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Robert William Anderson v. The Bank Of Upper India, Ltd.
Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The Bank of Upper India (plaintiff) sued to be put into possession of the chattels, goods, stock-in-trade, book-debts, securities, moneys and the business of the firm Burton and Co., or alternatively for a money decree of Rs. 18,839-5-6 against the defendants jointly and severally and for sale of the business in default of payment. The court below decreed payment of Rs. 18,839-5-6 with interest and costs and ordered that if the Receiver's funds were insufficient the Receiver should call for tenders and sell the business as a going concern, including its "good-will". Execution of the decree led to the sale of the business as a going concern. Robert William Anderson (appellant) appealed.
The Bank's claim rested on a deed dated 11 August 1911 executed by Percy Huburt Graham in favour of the Bank. That deed recited a loan, contained covenants to repay, and purported to mortgage to the Bank the chattels, goods, stock-in-trade specified in an attached schedule, the "good-will" of the business of Messrs. Burton and Co., fixtures, book-debts then due and owing and securities for them, and also included a clause authorising the Bank, on default, to take over the mortgaged property (a power which was never exercised). A later deed, dated 31 August 1912, showed Anderson advancing further sums to Graham and included powers for Anderson to take possession of the stock-in-trade and to treat subsequently acquired stock as pawned to secure Anderson's debt.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Bank's mortgage of 11 August 1911 covered only the articles specified in the schedule and the book-debts and "good-will" existing at the date of the mortgage, or whether it also extended to stock-in-trade subsequently acquired to replace sold or consumed items.
- Whether the Bank was entitled to profits in the hands of the Receiver and to the entire proceeds of the sale of the business (including proceeds attributable to stock acquired after the mortgage).
- Whether the Bank was entitled to a personal decree against the appellant, Anderson.
- Whether it was necessary to decide if Anderson had notice of the Bank's mortgage when he made his advance and obtained the 31 August 1912 documents.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant (Anderson) contended that the Bank's mortgage of 11 August 1911 bore only upon (a) the articles specifically set forth in the schedule to the deed, (b) the "good-will" and (c) the book-debts actually due at the time of the mortgage; it did not attach to goods subsequently purchased in the ordinary course of business.
- Anderson asserted that under his indenture he was entitled to enter into possession of the business and carry it on, that all profits made during his possession or later by the Receiver belonged to him, and that the proceeds of the sale in execution of the decree also belonged to him.
- He also contended that in no event should there have been a personal decree against him.
- (The appellant made no claim to the policy of insurance mentioned in the mortgage.)
Respondent's Arguments
- The Bank contended that on the true construction of the indenture of 11 August 1911 any stock-in-trade purchased to replace the articles specified in the schedule must be regarded as part of the Bank's security.
- Accordingly the Bank claimed entitlement to all profits in the hands of the Receiver and to the entire proceeds of the sale of the business.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Coltman v. Chamberlain (1890) 59 L.J.Q.B. 163; 25 Q.B.D. 328; 39 W.R. 12 | Shows that, depending on the construction of the mortgage, articles acquired after the date of a mortgage may pass under a mortgage described in general terms (in that case, articles appurtenant to a ship). | The court acknowledged this authority as cited by the respondent but treated it as a case of mortgage of a ship where appurtenances were held to pass; it was considered by the court but the court found a closer analogue in Tapfield v. Hillman for the present facts. |
| Tapfield v. Hillman (1843) 6 Man. & G. 245; 6 Scott (N.R.) 967; 12 L.J.C.P. 311; 7 Jur. 771; 134 E.R. 883 | Holds that, where a deed mortgages an inn together with its furniture and stock-in-trade, the stock-in-trade acquired after the date of the mortgage is not included unless the language of the deed plainly covers such after-acquired property. | The court found this case much more analogous and followed its principle: on true construction the after-acquired stock-in-trade is not subject to the mortgage in the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by examining the language of the indenture of 11 August 1911. It considered what property the deed actually mortgaged and focused on the attached schedule describing the goods and chattels. The court concluded that the deed, on its true construction, mortgaged the goods and chattels described in that schedule and also the "good-will" of the business.
The court considered authorities. It noted Coltman v. Chamberlain (a mortgage of a ship and its appurtenances) which had been cited for the proposition that after-acquired articles could pass under a broadly worded mortgage. However, the court found Tapfield v. Hillman—a mortgage of an inn with furniture and stock-in-trade—to be far more comparable. In Tapfield v. Hillman the judges held that the stock-in-trade acquired after the date of the mortgage was not covered, because the language of the deed was not sufficient to include property not on the premises at the time of execution.
Applying that principle to the present indenture, the court concluded that the Bank's mortgage did not attach to stock subsequently acquired in the ordinary course of business to replace items sold or consumed. Therefore, the Bank's security was limited to the scheduled goods (which in fact had been sold before the Receiver took possession) and the goodwill; it did not extend to later purchases of stock, nor to profits realized by the Receiver from running the business.
On the basis of this construction, the court held that the Bank was not entitled to the profits in the hands of the Receiver and was not entitled to any portion of the proceeds of the sale except insofar as those proceeds represented the value of the "good-will" of the business. The court also held that the Bank was not entitled to a personal decree against Anderson.
The court observed it was unnecessary to decide whether Anderson had notice of the Bank's mortgage, given the conclusion on construction. The court further remarked that it was unnecessary to decide exactly what amount the Bank was entitled to realize on sale, and expressed doubt that the Bank could add to their debt sums not strictly paid or advanced for the purpose of preserving the security (for example, premiums paid to keep up an insurance policy).
Finally, before making a final order, the court designated one factual/legal issue to be referred back to the Court below: what portion, if any, of the proceeds of the sale represents the value of the "good-will".
Holding and Implications
The court held that the Bank's mortgage of 11 August 1911 was limited to the goods and chattels specified in the schedule and to the "good-will" of the business; it did not extend to stock-in-trade subsequently acquired in the ordinary course of business. The Bank was not entitled to profits in the hands of the Receiver nor to any portion of the proceeds of the sale except so far as those proceeds represented the "good-will"; the Bank was also not entitled to a personal decree against the appellant, Anderson.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The Bank's claim to proceeds from the sale is limited to the portion attributable to the goodwill of the business; it cannot claim proceeds attributable to after-acquired stock or to profits realized by the Receiver.
- The appellant Anderson is not liable to a personal decree under the court's ruling.
- The court declined to decide the amount properly realizable by sale in detail and expressed doubt that the Bank could add sums not strictly paid or advanced to preserve security.
- The court has referred the factual/legal question of how much of the sale proceeds represent goodwill back to the Court below for determination.
Broader implications: The opinion confines relief to what the deed, on its true construction, covered and does not purport to lay down any wider novel principle beyond applying established authorities; it therefore addresses the rights of the parties under the specific mortgage instruments before the court.
Referral
The court directed that the question of what portion, if any, of the proceeds of the sale represents the value of the "good-will" should be referred to the Court below.
1. This appeal arises but of a suit brought by the Bank of Upper India claiming that they might be put into possession of the chattels, goods, stock-in-trade, book-debts, securities and moneys and the business belonging to a firm of merchants carrying on business under the style of Burton and Co. at Bareilly, or in the alternative that the Bank should have a decree for the sum of Rs. 18,839-5-6 against the defendants jointly and severally and that in default of payment the business should be sold for the realisation of their debt.
2. The Court below has given the plaintiff Bank a decree directing the defendants to pay the sum of Rs. 18,839-5-6 together with interest and costs, and further that in the event of the amount in the hands of the Receiver (who had already been appointed) not being sufficient to pay the plaintiff's decree, the Receiver should call for tenders and sell the business of Messrs. Burton and Co. with the
"good-will", etc., as a going concern.
3. We are informed that in execution of this decree the business has been sold as a going concern.
4. The defendant Robert William Anderson has appealed. The Bank's claim is based on a deed, dated the 11th of August 1911, executed by the defendant Graham in favour of the Bank of Upper India. The document commences by reciting that the said Graham was indebted to the Bank and other persons and required a loan of Rs. 11,000. Then follows a covenant to re-pay the Rs. 11,000 by instalments. There is a clause which provides if for the preservation of the security hereby created it be necessary for the said Bank to make any advance or to incur any other charge, such advance or charge shall form part of this loan and be subject to the same Stipulation about interest." The document then proceeds as follows: "and this indentu e further witnesseth that for the due re-payment of the money due under these presents and other charges as above specified and interest or both as above stated and agreed upon, the said mortgagor doth here-by mortgage unto the said Bank, its creditors and administrators and assigns all and singular the several chattels, goods, stock-in-trade and things specially described in the schedule hereto annexed by way of security for the re-payment of the loan and interest and charges thereon as stipulated above. Further he, the mortgagor, as beneficial owner doth hereby mortgage unto the said Bank, its executors, administrators or assigns all the beneficial interest of the said business of Messrs. Barton and Co. with the fixtures appertaining thereto and also all the book-debts and other debts now due and owing to the said Percy Huburt Graham or Messrs. Burton and Co. upon account or in respect of the said trade or business and all securities for the same, to hold the same unto the said Bank, its executors, administrators or assigns for securing payment of the loan and interest thereon as stipulated." There is a further clause authorising the Bank in the event of default to take over the property mortgaged. (This power was admittedly never exercised). There was a further clause mortgaging or charging a certain policy of insurance of the life of the said Percy Huburt Graham and finally a clause (hopelessly inconsistent with the entire object of the deed) that the mortgagor would not alienate any of the property mortgaged during the continuance of the security. Attached to this deed is a schedule of the goods which formed the stock-in-trade of Graham's business at the time of the mortgage.
5. The appellant, Anderson, who was connected by marriage with Graham, got a deed from the latter on the 31st of August 1912. This document recites that Graham was indebted to Anderson in the sum of Rs. 22,854. This sum was made up of Rs. 15,000 advanced at the time in cash, Rs. 3,750, promissory notes executed in favour of Anderson by Graham, Rs. 1,654, a decree against Graham by a creditor, and Rs. 2,450 a debt due by Graham to another firm. This document provided for interest on the Rs. 15,000 at seven per cent. It gave Anderson power to take possession of all the stock-in-trade in the business. It provided that the stock-in-trade should be kept fully replenished and all new stock which was brought in should be regarded and treated as being pawned to secure the debt. This document was followed by another document, dated the 31st of August 1912, which provided for the carrying on of the business by Graham as a manager at a salary of Rs. 200 per month, and a man of the name of Norton (who also was connected with both Anderson and Graham by marriage) should be an assistant at a salary. The deed finally provided that as soon as all debts and incumbrances had been discharged, the business should belong to Graham, Anderson and to two Nortons in certain specified shares.
6. There was considerable controversy in the Court below as to whether Anderson had notice of the Bank's mortgage when he made the further advance of Rs. 15,000 and got the documents of the 31st of August 1912 executed in his favour. The Court below has found that he had notice but having regard to the view we take of the case, it is quite unnecessary for us to come to any decision on the question of notice. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that all that was mortgaged by the Bank's mortgage of the llth of August 1911 were (1890) 59 L.J.Q.B. 163 : 25 Q.B.D. 328 : 39 W.R. 12 the articles which are specified and set forth in the schedule to the deed; (1843) 6 Man. & G. 245 : 6 Scott (N.R.) 967 : 12 L.J.C.P. 311 : 7 Jur. 771 : 134 E.R. 883 the "good-will" and (3) the book-debts actually due at the time, that at the time of the mortgage, and certainly at the time the Receiver took possession of the property, all the goods which were mentioned in the schedule had long before been sold in the ordinary course of business and that the plaintiff's security did not attach to any goods that might have been subsequently purchased. (The appellant makes no claim to the policy of insurance.) The appellant contends that under the terms of his indenture he was entitled to enter into possession of the business and to carry it on, that all profits made during that time, or subsequently by the Receiver, belong to him, and that the proceeds of the sale, which is said to have taken place in execution of the decree, also belonged to him. He finally contends that in no event ought there to have been a personal decree against him.
7. On behalf of the respondent it is con-fended that on the true construction of the indenture of the llth of August 1911, any stock in-trade which was purchased to re-place the articles specified in the schedule must be regarded as part of the Bank's security, and that accordingly they are entitled to all profits in the hands of the Keeeiver as well as to the entire proceeds of the sale.
8. In our opinion it is absolutely clear that the goods and chattels described in the schedule alone were mortgaged. We think that the "good-will" of the business was also mortgaged. Mr. O'Conor on behalf of the respondent has cited the case of Coltman v. Chamberlain (1890) 59 L.J.Q.B. 163 : 25 Q.B.D. 328 : 39 W.R. 12. That was a case of mortgage of a ship and in her boats, guns, ammunitions, small arms and appurtenances." The question arose as to whether sundry articles of ship's furniture purchased after the date of the mortgage were included in the security. It was held on the construction of the mortgage in that case that all these articles passed under the mortgage of the "ship" or as "appurtenant" thereto.
9. A case much more like the present is the case of Tapfield v. Hillman (1843) 6 Man. and G. 245 : 6 Scott (N.R.) 967 : 12 L.J.C.P. 311 : 7 Jur. 771 : 134 E.R. 883. In that case there was a mortgage of an inn together with "the furniture, stock-in-trade in, about, upon or belonging to the Inn," with a power on non-payment to the mortgagee to enter into possession of the in nand to take, possess, hold and enjoy all the goods,, chattels, effects and premises." The question arose as to whether or not stock-in-trade and goods acquired after the date of the mortgage were covered by the deed. Pattison, J., at the trial held that on the true construction of the deed only the stock-in-trade existing at the date of the mortgage was pledged. Tindal, C.J., Coltman, J., Maule, J., and Cresswell, J., all concurred in holding that the after-acquired stock-n-trade was not subject to the mortgage. Coltman, J., says "It is not improbable that the parties intended that the security of the mortgagees should extend to the stock and effects brought upon the premises from time to time to re-place that which was disposed of and consumed by the plaintiff in the course of his business. We can, however, only look to the language of the deed, which clearly is not sufficient to include property not on the premises at the time the deed was as executed."
10. If then the plaintiff's mortgage in the present case did not attach to the subsequently acquired stock, the Bank had no right to bring anything but the ""good-will"" to sale, and the question whether or not Anderson had notice of their mortgage became quite immaterial. In our opinion the plaintiff Bank are not entitled to the profits in the hands of the Receiver, nor are they entitled to any portion of the proceeds of the sale, save so far as the same are attributable to or represent the "good-will"" of the business. In our opinion, also, the Bank are not entitled to a personal decree against the appellant.
11. It is unnecessary to decide the question of the amount to realise which the Bank were entitled to bring the mortgaged property to sale. It srems to us more thari doubtful, that they were entitled to add to their debt nny sum that was not strictly paid or_ advanced for the purpose of preserving their security, e.g., premium paid to keep up the policy of insurance.
12. Before passing a final order in the case we think it desirable to refer an fesue to the Court below, namely, what portion, if any, of the proceeds of the sale represents the value of the "good-will"."
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