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Dwarka Das v. Kameshar Prasad
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal was brought by Babu Dwarka Das, the plaintiff in the original suit, from a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Benares which dismissed his suit with costs. The memorandum of appeal was originally presented to the District Judge of Benares, who returned it to the plaintiff on the ground that the appeal lay to the Court before which the memorandum was ultimately presented (referred to in the opinion simply as "this Court"). The appellant then presented the memorandum to this Court and the appeal was registered under section 548 of Act No. XIV of 1882.
The underlying dispute arises from an execution by Babu Kameshar Prasad, who obtained a decree on 20 August 1881 against Puran Chand (since deceased) and another. In execution of that decree, on 13 December 1889, Kameshar Prasad caused attachment of a house and a bungalow alleged to have been Puran Chand's property and then in the possession of Musammat Sahudra Bibi as Puran Chand's representative. Babu Dwarka Das filed an objection to that attachment, claiming the property as his by a registered sale-deed dated 22 March 1882 for Rs. 7,500 (alleging payment and proprietary possession). The Subordinate Judge disallowed the claim; the plaintiff then brought a suit under Section 283 of Act No. XIV of 1882 making the execution-creditor (Kameshar Prasad) and the representative of the deceased debtor (Musammat Sahudra Bibi) defendants.
In the plaint the plaintiff sought (1) a declaration that he became owner by the 22 March 1882 sale-deed and that the property was not attachable or saleable in execution of Kameshar Prasad's decree (value of suit Rs. 7,500), and (2) costs with future interest. Sahudra Bibi did not defend. Kameshar Prasad filed a written statement alleging, among other things, that the sale-deed of 22 March 1882 was fictitious and executed without consideration to protect the deceased debtor's property.
The principal procedural controversy in this appeal was a jurisdictional question: whether the appeal lay to the Court of the District Judge of Benares (as argued for the appellant) or to this Court (as argued for the respondent).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appeal from the decree of the Subordinate Judge in a suit under Section 283 of Act No. XIV of 1882 lies to the Court of the District Judge of Benares or to this Court, given the parties and the value of the suit as stated in the plaint.
- How the "value of the suit" (for the purposes of jurisdiction under Sections 19 and 21 of Act No. XII of 1887 and related statutory provisions) is to be determined in a suit under Section 283 when (a) the judgment-debtor or his representative is not a party and (b) when the judgment-debtor or his representative is made a defendant.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Babu Dwarka Das) Arguments
- The appellant (through Mr. Madho Prasad, vakil) contended that the appeal lay to the Court of the District Judge of Benares and not to this Court, and asked that the memorandum of appeal be returned for presentation to the District Judge.
- In his plaint the plaintiff contended that he had acquired title by a registered sale-deed dated 22 March 1882 for Rs. 7,500, had paid the entire purchase money and had proprietary possession, and therefore the property was not liable to attachment and sale in execution of Kameshar Prasad's decree.
Respondent's (Babu Kameshar Prasad) Arguments
- The respondent (through Mr. Jogindro Nath Chaudhri) contended that the appeal lay to this Court.
- In his written statement Kameshar Prasad alleged that the sale-deed of 22 March 1882 was fictitious, executed and completed without consideration to protect the deceased debtor's property, and therefore it did not transfer title to the plaintiff.
Other Procedural Points
- At the conclusion of the jurisdiction arguments the Court invited Mr. Madho Prasad to press the appeal on the merits; he admitted he could not support the appeal on the merits.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Moti Singh v. Kaunsilla, I.L.R. 16 All. 308 | Referenced as the authority governing the nature of the declarations the plaintiff sought (the plaint sought two substantial declarations "within the ruling" in this case). | The Court notes that the plaintiff's two declarations were sought within the ruling in this case and that the second declaration necessarily involved the first on the facts alleged; no further application or analysis of the precedent is given in the opinion excerpt. |
| Gulzari Lal v. Jadaun Rai, I.L.R. 2 All. 799 | One of the reported cases relied on by the appellant's counsel for the proposition relating to valuation and the Court in which an appeal lies; used in the cluster of authorities about valuation where only execution-creditor and claimant-objector are parties. | The Court explained that the decisions reported in this case (and others) support the rule that where the parties are limited to the execution-creditor and the claimant-objector the value of the suit is to be determined by reference to the amount to be realized/saleable portion of the property; but the Court qualified that rule as applicable only when the judgment-debtor is not a party. |
| Durga Prasad v. Rachla Kuar, I.L.R. 9 All. 140 | Similar to Gulzari Lal: relied on by appellant on valuation and jurisdiction where parties are confined to execution-creditor and claimant-objector. | The Court treated this decision as part of a group supporting the rule about valuation in suits where the judgment-debtor is not a party; it held that rule applies only in that limited party configuration. |
| Krishnama Chariar v. Srinivasa Ayyangar, I.L.R. 4 Mad. 339 | Another case cited for the rule on valuation when the suit is between execution-creditor and claimant-objector. | The Court included this case among those from which a rule can be deduced about valuation in suits confined to those two classes of parties, and limited its applicability when the judgment-debtor is not a party. |
| Modhusudun Koer v. Rakhal Chunder Roy, I.L.R. 15 Cal. 104 | Cited with the other authorities about valuation when only the execution-creditor and claimant-objector are parties. | The opinion regards this case as contributing to the rule that, with that restricted array of parties, the value of the suit is determined by reference to the property or the amount to be realized, but the Court distinguished this rule where the judgment-debtor is a defendant. |
| Daya Chand Nem Chand v. Hem Chand Dharam Chand, I.L.R. 4 Bom. 515 | Relied upon by appellant's counsel but the Court observed it has little or no bearing on the question before them. | The Court expressly stated that this decision has little or no bearing on the jurisdictional question in the present case. |
| Mahabir Singh v. Behari Lal, I.L.R. 13 All. 320 | Relied upon by respondent in support of the contention that the appeal lay to this Court. | The Court stated that its opinions do not conflict with Mahabir Singh v. Behari Lal; the decision is compatible with the Court's delineation of valuation rules depending on whether the judgment-debtor is joined as a defendant. |
| Madho Das v. Ramji Patak, I.L.R. 16 All. 286 | Also relied upon by the respondent for the proposition that the appeal lay to this Court. | The Court observed that its conclusions do not conflict with this decision and used it to show consistency between earlier authorities and the Court's view on valuation for jurisdiction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis focused on the statutory question of jurisdiction and the proper valuation of a suit under Section 283 of Act No. XIV of 1882 for the purposes of appeal. The analysis proceeded in identifiable steps:
- Identification of the material facts: the execution-creditor had a prior decree; attachment of house and bungalow followed; the claimant-objector (plaintiff) alleged title by a registered sale-deed of 22 March 1882 for Rs. 7,500; the judgment-debtor's representative (Musammat Sahudra Bibi) was made a defendant to the suit.
- Survey of authorities: the Court examined a series of reported decisions (Gulzari Lal, Durga Prasad, Krishnama Chariar, Modhusudun Koer) and observed that, in those cases, the suits were typically between the execution-creditor and the claimant-objector (or the judgment-debtor's title was not raised). From those authorities the Court accepted a rule applicable to that limited party configuration concerning how to assess the value of the suit for jurisdictional purposes.
- Distinction based on parties: the Court drew a clear distinction between (a) suits under Section 283 in which only the execution-creditor (or his representative) and the claimant-objector (or his representative) are parties and (b) suits in which the judgment-debtor or his representative is made a defendant. The Court reasoned that different considerations govern valuation and hence the forum for appeal in the two scenarios.
- Formulation of the valuation rules:
- When only the execution-creditor and the claimant-objector are parties and the sole question is whether the property attached is liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree, the value of the suit (for sections 19 and 21 of Act No. XII of 1887) is:
- the value of the property sought to be sold when the decree amount exceeds the property's value; or
- the value of so much of the property as will, on sale, satisfy the amount sought to be realized when the property's value exceeds the amount sought to be realized (i.e., the portion theoretically sufficient to satisfy the decree).
- When the judgment-debtor or his representative is made a defendant, the property attached must be regarded as the subject-matter of the suit, and the value of the suit must be the full value of the property attached, whether greater or less than the amount sought to be realized by sale under the decree.
- When only the execution-creditor and the claimant-objector are parties and the sole question is whether the property attached is liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree, the value of the suit (for sections 19 and 21 of Act No. XII of 1887) is:
- Application to the present case: because the claimant-objector (plaintiff) had made the representative of the deceased judgment-debtor a defendant and had sought declarations that necessarily rested on the validity of the sale-deed, the Court held that the property attached was the subject-matter and that the value of the suit was the value of that property. The Court accepted (for the purposes of jurisdiction, and noting it was not disputed) that the value of the property was Rs. 7,500, and therefore concluded that the appeal lay to this Court rather than to the Court of the District Judge.
- Merits and final disposition: after resolving the jurisdictional question the Court invited the appellant's counsel to argue the merits; the counsel admitted inability to support the appeal on the merits. The Court thereupon dismissed the appeal with costs. The Court explicitly stated it need not express any opinion on whether the plaint disclosed any cause of action against Musammat Sahudra Bibi, given the appellant's inability to sustain the appeal on the merits.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court held that, where in a suit under Section 283 of Act No. XIV of 1882 the judgment-debtor or his representative is made a party as a defendant, the property attached is to be regarded as the subject-matter of the suit and the value of the suit for jurisdictional purposes (under Sections 19 and 21 of Act No. XII of 1887 and related statutory provisions) is the value of the property attached. Applying that rule to the facts (the judgment-debtor's representative was a defendant and the property was valued at Rs. 7,500), the Court concluded that the appeal lay to this Court. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Implications:
- The decision clarifies the Court's view of how to determine the "value of the suit" for jurisdiction in actions under Section 283 depending on whether the judgment-debtor (or his representative) has been joined as a defendant. Where the judgment-debtor is joined, the full value of the attached property is to be treated as the value of the suit; where the judgment-debtor is not joined and the dispute is confined to execution-creditor versus claimant-objector, the narrower valuation rules applied in earlier reported cases govern.
- On the facts of this case the immediate effect is the dismissal of the appeal with costs. The Court did not proceed to decide the merits because the appellant's counsel conceded inability to support the appeal; consequently the Court made no binding determination on the substantive validity of the sale-deed as between the parties beyond the jurisdictional conclusion.
Note: This summary is limited to information explicitly contained in the provided opinion excerpt and does not infer facts or holdings beyond the text supplied.
and Banerji, J.
1. This is an appeal brought by Babu Dwarka Das, the plaintiff in the suit, from the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Benares dismissing the suit with costs.
2. The memorandum of appeal had been originally presented to the Court of the District Judge of Benares. The District Judge returned the memorandum of appeal to the plaintiff for presentation to this Court, holding that the appeal lay to this Court and not to the Court of the District Judge. The plaintiff thereupon presented the memorandum of appeal to this Court; the memorandum of appeal was admitted and the appeal was registered under section 548 of act no. xiv of 1882.
3. Upon the appeal being called on for hearing, Mr. Madho Prasad, vakil for the appellant, contended that the appeal lay to the Court of the District Judge, and not to this Court, and that we should return the memorandum of appeal to the appellant for presentation by him to the Court of the District Judge of Benares. On the other hand Mr. Jogindro Nath Chaudhri, for the> respondent, contended that the appeal lay to this Court.
4. The facts material to the question of jurisdiction are as follows: The respondent Babu Kameshar Prasad had obtained, on the 20th of August 1881, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Benares a decree for money against Puran Chand, since deceased, and Daru Mal, and in execution of that decree he obtained, on the 13th of December 1889, attachment of a house and a bungalow, which, he alleged, had been the property of Ptiran Chand in his lifetime and were, according to him, then in the possession of the respondent Sahudra Bibi as the representative of Puran Chand. Babu Dwarka Das filed an objection to the attachment alleging that the property was his, and was not liable to be attached and sold in execution of the decree of Babu Kameshar Prasad.
5. The Subordinate Judge disallowed the claim of Babu Dwarka Das, and thereupon Babu Dwarka Das, under section 283 of act no. xiv of 1882, brought the suit in which this appeal has arisen, making Babu Kameshar Prasad, as the execution-creditor, and Musammat Sahudra Bibi, as the representative of Puran Chand, deceased, defendants.
6. In his plaint Babu Dwarka Das alleged that, by a registered sale-deed made by Puran Chand on the 22nd of March 1882, Puran Chand had sold the house and bungalow in question to him for the price of Rs. 7,500 and that he, the plaintiff, having paid the entire purchase money, got proprietary possession of the house and bungalow and still held the house and the bungalow as his property. He stated the fact that Babu Kameshar Prasad had obtained the decree under which the property was attached, the fact of the attachment, of his objection and of the disallowance of his objection, and prayed that:
(1) It may be declared by the Court that by virtue of the aforesaid purchase the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the brick and stone-built house consisting of four sections, and the bungalow built after English fashion, both the land and the building, situate in mohalla Nilkanth Mahadeo in the city of Benares, hounded as below, and that the property is not attachable or saleable in execution of the said decree. Value of suit Rs. 7,500.
(2) The costs of the suit may be charged against the defendants with future interest.
7. The plaintiff sought two substantial declarations within the ruling in Moti Singh v. Kaunsilla I.L.R. 16 All. 308, the latter of which, on the facts alleged in the plaint, necessarily involved the former, although the former did not necessarily involve the latter.
8. The defendant, Musammat Sahudra Bibi, did not defend the suit. The other defendant, Babu Kameshar Prasad, filed a written statement and defendant the suit. In the written statement be alleged, amongst other things, that the whole proceedings "connected with the sale-deed in question, dated the 22nd of March 1882, are fictitious. The sale-deed in question was not intended to transfer any property, nor was any property transferred by it to the plaintiff.
9. It was executed and completed without any consideration with a view to protect the property of the deceased debtor Puran Chand alias Raja."
10. n support of the contention that this appeal lay to the Court of the District Judge--Mr. Madho Prasad, for the plaintiff appellant, relied upon Gulzari Lal v. Jadaun Rai I.L.R. 2 All. 799; Durga Prasad v. Rachla Kuar I.L.R. 9 All. 140; Krishnama Chariar v. Srinivasa Ayyangar I.L.R. 4 Mad. 339; Modhusudun Koer v. Rakhal Chunder Roy I.L.R. 15 Cal. 104, and Daya Chand Nem Chand v. Hem Chand Dharam Chand I.L.R. 4 Bom. 515.
11. Mr. Jogindro Nath Chaudhri, for the defendant respondent, Babu Kameshwar Prasad, in support of the contention that the appeal lay to this Court, relied upon Mahabir Singh v. Behari Lal I.L.R. 13 All. 320, and Madho Das v. Ramji Patak I.L.R. 16 All. 286.
12. It appears to us that the decision in Daya Chand Nem Chand v. Hem Chand Dharam Chand I.L.R. 4 Bom. 515, has little or no bearing on the question which we have to decide.
13. In Gulzari Lai v. Jadaun Rai I.L.R., 2 All. 799, (the decision in which was explained in the case to which we shall next refer); Durga Prasad v. Rachta Kuar I.L.R. 9 All. 140; Krishnama Chariar v. Srinivasa Ayyangar I.L.R. 4 Mad. 339, and Modhusudun Koer v. Bakhal Chander Roy I.L.R. 15 Cal. 104, the suits, so far as we can gather from the reports, were either solely between the execution-creditor and the claimant-objector on one side or the other, or, if the judgment-debtor was a party as defendant, the effect upon his title and that of all claiming through him of a decision in the suit that the property was not liable to the attachment of the execution-creditor was not raised or considered.
14. It appears to us that when the only parties to a suit under section 283 of act no. xiv of 1882 are the execution-creditor or his representative on one side, as plaintiff or as defendant, and the claimant-objector or his representative on the other, and the sole question in the suit between such parties is the question whether the property attached in execution of the decree of the execution-creditor is or is not liable to be attached and sold in execution of the decree of the execution-creditor, the value of the suit, within the meaning of sections 19 and 21 of act No. XII of 1887, which, by Clause (13) of Section 3 of Act No. I of 1887, means "the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit," is the value of the property sought to be sold in execution of the decree, when the amount of the decree exceeds the value of the property, and the value of so much of the property sought to he sold as will on a sale satisfy the amount sought to be realized by the sale, when the value of the property attached exceeds the amount sought to be realised, and that in such latter case the amount which it is sought to realise by a sale under the decree may be taken as the value of that portion of the property the sale of which will theoretically, although possibly not in practice, be sufficient to satisfy the amount sought to be realised by a sale. To that extent we are of opinion that the rule deducible from the cases reported in I.L.R.,2 All. 799 : I.L.R. 9 All. 140 : I.L.R. 4 Mad. 339, and I.L.R. 15 Cal. 104, is correct, when the array of parties is confined to the execution-creditor or his representative on one side and the claimant-objector or his representative on the other, and the sole question to be decided is whether the property is liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree of the execution-creditor.
15. In our opinion different considerations arise, which must he considered and given effect to, when in a suit under section 283 of act no. xiv of 1882 the judgment-debtor or his representative is made a party as a defendant to the suit, and it is necessary to decide the question of jurisdiction as to the Court in which the suit or an appeal in the suit may be brought.
16. In a suit under Section 283 of the Act No. XIV of 1882 in which the claimant-objector is the plaintiff and the execution-creditor is the defendant, and in which the judgment-debtor is not party as a defendant, the questions as to the title of the judgment-debtor which it may be necessary to decide are decided solely between the parties to the suit, and a decision of or involving those questions of title would not operate as res judicata under section 13 of act no. xiv of 1882, should the same title be in issue in any subsequent suit between either of the persons who was a party to the suit under Section 283 and the person who was the judgment-debtor in the proceedings to which the suit under Section 283 related, or those who claimed title through them respectively.
17. On the other hand, when the claimant-objector makes the judgment-debtor a defendant to his suit under Section 283, and does not limit his claim, he claims both in form and substance against the judgment-debtor a declaration of his title I to the whole of the property the title to which is in issue in the suit. A decree in such a suit declaring that the property is liable or is not liable to attachment and sale in execution of the execution-creditor's decree must necessarily, unless the suit be decided on a ground which did not involve the decision of a question of title, decide and determine all questions of title upon which in that suit the plaintiff on the one side and the judgment-debtor on the other could then rely, and such decision would operate in any future suit between these two parties or those who claim title through them as res judicata under I section 13 of act no. xiv of 1882 on those questions of title, although such subsequent suit might relate to property not in question in the suit under Section 283, provided that the Court in which the suit under Section 283 was instituted and decided was a Court of jurisdiction competent to try the subsequent suit. The present suit will illustrate our meaning. The plaintiff claims a declaration that the house and bungalow in question are not liable to attachment and sale in execution of Babu Kameshar Prasad's decree. The other declaration which is claimed by the plaintiff, namely, that the house and bungalow became vested in him by the alleged sale-deed of the 22nd of March 1882, is necessarily involved in the declaration that the house and bungalow are not liable to be attached and sold, as it appears that upon that sale-deed of the 22nd of March 1882 the plaintiff relies for his title and the right to a declaration that the property is not liable to attachment and sale in execution of Babu Kameshar Prasad's decree. A decree that the property was not liable to such attachment and sale would necessarily involve, there being no question of estoppel or limitation, the decision, on the question of title, that the sale-deed was a fictitious instrument under which no title passed from Puran Chand to the plaintiff, or that it was a genuine sale-deed effecting a genuine and unimpeachable transaction of sale, and by which title passed from Puran Chand to the plaintiff. The representative of the deceased Puran Chand being a defendant to this suit, and having regard to the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit has been brought, a decree declaring that the property was not liable to attachment and sale in execution of Babu Kameshar Prasad's decree would, in any subsequent suit between the present plaintiff or anyone claiming through him on the one side and Musammat Sahudra Bibi or anyone claiming through her on her title derived from Puran Chand on the other, preclude Musammat Sahudra Bibi and all those claiming through her or her title as the representative of Puran Chand from disputing the validity and effect in passing title of the sale-deed ; but it is to be observed that the plaintiff might be entitled to such a declaration as against Musammat Sahudra Bibi, although facts might possibly be proved which would estop the plaintiff from alleging as against Babu Kameshar Prasad that the property attached was not liable to attachment and sale in execution of Babu Kameshar Prasad's decree.
18. We are consequently of opinion that when in a suit under section 283 of act no. xiv of 1882 the claimant-objector makes the judgment-debtor or his representative a party as defendant to the suit the property attached must be regarded as the subject matter of the suit, and the value of the suit within the meaning of Section 19 and Section 21 of Act No. XII of 1887 must be the value f the property attached, whether such value exceeds or is less than the amount which is sought to be realised by the sale of the property in execution of the decree.
19. The opinions which we have above expressed in no way conflict with the decisions in Mahabir Singh v. Behari Lal I.L.R. 13 All. 320, and Madho Das v. Ramji Patak I.L.R. 16 All. 286. We have indicated what in our opinion, is, for the purposes of jurisdiction, the value of a suit under section 283 of act no. xiv of 1882, when the judgment-debtor or his representative is made, and when he is not made a party to the suit as a defendant. In either case the value of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction is the value stated by the plaintiff in his plaint, provided that such value is not understated or overstated with the object of getting the suit admitted in a Court in which, by reason of the true value of the suit and section 15 of act no. xiv of 1882, the suit does not lie. In the present case, assuming, and it is not disputed, that Rs. 7,500 is the value of the property, this appeal lay to this Court and not to the Court of the District Judge.
20. At the conclusion of the arguments on the question of jurisdiction we asked Mr. Madho Prasad to support his client's appeal on the merits, and he admitted that he could not do so. Under the circumstances it is not necessary for us to express any opinion as to whether or not the plaint disclosed any cause of action against Musammat Sahudra Bibi. We presume that the object of Mr. Madho Prasad in raising the question of jurisdiction and asking us to return the memorandum of appeal to his client was to avoid the appeal being dismissed with costs; and to enable his client to escape paying the costs of an appeal which could not be supported. It may be assumed, as the appeal cannot be supported on the merits, that the memorandum of appeal, if returned by this Court, would not be again presented to the Court of the District Judge.
21. We dismiss the appeal with costs.
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