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Mahmad Ali And Others v. Akram Ali And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The original suit was brought by the plaintiff for a declaration of title to the suit land, confirmation of possession and for partition. The land in dispute originally formed Cadestral Patta No. 129 in the joint names of two brothers: Anchal Mea (predecessor of the plaintiff) and Latu Mea (predecessor of the defendants). The patta was resurveyed in two operations: first into five R.S. pattas (165, 179, 180, 181 and 182) and thereafter into nine pattas (second R.S. pattas 261, 248, 249, 250, 251, 231, 240, 253 and 254).
The plaintiff asserted that Anchal Mea's share was 46-B. 4-K. 6-Ch. and that the plaintiff had additionally purchased 4-B. 14-K. 3-Ch. from some heirs of Latu Mea under three sale deeds (Exts. 10, 11 and 18), thereby claiming 50-B. 18-K. 19-Ch. After allowing for river erosion, the plaintiff prayed for declaration in respect of 49-B. 3-K. 14-Ch. and 4-G. The defendants contended that Anchal and Latu held equal interests in Patta No.129 and that the plaintiff could not acquire certain lands by purchase because those lands had earlier been repurchased by the defendants from Khurshed Ali.
At trial, both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence. The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit in full for the plaintiff. The defendants appealed; the Single Judge modified the trial court's decree by finding that the predecessors held equal halves of the patta (37-B. 9-K. 10-Ch. each) and that the plaintiff had acquired 3-B. 10-K. by purchase (Exts. 10, 11 & 18), resulting in a decree for a smaller area after erosion. The original plaintiff died during the appeal and his legal representatives were substituted. The plaintiff-respondents thereafter filed a Letters Patent Appeal; the defendants filed a cross-objection challenging the 3-B. 10-K. finding.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the two brothers, Anchal Mea and Latu Mea, had equal shares in C.S. Patta No. 129 (as alleged by the defendants) or unequal shares (as alleged by the plaintiff).
- Whether a respondent may file a cross-objection in a Letters Patent Appeal (i.e., the applicability of the provisions of Order 41, Rule 22 CPC to Letters Patent Appeals).
- On the cross-objection: whether the plaintiff's title by purchase under sale deeds Exts. 10, 11 and 18 is limited by an earlier sale (Ext. K/Ext. 55) by Khurshed Ali which, if valid, would reduce the area transferable to the plaintiff.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's (original) Arguments
- The plaintiff maintained that Anchal Mea had a larger share (46-B. 4-K. 6-Ch.) in the original patta and that the plaintiff had further acquired 4-B. 14-K. 3-Ch. from heirs of Latu Mea under sale deeds Exts. 10, 11 and 18, giving him a larger aggregate share.
- The plaintiff relied on sale deeds executed by Anchal Mea (including a sale deed dated 2-4-1906) and on purchases from sisters under Exts. 7 and 8, which he treated as evidence of his title and acquisitions.
- At the hearing before this Court, counsel for the appellant (as described in the opinion) contended that the 1906 sale deed did not prove that Anchal had only 37-B. 9-K. 10-Ch. and suggested that, if the 1906 deed had transferred the entire interest, there would have been no need for the plaintiff to purchase the interests of his sisters under Exts. 7 and 8.
Defendants' (original) Arguments
- The defendants contended that the two brothers held equal interests in the patta and that the plaintiff could not acquire certain acreage by purchase (Exts. 10, 11 & 18) because the defendants had earlier repurchased that land from Khurshed Ali.
- In the cross-objection the defendants argued that Khurshed Ali had in aggregate purchased 7-B. 17-K. 14-Ch. and subsequently sold back portions such that at the time of the plaintiff's alleged purchases Khurshed Ali had at most 1-B. 3-K. 6-Ch. left to sell; hence the plaintiff could not validly claim more than that from Exts. 10 and 11. They also relied on the validity (or otherwise) of Ext. K (also marked Ext. 55) — a sale by Khurshed to his son Mayor.
- Separately, the appellants raised a preliminary objection that Rule 22 of Order 41 CPC (permitting cross-objections) does not apply to Letters Patent Appeals and therefore no cross-objection lies.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sabitri Thakurani v. Savi, AIR 1921 PC 80 | Privy Council decision that Order 41 of the CPC is applicable to Letters Patent Appeals (considered in context of Rule 10 relating to security for costs). | The Court adopted the Privy Council's reasoning and treated this decision as supporting the applicability of Order 41 provisions to Letters Patent Appeals, as part of its justification for permitting cross-objections. |
| Venkateshan Chetty v. Motichand, AIR 1926 Mad 316 (Full Bench) | Madras Full Bench holding that a respondent in a Letters Patent Appeal from the original side could file a cross-objection (overruling an earlier Madras decision). | The Court expressly agreed with the Madras Full Bench view and cited it as authority supporting the proposition that cross-objections lie in Letters Patent Appeals. |
| Bhimasena v. Venugopal, AIR 1925 Mad 725 | Earlier Madras decision (overruled by Venkateshan Chetty). | Noted as an earlier decision that was overruled; used to contrast the development of authority in Madras. |
| State of West Bengal v. Ruttonjee, AIR 1970 Cal 548 | Calcutta High Court holding that Order 41 Rule 22 CPC is applicable to Letters Patent Appeals and that cross-objection lies (departing from an earlier Calcutta decision). | The Court cited and followed the Calcutta High Court's departure from earlier authority, adopting its conclusion that cross-objections are permissible in Letters Patent Appeals. |
| Brojendra v. Prasunna, AIR 1920 Cal 776 | Earlier Calcutta decision (departed from in Ruttonjee). | Referred to as an earlier conflicting authority which Ruttonjee departed from; used to demonstrate the judicial divergence on the point. |
| Khazanchi v. Niaz Ali, AIR 1940 Lah 438 | Lahore High Court decision taking the view that cross-objection lies in Letters Patent Appeals. | The Court cited the Lahore High Court as another authority in favour of permitting cross-objections and adopted the view while resolving the preliminary objection. |
| Daropudi v. S.K. Dutta, AIR 1957 All 43 | Allied decision of the Allahabad High Court holding that no cross-objection lies in Letters Patent Appeals (contrary view). | The Court acknowledged this contrary view and explained the reasoning adopted by Allahabad HC but declined to follow it, instead following the Privy Council/Madras/Calcutta/Lahore line. |
| Mt. Abhilakhi v. Sadanand, AIR 1931 All 244 | Allahabad Full Bench principle relied upon in support of the view that review-type applications do not lie before a Bench hearing an appeal from a Single Judge (distinguishing power from procedure). | The Court noted this authority as part of the rationale used by the Allahabad High Court in taking a contrary stance, but the present Court did not adopt that restrictive view. |
| (Decision cited in the opinion) AIR 1957 All 48 | Allahabad High Court decision cited as holding that no cross-objection lies in a Letters Patent Appeal because the Letters Patent did not provide for it. | The Court recorded this authority and the reasoning behind it, but ultimately declined to accept that it precluded cross-objections, instead accepting the contrary line of authorities and also relying on Rule 33 of Order 41 CPC as a saving power. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two main stages: (A) the primary dispute about shares in the cadestral patta; and (B) the procedural question and the cross-objection on the merits.
A. Determination of the shares in C.S. Patta No. 129
- The Court acknowledged the starting presumption that where two brothers inherit land from their father, equality of shares is the natural presumption.
- The defendants asserted that Latu Mea had disposed of substantial portions of his share prior to issuance of C.S. Patta No. 129, which would explain a lesser share; the plaintiff could not substantiate large disposals by Latu.
- The Court accepted the sale deed dated 2-4-1906 (produced as additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27) executed by Anchal Mea selling 37-B. 9-K. 10-Ch., where the recitals described the land as "the half share of the total land of the patta" and thus indicating Anchal's half share. The recitals were treated as clear and probative on the point of equality.
- The Court considered the plaintiff's contention (that Anchal must have had more land because the plaintiff later purchased his sisters' shares under Exts. 7 & 8) and analyzed arithmetic implications. It concluded that the purchases from sisters are reconcilable with the 1906 sale deed and that the existence of Exts. 7 & 8 did not undermine the 1906 deed. Notably, the 1906 deed had not been challenged as inauthentic, and the plaintiff had referred to it in pleadings but had not produced it at trial.
- On balance, the Court upheld the Single Judge's finding that Anchal and Latu held equal shares (each 37-B. 9-K. 10-Ch.) and therefore was satisfied that the Single Judge was justified in modifying the trial court's decree on that basis.
B. Procedural objection and cross-objection merit
- Preliminary objection: appellants argued that Rule 22 of Order 41 CPC (permitting cross-objections) does not apply to Letters Patent Appeals and hence no cross-objection lies. The Court examined comparative authorities (Privy Council and various High Courts) and concluded that the better view, adopting the Privy Council reasoning and following Madras (Full Bench), Calcutta and Lahore High Courts, is that cross-objections do lie in Letters Patent Appeals from decisions of a Single Judge.
- The Court additionally observed that even if one assumed a respondent had no statutory right to file a cross-objection, Rule 33 of Order 41 CPC gives the appellate Court power to pass any decree or make any order which ought to have been passed or made, leaving the Court empowered to deal with matters as justice requires. This served as an alternative basis to entertain and decide the cross-objection on merits.
- Merits of the cross-objection: the central factual contention was whether Khurshed Ali had sufficient title at the time of Exts. 10 and 11 to convey the extent claimed by the plaintiff. The defendants argued that Khurshed had been left with only 1-B. 3-K. 6-Ch. after prior transactions and therefore the plaintiff could not have validly purchased more than that from Khurshed under Exts. 10 & 11.
- The trial court had held that sale deed Ext. K (sale by Khurshed to his son Mayor) was not genuine because Khurshed's name appeared written under his "nisan" and the person who wrote the name was not examined. The present Court noted that the same form of execution (name written under nisan and writer not examined) applied to Exts. 10 and 11 which were relied on by the plaintiff. Moreover, the plaintiff had not challenged Ext. K at trial nor led evidence on that point; the trial Judge expressly recorded that the plaintiff did not challenge Ext. K.
- Given these facts, the Court found it was not open to hold Ext. K to be not genuine while relying on Exts. 10 & 11, which shared similar execution features and for which the plaintiff had relied on without challenging the writer of the name. Consequently, the Court concluded that the plaintiff could only derive 1-B. 3-K. 6-Ch. by purchase from Khurshed under Exts. 10 & 11; the remaining portion claimed under Ext. 18 (15-K. 7-Ch.) was not challenged.
- The Court then performed the arithmetic aggregation: original half-share 37-B. 9-K. 10-Ch. plus purchase entitlements (1-B. 3-K. 6-Ch. from Exts. 10 & 11 and 15-K. 7-Ch. from Ext. 18) amounted to 39-B. 8-K. 1-Ch. After deducting the admitted erosion (1-B. 14-K. 10-Ch. 16 G.), the net decreed area for the plaintiff was 37-B. 13-K. 6-Ch. and 4 Gondas.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed and the cross-objection is partly allowed. The decree is modified so that the plaintiff is decreed title and possession to 37-B. 13-K. 6-Ch. and 4 Gondas of land.
Implications:
- Direct effect on parties: The trial court's full decree for the plaintiff was reduced by the Single Judge; this Court further modified the Single Judge's decree so that the plaintiff's net entitlement is fixed at 37-B. 13-K. 6-Ch. and 4 Gondas. The cross-objection succeeded in part to limit the area the plaintiff acquired by purchase from Khurshed Ali.
- Procedure: The Court adopts the view that cross-objections lie in Letters Patent Appeals (following the Privy Council and the decisions of the Madras Full Bench, Calcutta and Lahore High Courts) and also relied on Rule 33 of Order 41 CPC as an alternative source of power to pass appropriate decrees in the appeal.
- Precedential stance: The Court followed and reconciled existing authorities; it did not purport to lay down a novel principle overriding prior decisions but rather adopted the line permitting cross-objections and expressly recorded the alternative basis under Rule 33. The opinion does not state that it sets a new precedent beyond its adoption of those earlier authorities.
Result: Appeal dismissed; cross-objection partly allowed; no order as to costs.
Sarma, J.:— This is a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge dated 8th August, 1974 passed in First Appeal No. 45 of 1965 modifying the decree of the trial court.
2. The plaintiffs brought the suit for declaration of his title to the suit land, for confirmation of possession thereon as well as for partition. The suit land originally appertained to cadestral patta No. 129 which stood in the names of two brothers, namely, Anchal Mea, predecessor of the plaintiff and Latu Mea, predecessor of the defendants. The patta covered an area of 74-B. 19k. and 4-Ch. The cadestral patta was resurveyed in five pattas during the first resettlement operation. The five resettlement pattas are first R.S Patta Nos. 165, 179, 180, 181 and 182. These five R.S Pattas were again resurveyed during the second resettlement operation in nine pattas, namely, second R.S Patta Nos. 261, 248, 249, 250, 251, 231, 240, 253 and 254. The original pattadars, namely, Anchal Mea and Latu Mea died leaving several heirs, each. Although each of them left several heirs, there is no dispute now that the plaintiff Mosaid Mea who was the son of Anchal Mea came to be the owner of the entire land falling in the share of Anchal Mea by right of inheritance as well as by purchase from other co-sharers. Similarly, although there were various other heirs left by Latu Mea, there is no dispute that present defendants have become the owners of the entire share of Latu Mea by inheritance as well as by purchase from other co-shares.
3. According to the plaintiff his predecessor Anchal Mea had 46-B. 4-K. 6-Ch. of land in Cadestral Patta No. 129 and his brother Latu Mea had only 28-B. 14-K. 14-Ch. of land. Besides 46-B. 4-K. and 6-Ch. of land left by Anchal Mea, the plaintiff claimed in the plaint another 4-B. 14-K. 3-Ch. of land by purchase from some of the heirs of Latu Mea under three sale deeds. Thus the plaintiff claimed 50-B. 18-K. 19-Ch, of land in the disputed pattas by right of inheritance and purchase. As 1-B. 14-K. 10-Ch. and 16-G. of land, out of the aforesaid area, was eroded by river, the plaintiff prayed for a declaration of his title to 49-B. 3-K. 14-Ch. and 4-G. of land in the disputed pattas and also for confirmation of his possession and partition. The defendants' case is that the two brothers, Anchal Mea and Latu Mea were the owners of equal interest in the disputed cadestral patta No. 129. The defendants' further case is that by his purchase under 3 sale deeds Exts. 10, 11 and 18 the plaintiff could not acquire any interest over 4-B. 14-K and 3-Ch. of land as the defendants had earlier repurchased this land from Khurshed Ali to whom their predecessor Anju Mea had sold the same.
4. Both the parties adduced oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their respective cases and on a consideration of the same the learned Subordinate Judge decreed in full the plaintiff's suit, i.e in respect of 49-B. 3-K. 14-Ch. and 4-G. of land in the disputed patta. Being aggrieved by the decree of the trial court the defendants filed an appeal before this Court, which was heard and disposed of by a single Judge, as indicated above, by his judgment dated 8-8-74.
5. On a consideration of the evidence on record, the learned single Judge held that the predecessors of both the parties, namely, Anchal Mea and Latu Mea held equal interest in the cadestral patta i.e 37-B. 9-K. 10-Ch. of land each. He also found that the plaintiff acquired his interest to an area of another 3-B. 10-K. by purchase under 3 sale deeds marked Exts. 10, 11 and 18. Thus the learned Judge found that the plaintiff had his interest over an area of 40-B. 19-K. and 10-Ch. of land in the disputed pattas. But as an area of 1-B. 14-K. 10-Ch. and 16-G. had been eroded by river out of this area, he decreed the plaintiff's suit in respect of 39-B. 4-K. 15-Ch. and 14-G. only.
6. It may be mentioned here that during the pendency of the appeal the original plaintiff-respondent Mosad Mea having died, his legal representatives were substituted as respondents.
7. Being aggrieved by the decree of the learned single Judge, the plaintiff-respondents have filed this Letters Patent Appeal. The defendant-respondents have also filed a cross-objection in respect of 3-B. 10-K. of land to which the plaintiff was found to be entitled by right of purchase under sale deeds Exts. 10, 11 and 18.
8. The only point for determination in this appeal is whether the two brothers, namely, Anchal Mea and Latu Mea had equal shares in C.S Patta No. 129, as alleged by the defendants or they had unequal shares in the said patta, as alleged by the plaintiff.
9. It is an admitted fact that Anchal Mea and Latu Mea in whose name C.S Patta No. 129 was issued were brothers and they inherited the land of the patta from their father. That being so, the natural presumption would be that both the brothers had equal shares in the land of the patta. The defendants alleged that before C.S Patta No. 129 was issued, the suit land appertained to Khasra patta No. 53/55 which also contained other lands and at that time Latu Mea disposed of some lands from his share in the said Khasra patta and that is why his share in C.S Patta No. 129 came to be lesser than that of his brother Anchal Mea. The plaintiff, however, could not prove that Latu Mea disposed of lands from his share to the extent of 18-B or so to bring down his interest in the cadestral patta to only 28-B. and odd as against 46-B. 4-K and 6-Ch. of his brother Anchal Mea. The plaintiff proved only one sale deed which was marked Ext. 56 by which Latu Mea sold 1 kedar of land i.e 1-B. 1-K. 4-Ch of land in favour of two persons, namely Abdul Rokman Mea Barbhuyan and Umed Raja Mea Barbhuyan. On the other hand the defendants have proved two sale deeds which were marked Exts. ‘L’ and ‘M’ by which Latu Mea purchased 5 kedars of land from one Chandan Jugini in Khasra patta No. 53/55. The contention of the plaintiff that the share of Latu Mea in the C.S Patta No. 129 was reduced to 28 bighas and odd only, as against 46-B, and odd of his brother Anchal Mea on account of the fact that he had disposed of his remaining lands, before the issue of the cadestral patta could not be substantiated. On the other hand the defendants proved the certified copy of a sale deed executed by Anchal Mea in favour of the plaintiff and his mother on 2-4-1906 before the single Judge at the time of hearing of the appeal by way of additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27. By this sale deed Anchal Mea sold 37-B. 9-K. 10-Ch. of land covered by C.S Patta No. 129 i.e the disputed patta. In this sale deed, the land sold has been described as below “the land described in the schedule of the sale deed measuring 37-B. 9-K. 10-Ch. covered by patta No. 129 of village Mohanpur Part II of Sub-division Hailakandi, Disict Cachar, being the half share of the total land of the patta which was my originally settled land with revenue of Rs. 22/15/6 P., being the half of the total revenue of Rs. 45 and As. 15.” The recitals in this sale deed make it clear that the two brothers had equal shares in C.S Patta No. 129.
10. Mr. A.K Laskar, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted before us that the aforementioned sale deed dated 2nd April, 1906 executed by Anchal Mea does not go to show that he had no other land in the patta except 37-B 9-K and 10-Ch. of land which he had sold to his son Mosaid Ali Barbhuyan and his wife Mahat Bibi. He further submitted that if his entire land in the patta was sold in favour of the plaintiff and his mother Mahat Bibi under the said sale deed, the plaintiff would have no occasion to purchase the interest of his two sisters, namely, Jarina Bibi and Rabejan Bibi under sale deeds Exts. 7 and 8 which were not challenged by the defendants.
11. In our opinion the recitals in the sale deed dated 2nd April, 1906 executed by Anchal Mea in favour of the plaintiff and his mother, are clear enough to indicate that he had only half share in the patta, i.e to the extent of 37-B. 9-K. 10-Ch. The other contention is also without any substance. By Ext. 7 Jarina Bibi, a sister of the plaintiff, sold 6-B. 9-K. 12-Ch. to him (plaintiff) and similarly by Ext. 8 the heirs of Musst. Robejan, another sister of the plaintiff, sold to him 6-B. 9-K. 12-Ch. of land. If Anchal Mea had 46-B. 4-K. 6-Ch. of land in the C.S Patta No. 129, as alleged by the plaintiff, after he had sold 37-B. 9-K. 10-Ch. of land to the plaintiff and his mother by sale deed 2nd April, 1906, he would have been left with only 8-B. 14-K. 12-Ch. of land to be inherited by his wife, one son i.e the plaintiff and two daughters, namely, Jarina and Robejan. In that case Jarina and Robejan could not have inherited 6-B. 9-K. 12-Ch. of land, each in C.S Patta No. 129 from their father to be transferred to the plaintiff afterwards under Exts. 7 and 8. If these sale deeds are genuine, the heirs of Anchal Mea gave a go-by to the sale deed dated 2-4-1906 and treated the entire original interest of Anchal Mea in the patta as available for inheritance by all his heirs. Be that as it may, it has not been challenged on behalf of the appellants that Anchal Mea in fact executed the sale deed dated 2-4-1906. In the plaint as well as in his evidence, the plaintiff referred to this sale but for obvious reasons he did not produce the sale deed in court. Thus, in any view of the case, we are unable to hold that the learned single Judge was wrong in coming to his finding that Anchal Mea and Latu Mea predecessors of the plaintiff and the defendants, respectively, had equal interest in the patta. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, perfectly justified in modifying the decree of the trial court on the basis of this finding. This brings us to the cross-objection filed by the defendant-respondents.
12. The appellants have taken a preliminary objection that in a Letters Patent Appeal, the provisions of Rule 22 of Order 41 of the CPC are not applicable and, therefore, no cross-objection lies. This question is not free from difficulty and the High Courts are not unanimous on the point. Prior to the Privy Council decision in Sabitri Thakurani v. Savi, AIR 1921 PC 80, all the High Courts before which this question came up for consideration, held that no cross-objection lies, on the footing that the provisions of Order 41 of the CPC were not applicable in a Letters Patent appeal. In the aforesaid decision the Privy Council held that Order 41 of the CPC is applicable to Letters Patent appeal. The point for determination in that case was whether Rule 10 of Order 41 regarding Appellate Court's power to require appellant to furnish security for costs is applicable in Letters Patent Appeal and it was decided in the affirmative. After this decision, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Venkateshan Chetty v. Motichand, AIR 1926 Mad 316, overruling its earlier decision in Bhimasena v. Venugopal, AIR 1925 Mad 725, held that a respondent in a Letters Patent Appeal from the original side, could file cross-objection. Similarly, the Calcutta High Court also has held in State of West Bengal v. Ruttonjee, AIR 1970 Cal 548, departing from its earlier decision in Brojendra v. Prasunna, AIR 1920 Cal 776 held that O. 41 Rule 22 of the CPC was applicable to Letters Patent Appeal and therefore cross-objection lies. The Lahore High Court has also taken a similar view in Khazanchi v. Niaz Ali, AIR 1940 Lah 438. The Allahabad High Court has however taken a contrary view in Daropudi v. S.K Dutta, AIR 1957 All 43 in spite of the Privy Council decision aforesaid. In taking this view the Court followed the principle laid down in its earlier Full Bench decision in Mt. Abhilakhi v. Sadanand, AIR 1931 All 244, where it was held that no application for review lies before a Bench hearing an appeal from the decision of a single Judge. The reason assigned by the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1931 All 244 for taking such view was that procedure is one thing and power is another thing. A Bench hearing a Letters Patent Appeal derives its jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the Letters Patent and not from the Code. As the Letters Patent has not provided for any review, the court cannot entertain any review petition in Letters Patent appeal. For the same reason, in AIR 1957 All 48 (supra), it was held that no cross-objection lies in a Letters Patent appeal as the Letters Patent has not provided for any such cross-objection.
13. We may also mention here that the Letters Patent Appeal dealt with by the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1957 All 48 (supra) was from the decision of a single Judge in a Second Appeal. As the Lahore High Court observed: “The matter might be different in the case of a second appeal, for, a Letters Patent Appeal in such a case is possible with the certificate of the Judge who heard the case in a single Bench. Therefore the question of cross-objection in such a case might raise a question of jurisdiction as distinct from a matter of procedure.”
14. Adopting the reasoning given by the Privy Council in Sabitri Thakurani's case (AIR 1921 PC 80), though in a different context, we respectfully agree with the view taken by the Madras, Calcutta and Lahore High Courts in AIR 1926 Mad 316 (FB) : AIR 1970 Cal 548 and AIR 1940 Lah 438, respectively, that cross-objection lies in Letters Patent Appeal from a decision of the single Bench Judge in the First Appeal.
15. Even if it is assumed that the respondent has no right to file any cross-objection in such an appeal, the power of the Court in dealing with an appeal, to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made, as justice of the case may require, is there as provided in Rule 33 of O. 41 of the CPC. Having thus disposed of the preliminary objection of the appellants we now proceed to decide the cross-objection on merits.
16. As already pointed out, by the cross-objection the respondents have challenged the decree of the learned single Judge in respect of 3-B 10-K of land which was claimed by the plaintiff on the basis of three sale deeds, namely, Exts. 10, 11 and 18. At the time of hearing the learned counsel for the respondents challenged the decree of the learned single Judge in respect of 1-B. 3-K. 6-Ch. of land. In this regard his contention was as below:
One Khursed Ali purchased 5-B 9-K 6-Ch. of land from late Arju Mea, predecessor of defendants by two sale deeds, namely, Exts. 53 dated 8-4-1920 and Ext. 54 dated 18-3-1926. Earlier he had purchased 2-B. 8-K. 8-Ch. of land from Moirang Bibi, a daughter of late Latu Mea under sale deed Ext. E dated 16-10-1906. Thus Khursed purchased in all 7-B 17-K 14-Ch. in the disputed patta. Out of this land he sold back to Arju Mea 4-B 6-K 0ch. of land under two sale deeds, namely, Ext. 1 dated 18-3-26 and Ext. J dated 27-2-29. He also sold 2-B. 8-K 8-Ch. of land to his son Mayor on 3-4-38 vide sale deed Ext. K. Thus, after these three sales, Khursed was left with only 1-B. 3-K. 6-Ch. of land alone in the patta. The plaintiff claimed to have purchased 2-B. 14-K. 9-Ch. of land from Khursed under two sale deeds, Exts. 10 and 11 dated 1-5-42 and 15-3-45, respectively. As at that point of time Khursed was left with only 1-B. 3-K. 6-Ch. of land, the plaintiff could not claim more than that area by his purchase. Having realised this position, the plaintiff prayed for a declaration that the sale deed Ext. K (it was also marked as Ext. 55) executed by Khursed in favour of Mayor Ali is void. The learned trial court granted this prayer, but the learned single Judge failed to consider this aspect altogether.
17. Mr. A.K Laskar, the learned counsel for the respondents challenged the claim of the respondents, in their cross-objection only on the basis of the sale deed Ext. K. If this document is valid, the contention of the respondents must be upheld.
18. In its judgment the trial court held that this document is not genuine, simply on the ground that Khursed Ali's name was written as executant under his ‘Nisan’ and it was not signed by himself and the man who wrote his name on his behalf was also not examined. We however find that in the sale deeds Exts. 10 and 11 which were relied on by the plaintiff Khursed Ali's names were similarly written under his ‘Nisan’ and the persons who wrote his name in the sale deeds were not examined.
19. It also appears that the plaintiff did not challenge the sale deed Ext. K at the time of hearing and he led no evidence on that point. The trial Judge himself has observed in his judgment at page 45 of the Paper Book that the plaintiff did not challenge this deed. In these circumstances we fail to understand how the sale deed Ext. K could be said to be not genuine. It appears the learned single Judge, while disposing of the appeal inadvertently lost sight of this aspect of the case.
20. From the foregoing discussion it is seen that the plaintiff can get only 1-B. 3-K. 6-Ch. of land by his purchase under sale deeds Exts. 10 and 11. His title to 15-K 7-Ch of land purchased under another sale deed Ext. 18 dated 2-7-30 from Arju Mea was not challenged by the defendant-respondents. Thus in all he is entitled to get 1-B. 18-K. 13-Ch. of land under the sale deeds Exts. 10, 11 and 18 in addition to 37-B. 9-K. 10-Ch. of land representing original half share in the patta, totalling 39-B 8-K 1-Ch. Out of this area, admittedly 1-B. 14-K. 10-Ch. 16 Gondas has been eroded by a river leaving only 37-B 13-K 6-Ch 4 Gondas of land for the plaintiff.
21. In the result we modify the decree of the learned single Judge and decree the plaintiff suit for only 37-B. 13-K. 6-Ch. and 4 Gondas. The appeal is dismissed and the cross-objection is partly allowed as indicated above. We however make no order as to costs.
22. Lahiri, J.:— I agree.
23. Appeal dismissed. Cross objection partly allowed.
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