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Agartala Bench Dhirai Alias Dhirendra Das v. State Of Tripura

Gauhati High Court
Jan 19, 1998
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a conviction and life sentence imposed by the Sessions Judge, North Tripura (Kailashahar) by judgment and order dated 31.3.1986 in Sessions Trial No. 22 (N.T./K) 82. The accused were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for causing the death of Naresh Das.

The factual matrix as recorded in the opinion: on 20.4.1980 at about 7.30/8.00 p.m. the informant, Rakesh Chandra Das, heard a hue and cry and saw at a distance the accused identified as Suresh Das, his two sons Babul (Sukanta) Das and Alok (Subhendu) Das, and others assaulting the deceased Naresh Das with lathis, jhatas and daggers. Police brought Naresh Das to Kailashahar Hospital, where he died on 21.4.1980 at 00:58 hours. A charge-sheet was submitted against four accused and one Kokil Mitra (who died subsequently after framing of charge). Sixteen witnesses were examined at trial, but the doctors who prepared the injury report and conducted the post-mortem were not examined by the prosecution at trial.

The trial court convicted and sentenced each accused to life imprisonment under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The convicted persons appealed against that conviction and sentence; the present opinion is the appellate decision by D.N. Chowdhury, J.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether conviction under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC could be sustained when the doctors who prepared the injury report and conducted the post-mortem were not produced and examined in court.
  2. Whether the prosecution established the existence of a common intention under Section 34 IPC to justify joint liability for murder.
  3. Whether the evidence on record (including eyewitnesses) sufficed to prove culpable homicide amounting to murder as opposed to grievous hurt causing death.
  4. Whether individual accused (specifically Suresh Das and Aloke/Subhendu Das) had sufficient evidence against them to sustain conviction for the offences charged.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (learned senior counsel B.B. Deb)

  • The conviction under Section 302 IPC could not be sustained because the doctors who prepared the injury report and conducted the post-mortem (Dr. Sudarshan Bhattacharjee and Dr. Sudhir Deb) were not produced in court, and therefore their reports could not be acted upon.
  • In the absence of reliable evidence of a common intention linking the accused to the commission of murder, conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC was unsustainable.
  • On the material on record there was no evidence against Suresh Das and Aloke Das; at best in respect of some accused (Dhirendra and Babul) inferences might support conviction for a lesser offence (e.g., Section 323 IPC) rather than murder.

Respondent / Prosecution Arguments (learned Public Prosecutor S. Das)

  • The conviction and sentence were sustainable based on evidence including the testimony of PW-16 Dr. Somendra Ch. Chakraborty who proved the injury report and the post-mortem report; Dr. Somendra Chakraborty was competent to depose from official records as he was the S.D.M.O. at the relevant time.
  • The prosecution relied on Section 294 of the Cr.P.C. for admissibility/formal proof of documents to avoid formal proof where genuineness is admitted, and maintained that accused were constructively liable under Section 34 IPC as the section declares joint criminal liability and is a rule of evidence rather than a separate offence.
  • The Public Prosecutor asked the Court to sustain the convictions based on the available record and witness testimony.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhanda Garh v. State of Assam, 1984 Crl.L.J. 217 Expert evidence is relevant under Section 45 of the Evidence Act; injury reports cannot be admitted and relied upon if the doctor who examined is not examined in court. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that injury/post-mortem reports could not be acted upon when the doctors who prepared them were not produced as witnesses.
Re Rangappa Goundan, (1936) ILR 59 Mad 349 Post-mortem reports prove nothing by themselves; they are not substantive evidence and can only be used by the witness who conducted the post-mortem as an aid to memory. The Court cited this decision to reinforce that post-mortem reports cannot substitute for oral testimony of the doctor and cannot be relied upon as conclusive proof of cause of death when the doctor is not examined.
Queen Empress v. Jadab Das, (1900) ILR 27 Cal 295 Authority relied upon in Rangappa Goundan for the proposition that post-mortem reports are not substantive evidence. The Court treated this older authority (as relied upon in Rangappa) as supporting the principle that post-mortem reports do not prove the case by themselves and require oral proof by the medical officer.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed both statutory provisions and established principles of criminal evidence to determine whether the conviction for murder could stand.

First, the court examined the prosecution's reliance on Sections 293 and 294 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It noted that Section 293 permits reception of certain government scientific expert reports subject to the court's discretion to summon the expert, and that subsection (4) limits applicability to specified categories of government scientific experts (which does not include medical officers who conduct post-mortems). Section 294 was characterized as a provision intended to avoid formal proof of certain documents on admission, not as a mechanism to bypass the ordinary rule that material facts and expert opinions must be proved by oral testimony where necessary.

The court reiterated foundational evidentiary principles applicable in criminal cases as stated in the opinion:

  • The burden to prove the essential ingredients of the offence lies on the prosecution.
  • Evidence must exclude every reasonable doubt; in case of doubt, the accused must benefit.
  • Corpus delicti must be clearly proved.
  • Any hypothesis of guilt must be consistent with all the facts.

Applying these principles, the court held that the injury report and post-mortem report were at best expert opinions. The court emphasized that a post-mortem report contains the doctor's opinion about cause of death and, as such, should normally be proved by oral testimony of the doctor under Section 32 of the Evidence Act (exception to hearsay when the declarant is dead or unavailable). The court noted that expert opinion evidence is governed by Section 45 of the Evidence Act and that absence of the experts (doctors) prevented the prosecution from relying on the written reports as substantive proof of murder.

The court recorded that the prosecution did not produce the two medical witnesses at trial and that, although this Court (on appeal) had directed on 31.5.1996 that their evidence could be recorded by the Sessions Court, the prosecution ultimately failed to produce them. Consequently, the trial court could not properly act upon those medical reports.

Turning to the eyewitness and other oral testimony (notably PWs 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 24), the court found that these witnesses established that Dhirendra (Dhirai), Babul (Sukanta) and Aloke (Subhendu) assaulted the deceased with lathi. However, the court concluded the evidence fell short of proving that the accused caused death with the requisite mens rea for murder (i.e., causing death or knowledge that the act was likely to cause death). The court therefore held the materials did not prove culpable homicide amounting to murder.

At the same time, on evaluation of the totality of evidence (direct and circumstantial), the court found that the three accused (Dhirendra, Babul and Aloke) had the intention to cause grievous hurt which resulted in death, but it could not be determined who administered the fatal blow. Accordingly, the court considered conviction under Section 325 IPC (voluntarily causing grievous hurt) read with Section 34 appropriate for those three persons.

Finally, the court found no evidence against Suresh Das and accordingly set aside his conviction and acquitted him on all charges.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeal is allowed in part.

  • The convictions and sentences of the accused appellants under Section 302 IPC (murder) read with Section 34 are set aside.
  • The accused Dhirai @ Dhirendra Das, Babul @ Sukanta Das and Aloke @ Subhendu Das are convicted under Section 325 IPC read with Section 34 (voluntarily causing grievous hurt by several persons in furtherance of common intention).
  • Those three accused are sentenced to the period already undergone (time served).
  • The conviction and sentence of Suresh Das are set aside and he is acquitted of all charges.
  • Sureties are discharged from their bail bonds.

Implications:

The direct practical consequences are the reduction of the legal characterization of the offence for three accused from murder to grievous hurt with joint liability, imposition of sentences equivalent to time already undergone, and acquittal of one accused (Suresh Das). The opinion rooted its outcome in established rules of criminal evidence (necessity of oral proof of medical opinion where required, limits of Sections 293/294 Cr.P.C., and the principles governing expert evidence) rather than announcing any new legal principle. No new precedent was purportedly created by this judgment beyond its application of existing authorities to the facts before the court.

Show all summary ...

D.N. CHOWDHURY, J.

(1.) This appeal is directed against the judgment and order elated 31.3. 1986 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, North Tripura, Kailashahar in Sessions Trial No. 22(N.T./K)82 convicting the accused appellants u/s 302 read with 34 IPC and sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment for life.

(2.) One Rakesh Chandra Das lodged First Information Report in the Kailashahar P.S. alleging that on 20.4.80 at about 7.30/8.00 p.m. when the informant was in his house he heard hue and cry towards the west and so he proceeded to see the things himself. On coming out he saw at a distance of 8-10 paces from the house of Suresh Das that the accused Suresh Das and his two sons, namely, Babul Das and Alok Das and 2-3 others when the informant could identify but did not know their names being armed with lathis, Jhatas and Dagger assaulted rthe deceased Naresh Das. The informant saw by the moon-light that accused Suresh Das was armed with Lathi, Dhirendra Das was armed with Jhata and Babul and Aloke Das were armed with Daggers and the others were armed with lathis and Jhatas. The informant tried to persuade them not to assault on Naresh Das. At this Suresh Das instigated others to catch hold of the informant and to cause assault. Then the informant fled away out of fear. It was further reported by the informant that the assailants named in the FIR caused the (Heath of Naresh Das. Police on the basis of the above information rushed to the spot and brought Naresh Das to Kaliashahar Hospital where he succumbed to the injuries on 21.4.1980 at 00.58 hours in the hospital. After the investigation police submitted charge sheet against the four acsused persons alongwith one Kokil Mitra who died subsequently after framing of the charge by the learned Sessions Judge. The accused were charged for the offence under section 302 read with 34 ipc for causing the death of Naresh Das along with the deceased Kokil Mitra in furtherance of their common intention. In the trial 16 witnesses were examined including the I/O. Incidentally the doctor who examined the injury of the deceased at the time of admission as well as the doctor who conducted the post mortem examination were not examined by the prosecution. The learned trial Court after the trial and on evaluation of evidence convicted the accused appellants u/s 302 read with 34 IPC and sentenced each of them to suffer imprisonment for life as stated above. Hence the appeal.

(3.) Mr. B.B. Deb, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants assailed the conviction and sentence an the accused persons as unsustainable. The learned senior counsel questioned the conviction firstly on the ground that no conviction of the accused could have been made u/s 302 IPC, for non examination of the person who conducted the autopsy. Mr. Deb, the learned counsel submitted that in the absence of the witnesses, namely, Dr. Sudarshan Bhattacharjee who prepared the injury report and Dr. Sudhir Deb who conducted the post mortem report who were not produced in the Court for reasons best known to the prosecution, those reports could not have been taken into account by the learned Sessions Judge for convicting the accused u/s 302 read with 34 IPC. Mr. Deb, the learned counsel further submitted that in the absence of any reliable evidence against the accused persons of the existence of common intention the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention the accused could not have been convicted under Section 302 of the IPC in aid of Section 34 of the IPC. Mr. Deb, lastly submitted that even otherwise on the basis of the material evidence on record there was absolutely no evidence against the accused Suresh Das and Aloke Das, though at best some inference could be drawn for conviction of the accused Dhirendra Das and Babul Das for convicting them u/s 323 IPC.

(4.) Mr. S. Das, learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand supported the conviction and sentence and submitted that there were no infirmity in the finding of the learned Sessions Judge in convicting and sentencing the accused on the basis of evidence of PW 16 Dr. Somendra Ch. Chakraborty who proved the injury report as well as the post mortem report, since Dr. Somendra Ch. Chakraborty was competent to depose from the official record as he was the S. D. M. O. at the relevant time. Mr. Das, the learned Public Prosecutor took us through the evidence on record to persuade us for sustaining the conviction. The learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Das, submitted that in this case the accused were held constructively liable under section 34 of the ipc. the section has not created a distinct offence and is merely declaratory of a rule of joint criminal liability and this is only a rule of evidence, submitted the learned Prosecutor Mr. Das.

(5.) We have also taken into consideration the submission of the learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Das as to the admissibility of the evidene of the above two documents on the strength of Section 294 of the Cr.P.C. Chapter-XXIII of the Code in Part-A provides for evidence in inquiries and trials and Part-B provides for Commission for the examination of witnesses. section 293 of the code enables the Court to receive in evidence the report of certain Government scientific experts purporting to be a report under the hand of a Government scientific expert upon any matter or thing duly submitted to him for examination or analysis. The Court is conferred with the discretion to summon such ex- pert as to the subject matter of the report. Sub- section (4) of the above provision envisaged that the Section applies only to six categories of Government scientific experts. The above provision does not include the medical witnesses including the doctor who conducted the post mortem examination. Section 293 of the Code corresponds to Section 510 of the old code with a view to accelerate criminal proceeding. Parliament in its wisdom inserted new provision in Section 294 of the Code to avoid formal proof of certain documents on admission. Section 294 however can not be meant to have introduced for dowing away with the rule of evidence in criminal trial. In our Criminal Jurisprudence there are certain known principles of law, viz. :

(a) the burden of proof of all essential ingredients of the offence against the accused rests on the prosecution. (b) The evidence must be of unimpeachable nature excluding every reasonable doubt of guilt of the accused, (c) In the matter of doubt the benefit must go to the accused because it is safer to acquit than to convict, (d) There must be clear and unimpeachable proof of the corpus delicti. (e) Any hypothesis of guilt should be consistent with all facts.

The essential ingredients of the offence is to be established by the prosecution and prosecution alone and for that purpose it is the burden on the prosecution to establish the case against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. As alluded earlier the above two reports at best can be treated as opinions of experts. The Court is to arrive at its own opinion as to whether offence of murder was committed by the accused on the basis of evidence. The opinion of the expert is required to be proved orally since the post mortem report also contains the opinion of the doctor about the cause of the death. Such report can be used by the witnesses who conducted the post mortem enquiry in aid of his memory and the said report is required to be proved and established in conformity with Section 32 of the Evidence Act when the person is dead, or who can not be found or who has become incapable of giving evidence or attendance of whom can not be procured without an amount of delay or expense. Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence. Hear- say evidence is excluded for the reason that in the interest of justice, fair play and equity, it is desirable to produce the person before the Court, whose statement or evidence is sought to be relied upon, for the purpose of examination and interrogated in Court to assess the accuracy and check and confirm his or her credibility. Criminal Justice system requires that no evidence can be relied upon against an accused person unless he is given an opportunity of cross examining the witnesses so long as the accused is not afforded with the opportunity of cross examining the witnesses the same can not be used as piece of material against the accused person. All oral evidence u/s 60 must be direct. A post mortem report as such can not be treated as proof by itself as a substantive piece of evidence. The requirement of proof of guilt of a criminal case under no circumstances can be allowed to be overreached-by taking aid of Section 294 of tlhe Cr.P.C. Section 294 in our view contemplates only reading in evidence on the admission of genuineness by the opposite party only those documents when formally proved speaks for itself like letters, written documents executed etc. Section 294 can not thus be read as a mechanism to replace the substantive evidence as to the commission of offence. A Division Bench of this Court in Bhanda Garh - Vs- State of Assam, reported in 1984 Crl.L.J. 217 held that an expert evidence is relevent only under Section 45 of the Evidence Act. In the above case the Court held that the injury report Ext. 5 can not be admitted in evidence and relied on by the prosecution because the Doctor who examined the accused was not put in the witness box. The Madras High Court in Re Rangappa Goundan reported in (1936) ILR 59 Mad 349) relied on a decision in Queen Empress -Vs- Jadab Das (1900) ILR 27 Cal 295) and held that a post-mortem report proves nothing. It is not even evidence, and can only be used by the witness who conducted the post mortem inquiry as an aid to memory.

(6.) In this case no endeavour was made by the prosecution to produce those witnesses before the Court. The learned Pubic Prosecutor even prayed before this Court for examination of Dr. Sudarshan Bhattacharjee and Dr. Sudhir Deb and this Court by its order dated 31.5.96 allowed their evidence to be recorded by the learned Sessions Court. But despite that opportunity the witnesses could not be produced by the prosecution. In the absence of testimony of the doctor in the Court the above two reports could not have been acted upon by the learned trial Court.

(7.) From the evidence of the witnesses 'relied on by the prosecution more particularly the evidence of PWs 2,3,4,6,7 and 24 it emerges that accused Dhirai @ Dhirendra Das, Babul @ Sukanta Das and Aloke @ Subhendu Das assaulted the deceased by lathi. From the nature of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as well as the injuries inflicted by the accused it can not be said that the accused persons caused the death or caused such bodily in jury as was likely to cause death or with the knowledge that such act was likely to cause death of the deceased. We have scanned through the evidence and after going through the same it seems to us that the evidence which was adduced in Court falls short of proof of culpable homicide not to speak of murder. We accordingly set aside the conviction and sentence of the above? accused appellants under Section 302 IPC.

(8.) We have gone through the evidence on record and the totality of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, however leads us to believe that the accused Dhirendra, Babul and Aloke had the intention to cause grievous hurt to the deceased which resulted in the death. It can not however be ascertained as to who dealt the fatal blow. On evaluation of the evidence we are therefore of the view that the accused Dhirai @ Dhirendra Das, Babul @ Sukanta Das and Aloke @ Subhendu Das is to be convicted under Section 325 IPC read with 34 of the said Code and which we hereby do and accordingly the above three accused appellants are convicted u/s 325 IPC read with 34 of the said Penal Code. Considering the facts situation and the age of the accused we are of the view that the ends of Justice will be met if the above three accused appellants, namely, Dhirai @ Dhirendra Das, Babul @ Sukanta Das and Aloke @ Subhendu Das are sentenced for the period already undergone and which we accordingly do. The accused appellants mentioned above, namely, Dhirai @ Dhirendra Das, Babul @ Sukanta Das and Aloke @ Subhendu Das are accordingly sentenced for the period already undergone. There is no evidence of whatsoever manner against the accused appellant Suresh Das and accordingly his conviction and sentence are set aside and we acquit him from all the charges.

(9.) In the result the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. The sureties are discharged from their bail bonds.