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Iqram And Another v. State Of U.P And Another

Allahabad High Court
Jul 24, 1987
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision under sections 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenges an order dated 20 February 1986 which allowed a revision and set aside an earlier order dated 18 April 1985 passed by the Additional City Magistrate, Aligarh under section 146 of the Code in a proceeding under section 145.

The underlying dispute arose from an application under section 145 by Sri Israt Ullah Khan (opposite party 2), alleging apprehension of breach of peace because the present applicants (the 2nd party) allegedly sought forceful possession of the land. A police report dated 16 January 1984 prompted the Magistrate to pass a preliminary order under section 145(1), fix dates and direct both parties to lead evidence as to possession.

The present applicants (second party) filed objections dated 3 April 1984, asserting that the application by Israt Ullah Khan was baseless and alleging collusion with the local police; they claimed that plot No. 120/4 belonged to applicant No. 1 who purchased it from Mohan Singh and had been in possession since.

Both parties led oral and documentary evidence. The Additional City Magistrate stated he was unable to decide which party was in possession and therefore passed an order under section 146 directing that the land remain attached until rights were declared by a competent court. A revision by the first party against that order was allowed by the Sessions Judge by the impugned order of 20 February 1986. The second party (present applicants) challenged that revisional interference in the present revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Sessions Judge, exercising revisional jurisdiction under sections 397/401 Cr.P.C., was justified in reappreciating the entire evidence and substituting his own view for that of the Magistrate on a question of fact when the Magistrate had considered the evidence and recorded a finding that he was unable to determine possession.
  2. Whether revisional powers under section 397(1) permit reassessment of evidence on facts where no illegality, incorrectness or irregularity in the Magistrate's finding or proceedings has been pointed out.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' (2nd party) Arguments

  • The order under section 146 was interlocutory and therefore not amenable to revision under section 397(2) as relied upon by the Sessions Judge.
  • There was no justification for interference under sections 397/401 because revisional power must be exercised within the limits prescribed by section 397 and evidence could not be reappreciated afresh by the revisional court.
  • Reliance was placed on Mahabir v. State of U.P., 1981 All Cri C 63 : (1981 All LJ 246).

Opposite Party 2's Arguments

  • The Sessions Judge was justified in interfering in revision and the revisional powers under sections 397/401 are comprehensive, permitting even reappreciation of evidence.
  • Relied on Sri Chand v. Dhundi Ram Mathuri, AIR 1955 All 56 and Ram Gopal Ganpatrai Ruia v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 97.

State's Arguments

  • The State supported the impugned order, arguing that the revisional power of the Sessions Judge was comprehensive and that interference by the Sessions Judge in the Magistrate's order was correct.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mahabir v. State of U.P., 1981 All Cri C 63 : (1981 All LJ 246) That a Sessions Judge acts with substantial irregularity if, in revisional jurisdiction under s. 397, he substitutes his own view after appreciating the evidence afresh where the Magistrate had considered the evidence and held he was unable to decide possession. The court relied on Mahabir to hold that the Sessions Judge was not justified in reappreciating evidence and substituting his view for that of the Magistrate.
Sri Chand v. Dhundi Ram Mathuri, AIR 1955 All 56 As cited by opposite party 2 to support the proposition that revisional courts may reappreciate evidence; the text indicates this was a case under the old Code with facts where one party admitted the other was in possession and evidence was one-sided. The court distinguished this precedent on facts, stating it arose under the old Code and different factual circumstances and therefore was of no assistance to justify the Sessions Judge's reappraisal here.
Ram Gopal Ganpatrai Ruia v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 97 As an authority on revisional jurisdiction under the old Code, indicating High Court can examine correctness/legality/propriety of subordinate court orders and may exercise powers of appeal if order is incorrect, illegal or improper. The court observed this case was on different facts (old Code, discharge order) and held it did not assist the Sessions Judge's action in reappreciating evidence in the present case.
Pathumma v. Muhammad, (1986) 2 SCC 585 : AIR 1986 SC 1436 Illustrates that questions of fact are pre-eminently for the Magistrate; the High Court (in revision) erred in reassessing evidence and substituting its view on facts when the Magistrate had analyzed evidence and reached a conclusion. The court relied on Pathumma to reinforce that revisional courts are not justified in substituting their view for that of the Magistrate on questions of fact after the Magistrate has considered evidence.
Guiseppi v. Walling, (1944) 324 US 244; Taders v. Savannah River Veneer Co., 202 SC 363; Barsky v. Board of Regents, (1953) 347 US 442; Flemming v. Florida Citrus Exch., (1958) 358 US 153 Principles from American jurisprudence cited on statutory interpretation: courts must apply statutes as written, not legislate by construction; the judiciary should not amend an Act by construction and must ascertain legislative intent where relevant. These authorities were cited to support the court’s approach to statutory construction: read the relevant Cr.P.C. provisions literally, examine legislative intent only where ambiguity exists, and avoid judicial overreach in construing revisional powers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the principal question as the ambit of revisional powers under section 397(1) Cr.P.C.: whether the Sessions Judge could reappraise evidence and substitute findings of fact when the Magistrate had already considered the evidence and recorded findings without any shown illegality, incorrectness or irregularity.

The court examined the statutory language of sections 397 and 401 (and related provisions such as ss. 386, 399, 400 and 465), explaining that these provisions must be read together and that their literal meaning should be ascertained; only where ambiguity exists may legislative intent be considered. The opinion quoted American jurisprudence to support the principle that courts must apply statutes as written and not amend them by construction.

It summarized the object of revisional jurisdiction as enabling the Sessions Judge or High Court to correct miscarriages of justice arising from misconception of law or irregularity of proceedings. Sections 397 and 401 preserve the court's power to ensure justice and to prevent subordinate courts from abusing their powers, but they do not create rights in litigants.

The court concluded that where the subordinate court has considered evidence and recorded findings of fact without procedural mistakes, those findings are normally binding on revisional courts, and a reappraisal of evidence is not permissible. Reversal is only justified where the revisional court is satisfied that a failure of justice has occurred due to incorrectness, illegality or impropriety.

The impugned order of the Sessions Judge was examined: the Sessions Judge had noted the Magistrate considered arguments without considering evidence and had then gone on to appreciate the evidence afresh and substitute his own findings. The court held that no incorrectness, illegality or irregularity was pointed out in the Magistrate's proceedings to justify such reappraisal.

The court distinguished the authorities relied on by the opposite party (Sri Chand and Ram Gopal Ganpatrai Ruia) on factual grounds, noting they arose under the old Code or different factual circumstances (e.g., discharge), and therefore did not support the Sessions Judge's action in this case.

The court relied upon Pathumma v. Muhammad and Mahabir v. State of U.P. to support the proposition that revisional courts should not substitute their view on questions of fact after the Magistrate has analyzed and recorded findings based on evidence.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 20-2-86 passed by the Sessions Judge is quashed and set aside; the order of the Additional City Magistrate dated 18th April 1985 is maintained.

Direct consequences and directions given by the court:

  • The land in dispute shall remain under attachment in the possession of some supurdar (a Supurdar may be appointed to supervise the land).
  • Any aggrieved person may file a regular suit before a competent court for declaration of rights or for injunction.
  • The interim stay dated 27th February 1986 is vacated.
  • The record of the Court below is to be sent back forthwith.

Implications: The decision directly restores the Magistrate's order and restrains a revisional court from reappraising evidence and substituting findings of fact where no illegality, incorrectness or irregularity in the subordinate court's proceedings has been shown. The opinion relies on existing authorities to clarify the limits of revisional jurisdiction; it does not state that it establishes a new rule beyond the principles applied to the facts of this case.

Disposition: Revision allowed.

Show all summary ...

1. This revision u/s. 397/401 of the Cr. P.C 1973 (for short the Code) is directed against the order dt. 20th Feb. 1986, allowing the revision and setting aside the order dt. 18th April, 1985, passed by the Additional City Magistrate, Aligarh u/s. 146 of the Code in a proceeding under S. 145. The Additional City Magistrate held that as he was unable to decide the possession of either party, hence land in dispute shall remain attached unless the controversy between the parties has been decided by a competeat court. The sequence of events leading to the present revision is that one Sri Israt Ullah Khan (opposite party 2) Assistant Registrar, (the first party) made an application u/s. 145, alleging that there is apprehension of breach of peace. On that application a report was obtained on 16th Jan., 1984, by the policed. The Additional City Magistrate, being satisfied with the said report passed a preliminary order u/s. 145(1) of the Code. It was directed that on the land of opposite party 2, the present applicants (Iqram etc.) the 2nd party wanted to take forceful possession hence there was apprehension of breach of peace. Consequently a preliminary order was issued and a date was fixed for appearance of both the parties and to lead evidence to prove their respective possession. The present applicants, the second party, filed their objections dt. 3rd April, 1984, alleging that application made, by Iqram Ullal Khan (opposite party 2) who was first party, was baseless and the local police was in collusion with him, the land in dispute (plot No. 120/4) belonged to applicant No. 1 which was purchased from one Mohan Singh and since then he was in possession.

2. The first party asserted its own possession. To prove their respective possession both parties led oral and documentary evidence. The Additional City Magistrate, was, however, unable to decide as to which party was in possession. He passed an order u/s. 14600 directing that the land in dispute shall remain attached till the parties get their rights declared from a competent Court. The Revision filed by first party against that order was allowed by the impugned order Feeling aggrieved, the 2nd party, the present applicants have preferred the present revision.

3. Sri Devendra Swaroop, learned counsel for the applicant urged that the order u/s. 146 was an interlocutory order hence no revision was maintainable u/s. 397(2), and there was no justification for interference in the revisional powers u/s. 397/401 of the Code, as the power of revision was to be exercised within the limits prescribed by S. 397, evidence cannot be considered afresh. Reliance was placed on Mahabir v. State of U.P, 1981 All Cri C 63 : (1981 All LJ 246).

4. Sri S.U Khan, learned counsel for the opposite party 2 urged that the Sessions Judge; was justified in making interference in the revision against the order of the Additional City Magistrate and the Revisional powers under revision u/s. 397/401 were much comprehensive, and even evidence can be appreciated afresh. Reliance was placed on Sri Chand v. Dhundi Ram Mathuri, AIR 1955 All 56 Ram Gopal Ganpatrai Ruia v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 97.

5. Sri P.S Adhikari learned counsel for the State strenuously urged and argued so many points in support of the impugned order particularly that the Revisional power was quite comprehensive and interference has correctly been made by the Sessions Judge Aligarh in the order of the Magistrate.

6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties the principal question centres round the ambit of Revisional powers u/s. 397(1) of the Code. In other words as the Magistrate has considered the entire evidence before recording the finding whether there was scope for reappraisal of evidence in Revisional Court without pointing out any illegality, irregularity or impropriety. S. 397(1) provides that High Court or any Sessions Court may call for and examine the record of any case before the inferior criminal Court, for the purposes of satisfying itself as to correctness, legality or propriety of any finding recorded and as to regularity of any proceeding. The jurisdiction is confined only to ascertain the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding and regularity of any proceeding. It was not pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge as to what was the incorrectness or illegality in the finding or what was irregularity in the proceedings.

7. In fact in order to have the extent of revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge, it is better to read Ss. 397/399, 400 and 401 of, Code together. It is better to consider relevant rules of construction. I am of the view that in such matters the literal meaning of relevant sections has to be ascertained. If there appears to be some ambiguity the object of the legislative-intent can also be looked into. In doing so it shall be permissible for a Court making constructions to even iron out the creases. But that must not go against the object of the legislature. In American Jurisprudence (2nd Edition) Vol I, Paras 36-37, pages 838-839, it has been observed as follows:—

“The Courts themselves have no power to legislate and may not amend an Act directly or indirectly by construction (See Guiseppi v. Walling, (1944) 324 US 244, Taders v. Savannch River Veneer Co., 202 SC 363). It is for the courts to ascertain, neither to add nor subtract, delete or distort (See Barsky v. Board of Regents), (1953) 347 US 442). It is the judicial function to apply statutes on the basis of what the legislature has actually written, not what the legislature might have written. (See Flemming v. Florida Citrus Exch., (1958) 358 US 153).

8. Applying these rudimentary principles of interpretations to the provisions of Ss. 386, 389, 390, 391, 397, 399, 400 and 401 and 465 it is evident that the object of creating revisional jurisdiction in favour of the Sessions Judge is to correct miscarriage of justice, emanating from misconception of law and irregularity of proceedings. Ss. 397 and 401 are interlinked. S. 397 provides grounds and also cases in respect of which Revisional power could be exercised by the Sessions Judge and the High Court. S. 398 enacts a special jurisdiction in respect of further enquiry to be made by the Chief Judicial Magistrate or some other Magistrate into any complaint dismissed under S. 203 or 204(4). Ss. 397 and 401 do not create any rights in the litigant but only preserve the power in the Court to see that the justice is done in accordance with recognized principles of criminal jurisprudence. This is with a view that the subordinate courts do not abuse their powers vested in them. The High Court or the Court of Session can interfere in cases of incorrectness, illegality or impropriety of any finding or irregularity of any proceeding. Once these conditions as pointed out under S. 397 are satisfied the Sessions Court can pass an appropriate order in the ends of justice. But in case the evidence has been considered and findings of fact have been recorded those findings need not be set aside. By reading Ss. 397, 401 and 465 together the only irresistible conclusion is that even though there might be some error, omissions or irregularity in the findings or order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but the Sessions Court cannot reverse those findings unless he is satisfied that a failure of justice has occasioned thereby. It is thus evident that in case evidence has been considered, and findings of fact have been recorded without committing any procedural mistakes, the finding of fact would be binding on Revisional Court it may be Sessions Court or High Court and reappraisal of evidence cannot be made.

9. In Pathumma v. Muhammad, (1986) 2 SCC 585 : AIR 1986 SC 1436 the ambit of Revisional jurisdiction has been indicated thus (p. 1437 para 6):

“The questions whether the appellant No. 1 was the married wife of respondent and whether the appellant No. 2 was the legitimate or illegitimate child of the respondent, are pre-eminently questions of fact. The learned Magistrate after considering the evidence as adduced by the parties held that the appellant No. 1 was not wife of the respondent. He further held on the basis of evidence on record that the appellant No. 2 was the illegitimate child of the respondent. We are afraid the learned Judge of the High Court committed an error in making a reassessment of the evidence and coming to a finding that the appellant No. 2 was not the illegitimate child of the respondent. We have ourselves considered the evidence on record and we agree with the learned Magistrate, who had taken much pains in analysing the evidence, the appellant 2 was illegitimate child of the respondent. High Court in its revisional jurisdiction was not justified in substituting its own view for that of the learned Magistrate, on a question of fact”.

10. Learned Sessions Judge, in his impugned order (paras 11 and 12) observed that he considered arguments of parties, without considering any evidence on record, the Magistrate held that he was unable to decide as to which party was in possession, after aforesaid paragraphs, the learned Sessions Judge, made reference to the arguments of the learned counsel for applicant land the opposite parties and appreciated the evidence afresh. The revisional jurisdiction did not justify the consideration of the entire evidence afresh without pointing out the incorrectness or the illegality in the finding and order or irregularity in the proceedings or any other impropriety. I am of the view that the Sessions Judge was not justified in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction to substitute its own view for that of the Magistrate on a question of fact Sri Chand v. Dhundhi Ram Mathuri, (AIR 1955 All 56) (supra) relied upon by opposite party 2 was a case under old Code, where there was admission of one party that other party was in possession, and that other party examined 3 witnesses to prove his case, and there was no evidence led by first party, hence it was held under the circumstances it cannot be said that the evidence of neither party was such as to lead to a positive conclusion about fact of possession of either party. Similarly Ram Gopal Ganpatrai Ruia v. State of Bombay, (AIR 1958 SC 97) (supra) was also a case under the old Code and arising out of an order of discharge. In respect of Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court it was held that High Court can examine the correctness, legality or propriety of an order passed by the subordinate Courts, and in case, it finds that order is not correct or is illegal or improper, it may exercise any power of the court of appeal. The present case was not against an order of discharge nor any illegality, incorrectness or impropriety was pointed out by Sessions Judge rather evidence was considered afresh and its own findings were substituted for the findings recorded by the Magistrate. Those cases: Sri Chand v. Dhundhi Ram Mathuri (supra) and Ram Gopal Ganpatrai were on different facts, hence of no assistance.

11. Under similar facts in Mahabir v. State of U.P, 1981 All Cri C 63 : (1981 All LJ 246) (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant, it was held that in case the Magistrate has held in a proceeding under S. 145 after considering the evidence that he was unable to decide the factum of possession, or as to which party was in possession since two months prior to the date of preliminary order, the Sessions Judge acts with substantial irregularity in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction under S. 397, if he substitutes his own view after appreciating the evidence afresh.

12. In the premise aforesaid there is no other alternative but to quash and set aside the impugned order passed by the Sessions Judge, which cannot be maintained. Learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 submitted that the case may be remanded to the Additional City Magistrate. I am of the view that there is no necessity to remand the case to the Additional City Magistrate, inasmuch as the material evidence has been considered fey him and he has come to the conclusion that he is unable to decide as to which party was in possession hence he directed that the land in dispute shall remain under attachment. I am now of the view that the land in dispute shall remain under attachment in possession of some supurdar. In the result the revision succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dt. 20-2-86 is set aside and that of the learned Additional City Magistrate dt. 18th April, 1985 is maintained. A Supurdar may be appointed to supervise the land. Any Aggrieved person may file a regular suit before the competent court for declaration of the rights or for injunction as advised. The interim stay dt. 27th Feb., 1986 is vacated. The record of the Court below be sent back forthwith.

13. Revision allowed.