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Vannisami Thevar v. Periyaswamy Thevar
Mr. Rajah Iyer's argument is that the application alone under O. 21, R. 89, of the Code of Civil Procedure need be made within 30 days as required by Art. 166 of the Limitation Act but the deposit might be made either within the 30 days mentioned in O. 21, R. 92, cl. (2), of the Code of Civil Procedure, or within such further time as the Court might choose to give in virtue of its alleged inherent powers under Sect. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In the first place it is clear from the decision in Karunakara Menon v. Krishna Menon that the “provision in O. 21, R. 89 is in “the nature of an indulgence to the judgment-debtors” and that “Courts are bound to see that the provisions of law in this respect “are very strictly conformed to.” That the deposit within 30 days is much more important than the application to set aside has been held in some cases [See Maniappa Annavi v. Harihara Iyer(2)] and that even an oral application to set aside is sufficient and can be presumed from an affidavit accompanying the deposit, provided the deposit itself is made within 30 days. Mr. Rajah Iyer's argument, if accepted, would make the deposit within 30 days a secondary matter.
Further we are of opinion that the words “on his depositing” in O. 21, R. 89, of the Code of Civil Procedure qualify “apply” and that such desposit is a condition precedent to the making of the application.
Lastly we hold that the Court has no power to extend the time given by the Code (and not by an order of the Court) for making the deposit and that the requirements of O. 21, R. 92, cl. (2), of the Code of Civil Procedure that the deposit should be made within 30 days is not merely directory but mandatory.
O. 21, R. 92, cl. (2), of the Code of Civil Procedure is not happily worded. An order allowing an application to set aside the sale is the same thing as an order setting aside the sale and it is therefore superfluous to say that on the allowing of such an application, the Court shall make an order setting aside the sale.
If again, the deposit should precede or be contemporaneous with the application, it was unnecessary to prescribe 30 days for the deposit when 30 days are prescribed by the Limitation Act for the application, unless the legislature intended not to allow to the making of the deposit the extension of the time permitted to applications by the Limitation Act in certain contingencies, such as the Court being closed on the last day of limitation.
However, we are clear that the learned Subordinate Judge was right in his view, that the Court had no power to extend the 30 days fixed in the Code for making the required deposit, as Sect. 151 of Civil Procedure Code cannot be legitimately invoked for extending periods of limitation and for overruling legislative provisions.
We dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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