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Yogendra Singh Dhakad v. Delhi Public School Society & Others
Heard on I.A.No.2531/2012, an application for condonation of delay.
There is delay of 814 days in filing the present appeal.
It is mentioned in the application that the counsel had no knowledge about the fact of dismissal of the petition and the appellant did not receive any information from the counsel. Thereafter the appellant contacted the counsel, then he came to know that the petition was dismissed vide order dt.9.11.2011. He filed this appeal after getting certified copy.
Petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed by the Writ Court on the ground that the Writ Petition against the respondent No.1 employer of the appellant is not maintainable.
The matter is covered by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Ahluwalia Vs. State of Punjab and others reported in (2012) 12 SCC 331. Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the writ against the Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, who has affiliation with Central Board of Secondary Education is maintainable.
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others reported in 2013 STPL (Web) 737 SC has laid down following principles in regard to considering the facts by the Court in the matter of condonation of delay after considering earlier judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:-
"15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:"
(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
(ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
"(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis."
(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
"(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude."
"Looking to the facts of the case, application is allowed and the delay in filing the appeal is hereby condoned."
Also heard on merits of the appeal.
The appellant was engaged by the respondent No.1 Society registered under the Societies Registration Act. The respondent No.1 Society is running a school named as 'Delhi Public School' where the appellant was serving. The school was affiliated with the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) New Delhi vide letter dt.20.11.1992. The Society was obliged to follow the rules and regulations framed by the CBSE. It was fully controlled by the National Fertilizer Limited (NFL) because Executive Director of the NFL is the Vice Chairman of the Society. The appellant was superseded and respondent No.4 was promoted to the post of Lab Assistant.
Learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition on the ground that the writ is not maintainable against the society, which was not getting grant-in-aid from the Government.
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Ahluwalia Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2012) 12 SCC 331 considered the question of maintainability of writ petition against the unaided private school. Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
"12. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. In our opinion, in view of the judgment rendered by this Court in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust there can be no doubt that even a purely private body, where the State has no control over its internal affairs, would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, for issuance of a writ of mandamus. Provided, of course, the private body is performing public functions which are normally expected to be performed by the State authorities."
13. In the aforesaid case, this Court was also considering a situation where the services of a Lecturer had been terminated who was working in the college run by the Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust . In those circumstances, this Court has clearly observed as under:
(V.R.Rudani case, SCC pp.700-701, paras 20 & 22).
"20. The term 'authority' used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as nonfundamental rights. The words 'any person or authority' used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the effected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied."
"22. Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor de Smith states : 'To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract. We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available 'to reach injustice wherever it is found'. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition."
"The aforesaid observations have been repeated and reiterated in numerous judgments of this Court including the judgments in Unni Krishnan and Zee Telefilms Ltd. brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Parikh."
"14. In view of the law laid down in the aforementioned judgments of this Court, the judgment of the learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be sustained on the proposition that the writ petition would not be maintainable merely because the respondent institution is a purely unaided private educational institution. The appellant had specifically taken the plea that the respondents performs public functions i.e. providing education to children in their institutions throughout India."
"Hon'ble Supreme Court specifically held that writ petition is maintainable against the institution even if it is purely unaided private educational institution and if it performs public function i.e. providing education to children in the institution."
"In the present case, respondent institution has been providing education to the children. It was affiliated to CBSE. The institution is controlled by the NFL, a government company. The institution is under an obligation to follow the byelaws and rules of the CBSE. Hence, the institution was performing public function. In such circumstances, in our opinion, writ against the respondent institution is maintainable."
"Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the Writ Court is hereby quashed. The matter is remanded back to the Writ Court to pass the order on merits."
No order as to costs.
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