the defendants' ancestors had lost, or had abandoned, their rights under Exhibits I and II, and that their rights now must be held to have originated with, and to depend solely on, the lease of 1832 (Exhibit A). They held, on the authority of the decision in Chockalinga Pillai's case 6. M.H.C.R. 164 that Exhibit A was merely a lease from year to year, and might be terminated at the end of any fasli. The learned Judge of the Lower Appellate Court further held that, even if Exhibit H could be explained away, and if Exhibit A were executed in consequence of the defendants' ancestors having the rights granted under Exhibits I and II, still the latter would be invalid on the ground that a manager of a temple could not alienate temple lands by a permanent lease in the absence of proved necessity for such alienation.

7. We are unable to accept these conclusions; but, before discussing the documents, it is necessary to notice a contention that was strongly pressed upon us by the respondent's vakil. That contention is that both Courts have found that Exhibit H shows that when it was written the defendants' ancestors had lost or abandoned their permanent rights under Exhibits I and II, that that finding is one of fact, and that it is not open to this Court in second appeal to consider whether that finding is right or wrong. If the inference to be drawn from the document were, in truth, a finding of fact, we should consider ourselves bound in this second appeal by the finding of the Lower Appellate Court, however unsatisfactory it might be Ramratan Sukal v. Mussumat Nandu 19 I.A. 1 but the finding as to the inference to be drawn from Exhibit II is one of law, not of fact. It is not any fact that is in question, but the soundness of the conclusion drawn from the terms of the document. This is a matter of law, and, as such, it is a proper subject for consideration in second appeal Ram Gopal v. Shamskhaton 19 I.A. 231.

8. The learned District Judge has pointed out that Exhibit A in the present case is (with one important exception to be presently noticed) in exactly the same words as the document which this Court in Chockalinga Pillai's case 6 M.H.C.R. 164 held to be a lease from year to year. That case has been repeatedly followed by this Court, and we do not question its authority; but in our opinion it is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. In Chockalinga Pillai's case 6 M.H.C.R. 161, the tenancy began under the lease, and all that that case decided was that, when a tenancy rests on contract only, the duration of the tenancy is regulated by the terms of the contract, express or implied, and that neither the Rent Act nor the Regulations operate to extend its duration Krishnasami v. Varadaraja I.L.R. 5 Mad. 354. In the present case we think there are sufficient grounds for finding that the tenancy began not under Exhibit A, but under Exhibit I, that Exhibit H is not sufficient to prove that the tenancy under Exhibits I and II was ever determined, and, finally, that the transaction evidenced by Exhibit A was not a new lease, but a confirmation of the lease under Exhibits I and II, with a modification as to the mode of paying the rent.

9. We have already referred to the fact that Exhibit A in the present case differs in an important particular from the corresponding document in Chockalinga Pillai's case 6 M.H.C.R. 164. The difference is this, viz., that in Exhibit A the executants are described as 'Ulavadai mirasidars,' that is, as persons with an hereditary right to cultivate. The Courts below have said that this description is inapplicable to Subbayyan, as he was not a lessee under Exhibits I and II, and they, therefore, treat the description as of little importance; but it seems to us that the description is applied to both the executants, because all the land dealt with in the lease was the subject of permanent rights of cultivation under Exhibits I and II and when Vriddhachala Pillai, who had those rights under Exhibits I and II, allowed Subbayyan to join him in executing Exhibit A, the description was applied to him also in order to mark the character of the tenure on which the land was held. Turning now to Exhibits I and II, it is to be observed that the very same description of the tenure occurs in the operative words of those documents by which the permanent tenure was created,

"you, your sons and grandsons shall, for all time to come, enjoy the land from generation to generation by 'right of Ulavadi Kaui.'"
This right of 'Ulavadi Kani' originated in the grants evidenced by Exhibits I and II, for prior to Exhibit I, Chokkanatha Pillai was a resident in another village, but under Exhibit I he was brought with a following of cultivators to the village of Vadagudi belonging to the temple to build houses there and cultivate the temple lands. When, then, we find that the right of 'Ulavadi Kani' was created under Exhibits I and II, and that the grantees under those, documents are, a few years afterwards, when executing Exhibit A in regard to the very same lands, described as 'Ulavadi mirasidars,' the inference is strong that the tenure under Exhibit A was intended to be the same as under Exhibits I and II. Nor is this all. In the security bond (Exhibit VII) executed the next day the same description of the executants as 'Ulavadai mirasidars' is given and the transaction evidenced by Exhibit A is recited as a taking of the land 'permanently on darkhast lease from fasli 1241.' Lastly, we find that for the next sixty years the defendants and their ancestors enjoyed the lands on the strength of those documents. The question then naturally suggests itself, what was the occasion for Exhibits H and A if there was already an existing permanent tenancy under Exhibits I and II. The answer is, we think, to be found in the fact that under Exhibits I and II the rent was to be a share of the produce paid in kind, viz., 35 kalams in every 100 kalams nett, whereas in Exhibit H an offer is made to pay not a percentage share of the crop, but a fixed quantity, viz., 51 kalams, and in Exhibit A it is agreed that the rent shall be fixed permanently in money at Rs. 520 each year. It is well known that the English Revenue authorities always preferred a fixed rent to a share of the produce, and constantly aimed at obtaining a fixed rent paid, if possible, in money, rather than in kind. Exhibit H stands by itself, and we have not before us either the order passed upon it, or any correspondence which took place prior to it; but in Exhibit VIII, dated the 14th February 1832, the Collector, in writing to the Tahsildar regarding this land, refers to a report of the Tahsildar, dated the 18th January 1832, in which that officer reported that Venkatachala Pillai and Subbayyan had 'according to order' applied to cultivate the plaint land for one year at a fixed rent of 51 kalams of paddy. It would appear from this that when the temple came under the Collector's management, he issued some order requiring or urging the tenants to agree to fix the rent on their lands instead of letting it depend on the varying outturn from year to year.. Exhibit H appears to have been the proposal made by Vriddhachala Pillai and Subbayyan in reply to this order, but they carefully restricted their offer to one fasli, and wished still to pay in kind as they had been accustomed to do. What negotiations took place after this we do not know, but that some negotiations took place seems to be clear, for Exhibit A cannot have been executed as a compliance with the proposal in Exhibit H. All the expressions used in Exhibit A indicate that the parties intended the arrangement to last for many years, whereas Exhibit H contains a proposal for one year only, and the rent offered in Exhibit II is in kind, while that finally agreed to in Exhibit A, six weeks later, is a sum permanently fixed in money. Thus Exhibits H and A do not indicate that the rights under Exhibits I and II had been lost or abandoned, but rather that they had been confirmed with a modification by the substitution of a fixed money rent for percentage share of the crop. That the original grants remained in force is rendered almost certain from the fact that the original documents evidencing the grants have remained in the hands of the grantees, and there is not before us a trace of any evidence in the temple or revenue accounts or otherwise to suggest that the land has ever been in the possession of any one but the grantees during the eighty years which have elapsed since the date of the first grant. The lower Appellate Court has, however, held that, even on the above finding as to the documents and the transactions evidenced by them, the defence must fail, inasmuch as the manager for the time being had no power to make a permanent alienation of temple property in the absence of proved necessity for the alienation. That no doubt is the ordinary rule but in the present case there are special circumstances from which the propriety of the alienation may rightly be presumed. There is no suggestion that the grant under Exhibit I was tainted with any fraud. It was made not to a member of the grantor's family, but to a stranger of different caste and from a different village. In consideration of the grant being permanent, the grantee was to come with a following of cultivators and build houses and cultivate the lands of the temple. It is well known that at the time when the grant was made the country was but slowly recovering from the depopulation and impoverishment resulting from centuries of internecine war, and the difficulty generally was not to provide land for the cultivators, but cultivators for the land. To cultivate wet lands, as these were, requires capital as well as labour, and these the grantees were to supply. It may well be that the trustee of the temple could not arrange for the cultivation of the temple lands on less onerous terms than those agreed to. That the terms were fair may be presumed from the fact that they were confirmed in 1820 (Exhibit II) and again in 1832 (Exhibit A) by the Collector, and have remained in force now for eighty years. In these circumstances, we do not think it is reasonable or equitable to throw on the defendants the onus of showing that the original grants were for a necessity, binding on the temple. We think that, after so great a lapse of time and under the circumstances which we find in this case, such necessity may rightly be presumed.

10. The result of our findings, then, is that the grants under Exhibits I and II are valid and still in force, and that the plaint land is still held under those grants as modified by Exhibit A.

11. On these findings the plaintiff's suit must fail, and it is unnecessary for us to discuss the pleas of limitation and want of notice raised by the appellants.

12. We reverse the decrees of the Courts below and dismiss the plaintiff's suit with costs throughout.