Chandrasekhar v. State Of Kerala & Ors.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Patnaik, J.:— The petitioners are the accused persons in Crime No. 225 and 246 of 1994 of Vanchiyoor Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram which were subsequantly registered as R.C 10(S)/94 and R.C 11(S)/94 by the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short CBI). The relevant facts and documents of O.P No. 12747 of 1996 are referred in this judgment for the purpose of disposal of the above cases, as common questions of law arise for consideration in all these cases. The relevant facts are also common in all the four writ petitions.

2. The petitioners have prayed for issue of a direction to the first respondent — State of Kerala and the second respondent — Secretary, Home Department, Govt, of Kerala not to initiate any further investigation or re-investigation regarding Crime No. 246/94 against the petitioners in view of the fact that the CBI has filed the referred or closure report after due investigation in the said case on the ground that the allegations levelled against the petitioners under sections 3, and 4 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 are false and also for quashing Exts. P3 and P4.

3. Exts. P3 and P4 are notifications dated 27-6-1996 and 8-7-1996 respectively of Government of Kerala by which the consent accorded to the members of the Delhi Special Police Establishment under section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 as per Notification dated 2.12.1994 to investigate Crime No. 246/94 has been withdrawn.

4. Crime No. 246 of 1994 of Vanchiyoor Police Station was being investigated by a Special Team under the supervision of Deputy Inspector General of Police, Crime Investigation (SR). In the course of investigation, it was found that a prima facie case of the offence under sections 3 and 4 of the Official Secrets Act was made out When the investigation by the State Police reached at the decisive stage, it was felt that the State Police may not be able to conduct the investigation effectively. The incidents of the case spread over to three States, namely Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka as well as foreign locations like Colombo and Male. There was reason to believe that strategically important informations about the IAF/Armed Forces (R&D Wing) have been passed on by the espionage chain to unfriendly countries and involvement or complicity of senior military personnel and some senior officers of the State and the Indian Space Research Organisation (for short, I.S.R.O). Due to the above mentioned reasons, the Deputy Inspector General of Police felt that the Special Team in charge of the case would not be able to do full justice to the case and it was a fit case to be transferred to CBI who are better equipped and also have the advantage of being a Central Police investigating outfit. The State Government after having considered the special nature of the crime, issued a notification dated 2.12.1994 (Ext. P1) in pursuance of the provisions of section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 according consent to the extension of powers and jurisdiction of the members of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (for short, DSPE) in the whole of State of Kerala for investigation of Crime Nos. 225 and 246 of 1994 of Vanchiyoor Police Station. Government of India, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 5 read with Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946, with the consent of the State Government, extended the powers and jurisdiction of the members of the DSPE to the whole of State of Kerala for investigation of offences punishable under sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 and other offences in relation to the said crimes.

5. CBI then registered case R.C No. II/8/94 under section 120-B I.P.C read with sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act and Section 34 IPC relating to Crime No. 246 of 1994 and R.C No. 10/8/94 under Section 14 of Paragraph? of Foreigners Act, 1948 relating to Crime No. 225 of 1994, on 3.12.1994 After investigation of Crime No. 225 of 1994, a charge sheet was filed in court on 17.12.1994 against the petitioner in O.P No. 16358 of 1996 (Mariyam Rasheeda). She was, however, acquitted by the judgment dated 14.11.1995 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam. Regarding Crime No. 246 of 1994, CBI conducted a detailed investigation and on the basis of evidence on record, both oral and documentary, they came to the conclusion that allegation of espionage was not proved and the same is false. Final report to that effect was filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI/STC. II/New Delhi before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam under Section 173(2) of the Cr. P.C The Chief Judicial Magistrate agreed with the report and therefore the accused persons were discharged.

6. Thereafter, the State Government issued the impugned notifications (Exts. P3 and P4) indicating therein that the Government considered it necessary in public interest to order further investigation in the case by a Special Team of State Police Officers, because the State Government felt that no proper investigation was made by the CBI in these cases.

7. It is contended by the patitioners inter alia that a report filed under section 173(2) of the Cr. P.C having been accepted by the Magistrate, further investigation can be held only under section 173(8) of the Cr. P.C if the investigating officer or the superior officer of that investigating officer obtains further evidence in connection with the crime. The investigating officer in this case is an officer of the CBI and the Superintendence of the CBI is vested with the Central Government. Hence, the State Government cannot engage the State Police to make further investigation in the case. The notifications revoking the consent (Exts. P3 and P4) under section 6 of the DSPE Act are invalid in law. Even if it is considered to be valid, the same will have only prospective operation. Since it has been issued after the investigation has been completed and the final report submitted, it cannot be relied upon to enable any other agency to conduct further investigation under section 173(8) of the Cr. P.C Under section 13(3) of the Official Secrets Act, no court shall take cognizance of the offence under this Act unless upon complaint made by order of, or under authority from the appropriate Government or some officer empowered in this behalf. As per sub-section (5) of Sec. 13 of the Act, the appropriate Government in this case is the Central Government. Section 13 makes it clear that the offences under this Act may be tried only on a complaint being filed before the competent court by the Central Government or an authority empowered in that behalf by the Central Government. Crime No. 246 of 1994 relates to an offence punishable under sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Act. Since the State Government has nothing to do with such matters, the impugned notifications are vitiated by total absence of jurisdiction.

8. An organisation called ‘Niyamavedi’ was also impleaded in this case as additional respondent No. 5. One Sri. S. Vijayan, Superintendent of Narcotic Control Bureau, Trivandrum, who took some part in the investigation of this case, prior to the investigation by the CBI, has been impleaded as additional respondent No. 4.

9. Respondents 1 and 2 in their counter-affidavit have stated that the State Government is convinced about the derelection of duty on the part of the CBI, in so far as it failed to collect the available evidence and did not produce all the evidence already collected before the Court. The State Government has invoked its powers in the matter of Crime/detection, for the purpose of safeguarding the security of the Nation and ordered further investigation into the crimes committed by the petitioners. The State Government has a wide spectrum of powers and control over the Police in respect of investigation of offences and other matters relating to crime control under the Kerala Police Act, 1960. The Government, after considering the entire matter, has come to the definite conclusion that the investigation by the CBI has not been properly conducted. The conclusion of an investigation and the filing of the final report under Sec. 173(2) of the Cr. P.C or its acceptance by the Magistrate have no bearing either on the power of the Police to further investigate a case or upon the power of the Government to direct for further investigation. Sec. 173(8) of the Cr. P.C is not the source of the power of the State Government to direct further investigation into a crime/offence. The further investigation in the instant case has not been ordered under section 173(8) of the Cr. P.C The filing of the final report, acceptance of the same by the Magistrate and closure of the file do not trammel upon the power of the State Government to order further investigation. It is further contended by the respondents that the CBI alone cannot be said to be the only agency to conduct further investigation in this case on obtaining further evidence. The allegation that the revocation of consent under Ext. P3 notification is prospective in operation is irrelevant for the purpose of examining the power of the Government to order further investigation. The Kerala Police Act, 1960 confers on the Government of Kerala the power of control over its police force. The provisions of the Kerala Police Act show that the State Government's power of superintendence and control over the police force is total and absolute. This power would comprehend the power to exercise effective control over the actions, performance and discharge of duties in a certain manner. It can, therefore, direct for further investigation. The DSPE Act is only permissive and is intended to merely enable the DSPE also to investigate into specified offences. Therefore, there is no legal basis for saying that by giving consent to exercise the powers under the DSPE Act, the State Government has abdicated its power to investigate the case. By giving consent, the State Government is not divested of the power to investigate a crime committed within the State. The State Government is of the opinion that an offence has been committed. It is, therefore, appropriate for the State Government to make further investigation to bring the offenders to book. On these grounds, it is contended that the prayer of the petitioners should be rejected. Similar contentions have been raised in the counter-affidavit filed by the 5th respondent.

10. In view of the above contentions, the points that arise for consideration are:

(i) Whether the impugned notifications (Exts. P3 and P4) revoking the consent of the State Government that enabled the members of the DSPE (CBI) to investigate into the crime are valid.

(ii) In view of the bar under section 13 of the Official Secrets Act, whether the State Government can file a report under section 173(2) or a complaint against the accused in a competent court regarding the commission of offences punishable under sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act.

(iii) Whether further investigation can be done by the State Police for the purpose of filing a charge sheet against the accused petitioners in Crime No. 246/94.

11. In view of Entry 80 of List I of Vllth Schedule of the Constitution of India, Giving of consent by the State is a condition precedent for application of the provisions of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 within the State. Under section 6 of the DSPE Act, no member of the said establishment can exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area in a State without the consent of the Government of that State.

12. By the notification dated 6th November, 1956, the Central Government specified certain offences and classes of offences for the purpose of section 3 of the DSPE Act, 1946. Under clause (h) thereof, the Central Government specified that the DSPE may investigate offences punishable under the Indian Official Secrets Act, 1923 (for short, IOS Act). Aftertiie said notification dated 6.11.1956, the Central Government requested all the State Governments that the consent for the members of the DSPE exercising power and jurisdiction within their State may be accorded. The Government of Kerala, by letter dated 14-12-1956, intimated that the Government accord their consent for the members of the DSPE exercising powers and jurisdiction within the Kerala State in respect of the matters specified in the notification. Subsequently, some more offences were specified under section 3 of the DSPE Act from time to time and the State Government accorded its consent to extend the jurisdiction of the DSPE to investigate into those cases within the territory of Kerala. The letter dated 14.12.1956 giving consent under section 6 of the DSPE Act for investigation by the members of the DSPE into the offences under the IOS Act, as notified in the Government of India Notification dated 6.11.1956, has neither been revoked & nor withdrawn. Notwithstanding the said consent being in force, the State Government again issued a notification (Ext. P1) dated 2.12.1994 according consent to the extension of powers and jurisdiction of the members of the DSPE in the whole of the State of Kerala for investigation of Crime Nos. 225/94 and 246/94 of Vanchiyoor Police Station. The Government of India, by notification dated 2.12.1994 (Ext. P2), in pursuance of the consent under section 6 of the Act, stated inter alia that the Central Government extends the powers and jurisdiction of the members of the DSPE to the whole of the State of Kerala for the investigation of offences punishable under sections 3, 4 and 5 of IOS Act, 1923, in relation to the facts contained in the FIR Case No. 246/94 of Vanchiyoor Police Station regarding spying, illegal communication of secret informations and conspiracy to undermine the security of the country. The CBI, after an investigation, submitted a report under section 173(2) of the Cr. P.C in the court of the Megistrate, Ernakulam stating that the case is false. Accordingly, a closure or referred report was filed. Thereafter, the impugned notification (Ext. P3) was issued. Ext. P4 is an erratum notification making certain corrections. By this notification, the consent given under Ext. P1 was withdrawn on the ground that the government consider it necessary, in public interest, to order a further investigation of the case by a special team of State Police Officers. The question is whether Ext. P3 notification is valid.

13. Learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the third respondent (CBI) contended that section 6 of the DSPE Act being a conditional legislation, the same cannot be withdrawn once the consent thereunder has been accorded. The exercise of discretion under section 6 is exhausted as soon as the consent is accorded and therefore there is no scope for the State Government to withdrawn that consent. Learned Additional Solicitor General relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Her Majesty the Queen v. Burah (5 Indian Appeals 178) and Inder Singh v. The State of Rajasthan (AIR 1957 SC 510) in support of his contention that this is a conditional legislation.

14. The Supreme Court in Inder Singh's case explained the connotation of the expression ‘conditional legislation as follows:

“When an appropriate Legislature enacts a law and authorises an outside authority to bring it into force in such area or at such time as it may decide that is conditional and not delegated legislation, and such legislation is valid. It cannot be said that while it may be competent to the Legislature to leave it to an outside authority to decide when an enactment might be brought into force, it is not competent to it to authorise that authority to extend the life of the Act beyond the period fixed therein. On principle, it is difficult to see why if the one is competent, the other is not. The reason for upholding a legislative provision authorising an outside authority to bring an Act into force at such time as it may determine is that it must depend on the facts as they may exist at a given point of time whether the law should then be made to operate and that the decision of such an issue is best left to an executive authority. Such legislation is termed conditional, because the Legislature has itself made the law in all its completeness as regards “place, person, laws, powers”, leaving nothing for an outside authority to legislate on, the only function assigned to it being to bring the law into operation at such time as it might decide. And it can make no difference in the character of a legislation as a conditional one that the Legislature, after itself enacting the law and fixing, on a consideration of the facts as they might have been then existed, the period of its duration, confers a power on an outside authority to extend its operation for a further period if it is satisfied that the state of facts which called for the legislation continues to subsist.”

15. The Supreme Court has also referred to Burah's case in this context. The statutes in the Burah's case and Inder Singh's case authorised the executive authority to bring the law into operation at such time and in such local area as it may decide. But, in our opinion, this is not the case here. Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the DSPE Act lays down that the Act extends to the whole of India. It is no where mentioned in the Act, that it is left to the executive or legislative authority of a State to bring the Act into force as and when they deem it fit to do so. On the other hand, section 6 clearly says that the members of the DSPE cannot investigate into any offence in a State other than the Union Territory or railway area, without the consent of the Government of that State. It does not therefore follow that merely because giving of consent is a condition precedent to the exercise of the powers and jurisdiction by the DSPE within the territory of a State, it gives any authority to the State Government to extend its operation for any period of time. The DSPE Act is already in force in the State of Kerala. All that section 6 contemplates is that Entry 80 of list I of Vllth Schedule of the Constitution of India needs to be complied. It cannot, therefore, be said that the consent of the State which was given in accordance with the aforesaid provisions of the Constitution is an executive act not supported by any authority of law. The matter of giving or withholding of consent under section 6, in our opinion, is an executive action of the Government. In this view of the matter, we hold that section 6 of the Act is not a conditional legislation.

16. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 lays down that where by any Central Act or regulation, a, power to issue notifications, orders, rules, or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions, if any, to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rule or bye-laws so issued.

17. Learned counsel on both sides have relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation (1994 Supp (2) SCC 116) in support of their respective contentions. That was a case in which the earlier notification issued under section 6 of the DSPE Act was Withdrawn by another notification by the Government of Sikkira in respect of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. One of the questions that was raised before the Supreme Court was whether the revocation of the earlier consent under section 6 of the DSPE Act is valid. On the facts of that case, the Supreme Court held that it was not necessary to go into the question whether the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act can be invoked in relation to consent given under section 6 of the Act. It has been observed as follows:

“Section 21 of the General Clauses Act does not confer a power to issue an order having retrospective operation. Even proceeding on the basis that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is applicable to an order passed under Section 6 of the Act an order revoking an order giving consent under Section 6 of the Act can have only prospective operation and could not affect matters in which action has been initiated prior to the issuance of the order of revocation. The impugned notification withdrawing the consent has to be construed in this light. If thus construed it would mean that investigation which was commenced by CBI prior to withdrawal of consent under the notification had to be completed and report submitted under Section 173 Cr. P.C and it was not affected by the withdrawal of consent. On that view, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act can be invoked in relation to consent given under Section 6 of the Act.”

18. It appears from the decision that the Suprme Court assumed, without considering the nature of power given under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, that the revocation of the consent under section 6 of the DSPE Act was not invalid. But such a notification being prospective in operation, the investigation which has been done or which was in progress on the basis of the earlier consent could not be allowed to remain suspended. In view of the previous consent the investigation must come to a logical and notwithstanding the issuance of such a notification whithdrawing the consent.

19. In our view, this being not a conditional legislation and the notification of revocation of consent being an executive act, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act applies to such a notification. Accordingly, the impugned notifications, namely, Exts. P3 and P4, cannot be held to be invalid, in so far as it relates to Crime No. 246/94. But, this notification does not amount to the revocation of the consent in the letter dated 14.12.1956

20. Learned counsel for the petitioners, by relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bihar State v. B.W Ganguly (AIR 1958 SC 1018) contended that a notification under section 6 being analogous to a reference made under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Government has no power to cancel or supersede Ext. P1. That was a case where by cancelling earlier two notifications of reference made under section 10(1) of the Industrial Tribunal came to be closed without any final decision. It was held that the Industrial Disputes Act does not expressly confer any power on the appropriate Government to cancel or supersede a reference made under section 10(1) of the Act. Nor can such power be claimed by implication on the strength of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. In paragraph 9 of the judgment, it is laid down as follows:

“It is well settled that this section (Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act) embodies a rule of construction and the question whether or not it applies to the provisions of a particular statute would depend or the subject-matter, context, and the effect, of the relevant provisions of the said statute. In other words it would be necessary to examine carefully the scheme of the Act, its object and all its relevant and material provisions before deciding whether by the application of the rule of construction enunciated by Sec. 21, the appellant's contention is justified that the power to cancel the reference made under Sec. 10(1) can be said to vest in the appropriate Government by necessary implication.”

21. In that case, the Supreme Court examined each and every provision of the Industrial Disputes Act together with the object and purpose and held that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is not applicable to a case of reference under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

22. The object of the DSPE Act is to enable the Special Police Establish ment to conduct investigations in all the States with their consent. By revoking the consent, the investigation may not be suspended in the midst of it or further progress may not be arrested. Investigation may be continued in such cases as has been held in K.L Dorji v. CBI. Hence, section 6 of the DSPE Act is not analogous to section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In this view of the matter, we hold that the law laid down in the decision in State of Bihar v. D.N Ganguly (AIR 1958 SC 1018) is not applicable to the instant case.

23. There is no dispute that the I.S.R.O premises is declared as a prohibited area. Crime No. 246/94 has been registered for offences alleged to have been committed under sections 3, 4 and 5 of the IOS Act. Under section 3 of the Act, a person is punishable for spying in the vicinity of any prohibited place. Under section 4, a person is prohibited from communicating with any foreign agent for commission of certain offences. Section 5 punishes a person for wrongful communication or information etc., to unauthorised persons relating to any matter the disclosure of which is likely to affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State or friendly relations with foreign States. Section 13 deals with restrictions on trial of offences. Sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) read as follows:

“13. Restriction on trial of offences:—

(3) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act unless upon complaint made by order of, or under authority from, the appropriate Government or some officer empowered by the appropriate Government in this behalf.

(4) For the purposes of the trial of a person for an offence under this Act, the offence may be deemed to have been committed either at the place in which the same actually was committed or any place in India in which the offender may be found.

(5) In this section, the appropriate Government means—

(a) in relation to any offences under section 5 not connected with a prohibited place or with a foreign power, the State Government; and

(b) in relation to any other offence, the Central Government.”

24. The allegation in this case being the commission of offences under sections 3, 4 and 5 connected with a prohibited place, the appropriate Government under sub-section (3) thereof is the Central Government. In other words, a Court shall take cognizance of any of the offences under the Act only upon a complaint made by order or under the authority from the Central Government. Thus, there can be no doubt that the State of Kerala has no jurisdiction to file a complaint much less to file a report under section 173(2) of the Cr. P.C to prosecute the petitioners under sections 3, 4 and 5 of the IOS Act. Assuming for the sake of argument, that further investigation by the State Police revealed that such an offence has been committed, no competent court shall take cognizance of the same on the basis of any complaint or report by the State Government or its Police organisation.

25. Admittedly in this case the closure report submitted by the CBI has been accepted by the Magistrate. There can be no dispute that under section 173(8) of the Cr. P.C the police is empowered to file additional report against the accused in case additional material or evidence come to its notice on further investigation. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the Police department, the superintendence of which vests in the State Government. In State of Bihar v. J.A.C Saldanha ((1980) 1 SCC 554 : AIR 1980 SC 326), one of the questions that arose for consideration was whether the State Government was precluded from directing further investigation in the case in which one investigating officer had submitted a report under section 173(2) of the Cr. P.C but on which the Court had not passed any order. It was held that “power to direct investigation is entirely different from the method and procedure of investigation and the competence of the person to investigate. An officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station could as well exercise the power of further investigation under section 173(8) of the Cr. P.C in view of the provision embodied in section 36 of the Cr. P.C” But in the instant case, the Magistrate has passed the order accepting the report submitted by the CBI.

26. In Kamalapati v. State of West Bengal (1979 Crl. L.J 679 : (1980) 2 SCC 91 : AIR 1979 SC 777) it is laid down that all orders passed by a Magistrate acting judicially (such as orders of bail and those passed under sub-section (3) of S. 173 of the Code discharging an accused or orders taking cognizance of the offence complained of) are parts of an integral whole which may end with a definitive judgment after an inquiry or a trial, or earlier according to the exigencies of the situation obtaining at a particular stage, and which involves, if need be, the adducing of evidence and the decision of the Magistrate on an appreciation thereof. They cannot be viewed in isolation and given a character different from the entire judicial process of which they are intended to form a part. Thus the order of discharge of an accused person on a consideration of the report filed under sectin 173 of the Cr. P.C is a judicial order. While considering the scope of section 173(8) relating to the circumstances under which further investigation can be done, the Supreme Court in Ram Lai Narang v. State (1979 SCC (Crl.) 479) laid down as follows:

“That the final word is with the Magistrate is sufficient safeguard against any excessive use or abuse of the power of the police to make further investigation. We should not, however, be understood to say that the police should ignore the pendency of a proceeding before a court and investigate every fresh fact that comes to light as if no cognizance had been taken by the court of any offence. We think that in the interests of the independence of the magistracy and the judiciary, in the interests of the purity of the administration of criminal justice and in the interests of the comity of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such administration, it would ordinarily be desirable that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh facts come to light… … …. Where the police desired to make a further investigation, the police could express their regard and respect for the court by seeking its formal permission to make further investigation.”

27. Though there was no statutory requirement for the police to obtain permission from the court concerned, the above quoted observations of the Supreme Court can be regarded as law declared by the supreme Court and hence it is necessary that the police should obtain formal permission from the court for conducting further investigation as envisaged in sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr. P.C (See - State of Kerala v. Sreedharan, 1993 (2) KLT 490).

28. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not contemplate any parallel investigation by two independent agencies in respect of the same crime. A report under sub-section (2) or (8) of section 173 of the Cr. P.C can be submitted only by a statutory investigating agency and no other agency who is not authorised to make investigation under Chapter XII of the Cr. P.C can file a report under it. Though successive and further investigation is not prohibited, yet on a reading of the provisions of sub-section (8) of section 173 it becomes clear that further investigation must relate to the allegations regarding which report under section 173(2) of the Cr. P.C was filed. It has been held above that the State Government has no jurisdiction to file a complaint or a charge sheet in respect of the alleged offences under the IOS Act. Of course, the State in exercise of its powers under the Police Act can direct a police officer to do any further investigation. But that power, in our opinion, is circumscribed by the provisions of the IOS Act. However, in view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it is open to the State Government to approach the competent Magistrate having the power of taking cognizance in respect of offences under the IOS Act, for permission to make further investigation in the matter, if so advised.

29. To sum up, our findings are:

(i) The impugned notifications (Exts. P3 and P4) being valid, the same cannot be quashed.

(ii) The State Government has no jurisdiction to file a complaint before a Court in respect of any offence under sections 3, 4 and 5 of the IOS Act, in this case.

30. With the above observations, we dismiss all these writ petitions.