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Ponnusamy Odayar And There Ors. v. Ramasamy Thathan

Bombay High Court
Apr 23, 1923
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter is a Criminal Revision Case referred to the Full Bench to decide the specific question whether, in summons cases, the provisions of Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are to be applied. The question arises because Section 342 requires that the accused be questioned generally on the case after the prosecution witnesses have been examined and before he is called on for his defence, while Section 364 requires that any such questions be taken down in full and shown or read to the accused (with interpretation if necessary). The opinion records practical concerns about applying Section 342 to the many petty summons cases (noting increased judicial time and administrative burden) and reviews existing judicial authority from several Presidencies and Provinces that had taken differing views. The Full Bench considered whether the language and structure of the Code (particularly Chapter XX and Chapter XXIV and provisions such as Sections 242, 244, 245, 256, 289, 342, 364 and 451) indicate that Section 342 was intended to apply to summons cases, and concluded on that question. As to other points raised in the revision, the case (with this direction) was to be referred to the Referring Bench for disposal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in summons cases, the provisions of Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are to be applied (i.e., whether the court must question the accused generally after prosecution witnesses have been examined and before he is called on for his defence).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Emperor v. Fernandez (1921) I.L.R., 45 Bom., 672 Decision directly on the point that Section 342 applies to summons cases. The decision was noted as a direct authority in favour of applying Section 342 to summons cases; other courts followed it, but the Full Bench considered the decision and declined to apply Section 342 to summons cases for reasons explained in its analysis.
Emperor v. Gulabjan (1922) I.L.R., 46 Bom., 441 Followed the decision in Emperor v. Fernandez that Section 342 applies to summons cases. Identified as a subsequent Bombay decision following Emperor v. Fernandez; the Full Bench acknowledged that such authorities exist but reached a contrary conclusion for summons cases.
Raghu Bhumij v. The King Emperor (1920) 5 Pat. L.J., 430 Discussed whether Section 342 is obligatory in sessions cases and whether it applies to summons cases; Sultan Ahmed, J., held it obligatory in sessions cases and expressed opinion it did not apply to summons cases; Mullick, J., took a contrary view on sessions cases; Jwala Prasad, J., later held it obligatory in sessions and thought it applied to summons cases. The Full Bench noted the varied positions in this reported case (including that the specific point was unnecessary to decision there) and treated the differing judicial opinions as part of the authorities to be weighed in reaching its own conclusion that Section 342 does not apply to summons cases.
Gulam Rasul v. The King Emperor (1921) 6 Pat. L.J., 174 Held that Section 342 applied to summons cases (decision by Adami and Bucknill, JJ.). Cited as one of the authorities supporting the application of Section 342 to summons cases; the Full Bench recorded this authority but concluded otherwise on statutory interpretation grounds.
Muhammad, Bakhsh v. Emperor (1922) 65 I.C., 618 Single-judge decision in Lahore following the view that Section 342 applies to summons cases (i.e., following Emperor v. Fernandez). Noted as part of the weight of judicial authority in favour of applying Section 342 to summons cases; the Full Bench considered these single-judge decisions but reached a different conclusion.
Parmeshwar Loll Mitter v. Emperor (1923) 67 I.C., 616 Single-judge decision in Patna following the view that Section 342 applies to summons cases. Recorded as another example of judicial authority applying Section 342 to summons cases; the Full Bench acknowledged such decisions but held Section 342 did not apply to summons cases under the Code's structure and wording.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded from a close textual and structural reading of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an assessment of practical consequences:

  1. Characterisation of Section 342: The Chief Justice observed that Section 342 is one of the general provisions concerning inquiries and trials in Chapter XXIV and, as a general provision, would normally apply to all cases unless special sections indicate otherwise or the section's own words show it was not intended to apply.
  2. Distinction in terminology: The Court emphasized the deliberate difference in phraseology between procedures for warrant/sessions cases and summons cases. Section 342 contemplates questioning "before the accused is called on for his defence." The expression "called on for his defence" has a definite meaning under Sections 289 and 256 (sessions and warrant cases), but that expression is not used in Chapter XX (which governs summons cases), where the Magistrate is bound "to hear the accused."
  3. Reference to Section 451 and legislative drafting: The Court noted Section 451's separate references to the accused being heard in summons cases and entering on his defence in warrant cases as supporting the view that the different wording was deliberate and material to interpretation.
  4. Examination of Chapter XX procedure: The Court examined the full procedure laid out in Chapter XX for summons cases—Section 242 (accused asked if he has any cause to show why he should not be convicted), Section 244 (Magistrate to hear complainant, take prosecution evidence, hear accused and take his defence evidence), and Section 245 (after taking evidence and further evidence and, if the Magistrate thinks fit, examining the accused, he must give his decision). The Court found no clear place in that sequence where a formal examination under Section 342 could be inserted.
  5. Practical consequences and statutory harmony: The Court observed the manifest inconvenience of applying Section 342 to the many petty summons cases—especially given Section 364's requirements for detailed recording and interpretation of questions—which would consume disproportionate judicial time and require an increase in the Magistracy. The Court noted that in practice Section 342 had not been treated as applying to summons cases in that Presidency.
  6. Conclusion on applicability: For these textual, structural and practical reasons, the Chief Justice concluded that Section 342 was not intended to apply to summons cases. He added that, although not obligatory, a Magistrate in summons cases may question the accused generally to enable explanation of circumstances appearing in evidence, and that doing so is often desirable in complicated cases or where the accused is unrepresented.
  7. Concurring opinions: Other judges concurred. One concurring judge (Ramesam, J.) expressly rejected two assumptions implicit in some authorities: (a) that entry on defence under Section 342 is identical to being "heard" under Chapter XX, and (b) that the language of Section 342 is applicable to the summons case procedure. He noted that under Section 242 the accused's "entry on his defence" in summons cases occurs earlier (when asked if he has any cause to show why he should not be convicted), but that at that stage prosecution witnesses have not been examined so the requirements of Section 342 cannot be satisfied.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to summons cases.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that magistrates conducting summons cases are not bound to conduct the formal examination prescribed by Section 342 after prosecution witnesses have been examined and before the accused is called on for his defence.
  • The Court left open the practical discretion of a Magistrate to question the accused generally in summons cases to enable explanation of circumstances appearing in evidence; such questioning is permissible and often desirable (especially where the accused lacks legal representation) but is not obligatory under Section 342.
  • As to other questions raised in the revision, the opinion records that those points will be referred to the Referring Bench for disposal; no broader changes to legal procedure beyond the direct effect described were articulated in the opinion.

Opinion authored by Oldfield, J.; the judgment of the Chief Justice and concurrences appear in the text and are reflected in this summary.

Show all summary ...

1. This Criminal Revision Case has been referred to the Full Bench on the question whether in summons cases the provisions of Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are to be applied, that is, is the Court bound, for the purpose of enabling the accused, to explain the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, to question him generally on the case after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence. The inconvenience of this course is manifest in view of the provisions of Section 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which require the taking down of any such question in full in the language in which the accused is examined, or, where that is not practicable, in the language of the Court or in English, and that the record shall be shown or read to him and, if necessary, interpreted. The great majority of summons cases are of a petty nature and a strict application of the section must necessarily involve a consumption of a large amount of judicial time. We are reliably informed that it would involve a considerable increase in the Magistracy and that, in fact, the section has in practice in this Presidency not been treated as applying to summons cases. In Madras there is no authority on the point except that in two recent cases single judges have felt themselves bound to hold that the section does apply by reason of the decisions of the Benches of other Courts referred to below. In other Courts there is considerable weight of judicial authority in favour of the application of the section. In Emperor v. Fernandez (1921) I.L.R., 45 Bom., 672, Shah and Crump, JJ., gave a direct decision on the point and it was followed in Emperor v. Gulabjan (1922) I.L.R., 46 Bom., 441, by Macleod, C.J., and Shah, J., the former pointing out the inconvenience and suggesting legislation as a remedy. In Raghu Bhumij v. The King Emperor (1920) 5 Pat. L.J., 430, in which the point was unnecessary for decision, as it was a sessions case, Sultan Ahmed, J., held that the application of Section 342 was obligatory in sessions cases and expressed the opinion that it did not apply to summons cases for reasons which I will refer to later. Mullick, J., holding that the section was not obligatory in sessions cases stated that he failed to see any difference between warrant and summons cases. On this case being referred to Jwala Prasad, J., he held that it was obligatory in sessions cases and was clearly of opinion that it applied to summons cases. In Gulam Rasul v. The King Emperor (1921) 6 Pat. L.J., 174, Adami and Bucknill, JJ., held that the section applied to summons cases. Emperor v. Fernandez (1921) I.L.R,., 45 Bom., 672, had been reported in the meantime and the Court simply followed that decision. This case has also been followed by single judges in Lahore in Muhammad, Bakhsh v. Emperor (1922) 65 I.C., 618 and in Patna in Parmeshwar Loll Mitter v. Emperor (1923) 67 I.C., 616, It is open to this Bench to take a different view and we have to consider the matter for ourselves, of course, giving due weight to the authorities quoted above. Section 342 is one of the general provisions as to inquiries and trials, contained in Chapter XXIV, and, being a, general provision, it must be applied to all cases, unless the special sections dealing with particular cases indicate that it is not intended to apply to them., or unless the words of the section itself give such indication. In my judgment, both these grounds of exception are to be found in respect of summons cases. Looking at Section 342 it is a condition that the questioning directed is to take place before the accused is called on for his defence. The calling on the accused for his defence has a definite meaning both in sessions and warrant cases under Sections 289 and 256, but when examining Chapter XX containing the provisions applying to summons cases, the expression is not used. The prisoner in these cases does not "enter on his defence" but the Magistrate is bound. "to hear the accused." That this distinction in phraseology is deliberate is clear from an examination of Section 451 relating to the trials of European British subjects which refers, in summons cases, to a time before he is heard in his defence under Section 244 and, in warrant cases, to a time before he enters on his defence under Section 256. [See on this point the judgment of Sultan Ahmed, J., in Raghu Bhumij v. The King Emperor (1920) 5 Pat. L.J., 430. In my judgment, the proper interpretation to be put upon Section 342 by reason of these words is that it is to apply only to those cases where under other sections of the Code the prisoner is to be called on for his defence. Again Chapter XX provides a complete procedure for the hearing of summons cases. Under Section 242 the accused is asked if he has any cause to show why he should not be convicted; but there is no sort of preliminary inquiry before framing a charge, as is the case in warrant cases, and before a case is committed to Sessions. Then under Section 244 the Magistrate must hoar the complainant and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution and also hear the accused and take all such evidence as he produces in his defence. Under Section 245 after taking this evidence and such further evidence (if any) as he may cause to be produced, and (if he thinks fit) examining the accused he must give his decision. It is difficult to see where in these sections a formal examination under Section 342 is to come in. It would have to be read in somewhere in Section 244 and it would be remarkable that, if Section 342 was intended to be applied to summons cases, the Legislature should not F have said at what stage in the application of Sections 242, 244 and 245 this further formal examination is to take place. I do not feel bound to read the provisions of section 342 as intervening in the middle of the operation of these sections) and in my judgment, it has no application to summons cases. It is perhaps worth observing that in summons cases there is no objection to a Magistrate questioning the accused generally for the purpose of enabling him to explain the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, and in complicated cases especially where the accused is not represented by Counsel, it is a desirable course notwithstanding that it is not obligatory.

2. As to the other points raised, this Criminal Revision Case with this direction will be referred to the Referring Bench for disposal.

Oldfield, J.

3. I agree. The authorities referred to in the judgment just delivered seem to me to proceed, implicitly or explicitly, on two assumptions, which, with all respect, I cannot follow:---that the entry by the accused on his defence, referred to in Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is identifiable with the hearing of the accused, referred to in Chapter XX, and that the language used in the section is applicable at all to summons case procedure. With all deference to my Lord, I am not sure that the separate references in Section 451 to accused being heard in summons cases and entering on his defence in warrant cases assist the argument. For it is not clear that they correspond with more than the draftsman's adherence in 1884, when I hat part of the Code was amended, to the wording of the other portions now under construction. It is, however, in my opinion, sufficient that the distinction to be inferred from the different wording used in each of those portions can easily be drawn, the hearing of the accused under Section 244 referring to the general hearing, to which he or his vakil on his behalf is entitled in the course of the trial. His entry on his defence under summons case procedure takes place earlier, when under Section 242, after the particular^ of the offence have been stated to him, he is asked if he has any cause to show why he should not be convicted. But, as the witnesses for the prosecution have not then been examined, there can be no question then or later of the requirements of Section 342 having been fulfilled.

Ramesam, J.

4. I agree with the judgment of the learned Chief Justice.

Devadoss, J.

5. I agree with the judgment of the learned Chief Justice.

Coleridge, J.

6. I agree.