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The Accounts Officer (Pension Sanction) v. Mariyamma

Kerala High Court
Mar 24, 2010
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Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, daughter of the late P.V. Joseph (a retired employee of the Kerala State Electricity Board), claimed contributory family pension following the death of her mother, the pensioner’s wife, in 2004. The pension office denied her claim on the ground that she was a married daughter and therefore not entitled to family pension under the Kerala Service Rules (K.S.R). The respondent had been married in 1971 but was deserted by her husband shortly thereafter and had been dependent on her parents since. She filed W.P.(C) No. 16858 of 2005 seeking a writ of mandamus to direct payment of family pension, contending she should be treated as unmarried, divorced, or widowed for pension purposes. The Single Judge ruled in her favour, treating her as an unmarried or divorced daughter and directing payment of pension prospectively. The appellants challenged this decision by filing the present writ appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a married daughter, whose marriage is subsisting but who has been deserted by her husband and dependent on her parents, is entitled to contributory family pension under Section VII of Part III of the Kerala Service Rules.
  2. Whether the court can treat such a married daughter as unmarried or divorced for the purpose of family pension entitlement under the K.S.R.
  3. The scope and application of Rule 7 of Part I K.S.R concerning relaxation of rules on grounds of undue hardship.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • Family pension is a welfare measure meant to alleviate penury among dependents of the deceased pensioner.
  • Though married in 1971, the respondent was deserted by her husband shortly thereafter and has since depended on her parents for sustenance.
  • She should be treated as unmarried, divorced, or widowed daughter under the K.S.R. to be eligible for family pension.

Appellants' Arguments

  • The respondent was admittedly married and the marriage has not been legally dissolved by divorce.
  • Under Rule 90(6)(e) of Part III K.S.R, only unmarried daughters above 25 years are entitled to family pension.
  • The rules do not contemplate family pension for married daughters unless they fall under specific categories such as disabled divorced or widowed daughters.
  • The court should not expand the definition of 'family' beyond the express terms of the rules on grounds of sympathy.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thankappan Nair v. State Of Kerala (2001 (3) KLT 855) Power coupled with duty concept in exercise of discretionary power under service rules. The court relied on this precedent to hold that Rule 7 of Part I K.S.R confers a power coupled with a duty to relax rules causing undue hardship, which the Board must exercise when warranted.
Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 Explanation of the concept of power coupled with duty. The Supreme Court’s explanation was cited to reinforce that discretionary power may impose a duty to act under certain conditions.
I. Hirday Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly, (1970) 2 SCC 355 : AIR 1971 SC 33 Duty to exercise authority invested by statute when circumstances warrant. The court applied this principle to hold that discretionary powers under service rules must be exercised when the applicant shows entitlement and circumstances exist.
Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford ((1880) 5 AC 214) Illustration of power coupled with duty doctrine. Quoted to support the proposition that certain powers carry an inherent duty to act when called upon.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by examining the relevant provisions of the Kerala Service Rules, particularly Rule 90(6) of Part III K.S.R, which defines the categories of family members entitled to contributory family pension. The rule excludes married daughters from entitlement unless they are disabled divorced or widowed daughters. The petitioner’s marriage was subsisting, and she did not suffer from any disability, thus excluding her from the definition of 'family' eligible for pension under the rules.

The court rejected the Single Judge’s approach of treating the petitioner as unmarried or divorced on the basis of desertion, emphasizing that the rules do not permit such an interpretation. The court underscored that the definition of 'family' under the rules is exhaustive and cannot be expanded on sympathetic grounds.

However, the court acknowledged the hardship faced by the petitioner and referred to Rule 7 of Part I K.S.R, which empowers the Government (and by adoption, the Kerala State Electricity Board) to relax the rules if strict application causes undue hardship. The court held that this power is coupled with a duty to act and must be exercised when warranted. It directed that if the petitioner files a representation seeking relaxation under Rule 7, the Board must consider it fairly and make a decision after due enquiry and hearing.

Holding and Implications

The court allowed the writ appeal, reversed the Single Judge’s judgment, and disposed of the writ petition. It held that under the existing Kerala Service Rules, the petitioner is not entitled to contributory family pension as a married daughter whose marriage subsists and who is not disabled.

However, the court directed that the Kerala State Electricity Board must consider any representation made by the petitioner under Rule 7 of Part I K.S.R for relaxation of the rules on grounds of undue hardship. The Board is obligated to conduct a due enquiry and pass an appropriate order within three months of such representation.

The decision does not create a new precedent expanding the definition of 'family' for pension purposes but clarifies the strict application of the rules and the discretionary but mandatory nature of the relaxation power under Rule 7. The immediate implication is that the petitioner’s entitlement depends on the administrative discretion exercised under Rule 7, not on an automatic legal entitlement under Rule 90(6).

Show all summary ...

P.N Ravindran, J.:— The appellants are the respondents in W.P(C) No. 16858 of 2005. The respondent is the petitioner therein. The short question that arises for consideration in this writ appeal is whether the married daughter of a pensioner, whose marriage is subsisting, is entitled to payment of contributory family pension under Section VII of Part III of the K.S.R The brief facts of the case are as follows.

2. The respondent is the daughter of late P.V Joseph, who was an employee of the Kerala State Electricity Board. He retired from service in the year 1985. Upon retirement he was paid pension and other terminal benefits. He expired in the year 1997 and thereupon family pension was paid to his wife and the petitioner's mother Smt. Rebeka Joseph. She passed away on 27.11.2004 The petitioner thereupon moved the Kerala State Electricity Board claiming payment of family pension by submitting an application dated 17.12.2004 The Accounts Officer in the office of the Chief Engineer (HRM) declined the said request holding that as the petitioner is a married daughter she is not entitled to get family pension. Ext. P4 letter dated 1.3.2005 was thereupon sent to the Executive Engineer, the second respondent in the writ petition, with copy to the petitioner. The Executive Engineer was also directed to inform the petitioner accordingly. The Executive Engineer sent Ext. P3 letter dated 23.3.2005 to the petitioner informing her that she is not eligible for family pension, she being a married daughter of the pensioner. The petitioner, therefore, filed W.P (C) No. 16858 of 2005 in this Court seeking the following reliefs:—

i) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, commanding the respondents to grant Family Pension to the petitioner with effect from the date of death of her mother, i.e 25.11.2004

ii) call for the records leading to Ext. P3 and P4 and issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, setting aside the same,

iii) declare that the petitioner is entitled for Family Pension, as she is widow within the meaning of R. 90 of K.S.R Part III.

3. The petitioner contended that the grant of family pension being a welfare measure to wade out the family members of the deceased pensioner from penury, the petitioner, a daughter who was given in marriage but was deserted by her husband within a few days of the marriage, should be treated as an unmarried or divorced or widowed daughter. She contended that though she was married to Sri Jacob in 1971, after a few days of the marriage he deserted her. She also contended that ever since her husband deserted her, she was depending on her father and later on her mother late Rebeka Joseph, for her sustenance.

4. The appellants resisted the Writ Petition by filing a counter affidavit. It was contended that as the petitioner was admittedly married to Sri Jacob and the marriage has not been dissolved by a decree of divorce granted by a competent court, the petitioner cannot claim that she is an unmarried or divorced daughter of the pensioner. Relying on R. 90(6)(e) of Part III K.S.R it was contended that unmarried daughters above the age of 25 years alone are entitled to family pension. By judgment delivered on 22.12.2009 the learned Single Judge held that the petitioner should be treated as a divorced or unmarried daughter and family pension be paid to her. In that view of the matter Exts. P3 and P4 were quashed and the appellants were directed to pay family pension to the petitioner prospectively. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants have filed this Writ Appeal.

5. We heard Sri. Ashok M. Cherian, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the appellants and Sri. K.P Dandapani, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent. We have also considered the pleadings and materials on record. The fact that the petitioner had married Sri Jacob is not in dispute. Though the petitioner claims and Ext. P1 indicates that ever since 1971 the petitioner is residing separately from her husband, it is not in dispute that the petitioner was given in marriage to Sri Jacob. Then the short question is whether under R. 90(6) of Part III K.S.R the petitioner is entitled to payment of family pension. The learned single Judge has relied on R. 71 of Part III K.S.R to hold that the petitioner has to be treated as an unmarried or divorced daughter of the pensioner for the reason that her husband deserted her shortly after marriage and therefore she is entitled to payment of family pension. R. 71 of Part III K.S.R which defines the term ‘family’, reads as follows:

“71. ‘Family’ for the purpose of this Section will include the following relatives of the employee:—

(a) Wife, in the case of a male employee;

(b) Husband, in the case of a female employee;

(c) Sons;

(d) Unmarried/divorced/widowed daughters;

(e) Brothers below the age of 18 years and unmarried or widowed or divorced sisters.

(f Father;

(g) Mother;

(h) Married daughters; and

(i) Children of a pre-deceased son.”

6. Rr. 80 to 89 of Part III K.S.R, both inclusive, deal with payment of non-contributory family pension. R. 83 thereof stipulates that family, for the purpose of payment of noncontributory family pension, will be as defined in R. 71 except items (h) and (i). If what is claimed is non-contributory family pension, an unmarried or divorced or widowed daughter of the pensioner will fall within the definition of the term ‘family’. Though married daughters are also included within the definition of the term ‘family’ in R. 71, in view of the stipulation in R. 83 married daughters are not entitled to non-contributory family pension. Further, payment of non-contributory family pension will not extend beyond a period of five years from the date of death of the employee. In the instant case, the petitioner's mother (wife of the pensioner) was being paid contributory family pension under Section VII of Part III K.S.R So, the definition of the term “family” in R. 90(6) is relevant in this case. R. 90(6) in Section VII of Part III K.S.R reads as follows:—

“90(6) ‘Family’ for purposes of those rules, means the following relatives of the employee, namely:—

(a) Wife, in the case of male employee.

(b) Husband, in the case of female employee.

(c) Eldest eligible son/daughter (in the order of seniority) till marriage or till attaining the age of 25 years or till he/she gets employed, whichever is earlier.

(d) Children suffering from Physical/mental disorder or disability.

(e) Unmarried daughters above 25 years.

(f Son/daughter adopted legally before retirement.

(g) Parents (in equal shares).

(h) Judicially separated wife.

(i) Judicially separated husband.

(j) Disabled divorced daughters.

(k) Widowed disabled daughters.”

Note 1. If there are no surviving members of the family as in items (a) to (e) above, Government may sanction family pension to the members, referred to in items (f) and (g) subject to the conditions prescribed in sub-r. 6A. If the members referred to in items (a) to (g) are not surviving, the family pension may be paid to the member specified in items (h) or (i) as the case may be, provided the employee has included the details of such member also in Form 5A If judicially separated wife/husband is not included in the details of family furnished in Form 5 A, family pension is not payable to judicially separated wife/husband.

Note 2. Legal marriage after retirement shall also be considered for the purpose of these rules. In such cases, the retired officer shall file a revised Form 5A before the Accountant General after marriage. In cases where Form 5A has not been filed due to death of the pensioner, the family pension will be sanctioned after observing the procedure laid down in R. 118(2) Part III, Kerala Service Rules. In the case of second marriage after retirement, necessary certificates/documents from the authorities concerned duly certified by the Notary Public of the locality to the effect that the spouse of the first marriage is not alive and the marriage of the deceased Government servant with the applicant was lawful and legally valid one shall also be produced.

Note 3. The terms ‘sons’ and ‘daughters’ occurring in clauses (c) and (d) of sub-r. (6) include posthumous sons and posthumous daughters.

Note 4. In the case of disabled divorced daughter of a deceased employee/pensioner whose marriage has been legally annulled, family pension is admissible from the date on which her marriage stands annulled. In the case of widowed disabled daughter of a deceased employee/pensioner, family pension is admissible from the date of death of her husband.”

7. As per item (c) in R. 90(6) of Part III K.S.R, the eldest eligible child was included in the definition of the term ‘family’. Item (c) was substituted by GO.(P) No. 229/2008.Fin. dated 31.5.2008 with effect from 18.10.2004 As per the amended entry, the eldest eligible son/daughter (in the order of seniority) till marriage or till attaining the age of 25 years or till he/she gets employed, whichever is earlier, alone is treated as the member of the family eligible for payment of family pension. Therefore, going by the said entry, a daughter will be treated as a member of the family for the purpose of payment of family pension only till her marriage or till she attains the age of 25 years or till she gets employment, whichever is earlier. As per item (e) unmarried daughters above 25 years of age are also included within the definition of the term ‘family’. Therefore, the petitioner would have become entitled to receive contributory family pension only if she had remained unmarried.

8. As per items (e), (j) and (k) of sub-r. (6) of R. 90 only unmarried daughters above 25 years of age or disabled divorced daughters/widowed disabled daughters of the employee are eligible for payment of family pension. The petitioner was admittedly given in marriage to Sri Jacob even while her father was alive. Therefore, she is not an unmarried daughter of the employee. She does not also suffer from any physical or mental disorder or disability. The marriage between her and Sri Jacob has not been dissolved. Therefore, she cannot be treated as a disabled divorced daughter. Her husband is alive and therefore, she cannot be treated as a disabled widowed daughter. In our view, on the terms of R. 90(6) of Part III K.S.R, the petitioner cannot, therefore, be said to be a member of the family of the employee for the purpose of payment of family pension.

9. As rightly contended by the appellants as the rules do not contemplate payment of family pension except to specified categories of persons who come within the meaning of the term “family” as defined in the rules, this Court cannot add to the definition of the term “family” on grounds of sympathy and direct payment of family pension to a person who is not included in the definition of the term “family”. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the direction issued by the learned single Judge to pay family pension to the petitioner by treating her as a divorced/unmarried daughter of the employee cannot be sustained.

10. R. 90(6) of Part III K.S.R as it now stands was substituted with effect from 29.8.2001 by GC).(P)N0.344/2005.Fin. Dated 25.7.2005 R. 90(6) of Part III K.S.R sets out the order of preference for payment of family pension. The spouse and minor children including legally adopted son or daughter, adopted before retirement, are included in the definition of the term ‘family’ as they are obviously dependents of the employee. Married daughters are excluded for the reason that after marriage there is no dependency on the father or mother. Likewise, parents of the employee can also be rightly termed as dependents of the employee. Judicially separated wife or husband of the employee continues to be his/her spouse until divorce. Therefore, they are also treated as a dependant of the employee. But when it comes to divorced or widowed daughters, only disabled divorced/disabled widowed daughters are treated as members of the family. In other words, a divorced or widowed daughter is treated as a member of the family only if by reason of her disability, after the loss of her husband, she has to again depend on her father or mother, as the case may be, for her sustenance. Thus, it is evident from the scheme for payment of family pension that persons eligible for payment of family pension have been identified based on their dependency on the employee.

11. In the instant case, though the petitioner was given in marriage even during the life time of her father, her husband deserted her in the year 1971 and according to her, she was depending on her father till his death in 1997 and on her mother till her death on 27.11.2004 Ext. P1 certificate issued by the Vicar of St. Thomas Evangelical Church discloses that the petitioner is not residing with her husband since 19.8.1971 and that the petitioner has not re-married. Ext. P2 certificate dated 18.12.2004 issued by the Village Officer, Vellathooval Village, where the petitioner is presently residing, also discloses that the petitioner has not re-married. The petitioner has positively averred in the Writ Petition that ever since 1971 she was depending on her parents for her sustenance. The respondents have rejected the claim of the petitioner for family pension on the short ground that she is not an unmarried daughter. The petitioner is stated to be 78 years old. With the death of her parents she is put to considerable hardship, it is stated. However, in view of the stipulations in R. 90(6) of Part III K.S.R, the petitioner cannot claim family pension as per rules.

12. R. 7 of Part I K.S.R empowers the Government to dispense with or relax the requirement of any rule in the Kerala Service Rules. The Kerala State Electricity Board has adopted the Kerala Service Rules and therefore, the Board can exercise the power of the Government to relax the requirements of the rules where the operation of any rule in the Kerala Service Rules causes undue hardship in any particular case. R. 7 of Part I K.S.R reads as follows:—

“7. Where Government are satisfied that the operation of any rule under these rules causes undue hardship in any particular case, the Government may dispense with or relax the requirements of that rule to such extent and subject to such conditions as they may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner.”

13. R. 7 of Part I K.S.R empowers the Kerala State Electricity Board to dispense with or relax the requirements of R. 90 of Part III K.S.R or of any other rule in the K.S.R, if the Board is satisfied that the operation of that rule causes undue hardship. The Board is empowered to dispense with or relax the requirements of that rule to such extent and subject to such conditions as it may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner.

14. Though the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Board contended that R. 7 only confers a discretion on the Board and that the Board cannot be compelled to exercise that discretion, we are of the opinion that the power conferred on the Board under R. 7 referred to above is a power coupled with a duty to act when the circumstances warranting the exercise of that power are shown to exist. A Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us (K. Balakrishnan Nair, J) was a party, has explained the concept of “power coupled with duty” in Thankappan Nair v. State Of Kerala (2001 (3) KLT 855). The Division Bench in that case was considering the question whether a Police Constable, who was dismissed from service for accepting Rs. 43/- as illegal gratification, was entitled to compassionate pension under R. 5(a) of Part III K.S.R.R 5(a) of Part III K.S.R reads as follows:—

“5. Misconduct or inefficiency:—

(a) No pension may be granted to an employee dismissed or removed for misconduct, insolvency or inefficiency, but to employees so dismissed or removed, compassionate allowances may be granted when they are deserving of special consideration, provided that the allowances granted to any employee shall not exceed two-thirds of the pension which would have been admissible to him if he had retired on the date of dismissal or removal”.

15. The Division Bench in Thankappan Nair v. State Of Kerala (supra) held as follows:—

“9. Apart from that, the power under R. 5 is a power coupled with a duty to act when the circumstances warranting the exercise of that power are shown to exist. Power is the capacity vested in an authority to affect the rights of others whereas the duty is an obligation to act in a particular manner which creates a corresponding right in somebody else. The Supreme Court in its decision in Commissioner of Police y. Gordhandas Bhanji (AIR (39) 1952 SC 16) has explained the concept of power coupled with a duty. The court was interpreting the rule:

‘The Commissioner shall have power in his absolute discretion at any time to cancel or suspend any licence granted under these rules.”

16. The contention that the said rule only confers a discretion which the Commissioner need not exercise was dealt with by the Supreme Court in the following manner:

“It was objected as to this that there is no specific law which compels him to exercise the discretion. R. 250 merely vests a discretion in him but does not require him to exercise it. That is easily met by the observations of Earl Cairns L.C in the House of Lords in Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford ((1880) 5 AC 214), observations which have our full and respectful concurrence:

“There may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something to the conditions under which it is to be done, something to the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty, and make it the duty of the person to whom the power is reposed, to exercise that power when called upon to do so.”

17. The discretion vested in the Commissioner of Police under R. 250 has been conferred upon him for public reasons involving the convenience, safety, morality and welfare of the public at large. An enabling power of this kind conferred for public reasons and for the public benefit is, in our opinion, coupled with a duty to exercise it when the circumstances so demand. It is a duty which cannot be shirked or shelved nor it be evaded, performance of it can be compelled under S. 45.”

18. The said principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in L??? I. Hirday Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly† ((1970) 2 SCC 355 : AIR 1971 SC 33). The relevant portion of the judgment is at paragraphs 12 and 13 which reads as follows:—

“If a statute invests a Public Officer with authority to do an act in a specified set of circumstances, it is imperative upon him to exercise his authority in a manner appropriate to the case when a party interested and having a right to apply moves in that behalf and circumstances for exercise of authority are shown to exist. Even if the words used in the statute are prima facie enabling, the courts will readily infer a duty to exercise power which is invested in aid of enforcement of a right - Public or private - of a citizen”.

19. In the light of the above legal principle, the power conferred under R. 5 is a power coupled with a duty to be exercised on an application made by the appellant.”

20. It was held that the power conferred under R. 5 of Part III K.S.R is a power coupled with a duty to exercise that power when the party interested and having a right to apply moves in that behalf and the circumstances for exercise of that power are shown to exist. R. 7 of Part I K.S.R empowers the Board to dispense with or relax the requirements of any rule in the K.S.R, if it causes undue hardship in a particular case. As noticed by the Division Bench in Thankappan Nair v. State Of Kerala (supra) power is the capacity vested in an authority to affect the rights of others whereas duty is an obligation to act in a particular manner which creates a corresponding right in somebody else. Therefore, if the petitioner is able to satisfy the Board that the operation of R. 90 of Part III K.S.R or of any other rule in the Kerala Service Rules causes undue hardship to her, we are of the opinion that the Board is bound to exercise the power vested in it under R. 7 of Part I, K.S.R We, therefore, hold that in the event of the petitioner moving an appropriate representation seeking relaxation of the rigour of R. 90(6) of Part III K.S.R, which stands in her way of getting family pension, the Board should consider, after due enquiry as to whether she was residing separately from her husband ever since 1971 as claimed in the writ petition and was depending on her late parents for her sustenance and take an appropriate decision thereon.

21. We, accordingly allow the Writ Appeal, reverse the judgment of the learned single Judge and dispose of the Writ Petition with a direction that in the event of the petitioner filing an appropriate representation before the Secretary of the Kerala State Electricity Board within one month from today setting out her claims and grievances and seeking payment of family pension, the Kerala State Electricity Board shall consider the same exercising the power conferred on it under R. 7 of Part I K.S.R and take an appropriate decision thereon within three months from the date of receipt of such a representation, after due enquiry and after affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of being heard.