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Anwari Begam v. Nizam-Ud-Din Shah
Judgment Summary — Blair and Aikman, JJ.
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal arises from a suit brought by Nizam-ud-din, a minor represented by his mother and certified guardian, to set aside a deed of gift executed by his grandfather Ghulam Jilani in favour of Anwari Begam (the appellant), and to recover possession of one-half of the property covered by that deed. Mesne profits were also claimed. Two transferees of separate portions of the property from the donee were made defendants; one of these transferees, Behari Lal, filed a separate appeal and the other (a mortgagee) did not appeal.
The deed of gift was executed on 21 October 1891 and registered on 22 October 1891. The deed recited that Ghulam Jilani was elderly and feeble and that, by reason of the death of his three grown-up sons, he had become dejected; it purported to transfer various properties (shares in villages Pingri and Basaiya and certain house property in the city of Agra) to his daughter Anwari Begam, and to put her in possession. The deed provided for an annual maintenance payment of 120 rupees to the donor, enforceable through the court if unpaid.
The donor died on 31 August 1892, about ten months after execution of the deed. Absent the deed, the property would, it was admitted, have devolved equally between the grandson (plaintiff) and the daughter (defendant). The Subordinate Judge decreed the plaintiff's claim on grounds of fact and law; the appellant challenged those findings on appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the donor, Ghulam Jilani, was of disposing mind at the date of executing the deed and whether the deed was executed under undue influence.
- Whether, with respect to each of the properties purportedly given (share in Pingri village, share in Basaiya village, and house property in Agra), possession had in fact and in law been given to and accepted by the donee so as to make the gift valid under Muhammadan law.
- Whether a gift under Muhammadan law can be validly made of property not in the donor's actual possession at the time of the gift (including rights subject to attachment by the Collector or in possession of mortgagees or lessees).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Subordinate Judge's factual findings were challenged: specifically, that the donor was not of a disposing mind and that the gift was obtained by undue influence.
- It was argued (as part of a mixed fact-and-law contention) that possession had not been given to and accepted by Anwari Begam in the donor's lifetime in respect of the properties; the Subordinate Judge had found non-delivery of possession.
Respondent's Arguments
- It was contended that under Muhammadan law a gift could not be made of a share in a village held under attachment by the Collector (the Pingri share), because the donor had no possession of that property at the time.
- The respondent relied on documentary evidence (plaints and decrees for rent in the donor's name, receipts for revenue paid in the donor's name, and a plaint by the donor in April 1892 claiming ownership and possession of certain house property) to show that the donor continued to exercise ownership and possession and thus that the gift had not been effectuated in the donor's lifetime.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent / Authority | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Grady's (Hamilton's) Hedaya (ed. 1870) | Definition of hiba/gift: "donation of a thing from which the donee may derive a benefit" and "transfer of property made immediately and without any exchange." | Used to show that the term "property" in the definition is broad and does not exclude reversionary rights; supports proposition that a gift can cover rights from which the donee may derive benefit. |
| Baillie's Digest of Muhammadan Law | Definition of gift as "the conferring of a right of property in something specific without any exchange"; reference (p.31) that a gift may be made of a debt. | Adopted to show that "property" is not confined to physical corpus and that rights (including debts and rights to receive allowances) may be gifted. |
| Ameer Ali, Muhammadan Law (Vol. I, 2nd ed.) | Statement that anything over which dominion or the right of property may be exercised or reduced to possession or existing as an enforceable right may form subject of gift; also comment that mortgagor may grant equity of redemption. | Relied on to affirm that rights short of actual corpus (e.g., rights enforceable or reversionary rights) can be gifted and that no solid Hanafi rule prevents transferring equity of redemption. |
| Mullick Abdool Guffoor v. Muleka | Authority for upholding a gift of malikana rights (right to receive an annual allowance). | Referenced to support the proposition that non-corporeal property rights can be the subject of valid gifts under Muhammadan law. |
| Mahomed Buksh Khan v. Hosseini Bibi (Privy Council) | Held that a gift of property not in donor's possession could be valid where the donor had done all to perfect the gift with publicity and the donee afterwards obtained possession. | Applied to the facts where donor could not give actual possession (attachment) but had taken all practicable steps and the donee thereafter obtained possession; supported validity of the gift to Pingri share. |
| Mohinudin v. Manchershah (Bombay High Court) | Two judges held that an owner whose property was in possession of a mortgagee could not make a gift of it (Kemhall, J. dissented). | Cited by the court but criticized: the judgment was treated as possibly carrying the rule of seisin "too far" and not determinative against gifting rights held by mortgagee or lessee. |
| Rahim Baksh v. Muhammad Hasan | Contains Mahmood, J.'s remark that Mohinudin may carry the rule as to seisin too far. | Used to show judicial criticism of the restrictive view in Mohinudin and to support the court's reluctance to adopt an absolute bar to gifting rights in possession of mortgagees. |
| Muhammad Mumtaz Ahmad v. Zubaida Jan (Privy Council) | Observations on weight to be attached to mutation orders and Revenue Court findings—mutation shows no objection and the patwari's report and tahsildar's adoption are material. | Relied upon to give weight to mutation and revenue records and to counter respondent's reliance on suits and receipts made before mutation as evidence that the donor remained in possession. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in two main stages corresponding to the principal contentions raised on appeal.
1. Mental capacity and undue influence
The court considered the Subordinate Judge's finding that the donor lacked a "disposing mind" and that the gift was executed under undue influence. After reviewing the evidence (the opinion notes that this part of the judgment was discussed earlier), the court concluded there was no evidence of mental incapacity or undue influence. The appeal did not succeed on this first branch.
2. Delivery of possession and the validity of the gift under Muhammadan law
The court addressed whether possession had been given to and accepted by the donee in respect of each of the three categories of property mentioned in the deed.
Share in Pingri (held under attachment by the Collector)
- The court noted that although the share in Pingri was under attachment by the Collector (s.154 of Act No. XIX of 1873) and in the Collector's possession for arrears of revenue, ownership had not passed from the donor; the donor could redeem by paying arrears and could not be kept out beyond the statutory maximum period.
- Relying on authoritative definitions of hiba (Hamilton's Hedaya, Baillie's Digest, Ameer Ali), the court held there is nothing in Muhammadan law to preclude a gift of a reversionary or other enforceable right; property is to be understood broadly.
- The court rejected respondent's attempt to distinguish between rights held by lessees or usufructuary mortgagees and rights held under attachment, seeing no sound legal principle to sustain such a distinction.
- Factually, within a fortnight of the gift the donor swore before the Assistant Collector that he had transferred his share in Pingri to Anwari Begam and had put her in possession; following the usual proclamation and inquiry, the donor's name was removed and the donee's name entered in government records as proprietor in January 1892.
- The court found that, insofar as the donor could transfer possession, he took the necessary steps and the donee in fact took his place; the gift to the Pingri share was therefore effective.
Share in Basaiya
- The respondent stressed delay in mutation (mutation of names for Basaiya was not taken until 14 April 1892). The court observed, however, that mutation proceedings were initiated at the donor's instance expressly to give effect to the gift and were completed in his lifetime.
- The court held that where possession is transferred pursuant to a deed of gift already executed, delay in mutation is immaterial; Revenue Court decisions and mutation orders are important as evidence of transfer and adoption by revenue authorities.
- The respondent relied on plaints and decrees in the donor's name for rent (filed 1 February 1892) and revenue receipts to show the donor continued to act as owner. The court considered these alongside Privy Council guidance (Muhammad Mumtaz Ahmad v. Zubaida Jan) and concluded this evidence did not negate abandonment by the donor.
- Positive evidence supporting donee's possession included entries in a deceased patwari's diary (produced by successor), dated 28 June 1892, showing the donee's agent exercising proprietary rights prior to the donor's death, and leases granted by the donee's agent. The court attached great weight to these entries and found transfer of possession in the donor's lifetime.
House property in Agra
- The respondent pointed to a suit brought by the donor on 19 April 1892 claiming ownership and possession of property. The court examined the descriptions, metes and bounds, and a map, and found the respondent failed to identify that property as any part of the property covered by the deed of gift.
- The respondent produced a tenant witness and endorsements on the lease purporting to show rent receipts in the donor's name; there were discrepancies between oral testimony and endorsements. The court declined to find forgery or concoction: if falsified, the receipts would likely have been signed by someone on behalf of the lessor or made to accord with the witness's story. The court therefore found the gift of the house property to be valid for lack of possession by the appellant.
Overall legal synthesis
The court synthesized the legal authorities to conclude that Muhammadan law does require transfer of possession "so far as is possible" by the donor, but this requirement does not rigidly forbid gifts of enforceable rights or rights not in the donor's khas (actual) possession. Where the donor has taken all practicable steps to divest himself and to put the donee in his shoes (including formal statements to revenue authorities and the initiation/completion of mutation proceedings in the donor's lifetime), the gift can be valid even if the corpus was at that time under attachment or in the hands of third parties.
Holding and Implications
Core ruling: The appeal is allowed; the decree of the Subordinate Judge is set aside; the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs; the appellant is awarded her costs of the appeal. (The judgment records "Appeal decreed.")
Implications:
- Direct effect: The plaintiff's claim to set aside the deed of gift and to recover possession of one-half of the property (plus mesne profits) is dismissed; the deed of gift to Anwari Begam is upheld as valid in respect of the properties in question under the facts before the court.
- The court's reasoning clarifies that under Muhammadan law a gift may be validly made of rights or reversionary interests not in the donor's actual possession, provided the donor divests himself as far as possible and takes the practicable steps to transfer the benefits and possession that he can. Mutation and revenue records, along with acts of the donee or her agent indicating exercise of proprietary rights, are important evidentiary indicators of effective transfer.
- The opinion does not purport to announce a novel legal doctrine beyond applying established authorities to the facts; the judgment resolves the competing factual inferences and applies existing statements of principle from recognized authorities and precedents to the present case.
This summary is compiled strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No facts or legal propositions beyond those appearing in the opinion have been added.
Blair and Aikman, JJ.:— This is an appeal arising out of a suit broug ht by Nizam-ud-dic, a minor, through his mother and certified guardian, to set aside a deed of gift which was executed by Ghulam Jilani, the grandfather of the minor, in favour of the appellant Anwar Begam, daughter of Ghulam Jilani, and to recover possession of one-half of the property covered by the deed, of which, it is said, the donee assumed possession on Ghulam Jilani's death. Mesne profits are also claimed. Two transferees of separate portions of the property from the donee are made defendants to the suit. One of these, Behari Lal who purchased a portion of the property from Anwari Begam, has filed a separate appeal. The other transferee defendant was a mortgagee of another part of the property and has not appealed.
The deed, which it was sought to set aside, was executed by Ghulam Jilani on the 21st of October, 1891, and was registered by him at the office of the Sub-Registrar of Agra on the following day. The deed is printed at page 18 of the appellant's book. In it the executant sets forth that he is the absolute owner of certain property detailed in the deed, situated in the city of Agra and in certain villages of the Agra district; that he is about seventy years of age and has now become feeble and weak, and [167] that owing to the death of his three grown-up sons he has become much dejected, and that there is no certainty of this precarious life.” The deed goes on:— Therefore I have of my free will and without any coercion or compulsion, while in a sound state of body and mind, made a gift of the whole of my property detailed below to my daughter, Anwari Begam, and put the donee in possession of the whole of the aforesaid property. I have removed and severed my possession and proprietary connection from the said property.” The deed goes on to provide that the donee shall pay the executant one hundred and twenty rupees annually for his maintenance, either in monthly or half-yearly instalments as may be convenient to the parties. Failing payment of this annual amount the donor is empowered to recover it through the Court. The property conveyed by the deed consists of a sharo in the village of Basaiya, in the Agra district, a share in the village of Pingri, in the Muttra district, and certain house property in the city of Agra. As stated above, the deed was executed on the 21st of October, 1891. The donor died on the 31st of August, 1892, that is upwards of ten months after the execution of the deed. Ghulam Jilani's three sons had died in their father's lifetime. Only one of them had left issue, namely, the present plaintiff. It is admitted that, failing the deed of gift, Ghulam Jilani's property would on his death have been divided equally between his grandson, the plaintiff, and his daughter, the defendant. The learned Subordinate Judge has decreed the plaintiff's claim upon grounds both of fact and law, which are impugned in this appeal. The argument urged upon us on behalf of the appellant divides itself into two main branches. The first disputes the conclusions of fact arrived at by the learned Subordinate Judge, that the donor was not of “disposing mind” at the date of executing the deed, and that he executed it under “undue influence.” The second branch of the argument is a mixed one of fact and law. The Subordinate Judge has found that, as a matter of fact, possession had not in the lifetime of the donor been given to, and accepted [168] by, Anwari Begam of the properties purporting to be conveyed to her in the deed of gift.
[After discussing the first of the contentions mentioned above and coming to the conclusion that there was no evidence of mental incapacity or undue influence, the judgment thus continued:—]
We come now to the second branch of the argument which impeaches the finding of the Subordinate Judge upon the question whether, in relation to the several properties purporting to be given by the deed, possession had or had not, in fact and law, been given to the donee. The property conveyed by the deed of gift consisted in the first place of shares in two villages, namely, Pingri in the Muttra district and Basaiya, in the Agra district. The property in the village of Pingri was, prior to and at the date of the deed of gift, and, for all we know, during the remainder of the lifetime of the donor held under attachment by the Collector of the district for arrears of revenue under s. 154 of Act No. XIX of 1873. Upon that ground it was contended that the donor had himself no possession of this property, and was therefore, according to Muhammadan law, incapable of making a valid gift of it. The share in Pingri being thus in the hands of the Collector it was possible and legal for him, if the arrears had not up to that time been cleared by the usufruct, to retain possession of it for the maximum period of five years, from the 1st of July next after the attachment—vide s. 156 of Act No. XIX of 1873. It is clear that, although the donor had not actual possession, the ownership of the village had not passed away from him. It was open to him at any period to pay off the arrears and regain absolute possession of the property, and in any case he could not be kept out of possession for a longer period than five years. It was strenuously argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that under the Muhammadan law a gift could not be made of a share in a village which was the subject of such attachment. The decision of this point brings us to the consideration of the question, what property can form the subject of a gift according to [169] Muhammadan law? In Grady's Hamilton's Hedaya, a work of considerable, but not infallible, authority on Muhammadan law, we find, at page 482 of the edition of 1870, the following definition under the title of hiba or gift:— “Hiba in its literal sense signifies the donation of a thing from which the donee may derive a benefit. In the language of the law it means a transfer of property made immediately and without any exchange.” Again, in Baillie's Digest of Muhammadan Law, second edition, page 515, gift is defined as “the conferring of a right of property in something specific without any exchange.” It is to be noted here that the word property is used by these two authorities without any limitation and is conterminous with what, according to the definition which is given of hiba in its literal sense, may form the subject of a gift, namely, something from which the donee may derive a benefit. There is nothing, therefore, in that definition to show that a Muhammadan cannot make a valid donation of a reversionary right. In Volume I of Ameer Ali's Muhammadan Law, second edition, page 58, it is said by that learned writer that “anything over which the dominion or the right of property may be exercised, or anything which can be reduced to possession, or which exists as a specific entity, or as an enforceable right, or anything in fact which comes within the meaning of the word mal, may form the subject of a gift.” It was admitted in argument that property can, under the Muhammadan law, be validly conferred by gift, though it be not in the actual, or what is known as khas, possession of the donor, as, for instance, a share in a village in the occupation of tenants or held in farm by a lessee. It was not, however, admitted that property in the possession of a usufructuary mortgagee was capable of such donation. We fail entirely to understand how any distinction can be drawn between the case of a lessee and of a usufructuary mortgagee. It is equally difficult to detect any legal principle upon which a right to property held under attachment by the Collector differs from a right to property held by a lessee or usufructuary mortgagee.
[170] From page 31 of Baillie's Digest it appears that a valid gift: may be made of a debt in favour of a person other than the debtor. In the case of Mullick Abdool Guffoor v. Muleka a gift of malikana rights, i.e, the right to receive an annual allowance, was upheld. In the case of Mahomed Buksh Khan v. Hosseini Bibi the Privy Council upheld a gift of property which was not at the time of the gift in the donor's possession. It was held in that case that as the donor “had done all that she could to perfect a complete gift which was attended with complete publicity, and as the donee had afterwards obtained possession, the fact that the donor had been out of possession and therefore had not delivered possession did not of itself invalidate the gift in favour of the respondent.” There is a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mohinudin v. Manchershah, in which two Judges held that the owner of property which was in the possession of a mortgagee could not, under the Muhammadan law, make a gift of it. Kemhall, J., dissented from this view. With reference to this case it was remarked by Mahmood, J., in the case of Rahim Baksh v. Muhammad Hasan: —“I may respectfully say that it probably carries the rule as to seisin too far.” Mr. Ameer Ali, at page 61 of the aforesaid volume, says, with reference to the case of Mohinudin v. Manchershah:— “The view taken by the majority of the Judges is founded upon an erroneous impression of Hanafi law, under which seisin is requisite for hypothecation. According to the correct view of the Hanafi doctrine on the subject, there is nothing to preclude the mortgagor from granting his equity of redemption to another.”
There is no doubt that the principle of Muhammadan law is that possession is necessary to make a good gift, but the question is, possession of what? If a donor does not transfer to the donee, so far as he can, all the possession which he can transfer, the gift is not a good one. As we have said above, there is, in our [171] judgment, nothing in the Muhammadan law to prevent the gift of a right to property. The donor must, so far as it is possible for him, transfer to the donee that which be gives, namely, such rights as he himself has; but this does not imply that where a right to property forms the subject of a gift, the gift will be invalid unless the donor transfers, what he himself does not possess, namely, the corpus of the property. He must evidence the reality of the gift by divesting himself, so far as he can, of the whole of what he gives. Now as to the village Piogri, we find that within a fortnight after the gift the donor went to Muttra, in which district the village of Pingri is situated, and stated on oath before the Assistant Collector as follows:—“I have transferred my share in the village Pingri to Musammat Anwari Begam, under a deed of gift dated the 21st of October, 1891, and have put her in possession of the said property like myself. I wish that by removal of the name of me, the donor, the name of the donee may be entered in the Government papers.” The usual proclamation and inquiry followed, and it is admitted that in January, 1892, the donor's name was removed and the donee's name entered in the Government records as proprietor of the share in Pingri. The donor could not give actual possession of, the share, as it was at the time held under attachment by the Collector. But it appears to us that, so far as he could, he took the steps necessary to put Anwari Begam in his shoes, and she, in point of fact, took his place.
We now come to consider the case as it relates to the giving of possession of the share in the village Basaiya. The learned counsel for the respondent laid stress upon the fact that proceedings were not taken to obtain mutation of names in respect of this share until the 14th of April, 1892. The fact, however, remains that those proceedings were taken at the instance of the donor, and in order expressly to give effect to his gift, and were completed in his lifetime. We consider that where possession is transferred by a donor to a donee in pursuance of the deed of gift previously executed, the provisions of the Muhammadan law are [172] satisfied and delay is immaterial. The delay which took place was explained by the learned counsel for the appellant as to some extent referable to the fact that the deed of gift had been filed in the Muttra proceedings which did not terminate until January 1892, and there was consequently a delay in getting the document from that district for the initiation of proceedings in relation to the village in the Agra district. It is not to be forgotten that the decision of the Revenue Court in mutation proceedings is based upon a transfer of possession effected before mutation takes place. Upon, the weight to be attached to the decision of the Revenue Courts in such proceedings, the following observations of the Privy Council in the case of Muhammad Mumtaz Ahmad v. Zubaida Jan, may be quoted:— “But the order for mutation is important as showing that no objection was made to the mutation, and that the report of the patwari, made during the lifetime of Zahur, as to the execution of the deed of gift and of the transfer of possession under it, which had been adopted by the tahsildar, was also adopted and acted upon by the Deputy Collector.”
We will now consider the documentary evidence relied on by the plaintiff as showing that, notwithstanding the deed of gift and the assertions contained in it as to the donor having put the donee in possession of the property, the donor himself continued in possession, exercising all the rights of ownership. In the first place copies are filed of plaints and decrees in suits brought by Ghulam Jilani against tenants in the village of Basaiya for arrears of rent. All these plaints were filed on the 1st of February, 1892, and were for the recovery of the arrears of rent for the kharif instalment of the year 1299 F. In them the cause of action is described as arising on dates ranging from the first to the 10th of November, that is, by far the major portion of the rent had accrued before the date of execution of the deed of gift. We note also that in all the plaints Ghulam Jilani describes himself, not as zamindar but as lambardar, and we have no [173] information as to the date upon which he ceased to be lambardar. Another circumstance is, that all these suits were instituted before the mutation of names had been made, at a time when Ghulam Jilani's name still appeared in the revenue record. The same observation applies to certain ejectment proceedings taken by Ghulam Jilani against tenants in Basaiya. In this connection we may quote another passage from the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Muhammad Mumtaz Ahmad v. Zubaida Jan, referred to above, most of the incidents of which bear a remarkable resemblance to those of the case now before us. At page 477 of the judgment their Lordships say:— “The reasons of the Subordinate Judge in support of his finding that the donee died before she obtained possession are weak and unavailing. First, he relies upon five decrees in suits brought in the name of Himayat Fatima for rent which accrued after the date of the deed of gift, and also upon one payment of revenue made in her name on the 26th November 1879, but the suits were commenced and the revenue paid before the mutation of names in the Collector's office, at a time when actions for rent and payment of revenue would in all probability be brought and made in the name of the person entered as the proprietor in the Collector's book.” In this case also two receipts for revenue paid in the name of Ghulam Jilani are relied on. One of these for Rs. 200 is dated the 4th of May, 1892. The sum purports be have been received from Ghulam Jilani as lambardar and on account of the rabi instalment of 1291F. At the time of that payment Ghulam Jilani's name stood in the Government books as the proprietor of the share and also as lambardar. The second receipt is dated the 18th of July, 1892, and is for Rs. 24-14-3. The money purports to have been received from Ghulam Jilani, lambardar, on account of revenue; miscellaneous items. At the date of this payment mutation proceedings had terminated, Auwari Begam's name having been substituted for Ghulam Jilani's on the 23rd of June 1892; but the receipt does not show on account of what instalment the money was paid, and from the amount of the payment and its date we have little [174] doubt that it was on account of a balance due in respect of some instalment previous to the mutation of names.
Applying the criticisms of the Privy Council in the above case, we think that the above evidence does not negative the abandonment by the donor to the donee of his possession in the village of Basaiya. As to the positive evidence to prove the donee's possession of the above share in the lifetime of the donor, we attach great weight to entries in the diary of a deceased patwari, produced by his successor, one of which is dated the 28th of June, 1892. These show that the agent of the donee was on her behalf exercising proprietary rights in the village prior to the decease of the donor.
The above entries strongly corroborate the genuineness of certain leases granted by the donee's agent, on which doubts have been thrown —it appears to us on insufficient grounds—by the lower Court. We have examined these documents and are unable to agree with the opinion expressed by the learned Subordinate Judge regarding them. We find that transfer of possession of the share in Basaiya did take place in the donor's lifetime.
The third property, the subject of the deed of gift, is the house property in the city of Agra. It is contended on behalf of the respondent that a part of the property purporting to be conveyed by the deed of gift had been the subject of a suit brought by Ghulam Jilani upon the 19th of April, 1892, in which he claimed to be the owner in possession of the property sued for. We have examined all details and descriptions by metes and bounds, and a map of the house property in question, and the respondent has failed to satisfy us as to the identity of the property sued for in the plaint above mentioned with any part of the property covered by the deed of gift. A tenant of this property was called as a witness and a number of endorsements upon the back of the lease to this tenant, purporting to be acknowledgments of receipts by the lessor of rent from him, were relied on. It is contended, and is no doubt true, that the oral statements made by the witness do not correspond therewith in relation to the amounts [175] due and payable by him in respect of this house property. We think there is possibly an explanation of the discrepancy, but we find it unnecessary to arrive at a conclusion upon that matter. In our opinion, if the receipts for rent had been forgeries or interpolations for the purposes of this case, they would have purported to be signed by some person on behalf of the lessor. We are also satisfied that if the story of the witness had been a concocted story, it would have been made to coincide accurately with the documentary evidence in possession of the party who called him. We therefore find that the gift of the house property is not invalid for lack of possession by the appellant here. The result is that the appeal is allowed, the decree of the lower Court is set aside, and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs. The appellant will have her costs of this appeal.
Appeal decreed.
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