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Arumuga v. Chockalingam And Ors.

Madras High Court
Mar 14, 1892
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Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns a suit filed by a purchaser at a private sale from the son of a purchaser at a Court sale. The purchaser had not obtained possession from the judgment-debtors. The lower Courts held that the suit was barred by Article 138 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act. The appellant contended that Article 136 should apply instead. The case reached the Court on a second appeal against these findings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Article 136 or Article 138 of the Limitation Act applies to a suit brought by an assignee of a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree.
  2. Whether the limitation period for such a suit begins from the date of sale or the date of confirmation of the sale.
  3. Whether the assignee of a purchaser at a Court sale can claim the benefit of Article 136 instead of Article 138.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant argued that Article 136 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act applies to the suit instead of Article 138.
  • It was contended that although Article 138 might apply to the purchaser himself, it should be strictly construed and not apply to the purchaser’s assignee.
  • The appellant claimed that the limitation period should begin from the date of confirmation of the sale, not the date of the sale itself.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondents maintained that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 138 since the judgment-debtors were in possession at the date of sale.
  • They argued that the assignee stands in the shoes of the purchaser and thus cannot claim a limitation period longer than the purchaser’s.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din I.L.R., 9 All, 97 That the term "mortgagee" includes an assignee of a mortgage. Supported the principle that assignees stand in the shoes of their assignors and cannot claim greater rights.
Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali I.L.R., 11 All., 423 That a co-mortgagor who redeems the mortgaged property is included in the term "mortgagee". Reinforced the interpretation of rights of assignees in limitation context.
Kishori Mohun Roy Chowdhry v. Chunder Nath Pal I.L.R., 14 Cal., 644 Application of Article 138 limitation period from date of sale. Confirmed that limitation under Article 138 runs from the date of sale, not confirmation.
Seru Mohun Bania v. Bhagoban Din Pandey I.L.R., 9 Cal., 602 Interpretation of limitation periods under the Limitation Act. Supported the Court’s view that Article 138 governs suits by purchasers at execution sales.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the applicability of Articles 136 and 138 of the Limitation Act to the suit. Article 136 applies to purchasers at private sales where the vendor was not entitled to possession at the date of sale, necessitating deferral of suit until third-party rights are resolved. Article 138 applies to purchasers at sales in execution of decrees where the judgment-debtor was in possession at the date of sale.

The Court rejected the appellant's contention that Article 136 applies to an assignee of a purchaser at a Court sale, holding that the assignee steps into the shoes of the purchaser and cannot claim a limitation period longer than the purchaser’s. The Court relied on precedents establishing that terms like "mortgagee" include assignees and that rights do not exceed those of the original party.

Since the judgment-debtors were in possession at the date of sale and the suit was brought by the assignee of the purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree, Article 138 applies, barring the suit as it was filed beyond the limitation period starting from the date of sale. The appellant’s argument that limitation should run from the date of confirmation was found contrary to the express provisions of Article 138 and relevant case law.

Holding and Implications

The Court dismissed the second appeal with costs, affirming the lower Courts' decisions that the suit is barred by limitation under Article 138 of the Limitation Act.

The direct effect of this decision is that suits by assignees of purchasers at sales in execution of decrees are subject to the limitation period under Article 138, running from the date of sale, regardless of possession status or confirmation timing. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles to the facts.

Show all summary ...

1. This was a suit by a purchaser at a private sale from the son of a purchaser at a Court sale, who had not obtained possession from the judgment-debtors. Both the Courts below held that it was barred by Article 138, second schedule of the Act of Limitations. I think that the decision is correct and that the appellant's contention that Article 136 governs the claim is not tenable. If the suit was brought by the auction purchaser, Article 138 would clearly apply. There is no reason to think that when it is brought either by his son or a purchaser claiming under him, the article ceases to be applicable. Reading Articles 136 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ [Article:

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Description of Suit. | Period of | Time from which period begins to run.

| limitation. | _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

136. By a purchaser at a private | Twelve years ... | When the vendor is first entitled to sale for possession of immoveable | | possession.] property sold, when the vendor | | was out of possession at the date of | | the sale.

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 137 and 138 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ [138. By a purchaser of land at | Twelve years ... | The date of the sale.] a sale in execution of a decree, for | | possession of the purchased land, | | when the judgment-debtor was in | | possession at the date of the sale. | | _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ together, I think that Article 136 applies to suits brought upon claims not derived from purchasers at a Court sale. I would dismiss the second appeal with costs, Best, J.

2. The only point urged before us is that the lower Courts are in error in holding that the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation. It is contended that Article 136 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act, and not Article 138 as held by the lower Courts, is applicable to this case.

3. Plaintiff sues as assignee of the purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree, and it is contended that, though Article 138 might apply to a suit by the purchaser himself, it must be read strictly, and so read is inapplicable to such purchaser's assignee. It has been held that the term "mortgagee" in Article 148 __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ [Article 148:

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Against a mortgagee to redeem or | Sixty years... | When the right to redeem or to to recover possession of immoveable | | to recover possession accrues.

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ of the same schedule includes an assignee of a mortgage--Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din I.L.R., 9 All, 97, and even a co-mortgagor by whom the mortgaged property had been redeemed-Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali I.L.R., 11 All., 423 and there is no reason why the word purchaser in Article 138 should be strictly construed so as to exclude the assignee of such purchaser, who of course stands in the shoes of his assignor and can have no right as such assignee greater than that possessed by his assignor.

4. Article 136 is intended to apply to cases in which the vendor is at the time of sale not entitled to possession of the property sold, and consequently the institution of a suit for possession has to be deferred till the right of any third person to its possession has determined. Had plaintiff's vendor purchased the property under such circumstances, no doubt plaintiff as his assignee would be entitled to the benefit of the further time allowed by Article 136. But this is not plaintiff's case. His contention is merely that as his vendor was not entitled to possession of the property purchased by him till the sale was confirmed, the limitation period must be counted from the date of confirmation of the sale, and not from the date of the sale itself. This is, however, opposed to the express provisions of Article, 138--Kishori Mohun Roy Chowdhry v. Chunder Nath Pal I.L.R., 14 Cal., 644 Seru Mohun Bania v. Bhagoban Din Pandey I.L.R., 9 Cal., 602.

5. It is not denied that the judgment-debtors were in possession at the date of the sale at which plaintiff's vendor, the first defendant, purchased the property. The first defendant has allowed the suit to proceed ex parte so far as he is concerned. The other defendants who have opposed the suit are the parties in possession of the property. If this suit had been brought against them by first defendant, it would clearly have been barred under Article 138, and it is similarly barred under that article when brought by plaintiff as assignee of the first defendant. This second appeal fails, therefore, and must be dismissed with costs.