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The Premier Insurance Co. Ltd. v. The Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jorhat And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act against an award made by the Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at Jorhat in Motor Accidents Claims Case No. 104 of 1968. The claimant, Lakhikanta Rajkonwar, alleged that he was hit by lorry No. ASJ-3083 owned by respondent No. 3, Kanta Prasad Singh. As a result of the accident the upper end of his right thigh bone was fractured into four pieces. He received treatment at the Christian Mission Hospital, Jorhat. At the time of the accident he was said to be about 57 years old and employed as a Tea Garden Mohurir at Hunwal Tea Company Ltd., earning Rs. 350 per month; he was expected to be in service for about seven months from the date of the accident. He claimed treatment expenses of Rs. 2,500 and total compensation of Rs. 30,000.
The insurer, Premier Insurance Company Ltd. (appellant), and the insured owner Kanta Prasad Singh (respondent No. 3) both filed objections disputing, among other things, negligence, the claimant's salary, and the quantum claimed as excessive. The Claims Tribunal tried the matter, framed seven issues (including cause of action, maintainability, negligence, salary, entitlement and excessiveness), and after trial awarded an aggregate sum of Rs. 12,274.45. The Tribunal held that the claimant sustained injury due to negligence of the vehicle's driver and ordered that, because the vehicle was insured with the appellant, the awarded amount be recoverable from the insurer.
Before this Court a preliminary objection was raised by learned counsel for the respondent that, in view of Section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the pleas advanced by the insurer were not available to it and consequently the appeal based on those pleas was incompetent.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an insurer who has been given notice under Section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act is entitled to defend the action on grounds other than those expressly enumerated in Section 96(2).
- Whether the appellant (insurer) could impugn the Claims Tribunal's decree in appeal on pleas which, it is contended, were not available to the insurer under Section 96(2).
- Generally, whether the award made by the Claims Tribunal (Rs. 12,274.45) was properly recoverable from the insurer — though the Court's decision turned on the preliminary objection concerning Section 96(2).
Arguments of the Parties
Claimant's Position
- Claimed compensation of Rs. 30,000 for fracture injury to right thigh; alleged monthly salary Rs. 350 and treatment expenses of Rs. 2,500; asserted injury caused by the insured vehicle.
Appellant (Premier Insurance Company Ltd.) — Insurer
- Objected that the claimant's injuries resulted from his own indecision, fault, negligence or carelessness and not from any fault of the vehicle or driver.
- Denied that the claimant's monthly salary was Rs. 350 or that he was entitled to the claimed compensation (or any portion of it) from the insurer.
- Contended, without prejudice, that the compensation demanded was highly excessive and without basis.
- In argument before this Court the appellant relied on a policy condition (Condition No. 2) suggesting the insurer may have rights to control defence or settlement and therefore submitted that the insurer could take broader pleas.
Respondent No. 3 (Kanta Prasad Singh) — Insured
- Denied the claimant's asserted monthly salary and entitlement to claimed compensation.
- Alleged that the claimant's injuries were due to his own indecision, fault, negligence or carelessness and not due to any fault or lapse of the insured vehicle or its driver.
- Contended that the claim was highly inflated and inadmissible in law on the facts and circumstances.
Preliminary Objection Raised by Respondent's Counsel
- Submitted that in view of Section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act the specific pleas taken by the appellant were not available to the insurer and therefore the appeal founded on those pleas was not competent.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Itbar Singh | Holds that when an insurer becomes a party under Section 96(2) it is entitled to defend only on the grounds expressly enumerated in sub‑section (2), and cannot rely on other grounds of defence available to the assured; sub‑section (3) and (6) shape the limits of the insurer's defence. | The Court adopted this authority to interpret Section 96(2) and (6) of the Act, concluding that the insurer is limited to the defences enumerated in Section 96(2) and cannot avoid liability by raising other grounds not specified therein. |
| Rameshwar Hazarika v. Promode Kanta Barua | Affirms that under Section 96(2) of the Act, an insurer can raise only the limited defences set out in Section 96(2)(a), (b) and (c). | Used as supporting authority for the proposition that the insurer's defences are confined to those specifically listed in Section 96(2), reinforcing the conclusion reached by the Court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began with statutory interpretation of Section 96, particularly sub‑section (2) and sub‑section (6). It observed that the right of an insurer to be made a party and to defend is a statutory right; hence its scope must be determined by the language of the statute itself. The Court read the plain language of sub‑section (2), which entitles an insurer "to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely" and then enumerates specific grounds.
From that textual reading the Court drew the following analytic conclusions:
- Because the statute itself specifies the grounds of defence, an insurer is entitled only to those enumerated grounds; additional grounds cannot be read into the provision without adding words to the statute.
- Sub‑section (6) reinforces this limitation by providing that an insurer to whom notice has been given shall not be entitled to avoid liability otherwise than in the manner provided by sub‑section (2). The only manner of avoiding liability under sub‑section (2) is by establishing one of the defences therein mentioned. Hence sub‑section (6) contemplates that the insurer cannot rely on defences not mentioned in sub‑section (2).
- The Court relied on British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Itbar Singh as authoritative precedent interpreting these sub‑sections in the same way; it also relied on Rameshwar Hazarika v. Promode Kanta Barua for the same proposition.
The appellant sought to rely on Condition No. 2 of the insurance policy (which confers on the company certain rights to control the defence or settlement where the insured makes admissions or payments). The Court examined this condition and held it was not attracted in the present case because no admission, offer, promise or payment had been made by the insured before the accident giving rise to liability. Therefore Condition No. 2 could not expand the insurer's statutory rights under Section 96(2).
The Court also noted that both the insurer and the insured had advanced similar pleas before the Claims Tribunal and had contested the claimant's claim on common pleas. Nevertheless, this did not entitle the insurer on appeal to rely on pleas that were not available to it under Section 96(2).
On the basis of the statutory interpretation, supported by the cited authorities, the Court concluded that the appellant's contentions in appeal which were not among the limited defences in Section 96(2) were not available to it. The preliminary objection therefore succeeded.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court concluded that the appellant (insurer) was limited to the defences expressly set out in Section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act and could not impugn the Tribunal's decree in appeal on pleas not available to it under that provision. Accordingly, the preliminary objection was upheld and the appeal was dismissed.
Core Ruling: APPEAL DISMISSED (with costs).
Immediate Consequences for the Parties
- The award of the Claims Tribunal for an aggregate sum of Rs. 12,274.45 stands and, as ordered by the Tribunal, is recoverable from the insurer (the appellant) because the vehicle was insured with the appellant.
- The appellant cannot rely on pleas in appeal that were not available to it under Section 96(2) and (6) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
Broader Implications
The Court applied existing authorities to construe the limits of an insurer's defence when made a party under Section 96(2). The opinion enforces the established principle that the insurer's defence is confined to the statutory grounds; the judgment did not announce a new legal principle beyond that existing line of authorities.
1. This appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) is directed against the award given by the Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereinafter called ‘the Claims Tribunal’) at Jorhat in Motor Accidents Claims Case No. 104 of 1968. The claimant, Lakhikanta Rajkonwar, filed an application before the Claims Tribunal claiming compensation for the injury caused to him in an accident in which he was hit by lorry No. ASJ-3083 belonging to the respondent No. 3 Kanta Prasad Singh. The upper end of his right thigh bone was fractured into four pieces. He had to be under treatment in the Christian Mission Hospital at Jorhat. He alleged that at the relevant time he was aged 57 years and was working as a Tea Garden Mohurir in the Hunwal Tea Company Ltd. and was drawing a salary of Rs. 350/- per month. He was expected to be in service for about 7 months from the date of the accident. He incurred expenses of Rupees 2,500/- for his treatment. He claimed Rs. 30,000/- in total.
2. The appellant, the Premier Insurance Company Ltd., is the insurer and the respondent No. 3 Kanta Prasad Singh, is the insured. The insurer was also made a party to his application. The appellant filed objection. Its material pleas were as follows:
“3. That the claimant sustained the alleged injuries as a result of his own indecision, fault, negligence or carelessness and not due to any fault or lapses on the part of the Vehicle No. ASJ-3083 or its driver.
4. That the objector does not admit that the claimant's monthly salary is Rs. 350/- or thereabout or that he is entitled to get the compensation claimed or any portion of it from this answering objector.
5. That without prejudice to other legal defence it is submitted that the compensation demanded is highly excessive and without any basis.”
3. The insured, respondent No. 3 also filed an objection. His material pleas also may be quoted:
“2. That the objector does not admit that the claimant's monthly salary is Rs. 350/- or thereabout or that he is entitled to get the compensation claimed or any portion of it from the answering objector.
4. That the claimant sustained the alleged injuries as a result of his own indecision, fault, negligence or carelessness and not due to any fault or lapses on the part of the objector's vehicle or its driver.
6. That the claim is highly inflated and inadmissible in law and under the facts and circumstance of the case.”
4. The learned Claims Tribunal framed the following issues:
1. Is there any cause of action for the claim?
2. Is the claim maintainable in law?
3. Whether the accident was due to any fault on the part of the owner of the vehicle or whether it was caused by contributory negligence on the claimant's part?
4. What was the monthly salary of the claimant at the time of the accident and the expenses incurred by him for treatment?
5. Whether the claimant is entitled to any compensation? If so, against which of the opposite party and for what amounts?
6. Whether the compensation claimed is excessive?
7. To what relief, if any, are the parties entitled?
5. The learned Claims Tribunal, after trial, awarded an aggregate sum of Rs. 12,274.45 as compensation and damage. It was ordered that as the vehicle was insured with the appellant the amount of compensation be recoverable from the insurer. He held that the claimant sustained injury due to the negligence of the driver of the vehicle.
6. Mr. J.N Sarma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, raised a preliminary objection namely, that in view of section 96(2) of the Act the pleas taken by the appellant are not available to him and therefore the appeal on the same pleas is not competent.
7. The relevant portion of section 96 of the Act may be quoted:
“96 Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments against persons insured in respect of third party risks—(1) if, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (4) of section 95 in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 95 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy the insurer shall subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were judgment debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments.
(2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment unless before or after the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment is given the insurer had notice through the Court of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of any judgment so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely—
(a) that the policy was cancelled by mutual consent or by virtue of any provision contained therein before the accident giving rise to the liability, and that either the certificate of insurance was surrendered to the insurer or that the person to whom the certificate was issued has made an affidavit stating that the certificate has been lost or destroyed, or that either before or not later than fourteen days after the happening of the accident the insurer has commenced proceedings for cancellation of the certificate after compliance with the provisions of section 105; or
(b) That there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely—
(i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle—
(a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or
(b) for organised racing and speed testing, or
(c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a public service vehicle or goods vehicle, or
(d) without side-car being attached, where the vehicle is a motor cycle; or
(ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification; or
(iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed by conditions of war, civil war, not or civil commotion; or
(c) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular.
(2A) Where any such judgment as is referred to in sub-section (1) is obtained from a Court in the State of Jammu and Kashmir or in a reciprocating territory and in the case of foreign judgment is, by virtue of the provisions of section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), conclusive as to any matter adjudicated upon by it, the insurer (being an insurer registered under the Insurance Act, 1938, and whether or not he is registered under the corresponding law of the reciprocating country) shall be liable to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree in the manner and to the extent specified in sub-section (1) as if the judgment were given by a Court in India.
Provided that no sum shall be payable by the insured in respect of any such judgment unless, before or after the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment is given, the insurer had notice through the Court in the reciprocating territory concerned of the bringing of the proceedings and the insurer to whom notice is so given is entitled under the corresponding law of the reciprocating country to be made a party to the proceedings and to defend the action on grounds similar to those specified in sub-section (2).
(3)……….
(4)………
(5)………
(6) No insurer to whom the notice referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (2A) has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of any such judgment as is referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2A), otherwise than in the manner provided for in sub-section (2) or in the corresponding law of the State of Jammu and Kashmir or of the reciprocating country as the case may be.”
8. Sub-sections (2) and (6) of Section 96 were exhaustively deal with and considered by the Supreme Court in the case of British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Itbar Singh,1 it has been held:
“The contention of the appellants is that when an insurer becomes a party to an action under sub-section (2), he is entitled to defend it on all grounds available at law including the grounds on which the assured himself could have relied for his defence and that the only restriction on the insurer's right of defence is that he cannot rely on the conditions of the policy which sub-section (3) makes as of no effect. This is the contention which we have to examine in these appeals.”
9. To start with it is necessary to remember that apart from the statute an insurer has no right to be made a party to the action by the injured person against the insured causing the injury. Sub-section (2) of Section 96 however gives him the right to be made a party to the suit and to defend it. The right therefore is created by statute and its content necessarily depends on the provisions of the statute. The question then really is, what are the defences that sub-section (2) makes available to an insurer? That clearly is a question of interpretation of the sub-section.
10. Now the language of sub-section (2) seems to us to be perfectly plain and to admit of no doubt or confusion. It is that an insurer to whom the requisite notice of the action has been given “shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely” after which comes an enumeration of the grounds. It would follow that an insurer is entitled to defend on any of the grounds enumerated and no others. If it were not so, then of course no grounds need have been enumerated. When the grounds of defence have been specified they cannot be added to. To do that would be adding words to the statute.
11. Sub-section (6) also indicates clearly how sub-section (2) should be read. It says that no insurer to whom the notice of the action has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability under sub-section (1) otherwise than in the manner provided for in sub-section (2). Now the only manner of avoiding liability provided for in sub-section (2) is by successfully raising any of the defences therein mentioned. It comes then to this that the insurer cannot avoid his liability except by establishing such defences. Therefore sub-section (6) clearly contemplates that he cannot take any defence not mentioned in sub-section (2). If he could then he would have been in a position to avoid his liability in a manner other than that provided for in sub-section (2). That is prohibited by sub-section (6).
12. We therefore think that sub-section (2) clearly provides that an insurer made a defendant to the action is not entitled to take any defence which is not specified in it.”
13. This Court also in the case of Rameshwar Hazarika v. Promode Kanta Barua, has held:
“It is clear that under Section 96(2) of the Act, an insurer can raise only limited defences available under-Section 96(2)(a)(b) and (c).”
14. Mr. K.N Saikia, learned counsel for the appellant, refers to condition No. 2 in the Insurance Policy proved as Ext. ‘Ga’ and submits that the insurer can take any plea. Condition No. 2 is as follows:
“2. No admission, offer, promise, or payment shall be made by the insured without the written consent of the Company which shall be entitled if it so desires to take over and conduct in the name of the insured the defence or settlement of any claim or to prosecute in his name for its own benefit any claim for indemnity or damages or otherwise and shall have full discretion in the conduct of any proceedings or in the settlement of any claim and the insured shall give all such information and assistance as the Company may require. If the Company shall make any payment in settlement of any claim and such payment includes any amount not covered by this Policy the insured shall repay to the Company the amount not so covered.”
15. Although condition No. 2 set out above is a provision contained in the Policy before the accident giving rise to the liability within the meaning of section 96(2)(b) condition No. 2 is not attracted to the present case as no admission or offer or promise or payment has been made by the insured. In fact, both the insurer and the insured took similar pleas before the Claims Tribunal and contested the claimant's claim on those common pleas. That being the position the appellant's plea must be limited to Sub-section (2) of Section 96 of the Act. The appellant, therefore, cannot in appeal impugn the decree on the pleas which he took before the Claims Tribunal, but which pleas were not available to him. In the result the preliminary objection prevails and the appeal is dismissed with costs.
16. Appeal dismissed.
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