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Queen-Empress v. Kandhaia And Others

Allahabad High Court
Aug 7, 1884
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Factual and Procedural Background

In 1883, police authorities of the Banda district reported that Kandhaia and others residing in mauza Khandia were persons of bad livelihood, potentially threatening property offences. On 8 December 1883, a Magistrate with first-class powers ordered Kandhaia's arrest under s. 55, Act X of 1882. The arrest was effected on 9 December by a constable, Salig Ram, but Kandhaia resisted and escaped with assistance from Mohan, Paltu, and Sewak. Kandhaia was later re-arrested the same day. On 17 December, the Magistrate discharged Kandhaia and Bhawani for lack of sufficient grounds to require security for good behaviour. Subsequently, charges were framed against Kandhaia for escaping lawful custody under s. 224 IPC and against Mohan, Paltu, and Sewak for rescuing him under s. 225 IPC. The accused’s defence witnesses were not summoned, and on 25 December 1883, the case was disposed of with a finding that the charges under s. 224 and s. 225 IPC could not be sustained as Kandhaia was not charged with or convicted of any offence. The accused were acquitted and the case struck off. The prosecution appealed this decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Kandhaia and the other accused committed offences punishable under sections 224 and 225 of the Indian Penal Code respectively, given that Kandhaia was not charged with an offence under the Penal Code but under s. 55, Act X of 1882.
  2. Whether an order under s. 55, Act X of 1882, requiring security for good behaviour, constitutes an "offence" within the meaning of s. 40 of the Indian Penal Code, thereby justifying charges under sections 224 and 225 IPC.
  3. Whether the accused should have been tried for an offence under section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, relating to the use of criminal force against a public servant in the execution of his duty.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
The Empress v. Shasti Churn Napit Interpretation of "offence" under s. 40 IPC and the non-punitive nature of orders for security for good behaviour under s. 118 CrPC. The court aligned with the Calcutta Court's view that requiring security for good behaviour under s. 55, Act X of 1882, does not amount to an offence under the Penal Code, thus charges under ss. 224 and 225 IPC cannot be sustained.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the definition of "offence" under s. 40 of the Indian Penal Code, which requires an act or omission punishable under the Penal Code or any special/local law. It held that an order under s. 55, Act X of 1882, requiring security for good behaviour is a preventive remedy and not a punishment for an offence. The court emphasized that such an order does not entail proof of commission or omission of an illegal act and is not an offence within the meaning of the Penal Code. Consequently, Kandhaia was not charged with an offence as defined by the Penal Code, and thus no offence under ss. 224 or 225 IPC was committed in relation to his escape or rescue. The court acknowledged an anomaly in the law due to absence of punishment for breaking arrest under s. 55 but stated its duty was to apply the law as it stands. The court further noted that if criminal force was used against the constable in the lawful execution of an arrest order, an offence under s. 353 IPC was committed, and the accused should have been tried on that charge. Since the record was incomplete due to the absence of defence witnesses, the court reversed the acquittal and directed a retrial on the charge under s. 353 IPC by a competent Magistrate other than the original presiding Magistrate.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed to the extent that the acquittal under sections 224 and 225 of the Indian Penal Code is upheld, but the case is remanded for retrial under section 353 of the Indian Penal Code.

The court's decision affirms that an order requiring security for good behaviour under s. 55, Act X of 1882, does not constitute an offence under the Indian Penal Code, precluding charges under ss. 224 and 225 IPC for escape or rescue from such custody. However, the use of criminal force against a public servant executing a lawful arrest order is punishable under s. 353 IPC, necessitating retrial on that charge. No new precedent was set beyond confirming the interpretation of "offence" and procedural directions for retrial.

Show all summary ...

Mahmood and Duthoit, JJ.:— This is an appeal under the provisions of s. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

[68] For its purposes the facts may be thus stated:—

On various dates in September and November, 1883, the police authorities of the Banda district represented that in mauza Khandia there resided Kandhaia and other persons of bad livelihood, and that unless measures for restraining those persons were taken, serious offences against property in the neighbourhood were to be apprehended.

On the 8th December, 1883, an order was issued by Saiad Sadik Husain, a Magistrate exercising first class powers, to the officer in charge of the Police Station of Khunna in the following terms:—

“Charge, s. 55, Act X of 1882.—Government v. Kandhaia, Brahman, and Bhawani, Nai, residents of mauza Khandia.

After perusal of the Special Diary noted above, and of the order of the Magistrate of the District of Banda, dated the 1st December, 1883, you are hereby directed to send up (chalan) the case in due form (hasb zabta) with proof in support of it.”

On receipt of this order, on the 9th December, 1883, the Head Constable in charge of the Police Station of Khunna gave to Salig Ram, one of the constables of the station, an order in writing directing him to arrest Kandhaia. Armed with this document, Salig Ram arrested Kandhaia. Kandhaia resisted his apprehension, and, with the assistance of Mohan, Paltu, and Sewak, escaped from the grasp of the constable and fled. This is admitted by the learned pleader who has defended the appeal. The evidence for the prosecution goes to show—this, however, is denied by the learned pleader for the respondents—that, in the course of the escape and rescue, Kandhaia struck the constable with a stick, and Mohan, Paltu, and Sewak hustled him. Later in the day, Kandhaia's arrest was effected by a party which came from the police station for the purpose.

On the 17th December, the Magistrate (Saiad Sadik Husain) held that there was no sufficient reason for requiring security for good behaviour to be furnished by Kandhaia and Bhawani. Kandhaia and Bhawani were therefore discharged. But proceedings were immediately afterwards taken against Kandhaia, Mohan, Paltu, and Sewak, with reference to the events of the 9th December-[69], 1883. Evidence on behalf of the prosecution was recorded, and charges were framed in these terms:—

“I, Saiad Sadik Husain, Magistrate, First Class, hereby charge you Kandhaia, Paltu, Mohan, and Sewak, with the following offences:—

On or about the 10th December, 1883, at mauza Khandia, you Kandhaia committed an offence under s. 224, Indian Penal Code, viz., the offence of escaping from lawful custody, and you Paltu, Mohan, and Sewak, an offence under s. 225, viz., the offence of rescuing Kandhaia from lawful custody, and of offering resistance. Therefore you Kandhaia have committed an offence punishable under s. 224, and you Paltu, Mohan, and Sewak, an offence punishable under s. 225 of the Indian Penal Code, and these offences are triable by my Court, and I hereby,” &c.

The witnesses named by the accused persons for their defence were not summoned; but, on the 25th December, 1883, the case was disposed of by a finding, the substantial portion of which is to the following effect:—

“The police had on former occasions made inquiries regarding Kandhaia accused under s. 55, Act X of 1882, and the Court ordered that the accused should be arrested and sent up with the evidence against him. The police deputed Salig Ram, constable, for the purpose. Kandhaia, accused, after having been arrested by Salig Ram, constable, escaped from custody, and Paltu, Mohan, and Sewak rescued him. The proceedings instituted under s. 55, Act X of 1882, were struck off by the Court for want of proof, and the accused were acquitted. The pleader for the accused in this case has raised the legal objection that, under ss. 224 and 225, it is necessary that the accused should have been charged with, or convicted, of some offence. Had the accused committed any offence and escaped from lawful custody, or given assistance in rescuing offenders, they could be charged under ss. 224 and 225 of the Indian Penal Code; otherwise they cannot be so charged; and as, under s. 40, Act XLV of 1860 the charge under s. 55, Act X of 1882, does not come within the definition of an offence it is no offence if Kandhaia accused escaped from custody, or Paltu, Mohan, and Sewak rescued him, even supposing that they [70] did so. Moreover, to require a man to enter into recognizances or to furnish security for good behaviour, under s. 55, Act X of 1882, is not one of the punishments prescribed by the Indian Penal Code, nor is it a punishment under any special or local law. This point was discussed on two days. After due consideration, I am also of opinion that the charge under s. 55, Act X of 1882, may result in calling for security for good behaviour, or in requiring a man to enter into recognizances to keep the peace, and this is not one of the punishments prescribed by the Indian Penal Code. Moreover, the charge under s. 55, Act X of 1882, was not proved against Kandhaia accused; the investigations made by the police were useless, and their report was wholly false. When the accused were not charged with or convicted of any offence, no charge can be brought against them under s. 224 or s. 225 of the Indian Penal Code. It is therefore ordered that the accused be acquitted, and the case be struck off the list.”

In appeal to this Court, it is contended that the Magistrate was wrong in holding that Kandhaia and the other accused persons did not commit offences punishable under ss. 224 and 225 of the Indian Penal Code respectively, and that, at any rate, they should have been convicted of the offence made punishable by s. 353 of the Indian Penal Code—a section which had been alleged against them by the prosecution.

S. 225 of the Indian Penal Code provides that “whoever intentionally offers any resistance or illegal obstruction to the lawful apprehension of any other person for an offence……shall be punished,” &c. Unless, therefore, Kandhaia was charged with an offence, there could be no valid conviction of him under s. 224 of the Indian Penal Code, nor of his companions under s. 225.

For the purposes of ss. 224 and 225 of the Indian Penal Code, “offence” is defined in s. 40 of that Code (as amended by s. 2, Act XXVII of 1870) as “a thing punishable under this Coda, or under any special or local law as hereinafter defined;” and s. 41 defines a “special law” as “law applicable to a particular subject.”

Act X of 1882 is therefore a “special law,” and it has been suggested that inasmuch as to require security to be furnished in [71] the terms of s. 118 of Act X of 1882 is to cast upon a man a burden which not unfrequently compels him to pay money by way of interest or otherwise, and, in default of discharge of the burden, renders him liable to imprisonment, an order directing a person to furnish security for good behaviour is equivalent to declaring such person guilty of an offence; and that the requirements of s. 40 of the Indian Penal Code are therefore satisfied in the case of a person who has been arrested in the terms of s. 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

We are of opinion that this argument is erroneous; for the Penal Code defines an offence as a “thing punishable;” and (a) a “thing” (cf., ss. 32 and 33 of the Code) must be an act, or a series of illegal acts, or an illegal omission, or a series of illegal omissions; or, to use the words of Mr. Bentham, “we give the name of offence to every act which we think ought to be prohibited by reason of some evil which it produces or tends to produce;” (b) “punishable,” must mean that the commission or omission of the act, the commission or omission of which is prohibited, renders the person who commits or omits it liable to the sanction of the law,—i.e, to “punishment.”.

But, for the purposes of an order under s. 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, evidence of the commission or omission of an act is not necessary—proof of general repute (s. 117 of the Code) is all that is required—and the order calling upon a person to furnish security is what Mr. Bentham calls a “preventive remedy,” as contrasted with a “penal remedy” or a “punishment.” Mr. Bentham defines “punishment” as an evil resulting to an individual from the direct intention of another, on account of some act that appears to have been done or omitted;” and he adds:— “An evil resulting to an individual, although it be from the direct intention of another, if it be not on account of some act that has been done or omitted, is not a ‘punishment.’” S. 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not set out any act, the omission or commission of which-renders the person committing or omitting it liable to punishment; nor ought a Magistrate, when passing an order in the terms of s. 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to have any direct intention of inflicting punishment; for the object [72] of s. 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, to use the words of Macpherson, J., in Umbica Proshad's case, “the prevention, not the punishment, of crime; and, with that object, it authorizes Magistrates to take from certain persons good and sufficient 1 security for their good behaviour. But it is solely for the purpose of securing good behaviour that” the section “can be used; and any attempt to use it for the purpose of punishment for past offences is wrong, and not sanctioned by the law.”

We must hold, therefore, that Kandhaia was not charged with an offence within the meaning of that term as defined in s. 40 of the Indian Penal Code, and consequently that no offence made punishable by s. 224 or s. 225 of the Indian Penal Code was committed in connection with his evasion of arrest. With the apparent anomaly of providing in s. 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the arrest of the persons described in (b) and (c) of that section, and of making no provision similar to those of s. 651 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and of s. 225-A of the Indian Penal Code (s. 9, Act XXVII of 1870), for punishing them for breaking their arrest, we are not here concerned. Our duty is to administer the law as it stands; and we have the satisfaction of noting that the Calcutta Court—The Empress v. Shasti Churn Napit(2)—has taken the same view of the law as we do.

So much as regards the acquittal under ss. 224 and 225 of the Indian Penal Code.

As regards the omission to try the accused persons on a charge under s. 353 of the Indian Penal Code, we observe that if, in the terms of s. 56 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an order for the arrest of Kandhaia was given to Salig Ram by his superior officer, and if, in the execution of his duty in carrying out that order, criminal force was used to him, an offence made punishable by s. 353 of the Indian Penal Code was committed by the persons who used such force. We think that the Magistrate should have tried the accused persons under s. 353 of the Indian Penal Code. But the record is at present incomplete, as the witnesses for the defence have not been examined. We reverse the finding of acquittal, and direct a re-trial of the accused on a charge under s. 353 of the [73] Penal Code by the Magistrate of the Banda District, or by such other competent Magistrate of that district, other than Saiad Sadik Husain, whom the Magistrate of the District may nominate for the purpose.