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Chief Secretary To The Govt. Of Assam Others v. P.C. Mahanta Another

Gauhati High Court
Aug 28, 1980
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Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion deals with three petitions heard together; the narrative focuses on Civil Revision 91/80. The General Secretary of the Sadau Assam Karmachari Parishad, on behalf of its officers, employees, teachers and workers (excluding Assam Civil Service Class I and II Police Officers), filed a suit before the Sadar Munsiff, Gauhati seeking a declaration that Memo No. AEP 556/79-A dated 27.4.80 and Memo No. FEG. 4/80/Pt. dated 28.4.80 were invalid, illegal and inoperative. Those memos had treated absence of government servants from 22nd to 26th and 28th April 1980 as unauthorised and ordered no pay for that period.

The learned Munsiff, by an order dated 5.5.80, restrained the defendants from giving effect to those memos. The defendants challenged the learned Munsiff's jurisdiction by approaching the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, principally contending that the learned Munsiff had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C. (as invoked) is maintainable in view of the amendment (subsection (2)) made by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976 and the availability of an appeal.
  2. Whether a petition invoking Article 227 of the Constitution ought to be entertained when an adequate alternative remedy (such as an appeal) exists.
  3. Whether the civil court (the Sadar Munsiff) had jurisdiction to entertain the suit or whether that jurisdiction is ousted by the Assam Administrative Tribunal Act, 1977 and/or the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964.
  4. Whether, independently, the remedy provided by the Rules (including Rule 16 relating to appeals against pay denial) and the Act together impliedly or expressly bar suit in the civil court.
  5. Whether the suit was not maintainable for failure to comply with procedural requirements — specifically (i) not serving notice under Section 80 C.P.C., and (ii) non-compliance with Order 1, Rule 8 C.P.C. for representative suits.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners (General Secretary, Sadau Assam Karmachari Parishad)

  • Plaintiffs sued for declaration that the two memos of April 1980 were invalid, illegal and inoperative and sought relief in the civil court (Sadar Munsiff).
  • Implicit in the suit is the contention that the learned Munsiff had jurisdiction to grant interim relief restraining implementation of the memos.

Defendants / Government (as represented before the High Court)

  • Preliminary objection on maintainability: Shri Bhattacharjee argued that Section 115 C.P.C. could not be invoked (relying on the 1976 amendment inserting subsection (2)) because the impugned order, though ad-interim, was appealable; therefore revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 was not available. He relied on authority such as United Club vs. Nowgoing Football Assort to support the proposition that the impugned interim order was appealable.
  • On Article 227: the defendants argued that Article 227 should not be invoked where an adequate alternative remedy exists; citations included Maneck Custodji vs. Sarafazali and Vishesh Kumar vs. Shanti Prasad to show that High Courts ordinarily do not exercise Article 227 in the presence of adequate remedies.
  • On the merits the Government Advocate contended the civil court's jurisdiction is barred by (a) the Assam Administrative Tribunal Act, 1977 — especially Section 9(2) read with Section 4 (concerning the Tribunal's jurisdiction over service matters), and (b) the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 — which provide procedures and appellate remedies (notably Rule 16 relating to pay variations) that, it was argued, form a complete code and thus impliedly or expressly exclude resort to the civil court.
  • Reliance was placed on the doctrine of statutes and rules being in pari materia (J.K. Steel Ltd. v. Union of India) to interpret the Act and the Rules together as a single code.
  • As a further submission, it was argued that because the Rules provide a remedy (for example, appeals against pay denial), the remedy is exclusive or at least excludes suits in civil courts for the same grievance — relying on principles discussed in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke about when statutory remedies are exclusive.
  • Finally, the defendants contended that procedural non-compliance (no Section 80 C.P.C. notice and failure to comply with Order 1, Rule 8 for representative suits) made the suit non-maintainable and the learned Munsiff lacked jurisdiction to pass the injunction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
United Club vs. Nowgoing Football Assort, AIR 1964 A & IN 81 Used to show that an ad-interim order may be appealable (relevance to maintainability under Section 115). The Court considered the argument but rejected dismissal on that preliminary ground because Article 227 had been specifically invoked and the defendants were attacking jurisdiction of the Munsiff; the point deserved High Court decision in view of its importance and public interest.
Maneck Custodji vs. Sarafazali, 1977 (1) SCC 227 Principle that High Court does not ordinarily entertain Article 227 where an adequate remedy is available. Cited by defendants to oppose Article 227 jurisdiction; the Court acknowledged the principle but distinguished the case because Article 227 had been specifically invoked and the defendants challenged jurisdiction of the trial court.
Vishesh Kumar vs. Shanti Prasad, AIR 1980 SC 829 Illustration where prayer to remit under Article 227 was rejected after Section 115 was held not maintainable. Invoked by defendants in support of the submission that Article 227 should not be used when Section 115 is not available; the Court addressed but did not allow the preliminary objection to dispose of the petition for reasons stated in the judgment.
J.K. Steel Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1173 Principle on interpreting statutes or provisions that are pari materia together as one system; used to argue Act and Rules should be read together. The Court accepted that pari materia doctrine exists but held that Section 9(2) of the Act could not be read so as to be extended by the Rules to bar civil court jurisdiction in matters outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction; the pari materia submission did not justify reading additional words into Section 9(2).
Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke, (1976) I SCC 496 Classification of cases where statutory remedies may be exclusive or where civil remedy is alternative; distilled three guiding principles on when civil court jurisdiction is barred. The Court relied on Principle No. 2 from Premier Automobiles — that where the dispute relates to a general/common law right and not a right created under a statute providing its own remedy, the civil court remedy is alternative. The Court held the right to pay is a general right and thus the Rules provide an alternative remedy, not an exclusive bar.
Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. vs. Hawkesford, (1859) 6 CB (NS) 336; 141 ER 486 (quoted by later authorities) Early articulation (Willes, J.) of three classes of cases concerning statutory liabilities and remedies (referred to in Premier Automobiles analysis). The Court reproduced the three-class formulation (via Premier Automobiles) to frame whether the remedy in the Rules/Act was exclusive or alternative. It was used to determine that the present case fell into the class where the remedy is alternative.
Heville vs. London "Express" Newspaper Ltd., 1919 AC 368 (HL) Authoritative reference supporting the three-class classification of statutory remedies. Referenced as part of the doctrinal background cited in Premier Automobiles; used to support the analytical framework applied by the Court.
Barraclough vs. Brown, 1897 AC 615 Principle that where a statute confers a right and prescribes a particular remedy, that remedy is exclusive and the statutory right cannot be enforced by other means. The Court relied on the articulated principle to contrast situations where statutory remedies are exclusive from those where they are not; ultimately, it found the present case did not attract exclusivity because the pay right was a general right.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two main stages: (A) addressing preliminary objections to maintainability; and (B) considering the merits of the jurisdictional challenge under the Act and the Rules.

A. Maintainability — Section 115 and Article 227

  • The defendants contended Section 115 C.P.C. could not be invoked post the 1976 amendment (subsection (2)) when an appeal lies, and that Article 227 should not be used when an adequate alternative remedy exists. Authorities were cited in support of these contentions.
  • The Court observed that Article 227 had been specifically invoked and that the defendants were challenging the entire jurisdiction of the learned Munsiff. Given the centrality of the jurisdictional question and its importance and public interest, the Court declined to dismiss the petition on this preliminary ground and proceeded to examine the substantive jurisdictional issue. In short, the Court held the point deserved decision by the High Court rather than being disposed of at the maintainability stage.

B. Merits — Whether civil court jurisdiction is barred by the Tribunal Act and the Rules

  • The Government Advocate relied on Section 9(2) of the Assam Administrative Tribunal Act, 1977, which bars civil courts from entertaining suits or proceedings with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and on Section 4 defining the Tribunal's jurisdiction over appeals by civil servants in respect of conditions of service.
  • The Court closely examined Section 4(1)–(3): the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain appeals by civil servants against orders affecting conditions of service, but Section 4(2) limits jurisdiction where the civil servant has not exhausted remedies under relevant service rules; a proviso allows the Tribunal to entertain appeals where the competent authority has not finally disposed of a representation within six months.
  • From that reading, the Court concluded that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is not so comprehensive as to oust civil courts in all situations. The crucial finding was that the present grievance (challenge to memos imposing pay denial for specified dates and alleging lack of opportunity to be heard) could not have been agitated for the first time before the Tribunal, and thus Section 9(2) could not be invoked to bar the suit before the civil court.
  • The pari materia argument (that the Act and Rules must be read together and thus the Rules extend the ouster) was considered. The Court accepted the general doctrine that statutes in pari materia may be read together, but rejected the submission that Section 9(2) should be extended by reading in the Rules so as to bar the civil court's jurisdiction: doing so would amount to adding words to Section 9(2), which the Court found impermissible.
  • The alternative submission — that the Rules themselves impliedly barred civil court jurisdiction because they provide a remedy (for example, Rule 16 permitting appeals against pay variations) — was analyzed through the framework articulated in Premier Automobiles. The Court noted the three-class classification of rights/remedies and concluded that the right to receive pay is a general/common law right rather than a right created exclusively by the Rules. Rule 4 of the Rules preserves other rights, and the requirement of hearing (audi alteram partem) embodied in the Rules was characterized by the Court as a general principle of natural justice rather than a novel statutory right giving rise to an exclusive remedy.
  • Accordingly, the Court held that the remedy provided by the Rules in relation to pay cuts was alternative (per Principle No. 2 of Premier Automobiles) and did not operate to bar resort to the civil court.
  • On the procedural attack (no Section 80 notice served; Order 1 Rule 8 non-compliance), the Court noted that the learned Munsiff had considered these aspects and had granted leave under Section 80(2) and Order 1, Rule 8 C.P.C. Any alleged illegality in that exercise would be an "error within jurisdiction" and not a ground for the writ court to interfere in the extraordinary jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in this proceeding.
  • Because the High Court was approached in its extraordinary jurisdiction and the defendants' attack was primarily on the trial Court's jurisdiction, the High Court refrained from examining the merits of the impugned interlocutory order; it confined itself to the jurisdictional question.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The petitions are DISMISSED.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The High Court found that the suit before the learned Sadar Munsiff was not barred by the Assam Administrative Tribunal Act, 1977 or by the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964. In particular, Section 9(2) of the Act did not oust the civil court's jurisdiction in the present circumstances, and the Rules provided an alternative remedy rather than an exclusive statutory bar to civil proceedings.
  • The challenge that the suit was not maintainable for procedural non-compliance (Section 80 C.P.C. notice and Order 1, Rule 8) was not accepted because the learned Munsiff had granted leave; any error in that exercise would be an "error within jurisdiction" not remediable by the writ petition in the High Court in this extraordinary jurisdiction.
  • The High Court did not examine the merits of the impugned interim order (the injunction passed by the learned Munsiff) and expressly noted that the merits could not be examined in the extraordinary remedy exercised by the Court in these petitions.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel or binding precedent beyond the resolution of the jurisdictional questions in the specific facts before the Court; the direct effect is that the trial Court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit stands upheld and the petitions challenging that jurisdiction are dismissed.

The Court also recorded appreciation for the "strenuous and sincere efforts" of the learned Government Advocate despite the petitions being dismissed.

Show all summary ...

Hansaria, J.

1. The points involved in these three petitions are same. They were therefore heard jointly and a common order is being passed to cover all. Facts involved in Civil Revision 91/80 alone would be noted which were placed before me and would unfold the canvass on which both the sides have drawn their own pictures.

2. The General Secretary of the Sadau Assam Karmachari Parishad, for self and on behalf of officers, employees, teachers and workers affiliated to the Parishad (except Assam Civil Service Class I and II Police Officers) filed a suit before the learned Sadar Munsiff, Gauhati for declaration that the order contained in Memo No. AEP 556/79-A dated 27.4.80 and Memo No. FEG. 4/80/Pt. dated 28. 4. 80 are invalid, illegal and inoperative. By these two memos, the period of absence of Government servants from 22nd to 26th and 28th April, 1980 (which might have been at the call of the organisers of the present movement here) was regarded as unauthorised and it was ordered that no pay be given for the above period to those who had remained absent without satisfactory explanation. The learned Munsiff, by an order passed on 5.5.80 restrained the defendants from giving effect to these orders. Feeling aggrieved, the defendants have approached this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, mainly on the ground that the learned Munsiff had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

3. Shri Bhattacharjee appearing for the opposite party takes a preliminary objection relating to the maintainability of the petition. The learned counsel submits that as the impugned order, even though ad-interim in nature was appealable in view of the decision of this Court in United Club vs. Nowgoing Football Assort, AIR 1964 A & IN 81, Section 115 of the Code cannot be invoked in view of insertion of subsection (2) in the section by C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976 which states that-

`The High Court shall not under the Section vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto". The amended provision thus makes it clear that revisional jurisdiction of this Court could not have been invoked in the present case. As to Article 227, it is submitted that in view of the existence of the adequate alternative legal remedy, recourse to Article 227 should not be permitted. Reference has been made by Shri Bhattacharjee to Maneck Custodji vs. Sarafazali, 1977 (1) SCC 227, in para 6 of which it has been observed by Bhagawati, J. that it is well settled that the High Court does not ordinarily entertain a special application under Article 227 where an adequate remedy is available. The strong feeling expressed in this para owes its origin to the fact that the matter was entertained under Article 227 though an appeal against the order lay to the High Court itself. The position is not so in the present case. My attention is also invited to Vishesh Kumar vs. Shanti Prasad, AIR 1980 SC 829, in para 22 of which a prayer to remit the case to the High Court for consideration of the petition under Article 227 was rejected after it had been held that the petition under Section 115 of the Code was not maintainable.

4. The present is not a case of conversion of the petition Tinder Article 227, because this Article was specifically invoked while approaching this Court. As regards the alternative remedy by way of appeal, it may be stated that the defendants have approached this Court, not so much against the order of injunction but they have challenged the entire jurisdiction of the learned Munsiff in entertaining the suit. This being the position, I do not think that the petition should be dismissed on the preliminary ground raised by Shri Bhattacharjee especially when the point involved deserves decision at the hand of this Court in view of its importance and larger public interest involved, albeit temporarily.

5. On the merits, the contention of learned Government Advocate is that the jurisdiction of a civil court stands barred in the matter like the present because of the provisions in Assam Administrative Tribunal Act, 1977 (for short, the Act) and the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). The learned Govt. Advocate presses into service section 9(2) of the Act, which reads:

"9(2). Notwithstanding anything contained in any law no civil court or other authority shall entertain any civil suit or other proceedings with respect to any of the matters which fall within the jurisdiction of the tribunal or question in any form any order passed by the Tribunal in any appeal or review with respect to any matters when an appeal could have been preferred under the provisions of this Act or with respect to any other matter which arises out of the exercise of powers under this Act."

6. From a reading of the section it is apparent that the jurisdiction of civil court has been barred relating to matters which are within the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal which has been dealt with by section 4 of the Act. This may be read:

"4(1). Save as other wise expressly provided in subsection (2) below the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of appeals preferred by Civil servants against any order passed by a competent authority in respect of any condition of service.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1) above, the Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction with respect to any order passed, when the civil servant has not availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules, executive instructions or orders:

Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in the above paragraph the Tribunal may entertain an appeal from a civil servant, if any appeal, revision petition or representation filed by him under the relevant service rules before the competent authority has not been finally disposed of by the competent authority within a period of six months from the date of filing such appeal, revision petition or representation.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) above, the Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of appeals against any order passed by a competent authority under Article 311(2) provisos (a), (b) and (c) as also under F.R. 56(b)".

7. This section clearly shows that except where the provision to section 4(2) is attracted, the Tribunal has no original jurisdiction in matters relating to conditions of service of the civil servants. Even where the proviso is attracted, the competent authority (see section 2(2) of the Act) must have been approached and period of at least six months must have expired after the approach. The fact that under Section 9(3) of the Act a pending matter relating to conditions of service over which the Tribunal had jurisdiction would have stood transferred cannot be a ground to bar further jurisdiction in relation to matters which could not have come directly to the Tribunal. It cannot be denied that the present grievance of the petitioner could not have been agitated for the first time before the Tribunal. As such, section 9(2) of the Act cannot stand in the way of the plaintiff.

8. Realising this position the learned Government Advocate submits that the Act and the Rules must be read together to form one Code and must be taken as interpreting, and enforcing each other, as they are to be understood as legislations in pari materia. Inspiration has been drawn in making this submission from J.K. Steel Ltd. vs. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 1173. In that case the interpretation of entry 63(36) in the First Schedule of the Tariff Act along with the entry 26AA inserted by the Finance Act, 1972 had come up for consideration. The learned Government Advocate refers to para 29 of the judgment which finds place in the minority decision rendered by Hegde, J. who was of the opinion that both the entries must be interpreted harmoniously as the two Acts were parts of one Code and so entries in one must throw light on the other. This reading of the two entries was however not favoured by the majority, as would appear from para 10 of Sikri, J's judgment with which Bachawat, J. had agreed. Though on facts the Hon'ble Judges had differed, it cannot be gainsaid that provisions appearing in statute, which are pari materia have to be taken and considered together, as one system, and as explanatory of each other. This has been stated at page 66 of Maxwell's `The Interpretation of Statutes' 12th Edn.` It has further been stated at that page that statutes are said to be pari materia when they deal with the same person or thing or class; it is not enough that they deal with a similar subject matter. It may thus be that the Act and the Rules are in pari materia as they deal with class of persons which is by and large same, as would appear from the definition of `Civil servant' in the Act and of `government servant' in the Rules. But then there is no question in the case at hand of interpreting section 9(2) of the Act with the aid of any provision in the Rules. When section 9(2) has ousted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court only with regard to matters ‘within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal', the same cannot be extended to cover matters falling within the jurisdiction of the `competent authority' of which reference has been made in section 4 of the Act. To do so would be to add words in section 9(2) which is not permissible.

9. The learned Government Advocate has an alternative submission also. According to him the Rules have impliedly barred the jurisdiction of the Court inasmuch as the Rules have provided a remedy for a grievance like the present and anybody aggrieved at the order passed by an authority under the Rules can further approach the Administrative Tribunal under the Act. As such, a complete and effective machinery has been provided to adjudicate the grievances like the present, and so remedy by way of suit is impliedly barred.

10. As to the applicability of the Ruler, my attention is invited to Rule, 16, which allows appeals against orders, inter alia, denying or varying to the disadvantage of a Government servant his pay. As the grievance in the present matter is relating to pay cut, the submission is that the Government servants could have filed appeals under this rule. Assuming arguando that this could be done, the moot point is whether the remedy provided by the Rules barred approach to the Civil Court. As one of grievances of the petitioners is that the pay cut was a penalty which had been inflicted without having given any opportunity, the submission is that the right to impose the pay cut if it was a penalty had been given by the Rules which have also provided the remedy; as such, recourse to any other remedy impliedly barred. Strong reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the Premier Automobiles Ltd. Js. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke, (1976) I SCC 496. In that case, a suit was filed to prevent threatened breach of the rights of the plaintiffs (members of Engineering Mazdoor Sabha, referred to as Sabha Union in the judgment), which flowed from a settlement reached between the Sabha Union and the Company. A point was raised that the suit was not maintainable. The Supreme Court accepted this contention. In coming to this conclusion a large number of English and Indian decisions were noted. The principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in relation to an industrial dispute were stated thus in para 23-(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the Civil Court.

(2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy.

(3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act."

11. Before that, the Supreme Court had noted the classic enunciation of the law and classification of these cases into three classes by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. vs. Hawkesford (1859) 6 CB (NS) 336 : 141 ER 486 which was quoted by Viscount Haldane in Heville vs. London "Express" Newspaper Ltd., 1919 AC 368 (HL). The three classes were enumerated thus:

"There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established by statute. There is that class where there is liability existing at common law, and which is only re-enacted by the statute with a special form of remedy there, unless the statute contains words necessarily excluding the common law remedy, the plaintiff has his election of proceeding under the statute or at common law. Then there is a second class, which consists of those cases in which a statute has created liability, but has given no special remedy for it; there the party may adopt an action of debt or other remedy at common law to enforce it. The third class is where the statute creates a liability not existing at common law, and gives also a particular remedy for enforcing it......with respect to that class it has always been held, that the party must adopt the form of remedy given by the statute."

12. The decision of the House of Lords in Barraclough vs. Brown, 1897 AC 615, was regarded as very much to the point. The special statute under consideration had given a right to recover expenses in a court of Summary Jurisdiction from a person who was not otherwise liable at common law. Lord Herschell, after referring to the rights conferred under the statute "to recover such expenses from the owner of such vessel in a court of a summary jurisdiction" stated:

"I do not think the appellant can claim to recover by virtue of the statute and at the same time insist upon doing so by means other than those prescribed by the statute which alone confers the right."

Lord Watson stated:

"The right and the remedy are given uno flatu and the one cannot be dissociated from the other."

The Supreme Court then observed-

......

"In other words, if a statute confers a right and in the same breath provides for a remedy for enforcement of such right, the remedy provided by the statute is an exclusive one."

13. The discussion in Premier Automobiles shows that if a statute has conferred aright which was not availabe under the general or common law, then the remedy prescribed by that statute alone can be availed of and not any other. In the suit which had been filed by member of the Sabha Union which had come up for examination in the Premier Automobile the plaintiff had based their claim on a memorandum of settlement arrived at with the employer. The Court examined various provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act relating to settlement and its enforcement etc. and came to conclusion in para 31 that the suit was in relation to the enforcement of a right created under the Industrial Disputes Act, and so held that the suit was barred following the summing up of the law in para 23 of the judgment.

14. The right of an employee to receive pay from his employer, more particularly, the right of the Government servant to receive pay from the Government, has not been conferred according to me by Rules. That is a general right of an employee. The remedy provided in the Rules, relating to pay cut cannot therefore be regarded as the only remedy available. It has to be regarded as alternative leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy. Principle No. 2 of Premier Automobiles, as quoted above, is therefore applicable in the present case. Really, Rule 4 of the Rules has stated that nothing in the Rules shall operate to deprive any govt. Servant of any right or privilege to which he is entitled to by or under any law for the time being in force. The submission that the right claimed by the plaintiff in the suit relating to affording of opportunity before ordering pay cut is a right flowing from the Rules, cannot also be accepted inasmuch as Rules have embodied in this regard only the principles of natural justice. It is really the rule of audi alteram partem which require hearing before any adverse order is passed and the Rules have merely incorporated this principle. So, it cannot be stated that the right of hearing has flowed from the Rules. I would rather regard this right as a part of general or common law.

15. The last attack on the impugned order is on the ground that the suit being not maintainable because of (i) no notice under section 80 C.P.C. having been served on the petitioners; and (ii) requirements of Order 1, rule 8 having not been complied with, the suit being in representative capacity, the learned Munsiff had no jurisdiction to entertain it and then to pass the impugned order. A reference to the order however shows that these aspects have been gone into and leave was granted both under Section 80(2) and Order 1, rule 8 C.P.C. While doing so whether any illegality was committed is a matter which cannot be gone into the present proceeding as the same, even if any, would be an "error within jurisdiction," which is not amenable to correction by a writ court.

16. In view of all the above, it cannot be held that the suit is barred. The contention of the petitioner that the learned trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit cannot, therefore, be accepted. As the approach to this Court is in its extra-ordinary jurisdiction the merits of the impugned order has not been examined; indeed cannot be examined.

17. The result is that the petitions stand dismissed. Despite this outcome, the strenuous and sincere efforts made by the learned Government Advocate to salvage the petitions need appreciation.