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Palaniappa v. Lakshmanan And Ors.
Legal Opinion Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
This suit was brought by the appellant to compel the first, second and third respondents to refund Rs. 5,630 with interest, claimed to be withdrawn by them from Rs. 28,600 which they had drawn out of amounts paid into Court in respect of Original Suit No. 7 of 1885 on the file of the Subordinate Court of Madura.
The background facts set out in the opinion are: respondents 4 to 6 held a hypothecation bond and desired to sue Adimulam Pillai and sons but lacked funds. They assigned two-fifteenths of their interest in the bond to the appellant, who advanced funds for prosecution. Original Suit No. 7 of 1885 was instituted by respondents 4 to 6 against Adimulam Pillai and others (including Father Laberthere). The decree in that suit exonerated Father Laberthere from liability; respondents 4 to 6 appealed against that part of the decree in High Court Appeal No. 84 of 1886. For the appeal they borrowed Rs. 3,000 more from the appellant and documented that advance in agreement B-1 (dated 21 July 1886), which purported to charge any costs or amounts awarded on appeal in favour of respondents 4 to 6 (their thirteen-fifteenths share) with repayment of the advance.
On 17 January 1888 the High Court decided Father Laberthere was liable and ordered payment (about Rs. 45,000) but directed each party to bear their own costs. Father Laberthere paid into Court sums amounting to about Rs. 44,000 in satisfaction of the appeal decree. Several claimants and decree-holders, including respondents 1–3, the appellant (on other claims and by virtue of his assignment), and others claimed portions of the fund. On 13 March 1889 the Subordinate Judge distributed the fund by order Exhibit C-2, excluding Rs. 28,600 from the distribution on the ground that it represented charity-fund (the opinion records that later a compromise of 27 April 1889 resulted in the payment of Rs. 28,600 to respondents 1–3 on 29 April 1889).
On 8 July 1889 Original Suit No. 48 of 1888 (instituted by the appellant on agreement B-1) was decreed in his favour. On 3 October 1890 the appellant filed the present suit claiming that he had a first charge under B-1 on the Rs. 28,600 drawn by respondents 1–3 and sought refund. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit, holding that the charge could not be enforced against the Rs. 28,600 paid to respondents 1–3 and that the appellant should proceed against property substituted under Exhibit II. The appellant appealed from that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether agreement B-1 created a valid and enforceable charge (assignment) upon the fund to be realized under the final decree in Original Suit No. 7 of 1885, including sums paid into Court by Father Laberthere.
- If a valid charge existed, whether that charge could be enforced against the first, second and third respondents and specifically against the Rs. 28,600 paid to them pursuant to a compromise.
- Whether the Rs. 28,600 being treated as a charity-fund (and paid by respondents 4–6, as trustees, to respondents 1–3) defeated the appellant’s prior charge on the fund.
- If the appellant had a valid charge, what relief (refund and interest) he was entitled to given that portions of the deposited fund had already been paid to various claimants (including some sums paid to the appellant himself).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant relied on agreement B-1 (not disputed as genuine) and asserted that it created a charge on what might be realized under the final decree in Original Suit No. 7 of 1885, specifically a first charge on the thirteen-fifteenths share.
- He contended that his charge became enforceable when Father Laberthere paid the money into Court, and that the Rs. 28,600 drawn by respondents 1–3 was subject to his prior charge.
- The appellant argued he could not be bound by the compromise (Exhibit II) which was made without his consent and to his prejudice, and therefore the substituted property could not defeat his prior charge on the fund.
Respondents' Arguments
- Respondents 1–3 (and others) contended that B-1 did not create a charge; that if it did, it was not perfected or was invalid; and that in any event it was not enforceable against respondents 1–3 or the Rs. 28,600 paid to them.
- They relied on their asserted priority by reason of attachment or other liens and maintained that Rs. 28,600 represented charity-fund and thus could be paid out to trustees (respondents 1–3) free of the appellant’s claim.
- It was also argued for respondents that because the appellant himself had been paid Rs. 3,000 out of the amounts paid into Court, he could not charge the entire remaining balance due under B-1 upon the Rs. 28,600 (i.e., any refund should be proportionate to what each claimant intercepted).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Collyer v. Isaacs, L.R. 19 Ch. D. 342 | Establishes that a contract to assign future or after-acquired property is treated in equity as creating an assignment once the property comes into existence (equity treats as done that which ought to be done). | The court applied this principle to hold that B-1, though referring to a fund not yet in existence at the date of the document, became a complete and enforceable charge upon the fund when Father Laberthere paid the money into Court. |
| Misri Lal v. Moshar Hossain, I.L.R. 13 Cal. 262 | Authority showing High Court (Calcutta) recognition of the equitable rule regarding assignments or charges on future/acquired property (as consistent with the court's statement). | The court cited this decision to support the view that the equitable rule operates in India and that the charge under B-1 became enforceable when the fund came into existence. |
| Bansidhar v. Sant Lal, I.L.R. 10 All. 133 | Authority from the Allahabad High Court reflecting the same equity principle concerning assignments/charges of after-acquired property. | The court relied on this authority, alongside Misri Lal, to show that High Courts in India have applied the equitable rule and thereby to justify enforcing the charge created by B-1 against the fund once it existed. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded through a focused analysis:
- Genuineness and Existence of the Advance: The Subordinate Judge's findings that Rs. 3,000 was advanced under B-1 were accepted; the appellant and his witnesses deposed to the advance and there was no contrary evidence.
- Nature of B-1 and Effect on Future Fund: The court construed B-1 as substantially an agreement by respondents 4–6 to appropriate what might be realized under the final decree in Original Suit No. 7 of 1885 (their thirteen-fifteenths share) first to repayment of the advance. Although the fund did not exist at the date of B-1, the court applied equitable principles (citing Collyer v. Isaacs) to hold that a contract to assign after-acquired property becomes a complete assignment in equity when the property comes into existence. The court expressly noted that neither the Transfer of Property Act nor the Contract Act invalidated such an equitable rule.
- Enforceability Against Respondents 1–3: The court observed that respondents 1–3 had notice of the appellant’s claim (via Exhibits C and L) and therefore the charge became enforceable against them when they received Rs. 28,600. The Subordinate Judge's view that respondents 1–3 had a valid lien by attachment was not sustained; his prior order (C-2) rejecting such a lien was adhered to and not seriously questioned on appeal.
- Charity-Fund Argument and Compromise/Substitution: The Subordinate Judge had held that the Rs. 28,600 represented a charity-fund and that the appellant could not question its transfer by respondents 4–6 (trustees) to respondents 1–3, and that the appellant was confined to proceeding against substituted property under Exhibit II. The appellate court found this approach erroneous: the appellant was not a party to Exhibit II, which was made against his will and to his prejudice, and therefore could not defeat his prior charge. Even if the Rs. 28,600 were charity-fund, the court reasoned that the fund would not have come into existence but for the appellant’s advance and prosecution of the appeal; the appellant’s prior charge therefore was not rendered inoperative by the transfer or substitution.
- Proportionate Liability Because Portions Were Intercepted: The court accepted the respondents’ contention (in part) that sums paid out of the deposited fund had already satisfied part of the indebtedness under B-1 (including more than Rs. 7,000 paid to the appellant himself and other sums paid to other decree-holders). The court held that the appellant was entitled to a refund proportionate to each claimant’s interception of the charged fund: each person who intercepted the fund is liable to replace it in proportion to the amount they drew.
- Remedy and Costs: Applying the above principles, the court calculated that the appellant was entitled to a decree for refund of Rs. 1,938-13-6, interest at 6% per annum from the date of the decree, and four-fifths of costs in the lower Court and in this Court (respondents entitled to one-fifth of costs). The court set aside the Subordinate Judge’s decree and directed that a decree be passed in the appellant’s favour for the stated amount with interest and costs.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The appeal is allowed; the decree of the Subordinate Judge is set aside, and a decree is to be passed in favour of the appellant for a refund of Rs. 1,938-13-6 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of this decree, together with four-fifths of the costs in the lower Court and in this Court (the respondents being entitled to one-fifth of the costs).
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The appellant obtains a monetary decree in his favour (refund plus interest and costs). Respondents who drew amounts from the fund are held proportionately liable to refund the appellant's claim to the extent they intercepted the charged fund.
- On the legal principle: The court applied and reaffirmed the equitable rule that a contract to assign or charge after-acquired property becomes effective when the property (or fund) comes into existence, and recognized existing High Court authorities applying that equitable rule in India. The decision enforces a prior equitable charge against a fund that came into existence because of the claimant's own advance and prosecution of litigation.
- Broader precedent: The opinion discusses and applies established equitable principles and prior High Court decisions, but it does not purport to establish a novel principle beyond those applications. The immediate consequence is limited to the rights of the parties in respect of the charged fund and substituted property; no sweeping new doctrine is announced in the opinion.
1. This was a suit brought by the appellant to compel the first, second and third respondents to refund Rs. 5,630, with interest thereon at 9 per cent. per annum, from Rs. 28,600 drawn by them out of the amount paid to the credit of Original Suit No. 7 1885, on the file of the Subordinate Court of Madura. The facts which have given rise to this claim may be briefly stated as follows: In 1885, respondents 4 to 6 desired to sue Adimulam Pillai and his sons, who owed them a large sum of money, upon a hypothecation bond for Rs. 43,000, but had no funds at their disposal to pay the expenses of the suit which they had to institute. They assigned to the appellant two-fifteenths of their interest in the hypothecation bond, and in return he advanced the funds necessary for the prosecution of their claim. The result was the institution of Original Suit No. 7 of 1885 by respondents 4 to 6 against Adimulam Pillai and his sons and against Father Laberthere. Although the decree passed therein was in their favor, yet it exonerated Father Laberthere, the fourth defendant in that suit, from all liability for respondents' claim. Adimulam and his sons not being solvent, the said respondents preferred an appeal to the High Court (No. 84 of 1886) against so much of the decree as absolved Father Laberthere. They again borrowed from the appellant Rs. 3,000 to prosecute the appeal and secured its re-payment by document B. That document purports to be an agreement executed by them in appellant's favour on the 21st July 1886 and, after reciting the advance, charged it upon the costs, if any, which the High Court might award on appeal and, if no costs were awarded upon the thirteen-fifteenths or the respondents' share of the debt that might be decreed. On the 17th January 1888, the High Court decided that Father Laberthere was liable to the respondents to the extent of about Rs. 45,000 and ordered him to pay that amount, but directed each party to bear his or their costs.
2. Father Laberthere paid into Court Rs. 41,000 and odd on the 13th October 1888 and Rs. 3,000 and odd on a subsequent date in satisfaction of the appeal-decree. At this time there were several decrees and claims outstanding against respondents 4 to 6. The first, second and third respondents had a decree against them for Rs. 36,000 and odd in Original Suit No. 12 of 1882 on the file of the Subordinate Court. The appellant himself had three distinct claims against the money in deposit. He had a decree for more than Rs. 7,000 in Original Suit No. 14 of 1887, and he was also entitled to two-fifteenths of the amount in deposit by virtue of the assignment already mentioned, He claimed further a charge upon it for the amount due under agreement B-1, which formed the subject of Original Suit No. 48 of 1888 then pending. The fourth to sixth respondents urged that a thirty-two forty-thirds share of the amount in deposit represented certain properties which had been dedicated to a charity, and should be paid out to them in their capacity as trustees of that charity without being applied in liquidation of their private debts. Again, one Subramaniyam Chetty had two decrees to be satisfied by respondents 4 to 6, one in Original Suit No. 13 of 1887 and the other in Original Suit No. 546 of 1888. Each of these persons claimed payment from the amount in deposit, and on the 13th March 1889, the Subordinate Judge, by his order, Exhibit C-2, distributed it in the following manner:
Rs. A. P.
3. Exhibit C-2 shows that the claim made by respondents 1 to 3 as decree-holders in Original Suit No. 12 of 1832 and so much of the appellant's claim as rested on agreement B-1 were excluded from the distribution. On the 27th April 1889, however, respondents 1 to 3 entered into a compromise with respondents 4 to 6 whereby the latter agreed, inter alia, that Rs. 28,600 which was excluded from the distribution on the ground that it was charity-fund should be paid to the former, and the Subordinate Judge accepted the compromise and paid Rs. 28,600 to the first three respondents on the 29th April. On the 8th July 1889, Original Suit No. 48 of 1888, Instituted by appellant against respondents 4 to 6 upon agreement B-1, was decreed in his favour, and on the 3rd October 1890 appellant brought the present suit. His case was that he had a first charge for the amount due under document B-1 on the sum of Rs. 28,600 drawn by the first three respondents. The Subordinate Judge held that the charge could not be enforced against Rs. 28,600 paid to the respondents 1 to 3 and that the appellant ought to proceed against the property substituted for it by Exhibit II; and on this ground he dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal.
4. The appellant's claim rests on agreement B-1, and there is no dispute as to its genuineness. The Subordinate Judge finds that Rs. 3,000 was, as stated therein, advanced by the appellant to respondents 4 to 6. The former and his two witnesses deposed to the advance and there is no evidence to the contrary. It is clear from Exhibit B-1, that the amount due thereunder was agreed to be paid first out of monies which might be realized in execution of the final decree in Original Suit No. 7 of 1885. The material words in the document are,
"you should first take out of the amount that may be first collected from the defendants (in Original Suit No. 7 of 1885) towards thirteen-fifteenths share of the decree-debt due to us, the whole of the amount incurred (spent) on account of the said costs."
5. It was urged in the Court below, and is reiterated on appeal, on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 that the document did not create a charge; that, if it did, it did not perfect it; that even if there was a completed charge, it was invalid; and that it was not enforcible either against respondents 1 to 3 or against Rs. 28,600 paid to them on account of their decree in Original Suit No. 12 of 1882.
6. The Subordinate Judge was of opinion that a complete charge was created and that it was valid as against the respondents, and we concur in that opinion. The transaction evidenced by document B-1 was substantially a contract by respondents 4 to 6 to appropriate what they might realize under the final decree in Original Suit No. 7 of 1885 for their thirteen-fifteenths share first to repayment of the money advanced by the appellant under B-1. Though, at the date of the document, the fund out of which the advance was to be repaid had not come into existence, and though it might possibly never have come into existence afterwards, yet that circumstance is not sufficient to prevent the charge taking effect against the fund when it subsequently came into existence. In Collyer v. Isaacs L.R., 19 Ch. D., 342 the Master of the Rolls, Sir GEORGE JESSEL, observed as follows:
"The creditor had a mortgage security on existing chattels and also the benefit of what was in form an assignment of non-existing chattels which might be afterwards brought on to the premises. That assignment, in fact, constituted only a contract to give him the after-acquired chattels. A man cannot in equity, any more than at law, assign what has no existence. A man can contract to assign property which is to come into existence in the future, and when it has come into existence, equity, treating as done that which ought to be done, fastens upon that property, and the contract to assign thus becomes a complete assignment."As for the contention that such assignment is recognized neither by the Transfer of Property Act nor by the Contract Act, the transaction is not invalidated by either of those enactments, and it falls under the rule of Equity which the Courts have to administer in this country. This is also the view taken by the High Courts at Calcutta and Allahabad, Misri Lal v. Moshar Hossain I.L.R., 13 Cal., 262 at p, 264) and Bansidhar v. Sant Lal I.L.R., 10 All., 133 at p. 136. It is, therefore, sufficient to observe that when Father Laberthere paid into Court Rs. 44,000 and odd, the fund indicated by the agreement B-1 came into existence and the charge created by it became enforcible as against respondents 4 to 6.
5. As observed by the Subordinate Judge, respondents 1 to 3 had notice of appellant's claim under Exhibits C and L, and the charge created by B-1 became, therefore, enforcible against them also when they took Rs. 28,600. Though they claimed a priority by reason of attachment, the Subordinate Judge adhered to the opinion which he expressed in C-2, viz., that they had no proper lien, and his decision on this point is not seriously questioned before us. The Subordinate Judge considers, however, that Rs. 28,600 represented a charity-fund, and that it was not open to the appellant to question its transfer to respondents 1 to 3 by respondents 4 to 6, the trustees of that fund, and that after such transfer, he could only proceed against the property substituted for it by the compromise II. To this compromise the appellant was not a party, and it was made against his will and to his prejudice. Such being the case, the Subordinate Judge is clearly in error in holding that the transfer is binding on the appellant and defeats his prior charge on the amount in deposit. The Subordinate Judge observes further that Rs. 28,600 was judicially recognized as charity money There was no specific issue raised on this point, and if we considered it necessary to determine that question for the purposes of this suit, we would remit an issue for trial. But we are of opinion that even assuming that Rs. 28,600 represented a charity-fund, the charge created by document B-1 is not inoperative. The Subordinate Judge himself considers that but for the advance made under B-1 by the appellant and the prosecution of Appeal No. 84 of 1886, Father Laberthere would not have had to pay into Court Rs. 44,000 and odd and that the fund out of which Rs. 28,600 was paid out for charity could not have come into existence. He, therefore, holds that the appellant might have had a lien by analogy to salvage lien, but refuses to enforce it on the ground that the appellant made his advance as a matter of speculation and had no interest in making it and that his claim was restricted to the property substituted for it under Exhibit II. In his order C-2, he discussed the question whether agreement B-1 was champertous and came to the conclusion that it was not, and to that conclusion he adheres in his judgment in the present suit. This being so, we do not consider that he is warranted in holding that the transaction is inoperative for the purpose of creating a lien on a fund which might never have been recovered but for that transaction. Neither do we see our way to support his conclusion that the property substituted for Rs. 28,600 by Exhibit II is the one against which the appellant ought to have proceeded. The appellant was no party to that document; it was entered into with the knowledge of his claim against his will and to his prejudice, and it cannot, therefore, defeat any prior claim which he had on Rs. 28,600 and transfer it to some other property. There is nothing to show that the one-third share in the Achampattu village which respondents 4 to 6 released from the charge they had upon it for the amount of the decree in their favour in Original Suit No. 12 of 1882 was as good a security as the fund in Court. It was not a band fide investment of a trust fund for the benefit of the charity but it was the appropriation of a charity-fund to the payment of the private debts of respondents 4 to 6. There is no analogy between such appropriation and the investment of a charity-fund in a bank. The appellant's claim to a charge upon the fund paid into Court by Father Laberthere and paid out to the first three respondents at the instance of the others, must be upheld.
6. For the respondents it is next contended that out of the amount paid into Court by Father Laberthere, the appellant himself was paid Rs. 3,000 and that he is not entitled to charge the whole of the balance due under B-1 upon Rs. 28,600. This contention appears to us to be entitled to weight. Under Exhibit B-1, the amount due under it was a first charge upon the thirteen-fifteenths share of the amount paid into Court by Father Laberthere. Out of that amount Rs. 28,600 was paid to respondents 1 to 3, Rs. 7,000 and odd to the appellant himself and Rs. 2,000 and odd to the decree-holder in Original Suit No. 13 of 1887, and the appellant is entitled to a refund of what was due to him under B-1 from each of those who shared in the amount deposited in Court in proportion to the amount drawn by them. The fund, on which the appellant had a charge, was intercepted by them all, and each is liable to replace it only in proportion to the extent to which he intercepted it.
7. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to a decree for refund of Rs. 1,938-13-6 and four-fifths of the costs incurred in the lower Court and in this Court, the respondent being entitled to one-fifth the costs. The decree of the Subordinate Judge will be set aside, and a decree will be passed in appellant's favor for the amount indicated above with interest at 6 per cent, per annum from date of this decree, inclusive of costs.
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