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Queen-Empress v. Bisheshar And Others

Allahabad High Court
May 16, 1887
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants were convicted on 22nd January by the Sessions Judge of Gorakhpur under sections 147 (riot) and 325 (voluntarily causing grievous hurt) of the Indian Penal Code. Harnath Pande received two years imprisonment for the riot and three years for causing grievous hurt, while Mangan was sentenced to one year for the riot and five years for causing grievous hurt, with sentences for grievous hurt to commence after the riot sentences. The incident involved Mr. Turner, who was seriously injured during a riot on 26th October 1886. Mr. Turner, acting as an agent for Nath Bakhsh Singh, was collecting rents when a group led by Harnath Pande attacked him with lathis, causing grievous hurt. The appellants were identified as participants in the riot and responsible for the injury inflicted on Mr. Turner. The appellants challenged the legality of the sentences based on section 71 of the Indian Penal Code as amended, and contended some were not present or parties to the offence. The court considered the construction of sections 71, 149, and 325 of the Indian Penal Code in determining the legality of the sentences.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sentences imposed on the appellants under sections 147 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code were legal, particularly in light of section 71 as amended by Act VIII of 1882.
  2. The proper interpretation and application of section 71 of the Indian Penal Code regarding punishment for offences composed of multiple parts.
  3. The role and effect of section 149 in establishing liability of members of an unlawful assembly for offences committed in prosecution of the common object.
  4. Whether an accused can be sentenced for both riot and voluntarily causing grievous hurt when the offences arise from the same incident.
  5. The extent to which precedent cases, including Queen-Empress v. Ram Sarup, affect the legality of multiple sentences for related offences.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • It was contended that some appellants (Dubri, Bisheshar, Lalsa, Sarjn, Amir Khan, and Mathura) were not present or parties to the riot or the grievous hurt inflicted on Mr. Turner.
  • Reliance was placed on section 71 of the Indian Penal Code as amended, arguing that the sentences were illegal because an offender should not be punished for more than one offence if the offences constitute parts of a whole.
  • It was also argued that the sentences passed were too severe.

Court's Arguments (Respondent's Position)

  • The riot did take place, and all appellants were parties to it, with alibis for some being considered worthless.
  • The common object of the unlawful assembly was to prevent Mr. Turner from collecting rents and to use violence, which was effected.
  • The appellants were properly convicted under sections 147 and 325, and the sentences were not too severe.
  • The legal construction of section 71 as amended does not prohibit sentencing for both riot and causing grievous hurt in this case.
  • Section 149 does not create a substantive offence but is declaratory of common law principles regarding joint liability in unlawful assemblies.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Queen Empress v. Ram Partab Interpretation of section 71 of the IPC regarding punishment for multiple offences. Considered respectfully but court expressed doubt about its applicability to this case.
Queen v. Bubbee-Oollah Whether a person can be punished for riot and also for grievous hurt caused during the riot. Used to illustrate that the person who inflicted the first blow may not be punished for both offences, but others may be.
Loke Nath Sarkar v. Queen-Empress Clarification on whether causing hurt constituted the entire riot. Supported the view that if rioting preceded the hurt, separate punishments may be valid.
Queen-Empress v. Dungar Singh Legality of passing sentences for riot and for voluntarily causing grievous hurt. Supports the view that both sentences can be legally passed.
Queen-Empress v. Ram Sarup Similar to Dungar Singh, on joint liability and sentencing for riot and grievous hurt. Referenced with some doubt about the precise facts, but generally supports multiple sentences.
Queen-Empress v. Pershad Joint judgments supporting sentencing for both riot and grievous hurt. Supports legality of sentences passed in this case.
Chandra Kant Battacharjee v. Queen-Empress Judgment supporting the principle of multiple sentences for related offences. Supports the court’s conclusion on legality of sentences.
Reg v. Tukaya bin Tamana Relevant to the point of sentencing for offences committed as part of a common unlawful object. Used to support the court’s reasoning on multiple punishments.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the applicability of section 71 of the Indian Penal Code as amended, which limits punishment for offences composed of multiple parts. The court noted that the combined sentences did not exceed the maximum punishment allowed for the gravest offence (section 325). It distinguished between "punishment" and "sentence," emphasizing that the legislature did not intend to restrict sentencing to only one offence in such cases.

The court rejected the appellants’ contention that they could only be sentenced for one offence, reasoning that section 71 as amended does not apply to cases involving section 149, which relates to unlawful assemblies. Section 149 was held not to create a substantive offence but to declare principles of joint liability, similar to section 34.

The court explained that each member of the unlawful assembly is liable for offences committed in prosecution of the common object, even if only some directly inflicted grievous hurt. It considered English law analogies and prior Indian case law to reason that the riot and the grievous hurt were component parts of one transaction but could attract separate punishments.

The court further reasoned that if the offence under section 325 was committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly, members could be sentenced for both riot and grievous hurt without violating section 71. The court expressed doubt about the precedents cited by the appellants but ultimately found the sentences lawful and appropriate.

Justice Brodhurst concurred, affirming the legality of convictions and sentences and seeing no reason for interference.

Holding and Implications

The appeals are dismissed.

The court held that the sentences imposed for riot and voluntarily causing grievous hurt were legal and appropriate. It clarified the interpretation of section 71 as amended, confirming that multiple sentences can be imposed when offences are related but distinct, particularly in cases involving unlawful assemblies under section 149. The decision affirms that members of an unlawful assembly can be held liable for offences committed in prosecution of the common object and can be sentenced accordingly. No new precedent was established beyond clarifying existing legal principles, and the direct effect is the upholding of the convictions and sentences against the appellants.

Show all summary ...

Sir John Edge, C.J:— The appellants in this case were, on the 22nd January last, convicted by the Sessions Judge of Gorakhpur, under s. 147 of the Indian Penal Code, of a riot, and, under s. 325 of the same Code, of voluntarily causing grievous hurt to Mr. Turner.

Harnath Pande was sentenced to two years imprisonment for the riot and to three years for causing grievous hurt. Mangan was sentenced to one year's imprisonment for the riot and to five years for causing grievous hurt. The Judge directed that in each case the sentence for causing grievous hurt should commence on the expiration of the sentence for the riot.

It was not contended by Mr. Alston, who appeared for the appellants, that a riot had not in fact taken place. But it was contended by him as to Dubri, Bisheshar, Lalsa, Sarjn, Amir Khan, and Mathura, that they were not present, and were not parties to the riot or to the inflicting of the grievous hurt upon Mr. Turner. It was contended by Mr. Alston, as to all the appellants, that by reason of s. 71 of the Indian Penal Code, as amended by s. 4 of Act VIII of 1882, the sentences were in each case illegal. In support of this contention Mr. Alston relied upon the judgment of Mr. Justice Straight in the case of Queen Empress v. Ram Partab. Mr. Alston also contended that in any event the sentences in each case were too severe. Owing to the respect we entertain for the opinion of Mr. Justice Straight, we took time to consider our judgment. The riot, in the course of which Mr. Turner was seriously injured [647] took place on the 26th of October, 1886. It appears that Mr. Turner had previously been in the employment of Sant Baksh Singh, and had, in the course of his employment, collected rents for him. Prior to the 26th of October, 1886, Mr. Turner had transferred his services to Nath Bakhsh Singh, a brother of Sant Bakhsh Singh, and on the occasion in question had gone to Chota Bishenpura, as the agent of Nath Bakhsh Singh, to collect rents from the villagers, who appear to have open the tenants of Sant Bakhsh Singh and Nath Bakhsh Singh. Whilst Mr. Turner was endeavouring to collect the rents for his employer, Nath Bakhsh Singh a large body of men armed with lathis, at whose head was the appellant Harnath Pande on horseback, came to the village. Harnath Pande was the karinda of Sant Bakhsh Singh. Harnath Pande ordered Nath Bakhsh Singh to move away, saying, “Sant Bakhsh Singh's orders are to beat the Sahib, not you or your men.” Harnath Pande's party surrounded Mr. Turner, and the appellant Mangan and others struck Mr. Turner with their lathis on the head and body and thereby caused him grievous hurt. Mr. Turner ultimately succeeded in escaping with his life. It does not appear whether or not any of the other appellants actually struck Mr. Turner. I have no doubt that each of the appellants was a party to, and participated in, the riot. Each of them is, in my judgment, fully identified, and as to the alibis which were called for Dubri, Bisbeshar, Lalsa, Sarju, Amir Khan and Mathura, I consider them to have been worthless. In my opinion it was also clearly established that Maugan, committed an offence under s. 325 of the Indian Penal Code by voluntarily causing grievous hurt to Mr. Turner, and that each of the other appellants is as responsible for the committing of that offence as if it had been committed by his own hand. The common objects of that unlawful assembly were, in my opinion, to compel Mr. Turner to refrain from collecting the rents for his employer, and to use violence to him. These objects were effected. That the appellants could legally be tried for and convicted of the offences under ss. 147 and 325 is not questioned, nor can there be any doubt on the point. That the appellants were properly convicted, and that the sentences passed in each case were not too severe, I have equally no doubt. My only doubt on this point of the amount of the sentences is whether Harnath Pande ought not [643] to have received a more severe sentence than that passed upon him.

The question then remains, whether or not the sentences were legal. This depends on the true construction of s. 71 of the Indian Penal Code as amended by s. 4 of Act VIII of 1882, and upon the construction of ss. 149 and 325 of the same Code.

A person convicted under s. 325 of voluntarily causing grievous hurt may be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years. In none of the cases before us did the combined sentences exceed the term of imprisonment which the Judge might have awarded in each case for the offence under s. 325.

S. 71 as amended is as follows:—“When anything which is an offence, is made up of parts, any of which parts is itself an offence, the offender shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such of his offences unless it be so expressly provided.

“When anything is an offence falling within two or more definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, or when several acts, of which one or more would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute when combined a different offence, the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the Court which tries him could award for any one of such offences.”

If the second and third paragraphs of s. 71 as amended are the only portions of the section which apply in this case, it is clear that none of the appellants has been punished “with a more severe punishment” than the Court which tried him could have awarded for the offence under s. 325. Mangan's punishment was six years' imprisonment, made up of two sentences of five years and one year. The Judge could have awarded him seven years for the offence under s. 325.

Throughout s. 71 the word “punishment” and not the word “sentence” is used and, I assume, with an object. If the earlier part of s. 71, that is, the section as it stood before it was amended, applies to this case, the answer is that none of the appellants has been punished with the punishment of more than one of his offences-[649]; that is to say, the combined periods of imprisonment do not in any, of the cases exceed the maximum punishment which could have been awarded for the offence under s. 325. If it were intended by the Legislature that in cases coming within s. 71 as amended, a prisoner should be sentenced to punishment for one offence only, it would have been easy for the Legislature to have said so, and the section would then have not only the effect which I think it has, but also the effect which it was contended by Mr. Alston that it has.

If Mr. Alston's contention be well founded, I confess I do not see any adequate reason for the insertion of s. 235 in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, nor of the illustrations to that section. There would be little use in inquiring into and convicting an accused person of two offences, if, he could be legally sentenced for one only. In my opinion, which I express with diffidence, knowing that it is opposed to that of one of the most accomplished criminal lawyers on the Indian Bench—I refer to Mr. Justice Straight—s. 71 as amended does not apply to a case of this kind at all. Whether or not s. 71 as amended applies to this case, must depend upon the construction of s. 149 of the Indian Penal Code. Unless s. 149 creates an offence, it is obvious that s. 71 does not apply.

S. 149 appears to me to create no offence, but to be, like s. 34 of the same Code, merely declaratory of a principle of the common law, which at any rate in England has prevailed. In the present case no doubt, in order to convict the appellants, other than Mangan, of the offence under s. 325, it was necessary for the prosecution to give such evidence as entitled the Judge to find that there was an unlawful assembly; that some member of that unlawful assembly had voluntarily inflicted grievous hurt, within the meaning of s. 325, upon Mr. Turner, and that the offence was committed by such member of the unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or was such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, and that the accused were, at the time of the committing of that offence, members of the same assembly. When such facts were established, the commission of an offence under s. 325 was proved against the accused. It is true that one stop in the proof was [650] the evidence that the accused, at the time of the committing of the offence under s. 325, were members of an unlawful assembly. The offence under s. 325 is one, except as therein provided, of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, and not of voluntarily causing grievous hurt whilst the accused is a member of an unlawful assembly. The object of s. 149, as I think, in such a case as the present is to make it clear that an accused who comes within that section, cannot put forward as a defence that it was not his band which inflicted the grievous hurt. Take the case of Mangan, whose hand did, in fact, inflict grievous hurt upon Mr. Turner. In his case he was a member of the same unlawful assembly, and the offence committed by him was committed in the prosecution of the common object of that assembly, and was such as he and the other appellants knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. According to the judgment of the majority of this Court in the case of the Queen-Empress v. Ram Sarup if their judgment applies at all, Mangan could be legally sentenced to imprisonment for the riot and to imprisonment for inflicting grievous hurt on Mr. Turner. My reason for raising a doubt as to whether the judgment of the majority of the Court in that case applies is, that it does not clearly appear from the referring order, or from the judgment of the majority of the Court, that the case had to be regarded by the Court, or was in fact regarded by the majority as one in which it was proved that the grievous hurt had been caused in the prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly, or that the offence of causing grievous hurt was known by the members of that assembly to be likely to be committed in the prosecution of the common object. Nevertheless, if that case was not referred on the basis that the Court should assume that the grievous hurt was caused in the prosecution of the common object of an unlawful assembly, it is difficult to see why the case was referred at all; and certainly my brother Brodhurst in his judgment in that case appears to have dealt with the reference on that basis.

If five people, A, B, C, D and E, go out with the common object and intention of doing that which would constitute a riot, and of causing in the course of the riot grievous hurt to a particular person, and carry this intention into effect, but by chance [651] the grievous hurt is inflicted upon the particular person by the hands of one only of the five rioters—let me say by the hands of A—I fail to see upon what principle of law or common sense A should be liable to be sentenced for the riot, and also for causing the grievous hurt, whilst his equally guilty companions should be liable to be sentenced for one only of those offences. It may be said on the authority of the decision in the case of Queen v. Bubbee-Oollah that, in the case I have just put, A could not have been punished for the riot and also for causing grievous hurt. A passage in the judgment of Tottenham and Ghose, JJ., in the case of Loke Nath Sarkar v. Queen-Empress, would appear also to be an authority for that contention. The passage to which I refer is as follows:—“If it had been found that the causing of hurt was the force or violence which alone constituted the rioting in the present case, then we should be prepared to hold that the prisoner could not be punished both for causing hurt and for rioting. But the facts of the case do not warrant such a finding, for rioting was being committed before the hurts were inflicted.” If this be a correct view of the law, A, whose act of causing grievous hurt constituted in that event the offence of rioting, could not be punished for the riot and for the grievous hurt, but his companions B, C, D, and E, who subsequently in the course of the riot and in the prosecution of the common object of the same unlawful assembly, by their own hands, voluntarily caused grievous hurt to another person, might be punished for the same riot and for the grievous hurt caused by them. In other words, the person whose act converted what was an offence under s. 143 into the offence of rioting under s. 146, and whose hand it was that inflicted the first blow, would be liable to be sentenced for one offence only, whilst his not more guilty companions would be liable to be punished for two offences, although all of the offences were committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly, and were such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. If it be said that in such a case A might be sentenced for the riot, and also for the grievous hurt caused by B, C, D, and E, the answer is that is to suppose that the latter offense was not a component part of the offence [652] of the rioting, and that nothing but the first act of force or violence, plus the unlawful assembly, constituted the riot. In that event I should like to ask how long the riot continued, and whether each subsequent act of force or violence constituted a fresh offence of rioting, and if it did, whether A, B, C, D, and E could, under such circumstances, be punished for more than one offence of rioting, or for the riot completed by the grievous hurt caused by A, and for the offence under s. 325 committed by B, C, D, and E, in prosecution of the common object of the same unlawful assembly, which by itself, plus the unlawful assembly, would have been sufficient to constitute a riot. In my humble opinion, the violence of A and that of B, C, D, and E were component parts of one and the same riot. It might be contended that, although A, B, C, D and E could not in a case like the present be sentenced for rioting and also for causing grievous hurt, they might each, or any of them, be sentenced for having been members of an unlawful assembly and also for the causing of the grievous hurt. Such sentences would, in the present case, be based upon findings inconsistent with each other and with the facts, and inconsistent also, as I think, with the law, unless the Judge were entitled to split up the transaction and find the appellants guilty of the offence of having been members of an unlawful assembly up to S. 9 o'clock in the morning, when the offence of unlawful assembly merge by the violence into that of riot. In such a case, would it have been competent for the Judge to have sentenced the appellants for having been members of an unlawful assembly and also for the roit? A component part of the riot was the same unlawful assembly and if s. 149 does create an offence, the same unlawful assembly was a component part of the offence of grievous hurt, so far as B, C, D and E are concerned, and in the case of A,—Mangan—the evidence showed that he had caused the grievous hurt whilst he was a member of the unlawful assembly, and in the prosecution of the common object of that assembly. As I have said, s. 149 does not, in my opinion, create an offence: it is merely declaratory of the law, and I should think the Courts in India would so have interpreted the law, even if s. 149 had not been in the Code. The section which relates to dacoity with murder—s. 396 of the Indian Penal Code—is, I thick, an example of a section [653] which does create a substantive and distinct offence. The difference in principle between s. 149 and s. 396 is apparent. Under s. 396 all persons who are conjointly committing dacoity are equally responsible, whether the murder was or was not committed in the prosecution of the common object, and even if they did not, in fact, know that it was likely that murder would be committed in the committing of the dacoity.

It appears to me that in the case of the other appellants the riot was no more part of the offence under s. 325 than it was in the case of Mangan. To take an illustration from the law in England, if these appellants had been convicted in England of, and sentenced for, the offence of unlawful wounding under circumstances similar to those in the present case, and were subsequently indicted for the riot, no one would, I think, suggest that they could plead the previous conviction as a bar, and for the reason that the offences were not the same, and they could not have been convicted of the riot on the indictment which charged them with the unlawful wounding. If they could not plead the previous conviction as a bar, they would be liable to be convicted and sentenced for the riot, although they had been previously convicted and sentenced for the unlawful wounding. But no doubt the previous sentence would be taken into account.

To constitute a riot according to the law in England, there must be an assembly together of three or more persons, and their assembling must be accompanied with some such circumstances, either of actual force or violence, or at least of an apparent tendency thereto, as are calculated to inspire people with terror. It is sufficient if any one of the Queen's subjects be in fact terrified. (Archbold's Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases, 20th ed., page 956.) As illustrating the Law of England on this point, I may quote the following passage from Archbold's Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases, 20th ed., page 148:—

“An acquittal upon an indictment for burglary and larceny may be pleaded to an indictment for larceny of the same goods, because upon the former indictment the defendant might have been convicted of the larceny. Bat if the first indictment were for a burglary with intent to commit a larceny, and did not charge an [654] actual larceny, an acquittal on it would not be a bar to a subsequent indictment for the larceny—2 Hale 245, B. v. Vandercomb, because the defendant could not have been convicted of the larceny on the first indictment. An acquittal upon an indictment for murder may be pleaded in bar of another indictment for manslaughter—Fost. 392; 2 Hale 46—because the defendant might be convicted of manslaughter upon the first indictment. So an acquittal upon an indictment for manslaughter is, it seems, a bar to an indictment for murder—Fost. 229; 3 Co. 466; Holcroft's case; 1 Stark. 305; B. v. Tancock. So now also a person cannot, after being acquitted on an indictment for felony, be indicted for an attempt to commit it, for he might have been convicted for the attempt on the previous indictment for the felony—14 and 15 Vic, c. 100, s. 9. So also a person indicted and acquitted on an indictment for robbery cannot afterwards be indicted for an assault with intent to commit it—ss. 24 and 25 Vic., c. 96, s. 41; a person indicted and acquitted for a misdemeanour, which upon the trial appears to be a felony, cannot afterwards be indicted for the felony—14 and 15 Vic, c. 100, s. 12; a person indicted and acquitted for embezzlement, cannot afterwards be indicted as for a larceny, or, if tried and acquitted for a larceny, cannot afterwards be indicted as for embezzlement upon evidence of the same facts—24 and 25 Vic, c. 96, s. 72; B. v. Gorbutt.

S. 71 would, in my opinion, apply, for instance, to a case in which a man in committing a theft voluntarily caused hurt to any person. In that case one component part of the offence of the robbery would be the offence of the theft.

The judgment of my brother Brodhurst in the case of Queen-Empress v. Dungar Singh, the judgment in the case of Queen-Empress v. Ram Sarup, the judgments of Oldfield, Brodhurst, Duthoit and Mahmood, JJ., in the case of Queen-Empress v. Pershad, and the judgment of Mitter and Beverley, JJ., in Chandra Kant Battacharjee v. Queen-Empress, support the view that in such a case as this a sentence for riot and a sentence for voluntarily causing grievous hurt can be legally [655] passed. The judgment in the case of Reg v. Tukaya bin Tamana(9) has a bearing on this point.

I am of opinion that the sentences in this case were legal, and that these appeals should be dismissed.

Brodhurst, J.:— The facts and the law applicable to the case have been fully stated by the learned Chief Justice, and I have, on previous occasions, expressed my own views on the legal points that have again arisen. Under these circumstances, it is, I think, sufficient for me to observe that the convictions are supported by the evidence for the prosecution; that the sentences that have been passed are, in my opinion, undoubtedly legal; that I see no sufficient reason for interference either with the convictions or the sentences, and that I therefore concur in dismissing the appeals.

Appeals dismissed.