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U. Bransly Nongaiang v. U. Drolishon Syiemiong & Ors. Opposite Parties.

Gauhati High Court
May 8, 1986
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses an application under Rule 13 of the Khasi Syiemship (Administration of Justice) Order, 1950 read with article 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing a final order dated 17.10.1985 passed by the Executive Magistrate, First Class, Nongstoin, Meghalaya in a proceeding under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The dispute arose from a complaint lodged by the petitioner alleging an attempted trespass and removal of boundary stones on disputed land by the opposite party. The police, after inquiry, prayed for initiation of proceedings under section 145 of the Code, which was accepted by the Executive Magistrate. The Magistrate proceeded with the case, ultimately dropping the proceedings after holding he had no jurisdiction to interfere with a prior civil court decree, but nonetheless ordered the petitioner not to disturb the opposite party's possession. The petitioner challenged this final order on grounds including denial of opportunity to contest and procedural irregularities.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Executive Magistrate had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the proceeding under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills District governed by the Khasi Syiemship Order.
  2. Whether the Magistrate's refusal to grant an adjournment and to allow the petitioner to file a written statement violated principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.
  3. Whether the Magistrate's ex-parte local inspection and decision without hearing both parties complied with the procedural requirements and principles of natural justice.
  4. Whether the impugned order injuncting the petitioner from disturbing the opposite party's possession was legally valid despite the Magistrate holding he had no jurisdiction to try the case.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that he was denied the right to contest the proceeding as the Magistrate rejected his prayer for adjournment due to his lawyer's failure to appear, thereby penalizing him for the lawyer's negligence.
  • The petitioner argued that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to pass an order injuncting him from disturbing the opposite party’s possession after holding he could not interfere with the civil court decree.
  • The petitioner claimed that the suit land and the disputed land were distinct, and that he was not a party to the civil suit, raising serious questions that required adjudication with both parties heard.
  • He challenged the ex-parte local inspection by the Magistrate as contrary to the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.

Opposite Party’s Arguments

  • The opposite party relied on the civil court decree in Title Suit No. 12/69 as establishing their right, contending that the Magistrate rightly held he had no jurisdiction to interfere with that decree.
  • Learned counsel for the opposite party submitted that applications against the impugned order were pending before the Additional Deputy Commissioner and the Sessions Judge, Shillong, suggesting deferment of this petition's disposal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Waghela Rajsanji v. Shekh Masludin (1887) 13 Ind. Appl. 89 Interpretation of "Justice, equity and good conscience" as rules of English law applicable to Indian society and circumstances. The Court applied this principle to interpret the procedural law in Khasi society, emphasizing the spirit rather than the letter of the Code.
Forching Rata v. The State, AIR 1952 Assam 3 Application of principles of justice, equity and good conscience in tribal areas. Referenced to support the application of equitable principles in the Khasi Syiemship judicial system.
N.W Kharmawphlang v. Kaj Kharmawphlang, AIR 1955 NOC Assam 4186 Same as above. Same as above.
Smti. Bhagwati Devi v. Smti. Uma Chatterjee, AIR 1960 Assam 305 Same as above. Same as above.
J. Rameswardin Singh v. Smti. Bidya Devi, AIR 1960 Assam 376 Same as above. Same as above.
Ka Idis Mary Khorkongor v. A. Theirit Lyngdoh, AIR 1960 Assam and Nagaland 92 Same as above. Same as above.
Digendra Kumar Das v. Rosle H. Rihimi, 1977 ALR 281 Same as above. Same as above.
Gurumayaum Sakhi Gopal Sharma, Civil Appeal No. 659 of 1957 Explanation of the application of "the spirit of law," justice, equity and good conscience in tribal areas. Supported the inherent power of courts in tribal areas to dispense justice in accordance with these principles.
State of Nagaland v. Ratan Singh (1966) 3 SCR 830 : AIR 1967 SC 212 Same as above. Reinforced the discretionary power of courts under the Khasi Syiemship Order to secure ends of justice.
Saptawna v. The State of Assam (1972) 4 SCC (N) 45 : AIR 1971 SC 813 Same as above. Same as above.
Mowu Angami v. Supdt. of Special Jail (1971) 3 SCC 936 Same as above. Same as above.
V.L Rohlu v. Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl District, 1971 Crl. L.J (N) 8 Same as above. Same as above.
Rafiq v. Munshilal (1981) 2 SCC 788 : AIR 1981 SC 1400 Whether it is just and equitable to penalize a litigant for the negligence or remiss of his lawyer. The Court held that an innocent party should not suffer due to lawyer’s negligence; this principle was applied to quash the Magistrate’s refusal to grant adjournment.
Goswami Krishna Murahlal Sharma v. Dhan Prakash (1981) 4 SCC 574 Same as above. Same as above.
Lachi Tewari v. Director of Land Records 1984 Supp SCC 431 : AIR 1984 SC 41 Same as above. Same as above.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by outlining the unique procedural framework under the Khasi Syiemship Order, emphasizing that the courts in the tribal areas are guided by the "spirit of the Code" of Criminal and Civil Procedure, and the principle of "Justice, equity and good conscience" rather than strict statutory interpretation. This principle originates from Roman and English legal traditions and is adapted to the tribal context to ensure justice is administered in an uncomplicated and equitable manner.

Applying this framework, the Court analyzed the impugned order and identified several critical errors by the Executive Magistrate:

  • The Magistrate held he lacked jurisdiction to try the case under section 145 but nonetheless issued an injunction against the petitioner, which the Court found illegal and beyond the Magistrate’s authority.
  • The refusal to grant an adjournment to the petitioner, who was unable to file his written statement due to his lawyer’s negligence, was held to violate principles of justice and equity. The Court relied on Supreme Court precedents establishing that a party should not be penalized for counsel’s default.
  • The Magistrate rejected the petitioner's written statement and denied him the opportunity to contest the case, resulting in a non-speaking order without reasons, which is contrary to the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.
  • The Magistrate failed to follow the mandatory procedure under section 145(4) of the Code, which requires calling parties to produce evidence and documents, thereby depriving the petitioner of a fair hearing.
  • The ex-parte local inspection conducted by the Magistrate without notice to the petitioner breached the principles of justice and good conscience, as such inspection should be conducted in the presence of both parties.
  • The Court acknowledged serious questions raised by the petitioner regarding the distinctness of the disputed land from the subject matter of the civil decree and the petitioner’s non-party status in the civil suit, which deserved adjudication after hearing both sides.

The Court concluded that the impugned order was contrary to the spirit of the law and the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, warranting its quashing and remand for fresh proceedings by a competent Magistrate.

Holding and Implications

The Court’s final decision is as follows:

The petition is accepted and the impugned order dated 17.10.1985 is set aside.

The Court directed the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Nongstoin, to take up the case or transfer it to another Magistrate competent to try the case, ensuring adherence to proper procedure and equitable principles.

The direct effect is that the petitioner is granted the opportunity to contest the proceeding fairly under the correct procedural framework. No new precedent is established beyond reaffirming the application of justice, equity and good conscience under the Khasi Syiemship Order and the established Supreme Court principles protecting litigants from penalization due to their counsel’s negligence.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an application under Rule 13 of the Khasi Syiemship (Administrution of Justice) Order, 1950, “the order” for short, read with article 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the final order dated 17.10.1985 passed by Executive Magistrate, First Class, Nongstoin, Meghalaya in a proceeding u/s. 145 of the Griminal Procedure Code.

2. “The order” provides the procedure for dispensing Civil and Criminal Justice in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills District. The term “Syiem” means the customary head of the Khasi Tri bal Institution within a definite administrative area in the distri cts. The Deputy Commissioner or the Additional Deputy Commissioner and his Assistants and the Court of Syiem try cases and the suits. The officers administering judicial justice are go verned by “the spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure”, and “the Code of Civil Procedure” hereinafter referred as “the Code”. The High Court may call for the records of these courts, examine the correctness, legality and propriety of any finding, order or sentence recorded or passed and may modify or set aside the order and/or remand the case for retrial. The High Court is also governed by “the spirit of the Code”. What is signification of the expression “JUSTICE EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE? WHY THE FORMULA IS APPLIED IN THE TRIBAL OF THE REGION? In the tribal areas the Chief or the Syiems etc. used to administer justice. They were socio-religious leaders rather, natural leaders accountable to God and the people. Trial system was simple, uncomplicated, even handed and speedy. Judges were not fettered by the quaniary of any procedural law apart from the customary procedure followed from time immemorial. The people were used to the system and were happy with it. It was therefore, decided not to bring the complicated procedural law to those areas. It is well known that the letter of a statute, as distinguished from its “spirit” means the strict and exact force of the language employed, as distinguished from the general purpose and policy of the law. The Courts were open the parties were given opportunities to produce evidenee and material, argue their cases and the justice were impartial. Those were the basic elements applicable in the legal system. As such the Centre constitued by “the Code” were not enchained to follow the strict and exact force of the language contained in “the Code”. The Courts are thererore to follow only the general purpose and policy of “the Code”.

3. The Formula “Justice, Equity and Good Conscience”—The origin of the formula lie in the Roman canonical sources, way back in the 16th Century. Late the formula was applied in Italy, Germany and France. It appealed the English legal system which modified and incorporated it in their own system.

4. The pramble to the Act of Succession enacted in 1536 used the expressions “Equity, reason and good conscience”. The East India Company carried the principle to India. In 1688, the Judges appointed in Bombay under the Company's Law were “to behave themselves according to good conscience”. The Royal Charters of 1683, 1687, 1726 and 1753 also used the expressions “Equity and Good Conscience” and “Justice and Right”. The Regulation of 1781 enjoined that in all cases for which no directions were given the respective Judge “do act according to justice, equity and good conscience”. The principles were to be applied where positive law or custom did not assist the Court to dispense judicial Justice. Indeed, the term “Justice” eludes a precise definition. It means the constant and perpetual disposition to render to every man his due. The Courts are to administer “commutative justice” and “distributive justice” as well. The expression “commutative justice” means that virtue whose object is to render to every one what belongs to him, as nearly as may be, or that which governs contracts. To render commutative justice, the judge must make an equality between the parties, so that no one may be gainer by another's loss. The expressions “distributive justice” means that virtue whose object is to distribute rewards and punishments to each one according, to his merits, observing a just proportion by comparing one person or fact with another, so that neither equal persons have unequal things nor unequal persons things equal. “Equity” is-a system of law or rules more consonant than the ordinary law which opinions current for the time being as to a just regulation of the mutual rights and duties of men living in a civilized society, vide Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 14. p. 464. ‘Equity’ according to Blackstone means “that portion of remedial justice which was formerly exclusively administered by a court of Equity as contra-distinguished from that portion which was formerly exclusively administered by a court of common law” vide Blackstone's Commentaries, 429-437. The meaning of the expressions “Justice, equity and good conscience” was summed up by Lord Hobhouse in Waghela Rajsanji v. Shekh Masludin, (1887) 13 Ind. Appl. 89 (96). “Justice, equity and good conscience” could be interpreted to mean the rules of English Law and found applicable to Indian society and circumstances”. It was said, with reference to the English Law. It may be stated in the context that the expressions should be interpreted to mean the Rules of “the Code” as found applicable to the Khasi society and circumstances. By application of the procedural law relating to trial of cases which were in vogue have been retained but the Court is given the scope and opportunity to apply the principles of “the Code” if found suitable to the society and the circumstances. One of the basic principles is that the principles which are universally accepted should be followed by the Courts. The principles of natural justice should be obeyed. Similarly, the Presiding Officer must be impartial having no interest in the case. The principles, and how “the Code” should be applied in “the area” are no longer res Integra. The High Court has explained the position in Forching Rata v. The State, AIR 1952 Assam 3, N.W Kharmawphlang v. Kaj Kharmawphlang, AIR 1955 NOC Assam 4186; Smti. Bhagwati Devi v. Smti. Uma Chatterjee, AIR 1960 Assam 305; J. Rameswardin Singh v. Smti. Bidya Devi, AIR 1960 Assam 376; Ka Idis Mary Khorkongor v. A. Theirit Lyngdoh, AIR 1960 Assam and Nagaland 92 and Digendra Kumar Das v. Rosle H. Rihimi, 1977 ALR 281.

5. The meaning of the expression “the spirit of law”, “Justice, equity and good conscience” and the method of their applications in the tribal areas have been out-lined by the Supreme Court in Gurumayaum Sakhi Gopal Sharma, Civil Appeal No. 659 of 1957 decided on 9.2.61; State of Nagaland v. Ratan Singh, (1966) 3 SCR 830 : AIR 1967 SC 212; Saptawna v. The State of Assam, (1972) 4 SCC (N) 45 : AIR 1971 SC 813; Mowu Angami v. Supdt. of Special Jail, (1971) 3 SCC 936; V.L Rohlu v. Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl District, 1971 Crl. L.J (N) 8. The power conferred on the Court is the inherent power to secure the ends of justice. The freedem is granted to the Courts to uphold the cause of justice or to secure the ends of justice and not to frustrate or impede the flow of justice. At this stage I recall the famous aphorism of that great historian Lord Acton:

‘Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely’.

6. When wide and inherent discretionary power has been conferred on the Court governed by the formula it was considered necessary that the higher courts should be careful to scrutinise the use or abuse of the power and accordingly “the order” empower the higher courts to be cautious, careful and circumspect to consider whether in a particular case the principles have been properly applied. Whether it has butteressed, fostered and promoted the cause of justice or hindered, voided and nullified the same. The Public Interest Litigations are in tune with the spirit of our enlightened Constitution. I feel that the decisions are based on spirit of the Constitution and on the principles of Justice, equity and good conscience to deliver judicial justice to the deserved.

7. THE PACTUAL MATRIX:

The petitioner apprehending breach of peace in respect of the disputed land lodged a complaint to the police alleging that the opposite party men armed with dsadiy weapons had tried to trespass upon the land, removed the boundary stones and threatened the petitioner and others with dire consequences. The police enquired into the matter and prayed to the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Nongstoin for drawal of proceeding u/s. 145 of “the Code”. It may be stated here that u/s 1(2) of “the Code” the provisions of section 145 are applicable in the area. The case was transferred to Mr. P. Roy Lawrimiang, Executive Magistrate, Ist Class, Nongstoin for disposal, who being satisfied that there was likelihood of breach of peace between the parties drew up a proceeding u/s. 145 of “the Code”, asked the police to attach the land and prohibited the parties from entering into it. The parties were asked to file written statement on 19.9.85 However, on the prayer of both the parties the date was extended to 11.10.85 On that date the petitioner-first party filed an application asking for time to file written statement stating, inter alia, that the brief and documents of the case bad been entrusted to his lawyer at Shillong for preparing the written statement but the lawyer did not turn up. Learned Magistrate rejected the prayer for adjournment on the ground that ‘the case’ was one of emergency*. The second-party filed their written statement. Learned Magistrate slraightway posted the case for final order on 17.10.85 without fixing any date for production of evidence by the parties. On 17.10.85 the petitioner filed his written statement and prayed that he should be allowed to contest the proceedings. Learned Magistrate rejected the written tatement and the prayer. He perused the written statement filed by the opposite party, the judgment and decree of Title Suit No. 12/69 and held that the Civil Court had already decided the right title and interest of the disputed land in favour of the second party. The impugned order also show that learned Magistrate-bad visited the disputed land and verified the boundaries of the disputed land and compared with (he bounds of the suit land. He held that the first party could but did not contest the civil action. He held that he was incompetent to entertain the proceeding as he bad no jurisdiction to interfere with the decree of the Civil Court and dropped the proceedings, released the land from attachment but strangely enough directed the first party petitioner not to disturb the right of the second party as decreed by the Civil Court.

8. There is no wrangle at the bar that the letters of Sec. 145 of ‘the Code’ are squarely applicable to the area and the procedure prescribed therein was required to be followed by the Magistrate. By the impugned order, learned Magistrate held that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and dropped the same However, having held so he injuncted the first party not to disturb the right of the second party. The principles of Justice, equity and good conscience or the spirit of ‘the Code’, do not empower a Court incompetent to try the case to render any effective order binding any of the parties. As such the order injuncting the first party is illegal and void and against all the known principles of law. It is directly opposed to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.

9. The second fatal error was the rejection of the prayer for adjournment when the first party failed to file his written statement due to the acts of inaction of his lawyer who was to attend court and file the written statement but did not turn up. It is thus seen that for the remiss or inaction or negligence of the lawyer the party was penalised. The petitioner did everything possible to cause the written statement to be filed. He engaged his lawyer who was to come and file the written statement but the lawyer failed to turn up and take steps. For the remiss of the lawyer the first party was penalised. Is it justice or equity or good conscience to penalise a party for the wrong of another person? The very same question came up before the Supreme Court, of course in different contexts, as to whether it was just and equitable to penalise a litigant for the negligence or remiss of his lawyer in Rafiq v. Munshilal, (1981) 2 SCC 788 : AIR 1981 SC 1400, Goswami Krishna Murahlal Sharma v. Dhan Prakash, (1981) 4 SCC 574 and Lachi Tewari v. Director of Land Records, 1984 Supp SCC 431 : AIR 1984 SC 41. The Supreme Court expressed the view that for the fault, remiss or negligence of the lawyer the party should not suffer. No innocent party should suffer injustice merely because his chosen advocate committed some error, wrong or mistake. When the innocent party could not prepare and file his written statement due to inaction or negligence of his lawyer he should not be made to suffer or penalised. This is an equitable rule applied by the Supreme Court in those cases. The Rules are of universal application. Situated thus and in view of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court I am constrained to hold that learned Magistrate committed a serious error in not granting a short adjournment to the petitioner. By the impugned order learned Magistrate disabled the petitioner to contest the case; he was thrown out of Court and that too for the inaction or negligence of his lawyer over which he had no hand at all. As such, the decision of the learned Magistrate is in breach of the spirit of the Code and the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. It is liable to be quashed.

10. Further, on 17.10.85, petitioner filed an application pra ying that his written statement be entertained and he should be allowed to contest the case. The prayer was rejected. Why was the first party penalised? There is no answer to the question. When the written statement was before the learned Magistrate he should have perused the same and should have decided the case on merits granting opportunities to both the parties. The act of refusal to entertain the written statement and not permi tting the petitioner-first party to contest the action are absolu tely illegal and without jurisdiction. No reason has been given for the rejection, and the order is a non speaking one and it is liable to be quashed on this ground as well.

11. Be that as it may, the Court was bound to follow the procedure laid down in sub sec. (4) of Sec. 145 of the Court, to call upon the parties, to produce documents and evidence in support of their case. This is mandatory provisions of law and it has been breached wherefore the first party did not get any opportu nity to produce any evidence. The petitioner was thrown out of court and was debarred from contesting the case. The subject-matter of the proceeding is a valuable property. The prejudice caused to the petitioner is writ large. A party should not be debarred to contest a case or action unless the law so permits, There was no reason for not allowing the petitioner to contest the proceeding.

12. It appears from the impugned order that the learned Magistrate made an ex-parte local inspection without serving any notice to the petitioner, allegedly compared the boundaries of the disputed land with those of the decree. This is also in total breach of the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. It should have been done in presence of both the parties.

13. The petitioner claims that he was not a party in the suit and the same was not enforceable against him. The petitioner further submits that the suit land is distinct and different from the disputed land. These are serious questions, and the court should have decided the questions upon hearing both the parties. I am constrained to hold that in the case in hand a party willing to contest the proceeding was denied the right to contest it without any rhyme or reason.

14. For the foregoing reasons I hold that the decision is against the spirit of the law. The procedure followed was in-violation of the principles of justice, equity and good conscience and, accordingly I set aside the impugned order dated 1.10.85 and direct the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Nongstain to-take up the case and/or transfer the case to some other Magistrate competent to try the case. Before parting with the records I would like to observe-that Mr. B.M Mahanta, learned counsel for the opposite party hag submitted that against the impugned order the petitioner filed an application to the Additional Deputy Commissioner and it was sent to the Sessions Judge, Shillong for disposal. Mr. Manama submits that two applications are pending against the impugned order and accordingly disposal of this petition should be deferred until a decision is given by the Sessions Judge. However, I find that Rule 13 of “the order” empowers this Court to entertain this application. Mr. Mahanta has failed ??? show that the Sessions Judge, Shillong has any jurisdiction to enterain any revision against the order. Be that as it may learned Sessions Judge has not yet passed any final order and as such, there is no impediment to dispose of this case, and accordingly, I have heard and disposed of the case.

15. In the result the petition is accepted.