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Jeng Hanser v. Karbi Anglong Autonomous District Council

Gauhati High Court
May 15, 1997
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking quashing of two orders dated 10.9.96 and 23.9.96 issued by the Deputy Secretary (T) in-charge Forest, Karbi Anglong Autonomous District Council. Those orders settled the Bark Mahals of the Hamren Forest Division in favour of respondents Nos. 6 and 7 (Sri Deori Rongpi and Sri Robi Singh Teron) for a period of one year.

Relevant facts recited in the opinion: in 1988 the petitioner had earlier been settled with the Laham Mahal for two years and collected bark in 1988–89, but that settlement was cancelled in public interest by order dated 9.5.89. From 1989 to 1995 Bark Mahals were not put up for sale. Then the impugned orders of September 1996 settled specified Bark Mahals with respondents 6 and 7 without any auction or advertisement inviting tenders. The petitioner challenged those orders on grounds including absence of an opportunity to participate, alleged negotiation without giving interested parties notice, and that the impugned joint settlement contravened Rule 12 of the applicable Rules.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Bark Mahal settlements dated 10.9.96 and 23.9.96 effected by negotiation without a prior public auction or inviting tenders were lawful under the Assam Sale of Forest Produce, Coupes & Mahals Rules, 1977 (Rule 3) and consistent with principles of public interest and fair play.
  2. Whether negotiation as a mode of sale under sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 can be invoked without giving notice or opportunity to prospective buyers and without demonstrating compelling reasons or steps taken to secure the best available price.
  3. Whether the impugned orders resulted in discrimination or a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution by not affording a fair opportunity and by being secret or arbitrary.
  4. Whether the Bark Mahal could be settled jointly in favour of two persons in light of Rule 12 of the Rules (as argued by the petitioner).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. A.F.G. Osmani)

  • No auction was held nor any advertisement inviting tenders issued before the settlements; hence the petitioner had no opportunity to participate.
  • The settlements were effected by negotiation; while Rule 3 permits negotiation, the Government cannot negotiate arbitrarily or exclusively with any person — all interested parties must be given an opportunity to participate in negotiation.
  • Cited the Supreme Court decision in Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana ((1985) 3 SCC 267) to submit that when the State deals with public largesse it must act fairly and cannot exercise absolute and unfettered discretion.
  • Contended that the impugned orders jointly settled the same Bark Mahal in favour of two parties and that joint settlement to more than one person is impermissible under Rule 12 except in specified cases (co-operative society, firm or company duly registered).

Respondents 1 to 4 (Karbi Anglong Autonomous District Council) — (as advanced by Mr. B.D. Das)

  • The petitioner did not make any application for settlement of the Mahal in question, so his case did not arise.
  • The petitioner had defaulted in payment of dues from the earlier settlement and had used unscientific methods to remove barks.
  • The authorities did not follow a pick & choose policy or discriminate; the settlements in favour of respondents 6 and 7 were made on the basis of their applications and in accordance with relevant provisions of the Rules.
  • Cited Chittaranjan Ganguly v. State of Assam ((1991) 2 GLR (NOC) 16) to support that the State has the power to negotiate under sub-rule (3) of Rule 3, subject to exercise in public interest and taking reasonable steps to obtain the best available market price, and that such settlement cannot be secret or arbitrary.

Respondent No. 5 (as advanced by Mr. S.S. Dey)

  • Rule 3 vests power to sell forest produce by negotiation, but normally sale should be by inviting tenders or public auction; negotiation is to be used only in exceptional circumstances where those methods would not fetch the best available price in the public interest.
  • Which method (tender, auction or negotiation) to adopt depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as reflected in the opinion)
Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267 Principle that the Government is not free like an ordinary individual when selecting recipients of public largesse; if it deals with parties it must act fairly and without exercising absolute and unfettered discretion. Cited by the petitioner's counsel to support the submission that the authorities must act fairly and cannot negotiate secretly or arbitrarily. The Court referenced the same overarching requirement of fairness in state action when evaluating the impugned settlements.
Sri Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal, (1987) 2 SCC 295 (AIR 1987 SC 1109) State-owned property should ordinarily be disposed of by inviting tenders or public auction; negotiation is permissible only where compelling reasons justify departure and the reasons must be rational and not suggestive of discrimination; appearance of public justice is important. The Court relied on the test articulated in this judgment to assess whether negotiation in this case was justified. Applying that standard, the Court found no compelling reasons or material showing negotiation was necessary or that best price was sought; therefore negotiation here failed the Sachidanand Pandey test.
Chittaranjan Ganguly v. State of Assam, (1991) 2 GLR (NOC) 16 Held that State has power to negotiate under sub-rule (3) of Rule 3, but such power must be exercised in public interest and the Government must take reasonable steps to obtain the best available market price; the settlement should not be secret or arbitrary. Cited by respondents to justify negotiation power under the Rules. The Court accepted the proposition that negotiation is permissible but reiterated that the standard from Chittaranjan Ganguly — exercise in public interest and reasonable steps to obtain best price — must be met; on the facts the Court found those requirements were not satisfied.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the statutory framework and the facts before it:

  1. The applicable statutory provision, Rule 3 of the Assam Sale of Forest Produce, Coupes & Mahals Rules, 1977, prescribes three modes of sale: (1) inviting tender, (2) public auction, and (3) negotiation by Government or on behalf of Government. The Rule thus permits negotiation but contemplates that tender or auction are the ordinary methods.
  2. The Court recognized authoritative guidance from the Supreme Court in Sri Sachidanand Pandey that public or State-owned property is not to be disposed of at the absolute discretion of the executive: public interest is paramount; auction or tender is the ordinary rule; departure from that rule is permissible only for compelling and rational reasons and not in a manner suggestive of discrimination or bias.
  3. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found: (a) admittedly no auction was held nor any tender invited for the Bark Mahal; (b) the respondents (authorities) did not place before the Court any compelling reasons justifying departure from the ordinary modes of sale; (c) there was no material demonstrating that the authorities had taken reasonable steps to obtain the best available price; and (d) the petitioner and other prospective buyers had no notice that negotiation was being considered, thereby depriving them of an opportunity to participate.
  4. The Court noted that although the petitioner had not applied for settlement, lack of notice of the negotiation process meant the petitioner was deprived of a fair opportunity. The Court also noted the respondents did not show the sale met the test of public interest or fairness required by the cited precedents and Rule 3.
  5. Given these findings, the Court concluded the impugned negotiated settlements were contrary to the principles of fair play and public interest and amounted to a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
  6. The Court recorded procedural fact that notices were sent by registered post with acknowledgement due to respondents 6 and 7 (dated 10.12.96) and that service was thus presumed, but those respondents did not appear to support the impugned orders.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court quashed the impugned orders dated 10.9.96 and 23.9.96 issued by the Deputy Secretary, in-charge Forest, Karbi Anglong Autonomous District Council, settling the Bark Mahal in favour of respondents 6 and 7, and allowed the writ petition.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The specific administrative settlements of the Bark Mahals in question are set aside by the Court's order.
  • The writ petition is allowed and the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal precedent beyond applying existing judicial principles: it enforces that negotiation under Rule 3 is permissible only where compelling, rational reasons are shown and reasonable steps are taken to secure the best available price in the public interest; absent such justification, negotiated settlements violate Article 14.

Note: This summary is limited exclusively to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

1. In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the orders dated 10.9.96 and 23.9.96 issued by the Deputy Secretary (T) i/c Forest, Karbi Anglong Autonomous District Council to the Divisional Forest Officer, Hamren Division for settling Bark Mahal of Hamren Forest Division with Sri Deori Rongpi and Sri Robi Singh Teron, respondents 6 and 7 respectively.

2. The facts, briefly, are that in the year 1988 the petitioner was settled with the Laham Mahal of Hamren Forest Division for a period of two years by an order dated 9.3.88 issued by the Principal-Secretary of the Karbi Anglong Autonomous District Council. On the basis of the said settlement the petitioner collected Bark from the said Mahal during the year 1988-89. But subsequently by an order dated 9.5.89 the aforesaid settlement in favour of the petitioner was cancelled in public interest. Thereafter, during the years 1989 to 1995, Bark Mahals under the Karbi Anglong Autonomous District Council were not put for sale presumably on account of ecological reasons and in the public interest. Suddenly by orders dated 10.9.96 and 23.9.96 issued by the Deputy Secretary, in-charge Forest, Karbi Anglong Autonomous District Council, the Bark Mahal (Baknallah Bark, Caul Bark, Laham Bark, Bud seed pipuli Bark of the entire Hamren Division) was settled with respondent No. 6 and Bark Mahal (A.P Bark & L.S Bark) was settled with respondent No. 7 respectively for a period of one year. It is these two orders issued by the Deputy Secretary, in-charge Forest, Karbi anglong Autonomous District Council in favour of respondents-6 and 7 which have been challenged in this writ petition. Mr AFG Osmani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that before settlement of the aforesaid Mahals in favour of respondents-6 and 7 no auction was held nor any advertisement was issued inviting tenders. Hence the petitioner did not get any opportunity to participate in the settlement. He further contended that the aforesaid settlement in favour of respondents-6 and 7 have been made by negotiation. According to Mr. Osmani though negotiation is one of the methods by which sale of forest Mahal can take place under Rule 3 of the Assam Sale of Forest Produce, Coupes & Mahals Rules, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) the Government or authority on its behalf cannot negotiate with any one it likes and in any case all interested parties should be given an opportunity for such negotiation. In the present case, no such opportunity was given to the petitioner and hence the settlement was contrary to the principle of fair play and public interest. Mr. Osmani cited a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267, wherein the Apex Court has held that the Government is not free like an ordinary individual, in selecting recipient to its largesse. It need not deal with anyone but if it does so, it must do so fairly and without exercising absolute and unfettered discretion and without unfair procedure. Alternatively, Mr Osmani submitted that from a reading of the two impugned orders dated 10.9.96 and 23.9.96 it will be clear that one and the same Bark Mahal has been settled jointly in favour of the two parties and according to Mr Osmani no such joint settlement is permissible as would be evident from Rule 12 of the Rules whereunder no coupe or mahal can be sold jointly to more than one person except in the case of a Co-operative society or a firm or a joint stock company duly registered in the office of the appropriate Registering Authority in Assam.

3. Mr BD Das, learned counsel appearing for the Karbi Anglong Autonomous District Council, respondent 1 to 4, submitted relying on the averment in the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the said respondents that the writ petitioner did not make any application for settlement of the Mahal in question and, therefore, the question of considering his case did not arise. He further submitted relying on the said averments in the affidavit-in-opposition that the petitioner defaulted in payment of Mahal dues of earlier settlement and had also resorted to unscientific method in removing the barks. He also contended that on the facts of the present case the authorities have not followed the pick & choose policy and discriminated against the writ petitioner and that the settlement has been made in favour of respondents 6 and 7 on the basis of their application for settlement of Mahal in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Rule. Mr. Das further pointed out that it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Chittaranjan Ganguly v. State of Assam, (1991) 2 GLR (NOC) 16, that the State Government has the power to negotiate and settle forest mahals under sub-rules (3) of Rule 3 of the Rules, but the said power has to be exercised in public interest and in doing so, the Government shall have to take all reasonable steps to obtain the best available market price and such settlement cannot be done secretly or arbitrarily.

4. Mr. S.S Dey, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, Assam, appearing for respondent No. 5, submitted that though under Rule 3 of the Rules a power has been vested in the State Government or any authority acting on behalf of the State Government to sell forest produce by negotiation, normally a sale has to be done by inviting tenders or by public auction and it is only in exceptional circumstances where the Government takes a view that the aforesaid first two methods would not fetch the best available pice in public interest, the Government may resort to negotiation. According to Mr Dey, question as to which of the three methods is to be adopted in selling forest produce will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

5. Rule 3 of the Rule which details the modes of sale to be adopted in respect of forest produce is quoted hereinbelow:

“3. MODE OF SALE- (a) The forest produce shall be sold by any of the followings methods:

(1) By inviting tender

(2) By public auction

(3) By negotiation, direct by Government or on behalf of Government of Assam in the Forest Department or any other manner as decided by Government on its own discretion.”

6. The aforesaid Rule makes it clear that sale of forest produce can take place by any of the three methods, i.e, by inviting tender, by public auction or by negotiation. Thus while sale of forest produce by inviting tender or by public auction may be the normal rule, in appropriate cases a departure can be made for sale of forest produce by negotiation for compelling reasons.

7. In fact, the question as to whether public owned property or State owned property can be sold by negotiation came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal, (1987) 2 SCC 295 : AIR 1987 SC 1109, in which sale of a public property by the Government of West Bengal to the Taj Group of Hotels by negotiation was challenged and the Apex Court after considering relevant case laws held:

“… State-owned or public-owned property is not to be dealt with at the absolute discretion of the executive. Certain precepts and principles have to be observed. Public interest is the paramount consideration. One of the methods of securing the public interest, when it is considered necessary to dispose of a property, is to sell the property public auction or by inviting tenders. Though that is the ordinary rule, it is not an invariable rule. There may be situations where there are compelling reasons necessitating departure from the rule but then the reasons for the departure must be rational and should not be suggestive of discrimination. Appearance of public justice is as important as doing justice. Nothing should be done which gives an appearance of bias, jobbery or nepotism.

8. Applying the said test, the Supreme Court held in that case that on the facts and circumstances as found in that case, it was impossible to hold that the Government of West Bengal did not act with probity in not inviting tenders or in not holding a public auction but negotiating straightway at arm's length with the Taj Groups of Hotels.

9. As far as the facts of the present case are concerned, admittedly, no public auction has been held nor any tender invited for sale of the Bark Mahal. No compelling reasons have been indicated by the respondents 1 to 4 as to why a departure has been made from the normal rule to sell the Forest Mahal in question by inviting tender or by holding public auction and to sell the Bark Mahal in favour of respondents-6 and 7 straightway by negotiation. It is true that the petitioner had not applied for settlement of Bark Mahal in question in his favour, but then the petitioner and other intending buyers had ho notice of the fact that the authorities were keen on selling the Bark Mahal by negotiation. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of fair opportunity to participate in the said sale by negotiation. No material has also been placed before the Court by the respondents-1 to 4 to show that the price at which the Bark Mahal has sold in favour of respondents No. 6 and 7 was the best available price and that the authorities had taken all reasonable steps to obtain the best available price. The sale in favour of respondent Nos. 6 and 7 did not satisfy the test of public interest. I have, therefore, no doubt in my mind that the sale of Bark Mahal in question in favour of respondents-6 and 7 under the impugned orders was contrary to the principle of fair play and justice and was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Records of the case indicate that notices on respondents-6 and 7 were issued by Registered post with A/D on 10.12.96 More than 30 days have lapsed since then and service of notice on the said respondents is thus presumed. The said respondents-6 and 7 have however not appeared before the Court either in person or through their counsel to support the impugned orders issued in their favour.

10. For the reasons stated above, the impugned orders dated 10.9.90 and 23.9.96 issued by the Deputy Secretary, in-charge Forest, Karbi Anglong Autonomous District Council, settling the Bark Mahal in favour of respondents-6 and 7 are quashed. The writ petition is allowed. However, considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.