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Huseni Begam v. Collector Of Moradabad
Judgment Summary (Burkitt, J.; Knox, J., concurring)
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit was instituted by the Collector of Moradabad under instructions from the Local Government under section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The plaintiff alleged that some fifty years before the suit one Miran Shah endowed (made a waqf of) mauza Haibatpur for religious and charitable purposes — to maintain a mosque and an imambara he founded, to fund an annual "urs" to commemorate Pir Ghaus Azam, to feed the poor at the "urs", and to keep Miran Shah's tomb in repair. It was admitted that mauza Haibatpur had been granted revenue-free (muafi) to Miran Shah by the Oudh Government and remained muafi through subsequent settlements under British administration.
The plaint alleged that Miran Shah's heirs (the defendants' ancestors) held the village as trustees and originally performed the trust duties, but later (allegedly having become Shiahs) treated the trust property as their own, mortgaged or alienated parts of it, demolished trust buildings, and appropriated the proceeds. Reliefs sought included (inter alia) appointment of new trustees (implying removal of the existing trustees), declaration that the property was wakf, accounts and recovery of misapplied sums, and a scheme for management of the trust.
The defendants raised several pleas in their written statement: (1) limitation (possession as owners for more than twelve years); (2) want of parties — that transferees from the defendants should have been impleaded; (3) denial of the endowment (a paragraph denying the endowment but arguably admitting the charitable nature of the objects); (4) denial that income was applied to the alleged purposes; and (5) admission that the property descended to them from Miran Shah but assertion that any spending on mosque, imambara and tomb was voluntary, not obligatory.
At first instance the District Judge decreed for the plaintiff. The defendants appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a plea of limitation (possession by the defendants as owners for more than twelve years) could bar a suit to enforce a trust once the trust was established.
- Whether transferees or alienees of trust property are necessary parties to a suit under section 539, Code of Civil Procedure, for execution and administration of a trust and removal of trustees.
- Whether the alleged waqf (endowment) of mauza Haibatpur was for public religious or charitable purposes (i.e., whether the endowment was a valid public charitable waqf).
- Whether a suit to remove trustees (and appoint new trustees) can be maintained under section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure (given conflicting authorities).
- On the merits, whether Miran Shah in fact dedicated mauza Haibatpur as waqf and whether the defendants, as trustees, had breached trust duties (demolition, misappropriation, wrongful alienation).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Case (as presented in the plaint and at trial)
- Miran Shah endowed mauza Haibatpur for the maintenance of a mosque and imambara, to fund an annual "urs" for Pir Ghaus Azam, to feed the poor at the "urs", and to maintain Miran Shah's tomb.
- The village was revenue-free (muafi) by grant of the Oudh Government and remained muafi under British settlement records (Records No. 18C and 19C), with the continuance explicitly attributed to charitable appropriation for the mosque, imambara and "urs".
- The descendants of Miran Shah hold the village as trustees (mutawallis) and have neglected and misapplied the income, alienated portions, demolished buildings and appropriated proceeds; relief sought included removal of trustees and appointment of new trustees, declaration of waqf status, accounts and recovery.
- Documentary evidence and witness testimony were adduced: settlement records (18C, 19C), deposition and petitions from partition proceedings (Records 74C, 75C, 76C, 78C, 79C) and oral witnesses (Kazi Imam Ali, Sheikh Wilayat Ali, Masiat-ullah) who knew Miran Shah and attested to his dedication and to subsequent neglect/alienation by descendants.
Defendants' Arguments (as set out in written statement and at trial)
- Plea of limitation: the defendants asserted they had been dealing with the property as their own for more than twelve years.
- Plea of want of parties: argued transferees from the defendants (alienees/incumbrancers) should have been impleaded.
- Denial of endowment: a paragraph denying that the property was ever endowed "for charitable purposes as alleged" (though the pleading possibly admits the charitable character of the objects as pleaded).
- Denial that income was applied to the purposes alleged and denial of demolition of imambara in Haibatpur and ancestral house in Sambhal (the plaint was later amended to correct locus of some buildings).
- Admitted descent from Miran Shah but stated expenditure on mosque, imambara and tomb was voluntary (done of their own free will), implying no binding trust obligations.
- At trial the appellants produced no documentary evidence and called four witnesses (three described by the court as worthless and one whose deposition was more favourable to the respondent).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bishen Chand v. Syed Nadir | Illustrates difficulty of deciding extent of trusts when all interested parties are not before the court. | The court rejected the appellants' reliance on it to argue that alienees of trust property must be impleaded in a s.539 suit; the case does not support that proposition. |
| Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev | Suit under s.539 for execution and administration of a trust and for removal of trustees; incumbrancers and alienees were not treated as necessary parties. | Used to support the proposition that alienees and incumbrancers need not be made parties to a s.539 suit; the court relied on this authority to overrule the want-of-parties plea. |
| The Attorney General v. The Port Reeve of Avon | Persons claiming title adverse to a trust cannot be made parties to a suit for the execution of the trust. | Cited to reinforce that adverse alienees need not be impleaded in a trust execution suit under s.539; the court treated it as supportive authority. |
| Narasimha v. Ayyan Chetti | Contains an obiter dictum suggesting doubt whether a suit to remove a trustee can be maintained under s.539. | Cited to show some judicial doubt had been expressed earlier, but not treated as decisively resolving the question. |
| Sathappayar v. Periasami | Held the case did not come under s.539 because the endowment's object was for private religious family purposes. | Noted by the court as a case where the question of s.539 applicability was not decided because the endowment was private in character. |
| Subbayya v. Krishna | Majority held that a suit to remove a trustee could be maintained under s.539 of the Code of Civil Procedure. | The court agreed with the majority in Subbayya v. Krishna and adopted its reasoning, holding that a suit for removal of trustees is maintainable under s.539. |
| Rangasami Naickan v. Varadappa Naickan | A Bench of three Judges held that a suit to remove a trustee could not be maintained under s.539 (conflicting with Subbayya majority). | Noted as conflicting authority; the court acknowledged the conflict but sided with Subbayya's majority view. |
| Tricumdass Mulji v. Khimji Vullabhdas | Following the majority in Subbayya, held the suit came under s.539 and, because sanction of the Advocate-General had not been obtained, could not be maintained. | Referred to as an example of application of the Subbayya majority principle, illustrating that s.539 suits may require sanction in certain contexts. |
| Sayad Hussein Mian v. The Collector of Kaira | Affirmed decisions following the majority ruling in Subbayya v. Krishna. | Noted as recent Bombay authority confirming the line of decisions which treat removal suits as covered by s.539. |
| Sajedur Raja v. Baidyanath Deb; Mohiuddin v. Sayiduddin (20th I.L.R. Calcutta Series) | Laid down a rule to the same effect as the Bombay cases and Subbayya v. Krishna (i.e., removal suits covered by s.539). | The court recorded these Calcutta cases as consistent with the view that suits for removal of trustees fall under s.539. |
| Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Das Baishnav | Published after the reserved judgment; follows and approves the majority decision in Subbayya v. Krishna. | Referred to as a subsequent authority that supports the Subbayya majority position which this court adopted. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed the principal pleas and issues in turn and applied documentary and oral evidence to reach its conclusions.
1. Limitation plea. The defendants' plea that they had treated the property as their own for over twelve years was not discussed at length at the hearing. The court observed that, once the trust is established, a limitation plea of this nature could not prevail (i.e., the existence of the trust defeats that plea).
2. Want of parties (transferees/alienees). The District Judge overruled the plea that transferees should have been impleaded. The court examined authorities and concluded that in a suit under s.539 for execution and administration of a trust and removal of trustees, the alienees or incumbrancers of the trust property are not necessary parties. The court relied on Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev and The Attorney General v. The Port Reeve of Avon to support the proposition that persons claiming title adverse to a trust need not be made parties; Bishen Chand v. Syed Nadir did not support the contrary argument urged for the appellants.
3. Validity of the waqf as public charitable/religious. The court examined the stated purposes (mosque, imambara, "urs", relief of the poor, maintenance of tomb) and found on brief consideration that these purposes are abundantly public, charitable and religious. The defendants' contention that the waqf was not for public religious or charitable purposes therefore failed.
4. Whether a suit to remove trustees is maintainable under s.539. The court acknowledged conflicting authorities. It reviewed obiter doubts in Narasimha v. Ayyan Chetti, the non-application in Sathappayar v. Periasami, the majority decision in Subbayya v. Krishna holding such suits are maintainable under s.539, and the contrary three-judge decision in Rangasami Naickan v. Varadappa Naickan. After considering these decisions and studying the Madras High Court judgments in detail, the court expressed conformity with the majority in Subbayya v. Krishna and Justice Weir's reasoning, and held that a suit for removal of trustees is not bad because of the prayer for removal — i.e., such a suit can be maintained under s.539.
5. Merits — documentary and oral evidence. The court analysed documentary material (Record Nos. 18C and 19C — settlement records showing muafi was continued because the mahal was appropriated for charitable expenses in connection with mosque, imambara and "urs"; Record Nos. 74C, 75C, 76C — deposition and petitions in partition proceedings where parties or their pleader admitted the village to be endowed and income applied to charitable purposes; Record Nos. 78C and 79C — petitions before revenue authorities asserting the village's endowed status). The court observed that appellants did not produce these papers despite those documents having been produced earlier (in 1889) on behalf of an appellant.
On oral evidence, the respondent called three witnesses acquainted with Miran Shah whose testimony supported the creation of the waqf, the building of mosque and imambara by Miran Shah, and the descendants' discontinuance of the charities and demolition of buildings. The appellants' witnesses were largely unhelpful. Given the mass of documentary and oral evidence favouring the plaintiff and the lack of adequate rebuttal by the appellants, the court found the plaintiff had proved the waqf and the trustees' breach.
6. Relief and practical disposition. The court agreed with the lower court's findings: (a) mauza Haibatpur was dedicated as waqf by Miran Shah before his death; (b) it devolved on his daughters and their descendants as trustees for the specified religious and charitable purposes; (c) the defendants are trustees in possession without proprietary rights; (d) the trustees grossly violated their duties, failed to apply income to trust purposes, appropriated income to private use, dismantled/demolished trust buildings and wrongfully alienated portions of the endowed property; (e) the trustees denied their trust character and claimed proprietary rights. For these reasons the court directed removal of the trustees and transfer of possession to the mutawalli nominated by the District Judge. The court declined to comment on the scheme for administration prepared by the District Judge because no arguments were addressed to the court about it.
Holding and Implications
Final Disposition: APPEAL DISMISSED — the decree of the District Judge in favour of the plaintiff was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed with costs.
Primary holdings and immediate consequences for the parties:
- The court declared mauza Haibatpur to be waqf (endowed property) dedicated by Miran Shah for the mosque, imambara, "urs" of Ghaus Azam and associated charitable purposes.
- The defendants were held to be trustees (mutawallis) in possession but without proprietary rights; they were found to have breached their duties by failing to apply income to trust purposes, appropriating income for private use, demolishing and dilapidating trust buildings, and wrongfully alienating trust property.
- The trustees were ordered removed, and possession of the trust property was directed to be transferred to the mutawalli nominated by the District Judge.
- The appeal was dismissed with costs in favour of the plaintiff-respondent.
Implications for legal principles:
- The court sided with the majority view in Subbayya v. Krishna that a suit to remove trustees and appoint new trustees can be maintained under section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure; the judgment therefore endorses that line of authority in the conflict of decisions the court reviewed.
- The court held that alienees or incumbrancers of trust property are not necessary parties to a s.539 suit for execution and administration of a trust and removal of trustees, relying on Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev and The Attorney General v. The Port Reeve of Avon.
Note: The court refrained from commenting on the District Judge's proposed scheme for administration of the trust because no observations were addressed to the Court on that scheme by either party.
Appeal dismissed.
Burkitt, J. (Knox, J., concurring):— The suit out of which this first appeal has arisen was instituted by the Collector of Moradabad (under instructions from the Local Government) under the provisions of s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The case for the plaintiff is that one Miran Shah, the ancestor of all the defendants, had, before his death some fifty years before suit, made a waqf of mauza Haibatpur for religious and charitable purposes, for the up-keep of a mosque and imambara he had founded, for the expenses of an annual “urs” or religious assembly to commemorate the Pir Gbaus Azam, to feed the poor at the “urs” and to keep his (Miran Shah's) tomb in repair. It is admitted that mauza Haibatpur had been granted revenue-free to Miran Shah, who was a man of great piety and sanctity among Mussalmans; that the revenue-free grant was made by the Oudh Government, and that the village still remains muafi, not having been resumed at either of the two settlements which have taken place since the British Government came into possession. It was alleged for the (plaintiff that the village came into the possession [48] of Miran Shah's heirs as trustees, and that they for a considerable time performed properly their duty as such; but latterly (having become Shiahs) they have, in breach of the trust, treated the trust property as their own, have mortgaged and otherwise alienated some portions of it, and have pulled down some of the trust buildings and appropriated to their own use the value of the materials. The plaintiff accordingly prayed for the appointment of new trustees—which of course implies the dismissal of the existing trustees; that the property be declared to be wakf, and the defendants be required to furnish accounts and to pay sums which they had improperly appropriated in breach of the trust. It was also prayed that a scheme for the management of the trust should be settled.
Those of the defendants who appeared first of all raised a plea of limitation to the effect that they had been dealing with the property as their own for more then twelve years. There does not seem to have been any discussion as to this plea at the hearing. Clearly, once the trust was established, such a plea could not prevail. They next pleaded want of parties, that their transferees should have been made parties. This plea, was overruled by the lower Court. In the fourth paragraph of the written statement, the defendants deny the fact of the endowment, alleging that “the property in dispute was never endowed for charitable purposes as alleged by the plaintiff on behalf of any party, i.e, for the purposes set forth in the plaint.” This paragraph, while denying the plaintiff's case as to the trust, may perhaps be regarded as an admission that the objects of the alleged waqf as set forth in the plaint are charitable purposes. In subsequent paragraphs, the defendants deny that the income of the property in dispute was ever applied to the purposes mentioned in the plaint. They also deny the demolition of an imambara in Haibatpur and of an ancestral house in Sambhal. The first portion of this plea—like the first paragraph of the written statement—takes advantage of a blunder in the plaint, afterwards amended. The imambara, mosque, &c, were not in [49] Haibatpur, but in an adjoining mohalla of the town of Sambhal. There is nothing in the plaint about an ancestral house. The seventh paragraph of the written statement is important. In that paragraph the defendants admit that the property in dispute descended to them from Miran Shah, and they add that they spend money on the mosque, imambara and tomb according to their respective positions, a statement which at the hearing of this appeal was explained to mean that they were not legally bound to spend any money on such purposes, but did so of their owe free will and pleasure. These are the only pleas which call for notice.
The, District Judge gave the plaintiff a decree. The defendants appeal.
The first plea argued for them was that the suit was had because the transferees from the defendants had not been impleaded. That plea was overruled, and we think rightly, by the learned District Judge. In support of this contention the learned advocate for the appellants cited the case of Bishen Chand v. Syed Nadir(1), in which, at p. 9, their Lordships found themselves unable, in a suit in which all the parties interested were not before them, to decide the extent of certain trusts, and whether any surplus remained over to the mutawalli for his private use. We cannot see that this case is any authority for the proposition that to a suit for the execution and administration of a trust the alienees of the trust property, who have an interest adverse to the trust are necessary parties. In the case of Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dkondo Ganesh Dev which was a suit under section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the execution and administration of a trust and for removal of the trustees, who had incumbered and alienated a large portion of the trust property, the incumbrancers and alienees were not considered necessary parties. And in the case of The Attorney General v. The Port Reeve of Avon, it was held by the [50] Lords Justices that persons claiming title adverse to a trust cannot be made parties to a suit for the execution of the trust. No case has been shown to us in which, in a suit under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the alienees or incumbrancers have been made parties, and indeed it does not appear what relief could be granted against them under that section. We think that a prayer for recovery of possession from such persons could not be entertained under that section. The plaintiff in this suit could not institute a suit for possession. Such a suit could be instituted only by the trustee. We therefore overrule this plea.
Next it is contended that the waqf set up by the plaint is bad as it is not for public religious or charitable purposes. The briefest consideration of the purposes of the waqf set out above is in our opinion abundantly sufficient to show that they are public charitable and religious purposes. That plea also fails.
The last plea of law raised by the appellants is that the suit is bad because a suit to remove a trustee cannot be entertained under s. 539 of the Code as far as we can ascertain the first doubt whether such a suit would lie was suggested by an obiter dictum in the case of Narasimha v. Ayyan Chetti, where the learned Judges are reported to have said that “it is not at all clear that a suit to remove a trustee can be maintained under s. 539.” The question was not decided in the next case, Sathappayar v. Periasami, as it was held that case did not come under s. 539, the object of the endowment being for private religious purposes, namely to perpetuate the spiritual, family of a guru. But in the case of Subbayya v. Krishna the question was very elaborately argued before a Bench of three Judges, and it was held by a majority of the Court that a suit to remove a trustee could be maintained under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The same question again came before the Madras High Court in Rangasami Naickan [51] v. Varadappa Naickan, when a Bench of three Judges (one of whom was the dissentient Judge in the case of Subbaya v. Krishna just mentioned) held that a suit to remove a trustee could not be maintained under s. 539 of the Code. In Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondc Ganesh Dev, a case already cited, the question was not raised. It appears to have been taken for granted that such a suit could be maintained. In the case Tricumdass Mulji v. Khimji Vullabhdas, which was a suit to administer a public charitable trust, to compel a trustee to account, and for the removal from office of that trustee and for the appointment of a new trustee, it was held, following the decision of the majority of the Bench in Subbayya v. Krishna, that the suit came under s. 539, and could not be maintained, as the sanction of the Advocate-General had not been obtained. The most recent case in the Bombay Court is that of Sayad Hussein Mian v. The Collector of Kaira, and in it the decision in the previous case following the ruling of the majority of the Judges in Subbayya v. Krishna was affirmed. There are also two cases in the 20th volume of the Indian law Reports, Calcutta Series, namely, Sajedur Raja v. Baidyanath Deb at p. 397 and Mohiuddin v. Sayiduddin at p. 810, the rule laid down in which is to the same effect as in the Bombay cases and in Subbayya v. Krishna. The case of Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Das Baishnav, the report of which was published after we had reserved judgment in this appeal, follows and approves of the decision of the majority of the Bench in Subbayya v. Krishna.
In this conflict of authority there is undoubtedly a preponderance of judicial decisions in favour of the proposition that a suit to have a trustee removed and another appointed in his place is a suit which is covered by the provisions of s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We have considered and studied the elaborate judgments of the Madras High Court in the cases in [52] the 14th and 17th volumes of the Madras Reports. After mature consideration our opinion is in conformity with that expressed by the majority of the Bench in Subbayya v. Krishna. We entirely concur in the elaborate judgment of Mr. Justice Weir and in the reasons he gives for the conclusion at which he arrived. We feel we can add nothing to it. We hold therefore that this suit is not bad because of the prayer for the removal of the existing trustees.
On the merits we are of opinion that the appellants have failed to make out their case. That mauza Haibatpur was granted free of revenue to Miran Shah, though a Sunni, by the Shiah Government of Oudh, on account of his character for holiness and sanctity is not denied. It is also admitted that the British Government has continued the muafi to Miran Shah's family up to the present day. The exhibits Record Nos. 18C and 19C show the reason why Government at the last settlement, instead of resuming the muafi grant (as it might have done), allowed it to continue. The first paragraph of the wajib-ul-arz No. 18C shows the reason for the continuance of the muafi to be because mauza Haibatpur is a mahal “appropriated to charitable expenses in connection with a mosque, imambara and ‘urs’ of Ghaus Azam.” And the same reasons for the continuance of the muafi are given in Record No. 19C drawn up some three years later. We think these facts are most significant and important. It is admitted that Miran Shah left no son living at his death and that he was succeeded by his daughters (three in number), whose descendants are now in possession of Haibatpur. Why should the grant have been continued to them revenue free, unless because of Miran Shah having dedicated Haibatpur to charitable and religious purposes? It is not even suggested that these descendants of Miran Shah in the female line had any personal claims to receive a revenue-free grant at the hands of the British Government, nor is it suggested that, either at the settlement; of 1846 or at the subsequent [53] settlement of about 1874–1875, any such personal claims were put forward. Clearly the muafi was continued at settlement because of the reasons stated in Record Nos. 18C and 19C. Here we would refer to the attested copy (Record No. 74C.) of a deposition by Sayyed Hasan, a pleader who appeared for Musammat Huseni Begam (one of the appellants here), in a partition case, in which it was sought to have mauza Haibatpur partitioned among the descendants of Miran Shah in 1889. The pleader in that deposition on behalf of his client, the defendant-appellant Musammat Huseni Begam, in the clearest terms declared mauza Haibatpur to be endowed property, the income of which was applied to the mosque, the imambara and the “urs,” and that it was so applied by his client as mutawalli jointly with the other mutawallis. To the same effect is a petition, No. 75C of the record, filed in the same partition proceedings by Musammat Muhamdi, one of the defendants to this suit, now deceased. The genuineness of the petition is proved by the evidence of Muhammad Husen, son of Musammat Muhamdi. This petition is much to the same effect as the deposition just mentioned above. It states that mauza Haibatpur is endowed property, and that it was granted muafi in 1840 to Miran Shah for charitable purposes. No. 76C of the record is an attested copy of another deposition made by the pleader Sayyed Hasan in July 1889, on behalf of Musammat Huseni Begam in the partition case. This deposition emphasizes the pleader's former statement, and further makes mention of papers relating to the settlement of 1846, copies of which papers the witness produced to the official making the partition. The appellants have not attempted to produce any of the papers just mentioned, though, as they were produced by Musammat Huseni's pleader in 1889, it may be presumed she has possession of them now. There are further on record two petitions, Nos. 78C and 79C, dated the 21st of January and 24th of February 1890, filed by Sayyed Asghar Hasan (one of the defendants-appellants) before the revenue authorities in mutation of names proceedings, in both of which he asserts that [54] mauza Haibatpur is an endowed village, the revenue of which is devoted to the mosque, imambara, urs of Ghaus Azarn and support of the mutawallis. In No. 780 it is alleged that the wajibniarz (record No. 18C) was prepared as proof of those facts. The documentary evidence detailed above establishes in our opinion a very strong case in favour of the plaintiff respondent.
The defendants appellants did not produce any documentary evidence. They have contended themselves with calling four witnesses, three of whom are worthless, while the deposition of the fourth, Intizam Ali, is more favourable to the respondent's case than to the appellants'.
The respondent has called three witnesses, Kazi Imam Ali, Sheikh Wilayat Ali and Masiat-ullah, all of whom were acquainted with Miran Shah. Their evidence most strongly supports the respondent's case, showing as it does that Miran Shah himself built the mosque and imambara and expressed his intention of dedicating the income of Haibatpur to their support. One of the witnesses professes to know of, and to have, been present at, the execution of the waqf by Miran Shah. Two of them also speak of how the descendants of Miran Shah have now discontinued the charities and demolished the buildings.
Having now discussed all the material evidence in the case, it appears to us that there is a great mass of evidence in favour of the plaintiff which the appellants have in no way attempted to rebut. We have no hesitation in finding, concurring therein with the Court below, that Miran Shah did before his death dedicate mauza Haibatpur as a waqf for the religious and charitable institutions mentioned in the plaint, which he had established, the mosque, the imambara, the “urs” of Ghaus Azam, &c. We find that mauza Haibatpur devolved on the daughters of Miran Shah and on their descendants in trust for the performance of the religious and charitable purposes to which Miran Shah had dedicated the village. We concur with the lower Court in holding that the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration he has obtained as [55] to mauza Haibatpur being waqf property, and in the finding that the defendants are in possession as trustees of the waqf and have no proprietary rights in Haibatpur. We find that the trustees have grossly violated their duties as such, that they have failed to apply any portion of the income of the village to the purposes of the trust, that they have appropriated the income to their own private purposes and that they have dilapidated and dismantled the buildings constructed by Miran Shah, and have put into their own pockets the value of the materials of the imambara. We further find that they have wrongfully alienated portions of the endowed property and that they have denied that they are trustees and claim to be proprietors of Haibatpur in their own right. Such trustees should not in our opinion be permitted to remain any longer in possession of the trust property. We therefore direct their removal and chat possession of the trust property be transferred to the mutawalli who has been nominated by the learned District Judge. We may add that, as no observations were addressed to us on either side either for or against the scheme for the administration of the trust prepared by the District Judge, we refrain from making any remarks as to it. The only questions argued before us are those which we have discussed in this judgment. We dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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