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Umesh Chand Petitioner (In Custody) v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others Opposite Parties.

Allahabad High Court

May 2, 1984

Judgment

Subsequent
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Judgment Summary — B.N. Katiu, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a petition for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus challenging the detention of the petitioner in District Jail, Aligarh pursuant to an order of the District Magistrate, Aligarh dated 30-11-1983 made under S. 3(2) of the Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (“the Act”). The petitioner was arrested on 2-1-1984 and was served on that day with the detention order and the grounds of detention.

Relevant procedural events and dates recorded in the opinion:

19-1-1984 — Petitioner applied for supply of certain documents (application rejected by the District Magistrate on the same day).
22-1-1984 (evening) — Petitioner submitted a representation to the Superintendent, District Jail, Aligarh.
23-1-1984 — The Superintendent sent the representation to the District Magistrate, Aligarh (received by the District Magistrate on 23-1-1984).
24-1-1984 — The District Magistrate sent the representation to the State Government along with comments.
24-1-1984 — According to the State Secretariat, the representation was received in Lucknow on this date.
28-1-1984 to 1-2-1984 — Secretariat processing (intervening holiday on 26-1-1984 noted); placed before Under Secretary on 31-1-1984 and examined by Secretary on 1-2-1984.
4-2-1984 — State Government rejected the representation.

The detention order arose from allegations connected to the petitioner’s activities as proprietor of a rice mill: supplies of paddy in 1980–1981 under an agreement were not returned or converted to rice as required; a report was lodged on 5-9-1983; the wholesale licence of the petitioner was suspended on 8-9-1983 (communicated 16-9-1983); and an inspection on 14-11-1983 disclosed stock and documents suggesting purchase/holding of paddy after suspension.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the detaining authority and the State complied with the time-limits and procedural requirements for placing and disposing of the detenu’s representation (S. 10 of the Act and Article 22(5) of the Constitution).
Whether the detaining authority was obliged to supply to the petitioner documents that were not before it at the time the detention order was made.
Whether the grounds of detention were stale, in particular whether the breach of the 1980–1981 agreement could lawfully be relied upon in the detention order passed on 30-11-1983.
Whether the petitioner’s conduct amounted to a breach of cl. 9 of the U.P. Rice and Paddy (Levy & Regulation of Trade) Order, 1981 (and thereby an offence under S. 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act), taking into account the relationship between the 1980–81 government orders and the 1981 Order.
Whether the petitioner could lawfully be regarded as engaged in purchase/storage of paddy after suspension of his wholesale licence, or whether he was acting merely as a commission agent (i.e., whether the material justified detention).
Whether minor misquotations in the grounds of detention or the absence of a particular charge-sheet before the detaining authority vitiate the detention.
Whether the petitioner’s licence under the Rice Milling Industries Regulation Act, 1958 entitled him to hull paddy after suspension of his wholesale licence.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The petitioner’s representation was not placed before the Advisory Board within three weeks from the date of detention as required by S. 10 of the Act.
The State Government did not dispose of the petitioner’s representation expeditiously as required by Article 22(5) of the Constitution.
The detaining authority failed to supply documents requested on 19-1-1984 that were necessary to make an effective representation.
The grounds of detention relied upon stale events (notably the 1980–1981 agreement breach) and therefore could not justify detention in November 1983.
The petitioner did not breach cl. 9 of the 1981 Order because the agreement whose breach was alleged had expired on 30-6-1981 and the 1981 Order came into force only on 7-11-1981.
Only the wholesale licence had been suspended; the petitioner’s commission-agent licence remained, so the paddy found could have been received in that capacity rather than by way of prohibited wholesale activity.
Minor misquotations of the 1981 Order in the grounds of detention showed careless or mechanical treatment and a failure to apply mind.
The charge-sheet placed in the criminal court was under S. 406 IPC rather than S. 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act and was not placed before the detaining authority.
Under the 1958 Rice Milling Act licence the petitioner was entitled to hull his paddy even if his wholesale licence had been suspended.

Detaining Authority / State's Position (as recorded)

The Superintendent forwarded the petitioner’s representation to the District Magistrate on 23-1-1984; the District Magistrate could not send it to Lucknow on that same day so as to reach the Advisory Board by 5 p.m. due to train connections and therefore sent it on 24-1-1984 — the District Magistrate’s explanation was satisfactory.
The State Government received the representation on 24-1-1984, processing was affected by the intervening 26-1-1984 holiday, and the representation was placed before relevant officers and rejected on 4-2-1984 — thus the representation was disposed of within 12 days of submission.
All documents that were before the District Magistrate when he passed the detention order were supplied to the petitioner; the agreement entered in 1980–81 and copies of three licences were not before the District Magistrate when the order was passed, and therefore were not required to be supplied.
Material recovered at inspection (14-11-1983) — including stock discrepancies, documents addressed to the petitioner, truck deliveries, and absence of required stockbooks — supported the conclusion that the petitioner was engaged in purchase/storage of paddy and other regulated activity after suspension of his wholesale licence.
The breach of the 1980–1981 agreement was connected with later conduct (inspection results, licence suspension) and thus was not stale for purposes of the detention order.
Misquotation of the 1981 Order in a place or two was trivial and did not prevent the petitioner from making an effective representation.
The charge-sheet’s exact statutory label was not material because there was no discrepancy between the factual material in the charge-sheet and the grounds of detention.
The 1958 Act licence allowed operation of the mill but did not entitle the petitioner to purchase, store for sale, or sell paddy after suspension of the wholesale licence; thus he could not lawfully hull his own paddy in that period.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ibrahim v. State of West Bengal ((1975) 3 SCC 13 : AIR 1974 SC 736)	Held that disposal of a detenu's representation within 10 days does not amount to an inordinate delay for purposes of Article 22(5).	The court relied on this authority to support the view that a representation disposed of within a short period (here, 12 days) cannot be treated as disposed of after an inordinate delay.
Suresh Bhojraj Chelani v. State of Maharashtra ((1983) 1 SCC 382 : AIR 1983 SC 181)	Held that disposal of a detenu's representation within 16 days (and within 6 days of its receipt) was not an unreasonable delay.	The court cited this decision to reinforce that the 12-day disposal period in this case was not unreasonable and did not indicate lethargy by the State Government.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the chronological record and evaluated each contention by applying statutory provisions, factual material produced before the detaining authority, and relevant precedent.

On compliance with S. 10 of the Act (placement before Advisory Board):

The petitioner’s representation was submitted to the prison superintendent on the evening of 22-1-1984 (a Sunday) and was received by the District Magistrate on 23-1-1984. The District Magistrate explained that the representation could not be transmitted from Aligarh to Lucknow by the trains available on 23-1-1984 to reach the Advisory Board by 5 p.m., and therefore it was sent on 24-1-1984. The court found this explanation satisfactory and noted that the petitioner had submitted his representation 20 days after arrest (22-1-1984). In these circumstances it was not possible for the District Magistrate to comply with S. 10, and non-compliance did not render the detention illegal.

On Article 22(5) (expeditious disposal by State Government):

The court traced the Secretariat processing: receipt at Lucknow on 24-1-1984, Secretariat processing delayed by the 26-1-1984 holiday and routine office handling thereafter, placement before officials between 28-1-1984 and 1-2-1984, and final rejection on 4-2-1984. The court observed that the representation was rejected within 12 days of its submission. Relying on cited precedents that held disposal within 10 or 16 days was not inordinate, the court concluded that the State Government did not dispose of the representation with undue delay or lethargy.

On supply of documents to the detenu:

The court applied the principle that a detenu is entitled to the grounds of detention and the documents and material on which those grounds are based, i.e., the material that was before the detaining authority when it passed the order. It found that the District Magistrate had supplied all documents that were before him. The agreement of 1980–1981 and copies of three licences were not before the District Magistrate when he passed the detention order; therefore, the detaining authority was not required to supply those documents. The court held that the non-supply of those documents did not affect the petitioner’s right under Article 22(5) to make an effective representation.

On staleness of grounds:

The court observed that the breach of the 1980–1981 agreement (failure to supply rice and return bags) was connected with later events that led to suspension of the wholesale licence on 8-9-1983 and the inspection of 14-11-1983 which revealed continued activity inconsistent with suspension. Thus the earlier breach could not be treated in isolation as stale; it was part of a continuing course of conduct relevant to the detention order of 30-11-1983.

On applicability of the 1981 Order and legal characterisation of the 1980–81 agreement:

The court examined statutory saving/transition provisions. Clause 15 of the 1981 Order rescinded the 1977 Order subject to application of S. 6 and S. 24 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904. Under S. 24 of that Act, orders made under the repealed enactment continue in force and are deemed to have been made under corresponding provisions of the repealing order. The court therefore held that the government orders and the 1980–81 agreement (issued under cl. 10 of the 1977 Order) would be deemed to have been made under cl. 9 of the 1981 Order, and the petitioner’s breach could be characterised as contravening cl. 9 of the 1981 Order punishable under S. 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act. The court also noted that extensions of time recorded in the file did not alter the fact that the required rice had not been supplied even up to 5-9-1983.

On whether the 160 bags and other material could be explained as commission-agent activity:

The court reviewed the documents recovered at the 14-11-1983 inspection (covering letters, cash memos, transport documents, mandi receipts) and found that the documents were addressed to the petitioner’s mill and contained price and total price particulars; the covering letter did not indicate consignment to be sold on behalf of the sender with commission to the petitioner. The court observed that in a habeas corpus petition the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be lightly interfered with; it can only be disturbed if there was no material on which the subjective satisfaction could be based. Here there was material from which the detaining authority could reasonably conclude that the petitioner was engaged in purchase of paddy despite suspension of his wholesale licence.

On misquotation, charge-sheet absence, and the 1958 Act contention:

The court treated the misquotation of the 1981 Order as trivial and not such as to have misled the petitioner in making an effective representation. The absence of the charge-sheet under S. 3/7 before the detaining authority was held not to be fatal because the factual material supporting the detention was available and consistent with the grounds. Finally, the court rejected the contention that the 1958 Act licence permitted independent purchase and hulling after suspension of the wholesale licence: the 1958 licence allowed operation of the mill, but not purchase, storage for sale, or sale of paddy after wholesale licence suspension; if the petitioner could not purchase paddy he could not lawfully hull his own paddy.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The petition is DISMISSED. The court held that the detention of the petitioner in District Jail, Aligarh, was not illegal.

Implications and direct consequences:

The detention order dated 30-11-1983 under S. 3(2) of the Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, was upheld as lawful on the record and reasoning presented.
The petitioner's procedural challenges (S. 10 placement timing, Article 22(5) delay, document supply) were rejected on the facts and legal principles examined.
The court refused the petitioner's request for a certificate that the case was fit for appeal to the Supreme Court.
No broader or novel precedent was announced beyond the application of established transitional and procedural principles recorded in the opinion; the decision resolves the petition on its facts and existing authority cited in the opinion.

Disposition: Petition dismissed; no certificate for appeal granted.

Show all summary ...

B.N Katiu, J.:— This is a petition for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus.

2. The petitioner is detained in District Jail Aligarh under the order of the District Magistrate Aligarh dated 30-11-1983 passed under S. 3(2), Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community. The petitioner was arrested on 2-1-1984 and the aforesaid order was served on him on that day along with the grounds of detention. The petitioner made an application for the supply of certain documents on 19-1-1984, which was rejected by the District Magistrate on the same day. The petitioner submitted his representation to the Superintendent, District Jail, Aligarh on 22-1-1984. It was received by the District Magistrate, Aligarh on 23-1-1984 and was sent by him to the State Government on 24-1-1984. It was rejected by the State Government on 4-2-1984. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the representation of the petitioner was not placed before the Advisory Board by the State Government within three weeks from the date of his detention as required by S. 10 of the Act. From an examination of the record of the District Magistrate it appeared that the representation of the petitioner was received by the Superintendent District Jail, Aligarh, on the evening of 22-1-1984, which was a Sunday. It was sent by him to the District Magistrate on the next day (23-1-1984). According to the counter-affidavit of the District Magistrate the representation of the petitioner could not be sent from. Aligarh on 23-1-1984 so as to be placed before the Advisory Board by 5 P.M on that day (23-1-1984). It was, therefore, sent from Aligarh to the State Government by the District Magistrate on 24-1-1984 along with his comments. It thus appears that the representation of the petitioner was not received by the District Magistrate from the Superintendent District Jail, Aligarh on 23-1-1984 in time so that it could be sent to Lucknow on that day by the trains which connect Aligarh with Lucknow so as to reach the Advisory Board by 5 P.M on that day. The explanation furnished by the District Magistrate, Aligarh, for not sending it on 23-1-1984 is thus satisfactory. The representation of the petitioner was admittedly submitted by him 20 days after his arrest on 22-1-1984. In these circumstances, it was not possible for the District Magistrate to comply with the provisions of S. 10 of the Act. The detention of the petitioner cannot, therefore, be held to be illegal for non-compliance with the provisions of S. 10 of the Act.

3. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the representation of the petitioner was not disposed of by the State Government expeditiously as required by Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. As mentioned earlier, the petitioner submitted his representation to the Superintendent, District Jail, Aligarh, on 22-1-1984 in the evening. It was sent by the Superintendent, District Jail, Aligarh, to the District Magistrate, Aligarh on 23-1-1984 and the District Magistrate, Aligarh, sent it to the State Government on 24-1-1984. According to the counter-affidavit filed by Syod Israr Rizvi, Assistant in the Food and Civil Supplies Department, Section 10, U.P, Secretariate, Lucknow, the representation of the petitioner was received at Lucknow on 24-1-1984 and on account of the intervening holiday (26-1-1984) it was dealt with in the Secretariate on 28-1-1984. It was placed before the Under Secretary on 31-1-1984. On 1-2-1984 it was examined by the Secretary, Food and Civil Supplies Department and was rejected by the State Government on 4-2-1984. It is, therefore, evident that the representation of the petitioner was rejected within 12 days of its submission by him. It cannot, therefore, be held that the representation of the petitioner was disposed of after an inordinate delay and the State Government acted in a lethargic manner or in a cavalier fashion. It may be mentioned that it has been held in Ibrahim v. State of West Bengal ((1975) 3 SCC 13 : AIR 1974 SC 736) that the disposal of the representation of the detenu within 10 days does not amount to its being disposed of after an inordinate delay. In Suresh Bhojraj Chelani; v. State Of Maharashtra. ((1983) 1 SCC 382 : AIR 1983 SC 181) the representation of the petitioner was disposed of by the State Government within 16 days of its submission and within 6 days of its receipt. It was held that the delay in the disposal of the representation of the petitioner was not unreasonable. It is well settled that no absolute test can be laid down to determine whether there has been a delay in disposing of the representation of the detenu. It is a question of fact to be determined in each case. In the present case, it cannot be held that the representation of the petitioner was not disposed of by the State Government expeditiously as required by Art. 22(5) of the Constitution.

4. It was next contended, by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the detaining authority did not supply the documents, which were demanded by the petitioner in his application dated 19-1-1984, which were necessary for making his representation. It appears that all the documents referred to in the grounds of detention and demanded by the petitioner were supplied to him except the agreement entered into by him in 1980–1981 and copies of his three licences. In our opinion, the detaining authority is only required to supply those documents, which were before it when it passed the order of detention as the order of detention is based only on those documents. The detaining authority, in our view, is not required to supply documents, which were not before it when it passed the order of detention, although they may have been referred to in some of the documents, which were before it when it passed the detention order. It is well settled that the detenu is entitled to be furnished with not only the grounds of detention but also the documents and material on which those grounds are based. It is obvious that the grounds of detention are based only on the material that is before the detaining authority. Although in that material there may be a reference to some other documents, but the detenu is not entitled to get a copy of those documents as they were not before the detaining authority when it passed the order of detention. In the present case, the counter-affidavit of the District Magistrate shows that all the relevant documents were supplied to the petitioner along with the grounds of detention. We have also examined the record of the District Magistrate relating to the case of the petitioner and found that copies of all the documents that were before the District Magistrate when he passed the order of detention against the petitioner were supplied to the petitioner along with the grounds of detention. The record also showed that a copy of the agreement entered into by the petitioner in 1980–1981 and copies of the three licences of the petitioner were not before the District Magistrate when he passed the detention order against the petitioner. He was, therefore, not required to supply these documents to the petitioner along with the grounds of detention. In our opinion, the non-supply of these documents has not affected his right under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution to make an effective representation against the grounds of his detention.

5. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the ground of the detention of the petitioner was stale. It was stated in the grounds of detention that the petitioner was the proprietor of Govind Dal Mill Aligarh. In 1980–1981 the petitioner was supplied 3477.82 quintals of Dhan Cotnmon, 2844.24 quintals of Dhan fine and 44.10 quintals of Dhan super fine (total quantity of 6366.21 quintals) for custom hulling under an agreement under which the rice was required to be supplied after hulling of the Dhan to the State Government by 30-6-1981. The petitioner, however, did not comply with the aforesaid agreement and did not supply 220 quintals of rice from Dhan common and 214 quintals, 65 kilograms and 300 grams of rice from Dhan fine to the State Government by 5-9-1983. The petitioner also did not return 5451 bags to the State Government as required under the agreement by 5-9-1983. All this was also not in stock on 5-9-1983. The petitioner thus sold the aforesaid quantity of rice in blackmarket and violated cl. 9, U.P Rice and Paddy (Levy and Regulation of Trade) Order, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the 1981 Order), which was punishable under Section 3/7, Essential Commodities Act. A report under that section was lodged against the petitioner by Suresh Chand Garg Marketing Inspector on 5-9-1983 at P.S Banna Devi at Aligarh.

6. The Regional Food Controller, Agra, suspended the wholesale licence of the petitioner on 8-9-1983 as the petitioner had violated the agreement entered into by him with the Food Controller by not supplying the agreed quantity of rice by 30-6-1981 and the said rice was also not found in stock on 5-9-1983, from which it appeared that the petitioner had sold it in black-market, thus violating the provisions of cl. 9 of the 1981 Order. The petitioner also did not return 5451 bags which he was required to return to the State Government under the agreement. The petitioner thus violated conditions Nos. 5, 6, 7, 11 and 13 of the wholesale licence issued under the U.P Foodgrains Dealers' (Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the 1976 Order) and condition No. 1 of the Rice Milling Licence issued under the Rice Milling Industries Regulation Act, 1958. The order suspending the wholesale licence of the petitioner was served on him on 16-9-1983.

7. The mill of the petitioner was inspected on 14-11-1983 by Bhagwan Singh Senior Marketing Inspector along with the Sub-Divisional Officer Koel, the District Supply Officer, Aligarh and others. At the time of the inspection. Suresh Chandra, the brother of the petitioner was present. The Satti Bahi and the stock register were demanded from the brother of the petitioner, but they could not be produced. Truck No. UTI 9459 was found parked in the premises of the mill, from which 150 bags had already been unloaded and 10 bags were to be unloaded. The driver of the truck informed that the bags had been brought from Bareilly. The documents relating to the aforesaid bags were recovered from the office of the mill. It was found from the documents that the bags had been sent by New Bharat Agency, Ghora Tanda, Bareilly to the petitioner's mill. The documents consisted of covering letter issued by New Bharat Agency, cash memo, transport covering letter (Bilti), receipts of the Mandi Samiti, Ghora Tanda, Bareilly and the octroi post, Aligarh, which were signed by the Senior Marketing Officer and also by the brother of the petitioner on 14-11-1983. The stock board was also found filled with the undermentioned particulars of the stocks:

8. Dhan third quality 457.71 quintals; Rice first quality 209.76 quintals; Rice third quality 45.85 quintals; Wheat 90.03 quintals; Flour 10 bags and below it licence No. B48/41 and licence No. F127/50 were written. The date was mentioned in the Board, but it did not bear any signature. The Senior Marketing Inspector and others made inquiries as to how the petitioner was carrying on trade on his licence when it was suspended on 8-9-1983 and the suspension order was communicated to him on 16-9-1983, but they could not obtain any satisfactory answer. Huge quantity of paddy was also being dried in the mill premises, the hulling machine was found to be working and ovens were heated. 10 bags of rice mixed with husk was also recovered from the hulling machine. The articles recovered from the mill of the petitioner were as follows:—

1. Dhan Basmati 112.00 quintal 2. Dhan fine 552.16 quintal 3. Dhan common 12.24 quintal 4. Rice fine 132.92 quintal 5. Rice Basmati 26.93 quintal 6. Rice common 97.02 quintal 7. Broken rice fine 21.04 quintal 8. Broken rice common 11.85 quintal

9. Wheat 74.00 quintal 10. Maida 3.50 quintal 11. Flour 3.60 quintal 12. Husk 0.72 quintal 13. Rice fine mixed with husk which was in the process of hulling 8.00 quintal

9. Thus the stock found in the mill of the petitioner did not tally with the entries in the stock board. As the wholesale licence of the petitioner had been suspended on 8-9-1983 and the suspension had been communicated to him on 16-9-1983, the petitioner was not entitled to purchase any paddy for himself after 16-9-1983. As 160 bags of paddy had been brought by truck No. UTI 9459 from Ghora Tanda, Bareilly, on the licence of the petitioner, it appeared that it had been brought for illegal trade. The petitioner could only operate on his commission agent's licence and purchase paddy on behalf of others. He could also not store paddy which had been purchased by him nor could he hull his own paddy, but he could hull the paddy of others provided that he obtained a permit under cl. 4 of the 1981 Order, which was not obtained by him. Apart from this the stock register relating to the wheat and other articles recovered from the mill was not produced by the brother of the petitioner although a written order was given to him to do so. The petitioner thus violated cl. 3 of the 1976 Order and the provisions of 1981 Order.

10. It appears from the grounds of detention that part of paddy that was supplied to the petitioner in 1980–1981 under the agreement entered into by him with the Food Controller for conversion into rice was not returned to the State Government as required by the agreement by 30-6-1981. It was not returned even till 5-9-1983 and was also not found in stock of the mill on that day. The wholesale licence of the petitioner was consequently suspended by the Senior Marketing Inspector on 8-9-1983 and the suspension order was communicated to the petitioner on 16-9-1983. It is thus clear that the breach of the agreement of 1980–1981 by the petitioner was directly connected with the suspension of the wholesale licence of the petitioner on 8-9-1983. At the time of the inspection of the petitioner's mill on 14-11-1983 it was found that the petitioner was carrying on business of purchase of foodgrains even after his wholesale licence had been suspended on 8-9-1983. The breach of the agreement entered into by the petitioner in 1980–1981 cannot, therefore, be considered in isolation but must be considered along with the activities of the petitioner in November, 1983, which led to the suspension of his wholesale licence on 8-9-1983. It cannot, therefore, be held that the breach of the agreement entered into by the petitioner in 1980–1981 was stale and could not be taken into consideration by the District Magistrate while passing the detention order against the petitioner on 30-11-1983.

11. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner did not commit any breach of cl. 9 of the 1981 Order as the agreement entered into by the petitioner in 1980–1981 had expired on 30-6-1981 whereas the 1981 Order came into force on 7-11-1981. It is clear from Cl. 10, U.P Rice and Paddy (Levy & Regulation of Trade) Order, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the 1977 order) that the State Government could by general or special order make supplementary provisions in respect of matters for which no provision existed or insufficient provision existed in that Order. It appears from the letter of the Deputy Secretary, Food and Civil Supplies, U.P Government, which was examined by us, that the State Government had passed general order on 10-10-1980 and 31-10-80 directing the Food Controllers to enter into agreement with rice millers for the hulling of paddy into rice and the form of the agreement was also prescribed in the Government Order. It may be mentioned that the aforesaid letter of the Deputy Secretary was not before the detaining authority when it passed the detention order against the petitioner, but a reference was made to it in the first information report dated 5-9-1983 which was before the detaining authority who it passed the detention order against the petitioner. It thus appears that the agreement entered into by the petitioners and the Food Controller in 1980–1981 was under the Government Orders passed under cl. 10 of the 1977 Order. The 1977 Order was repealed by the 1981 Order, which came into force on 7-11-1981. Clause 15 of the 1981 Order is as follows:—

“15. Rescission.— The Uttar Pradesh Rice and Paddy (Levy, Regulation of Trade and Control of Movement) Order, 1977 is hereby rescinded and the provisions of S. 6 and S. 24, U.P General Clauses Act, 1904 (U.P Act No. 1 of 1904) shall apply in relation to its rescission as they apply in relation to the repeal of an enactment by an Uttar Pradesh Act.”

12. Under S. 24, U.P General Clauses Act, orders made or issued under the repealed enactment continue in force and are deemed to have been made or issued under the corresponding provisions of the repealing Act. Clause 9 of the 1981 order specifically mentions that the State Government may enter into an agreement with a licenced rice miller to convert paddy into rice. It, therefore, follows that the Government Order passed under cl. 10 of the 1977 order will be deemed to have been passed under cl. 9 of the 1981 Order. By virtue of S. 24, U.P General Clauses Act, the agreement entered into by the petitioner under the Government Order passed under cl. 10 of the 1977 Order will, therefore, be deemed to have been entered into under cl. 9 of the 1981 Order. Thus although the breach of 1980–1981 agreement entered into by the petitioner had taken place on 30-6-1981, the petitioner would be deemed to have violated cl. 9 of the 1981 Order, which is punishable under S. 3/7, Essential Commodities Act. In these circumstances, it cannot be held that the petitioner did not violate cl. 9 of the 1981 Order, but only committed breach of the general order passed under cl. 10 of the 1977 Order by not returning the rice to the State Government by 30-6-1981 as required under the agreement entered into by the petitioner in 1980–1981. It may be mentioned that from the record relating to the case of the petitioner produced before us that the time of 30-6-1981 for the return of the rice to the State Government under the 1980–1981 agreement was extended first till 3-11-1981 and then till, 28-2-1981. It, however, appears from the record of the District Magistrate that this extension of time for the supply of rice by the petitioner to the State Government was not brought to the notice of the Distt. Magistrate when he passed the order of detention against the petitioner. In our opinion, this was not material as admittedly the petitioner did not supply the required rice to the Government even till 5-9-1983, which was much beyond the extended period.

13. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that only the wholesale licence of the petitioner had been suspended but his licence as a Commission Agent was not suspended. He could, therefore, do the business of a Commission Agent even after the suspension of his wholesale licence and the 160 bags of paddy, which were found in his mill on 14-11-1983, could have been received by him as a Commission Agent and not as a wholesaler. The documents, which were recovered from the office of the mill of the petitioner on 14-11-1983 at the time of the inspection of the mill were addressed to the petitioner's mill and included the covering letter sent by the New Bharat Transport Agency, Ghora Tanda, Bareilly. It was not mentioned in this letter that the bags were sent to the petitioner to be sold to third parties on behalf of the New Bharat Transport Agency and the petitioner could deduct his commission charges. It was only mentioned in the covering letter that the petitioner may receive the bags that were being sent. The cash memo of the New Bharat Agency that was recovered at the time of the inspection, on the other hand, mentioned the price of each bag of paddy and also the total price. The documents recovered from the petitioner's mill on 14-11-1983 provided material for the detaining authority to reach the conclusion that the petitioner was engaged in the business of purchase of paddy. In a Habeas Corpus petition, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be interfered with on the ground that another view on the material before him was possible, but can only be interfered with if there was no material on the basis of which his subjective satisfaction could be arrived at. In the present case, there was enough material in the form of the documents recovered from the office of the mill of the petitioner at the time of the inspection of the mill on 14-11-1983 on the basis of which the detaining authority could come to the conclusion that the petitioner was engaged in the business of purchase of paddy even though his wholesale licence had been suspended earlier.

14. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the 1981 Order was wrongly quoted in one or two places in the grounds of detention. Instead of mentioning the order as “Rice and Paddy (Levy and Regulation of Trade) Order”, it has been mentioned as “Paddy and Rice (Levy and Regulation) Order”. This indicated that the case of the petitioner had been dealt with casually and mechanically and the detaining authority did not apply its mind. The 1981 Order has, however, been rightly quoted at two places in the grounds of detention. In our opinion, the misquoting of the 1981 Order is of a very minor and trivial character and it was not such as to have misled the petitioner so that he could not have made an effective representation against the grounds of detention.

15. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the charge-sheet submitted by the investigating officer on 22-9-1983 in the Court of C.J.M, Aligarh, was under S. 406, I.P.C and not under S. 3/7, Essential Commodities Act. This document, which was relevant was not placed before the detaining authority when it passed the order of detention against the petitioner, on 30-11-1983. In our opinion, there was enough material before the detaining authority to come to the conclusion that the petitioner had committed a breach of Cl. 9 of the 1981 Order punishable under S. 3/7, Essential Commodities Act and it was not at all necessary to place the charge-sheet before the detaining authority before it passed the order of detention against the petitioner. It is noteworthy that there was no discrepancy between the charge-sheet and the grounds of detention regarding the activity of the petitioner, but only with respect to the offence made out against the petitioner.

16. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was entitled to hull his paddy under the licence issued to him under the Rice Milling Industries Regulation Act, 1958 even though his wholesale licence issued under the 1976 Order was suspended on 8-9-1983. We are unable to accept this contention as under the licence issued to the petitioner under the 1958 Act, he was only entitled to operate his mill whereas after the suspension of his wholesale licence he was not entitled to engage in the business of purchase, store for sale or sell paddy. It is obvious that if the petitioner could not purchase paddy, he could not hull it in his mill.

17. The result, therefore, is that the detention of the petitioner in District Jail, Aligarh, is not illegal.

18. There is no merit in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed. The prayer of the learned counsel for the petitioner for the grant of a certificate that this is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court is refused.

19. Petition dismissed.