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Krishna Jain v. Dharam Raj Jain

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jan 14, 1991
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — P.C. Pathak, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Smt. Krishnabai (the applicant) was married to Dharamraj (the non-applicant) about 16 years before the petition. She alleged that while she was pregnant with Ku. Kalpana (applicant No. 2), the non-applicant seized her ornaments and forced her to return to her parents' home. After the child's birth, the applicant requested the husband to take her back but he did not. The applicant and the child continued to live with the applicant's parents.

On 4-6-1982 the applicant and her child filed a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. before the Chief Judicial Magistrate claiming maintenance of Rs. 400 per month to the wife and Rs. 200 per month to the child from the date of the application. The non-applicant filed his written statement on 30-9-1982. The trial Court, by order dated 24-4-1985, allowed the application and granted Rs. 200 to the wife and Rs. 100 to the child from the date of the application.

The non-applicant filed a revision on 5-6-1985 before the Sessions Court. The Revisional Court found that although Ku. Kalpana was not born of cohabitation with the non-applicant, this did not absolve his liability to maintain the applicant and the illegitimate child. The Revisional Court held that the normal rule is to award maintenance from the date of the order and that, if maintenance is to be awarded from the date of application, reasons must be recorded; since the Magistrate had not given reasons, the Revisional Court modified the order and made maintenance payable from the date of the trial Court's order (24-4-1985).

Aggrieved, the non-applicant filed M. Cr. C. No. 1096/86, while the applicants filed revision challenging (inter alia) the revisional Court's alteration of the date from which maintenance was payable. One of the Judges (Pathak, J.) referred specific questions to a Division Bench for answer.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether recording of reasons is sine qua non for awarding maintenance from the date of application?
  2. If so, whether the order must be modified, making it payable from the date of order?
  3. Whether the 'date of order' in S. 125(2) means the date of order of the Revisional Court also?

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lachhmani v. Ramu (Cr. Re. No. 405/82) Held that sub-section (2) of S.125 should normally result in payment from date of order and, if from date of application, the order should be backed by reasons. The bench concluded that Lachhmani's view strained the plain words of S.125(2) and that the decision does not lay down correct law; it was overruled on that point.
Mohd. Inayatuhlla Khan v. Smt. Salma Bano (M. Cr. C. No. 97/83) Expressed agreement with the view that ordinarily maintenance under S.125 is ordered from date of the order, not from the date of application. The Court held this view to be incorrect as a legal generality and indicated it should be overruled insofar as it creates a 'normal rule'.
C. M. Manai v. Esther Pachikara (1983) 1 DMC 40 : 1981 Cri LJ (Ker) 76 Held that it is not necessary for the Court to record reasons for awarding maintenance from the date of petition; omission to mention date implies payment from date of order unless Court specifically directs otherwise. The opinion records this as a contrary view but ultimately holds that reasons should be recorded in either situation (from date of application or from date of order) under S.354(6).
Makundum Ali v. Nargis Bano (1983) 1 DMC 40 : 1983 Cri LJ 111 Held that there ought to be compelling reasons before the wife is deprived of maintenance from the date of application; High Court allowed maintenance from date of application where no reasons to deprive existed. Used as an example supporting awards from date of application where justification exists; cited in discussion of relevant authorities.
Sampat Kumar v. Shanti Devi (1986 MPLJ Note 4) Indicates that the Court has power to allow maintenance either from the date of order or from the date of application. Quoted to support the conclusion that the Magistrate has discretion to direct payment from either date.
Jodhan Sahu v. Mst. Kulwantikher, 49 Cri LJ 323 (Pat): AIR 1948 Patna 285 Principle that a party cannot set up an altogether new case in revision that was not set up in the pleadings. Applied to show that if the husband fails to contest an application-from-date claim in the written statement, he cannot later urge in revision that allowance should be only from the date of order.
Chittaranjan Das v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1963 SC 1696 Section 465: omissions, errors or irregularities will not entail reversal unless they have occasioned a failure of justice. Cited to support the proposition that mere technical omissions (e.g., lack of stated reasons) should not automatically defeat justice unless they caused failure of justice.
1971 Pat LJR 666 (Patna High Court) Held that Section 125 should be construed liberally and beneficially to the applicant when deciding the date from which maintenance is to be granted. Relied upon to argue against blanket interference with magistrate's orders and in favour of a claimant-friendly construction.
Makudum v. Nargis Bano, 1982 Mat LJ 366 Held that where wife and child had been neglected, they were entitled to maintenance from the date of application. Cited in support of awarding maintenance from date of application in appropriate cases.
Sunita Bhutani v. Satpal, 1985(2) Crimes 1007 Held that modification by an appellate judge without assigning reason, directing payment from the date of order, was unwarranted and Magistrate's order granting maintenance from date of application was restored. Used to illustrate that revisional modification without reasons can be improper and that magistrate's retrospective award may be restored.
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, AIR 1985 SC 945 Holds that the Magistrate can grant interim maintenance. Cited to note that claimants have been relieved by Supreme Court decisions allowing interim maintenance; used in discussing enquiry into source of sustenance pending proceedings.
Smt. Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat, AIR 1986 SC 984 Also holds that Magistrate can grant interim maintenance. Used alongside Shah Bano to support the view on interim maintenance and the need for magistrates to inquire into a claimant's means during proceedings.
S. A. Kaiser v. Noor Sahan, 1980 Cri LJ 611 (Cal) Illustrates that where wife maintained herself/children by selling ornaments and collecting funds, court awarded maintenance from date of application. Relied on as an example where retrospective maintenance from date of application was granted because of claimant's situation.
Rosa Cracker v. Emperor, AIR 1928 Mad 899 Authority that the Magistrate has no discretion to allow maintenance from a third date (i.e., other than date of order or date of application) and cannot award maintenance prior to the date of application. Cited to support the proposition that the Court cannot award maintenance from a date other than those contemplated by S.125(2).
Abdul Rahim v. Mst. Amir Begum, AIR 1926 Lah 532 Similar principle that maintenance cannot be awarded from a date prior to the application or other dates not authorized. Used to underline limits on permissible dates for awarding maintenance.
Enamul Haque v. Bibi Taimnissa, AIR 1967 Pat 344 Authority following the rule that maintenance should be from Magistrate's order or date of application only. Cited in support of the settled position on permissible dates for maintenance.
Janamma v. Kuthappa Panicker, AIR 1959 Ker 366 Held that Court cannot award maintenance from the date of child's birth (i.e., a date before application). Quoted to demonstrate that maintenance prior to application date is impermissible.
Gafoor Ahmed v. Amnabi, Cr. R. No. 22 of 1983 (Indore) The Revisional Court granted maintenance from the date of application without indicating reasons; the Revisional Judge (Y.D. Gyani, J.) directed maintenance to be payable from the date of the Revisional Court's order because no reasons were recorded for a retrospective effect. The present Court held that Gafoor Ahmed's approach of directing payment from the revisional Court's date carved out a third date and was beyond the scope of S.125(2); to that extent Gafoor Ahmed is not good law.
Hemibai v. Kundibai, AIR 1940 Sind 222 When the opposite party behaved badly, maintenance was awarded from the date of application. Used as an authority supporting retrospective maintenance where the husband's conduct warranted it.
1965 Pun LJ 170 (67 Punjab Law Reporter 263) Held that accumulated arrears are no justification for writing them off; the wife's right to maintenance is enforceable despite accumulation. Quoted to reject the argument that accumulated arrears justify denying retrospective maintenance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by close textual analysis of Section 125(2) Cr.P.C. and related procedural provisions:

  • Textual interpretation: The Court observed that S.125(2) plainly permits an allowance to be payable either "from the date of the order" or, if so ordered, "from the date of the application for maintenance." It rejected the notion that the subsection imports a 'normal rule' that payments must be from the date of the order except by exception.
  • On precedent: The Court examined prior decisions that imposed a presumption in favour of the date of the order (notably Lachhmani and Mohd. Inayatuhlla Khan) and held that treating the date of the order as a 'normal' outcome was an impermissible gloss on the statutory text; those rulings were said not to state the correct law and were disapproved to that extent. Conversely, Sampat Kumar was cited to support the view that discretion exists to order payment from either date.
  • On recording reasons: The Court held that reasons must be recorded in either situation (whether maintenance is awarded from the date of application or from the date of order). This obligation flows from S.354(6) of the Code, which requires every final order under S.125 to contain points for determination, the decisions thereon and the reasons for those decisions. The 'date from which' is a point for determination dependent on pleadings and evidence, and the decision on that point must be supported by reasons.
  • On the role of pleadings and contest: If the husband fails to contest a claim for payment from the date of application (i.e., omits specific denial in the written statement), the trial Court may decide that point in the wife's favour on the short ground of non-denial, which satisfies S.354(6). In such circumstances a Revisional Court should be slow to interfere.
  • On omission of reasons: The Court applied S.465 to observe that omissions or irregularities do not require reversal unless they occasion a failure of justice. It criticised a mechanical practice of Revisional Courts (following Lachhmani) that would routinely modify awards to the date of order solely because the Magistrate did not record reasons; instead a Revisional Court ought to examine evidence and, if appropriate, supply reasons or remand rather than blindly change the date and thereby cause potential injustice to claimants who may have subsisted on loans or sold property during proceedings.
  • On the meaning of "date of order": The Court concluded that "date of order" in S.125(2) means the date of the Magistrate's order and not the date of the revisional Court's order. It held that Revisional Courts do not have power to substitute a third date (e.g., the date of revisional order) not contemplated by the subsection, and therefore the portion of Gafoor Ahmed's decision directing payment from the date of the Revisional Court's order was held to be not good law.
  • On hardship and arrears: The Court rejected the argument that accumulation of arrears is a sufficient reason to deny retrospective maintenance; authorities were cited to the effect that arrears are not a ground to write off a claimant's right.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Division Bench answered the referred questions as follows and gave the attendant directions:

  • Recording of reasons is essential in either case — whether maintenance is granted from the date of application or from the date of order (answer to question (i)).
  • Absence of reasons does not automatically mean that maintenance must be awarded from the date of the order (answer to question (ii)). The Revisional Court should not mechanically set aside a magistrate's retrospective grant solely for want of stated reasons; it should examine the record, supply reasons where appropriate or remand.
  • The "date of order" in S.125(2) means the date of the Magistrate's order and not the date of the Revisional Court's order; a Revisional Court cannot lawfully pick a third date (answer to question (iii)).

Implications for the parties and courts (as stated in the opinion):

  • The record in the present matter is to be placed before the Single Judge for disposal of the revisions (direct consequence for the parties in this litigation).
  • Magistrates have discretion to make maintenance payable from either the date of application or the date of their order, but when they decide the question the order must show points for determination and reasons as required by S.354(6).
  • Revisional Courts should not alter the effective date of maintenance to the date of the revisional order (i.e., create a third date) since such a practice is beyond S.125(2); if reasons are lacking a proper course is to examine evidence, supply reasons, or remand rather than mechanically modify the date.
  • The Court expressly disapproved prior lines of authority that treated the date of order as a 'normal rule' and held those views to be incorrect insofar as they import such a presumption into S.125(2).

Direct order in the opinion: The record be placed before the Single Judge for disposal of the revisions.

Show all summary ...

P.C. PATHAK, J.

(1.) This is reference made by one of us (Pathak-J) to Division Bench to answer the following questions.

"(i) whether recording of reasons is sine qua non for awarding maintenance from the date of application? (ii) If so, whether the order must be modified, making it payable from the date of order? (iii) Whether the 'date of order' in S. 125(2) means the date of order of the Revisional Court also"
?

(2.) Smt. Krishnabai was married to non-applicant Dharamraj 16 years before the date of petition in accordance with Hindu Rites. She alleged that when Ku. Kalpana applicant No. 2 was in the womb, the non-applicant snatched her ornaments and forced her to return to her parents. After the birth of the child, she requested him to take her back, but he gave no response. The applicant with her child continues to stay with her parents. On 4-6-1982 the applicant and her child filed petition u/ S. 125 Cr P. C. before the Chief Judicial Magistrate claiming maintenance @ Rs. 400/- per month to the mother and Rs. 200/- to the child from the date or application. The non-applicant filed his written statement on 30-9-1982. The trial Court allowed the application by order dated 24-4-1985, granting Rs. 200/- to the wife and Rs. 100/- to the child from the date of application.

(3.) The non-applicant filed revision on 5-6-1985 before the Sessions Court. The Revisional Court held that Ku. Kalpana was not born from the cohabitation of the non-applicant but this does not affect his liability to maintain her as also his illegitimate child. There being no proof that the applicant was 'living' in adultery, the maintenance could not be denied to her also. Thus, both were held entitled to maintenance from the non-applicant. The Revisional Court further held that the normal rule is to award the maintenance from the date of order and if the maintenance is to be awarded from the date of application, the Court must record reasons. Since no reasons were given by the Magistrate, the award of the maintenance from the date of application, was set aside. The trial Court's order was modified only to the extent that the maintenance to both was allowed from the date of order of the trial Court i.e. 24-4-1985.

(4.) Aggrieved by the said order, the non-applicant filed M. Cr. C. No. 1096/86 while the applicants filed revision challenging the findings as to the legitimacy of Ku. Kalpana, so also that part of the order which set aside the grant from the date of application.

(5.) Counsel for both parties were heard. Shri Surendra Singh, Advocate, appears as amicus curiae.

(6.) The first question for decision is whether recording of reasons is sine qua non for awarding maintenance from the date of application. S. 125(2) of the Criminal P.C., 1974, runs as under:-"Such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered from the date of the application for maintenance." Even in the Criminal P.C. (Act No. V of 1898) the analogous provision S. 488(2) was the same as will be clear from the following:- "Such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance."

(7.) In Lachhmani v. Ramu (Cr. Re. No. 405/82, decided on 10-11-1982.), Shri M. D. Bhatt, J. held as under:-"Sub-section (2) of section 125 shows that such allowance has to be normally payable, from the date of the order. In the alternative it could be equally ordered from the date of the application for maintenance. Reading the sub- section, it clearly shows that the grant of allowance has normally to be, from the date of the order alone; and in case, this normal rule is not intended to be followed, then the Court concerned, may well grant the allowance from the date of the application; but, such order should be backed by some reason, to support the same" (Emphasis added). Shri R. C. Shrivastava J. (Gwalior Bench), agreeing with view of Shri Bhatt J., in Mohd. Inayatuhlla Khan v, Smt. Salma Bano, M. Cr. C. No. 97/83, decided on 2/04/1985, held as under:- "There can be no dispute on the point that, ordinarily, payment of maintenance under S. 125 of the Criminal P.C. has to be ordered not from the date of the application but from the date of the order." Thus, according to both the learned Judges, the normal rule is to award the maintenance from the date of order, but, if the award is from the date of application, it should be supported by reasons.

(8.) A contrary view of Shri U. L. Bhatt, J. in C. M. Manai v. Esther Pachikara, (1983) 1 DMC 409 : 1981 Cri LJ (NOC) 76 (Kerala), is that it is not necessary for the Court to record reasons for awarding maintenance from the date of petition. According to him, the Court may omit to mention the date from which the maintenance order is to take effect. In such case the amount is payable from the date of order. The Court may specifically direct the order to take effect from the date of the petition.

(9.) In Makundum Ali v. Nargis Bano, (1983) 1 DMC 40 : (1983 Cri LJ 111), it was held that there ought to be compelling reasons before the wife is deprived of maintenance from the date of the application. Since the two Courts failed to assign any such reason, the High Court set aside the order and allowed the maintenance from the date of application.

(10.) A plain reading of sub-section (2) of P. 125 shows that the allowance is payable from the date of order where the Court omits to specify the date from which it is payable. The Court has power to make it payable from the date of application. See Sampat Kumar v. Shanti Devi, 1986 MPLJ Note 4. Thus, it is open to the Court to allow the maintenance either from the date of order or from the date of application. The view in Lachhmani's case (supra) that the grant of allowance has 'normally' to be, from the date of order and in case, this 'normal rule' is not intended to be followed the grant from the date of the application should be backed by some reason is nothing but to strain the plain words of the sub-section. It is an attempt to insert something more in the sub-section, which the legislature never intended. We are unable to read in the sub-section laying down any normal rule to award from the date of order or that the grant from the date of application an exception. Both the aforesaid decisions do not lay down correct law, and must be overruled. It is the discretion of the Magistrate to direct payment either from the date of Application or from the date of order.

(11.) Next question for decision is whether it is essential to record reasons, if the allowance is made payable from the date of application which implies reasons need not be recorded if the same is allowed from the date of order. In in our opinion, reasons have to be recorded in both the situations. S. 354(6) of the Code provides that every final order u/ S. 125 and certain other sections, shall contain points for determination, the decisions there on and the reasons for the decisions. In a petition u/ S. 125, the last point for determination is the date from which the maintenance ought to be granted. This depends on the pleadings in the case. The wife may claim the allowance from the date of application and the husband may deny it. In such a case the question has to be framed and decision on it has to be supported by reasons based on evidence led by both parties in support of their claims. Yet, in other case the husband may omit to deny the wife's claim from the date of application. In such cases, the question may be answered in wife's favour, on the short ground that there is no denial in the written statement and this may satisfy the requirement of S. 354(6). It is well settled that a party cannot be allowed to set up altogether a new case in revision, not set up altogether a new case in revision, not set up in the pleadings. See Jodhan Sahu v. Mst. Kulwantikher, 49 Cri LJ 323 (Pat): AIR 1948 Patna 285. Therefore, where the husband fails to contest the claim from the date of application by raising specific objections in the written statement, he has no right to urge that the allowance should have been from the date of order and not from the date of application. A Revisional Court should be slow to entertain any objection, against the Magistrate's order allowing the maintenance from the date of application, when the husband fails to contest the claim in the lower Court.

(12.) Next question for decision is what is the effect of non-supply of reasons for awarding maintenance from the date of application ? S. 465 of the Code provides that no omissions, errors, or irregularities in any proceeding will entail a reversal or alteration in appeal or in revision of any finding, sentence or order, unless such error, omission of irregularity has occasioned a failure of justice. Mere technicalities in respect of matter which are not vital or important or significant in a trial should not be allowed to frustrate the ends of justice. Chittaranjan Das v. State Of West Bengal ., AIR, 1963 SC 1696 : (1963 (2) Cri LJ 534).

(13.) I came across several cases in which the Revisional Courts, following Lachhmani's case, on a finding as to the absence of reasons to award the maintenance from the date of application, modified the Magistrate's order mechanically directing payment only from the date of Magistrate's order. Such a short cut approach to dispose of the revision, cannot be called judicious. The Revisional Court is obliged to scan the evidence on record to satisfy itself and supply the reasons in support of the Magistrate's order and the order impugned may not call for any interference. If the material on record is absent or insufficient, it may resort to an order of remand with or without retaining seisin of the revision as the interest of justice and early disposal may demand. Patna High Court in 1971 Pat LJR 666 held that the section should be construed liberally and beneficially to the applicant while deciding the date from which the maintenance is to be granted. A blancket interference with the Magistrate's order in the manner aforesaid, may result in grave injustice and untold miseries to the claimants who may have managed to survive, during pendency of proceedings, on loans or by sale of ornaments etc. or subscriptions from relations and sympathisers. In Makudum v. Nargis Bano, 1982 Mat LJ 366, it was held that where the wife and the child had been neglected, they were entitled to maintenance from the date of application. Following this decision, in Sunita Bhutani v. Satpal, 1985(2) Crimes 1007, the modification by the Additional Sessions Judge without assigning reason, directing payment from the date of order, was held to be unwarranted and the order of the Magistrate granting-maintenance from the date of application was restored.

(14.) The claimants have now been relieved by the decisions of Supreme Court in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, AIR 1985 SC 945 : (1985 Cri LJ 875) and Smt. Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat, AIR 1986 SC 984 : (1986 Cri LJ 4 1), laying down that the Magistrate can grant interim maintenance. In the absence of any such order, it is essential for the magistrate to enquire the source from which the wife maintained herself and her child, if any, the conduct of parties during the proceedings and other relevant matter so as to properly decide the date from which the maintenance may be payable. Where the wife maintained herself and children by selling ornaments and collecting funds from the relations, the Court awarded maintenance from the date of application. S. A. Kaiser v. Noor Sahan, 1980 Cri LJ 611 (Cal).

(15.) Next question for decision is whether the 'date of order' in sub-sec. (2) of S. 125 could also be the date of revisional order ? It is settled by catena of cases that maintenance can be granted either from the date of order of the Magistrate or from the date of application before him. The Magistrate has no discretion to allow it from a third date. There is also no provision for awarding maintenance prior to the date of application. Rosa Cracker v. Emperor, AIR 1928 Mad 899, Abdul Rahim v. Mst. Amir Begum, AIR 1926 Lah 532: (27 Cri LJ 610) and Enamul Haque v. Bibi Taimnissa, AIR, 1967 Pat 344 : (1967 Cri LJ 1364). Thus, the Court cannot award maintenance from the date of child's birth : Janamma v. Kuthappa Panicker, AIR 1959 Ker 366 : (1959 Cri LJ 1328).

(16.) In Gafoor Ahmed v. Amnabi, Cr. R. No. 22 of 1983 (Indore) decided on 7-8-1986, Y.D. Gyani, J. held as under (at page 392 (of '86 DMC)):-

"So far as the question of making the order retrospective, the learned Sessions Judge in his order has not indicated any reason, for doing so. No doubt, it is within the discretion of the Court making the order of maintenance to award a sum either from the date of application or from the date on which the order is passed. In such matters, it is expected of the Revisional Court to take realistic view of the matter as the proceeding, at times, consume considerable time before an order is passed, accumulation of arrears of maintenance allowance, in case the order is made retrospective in effect, at times results in great deal of hardship. To avoid this, the Court should consider awarding of interim maintenance, which has now been held to be awardable by the Supreme Court, if such interim maintenance is not asked for and awarded, at least the Revisional Court should, in the event of making the order retrospective in effect, record reasons for doing so, lest it results in not merely a great deal of hardship to the husband but also deprives forums of granting, the grounds or reasons on the basis of which a retrospective maintenance order is passed. As in this case, no reasons are indicated, the ends of justice, would sufficiently be met if the order is made effective from the date, it was made, by the learned Sessions judge."

(17.) In the aforesaid case (Gafoor Ahmed's case), the trial Court had dismissed the application u/S. 125. The Revisional Court granted maintenance from the date of application. In order to avoid hardship to the husband due to accumulated arrears, Gyani, J. held that reasons must be recorded for granting maintenance from the date of application. Since no reasons were given by the revisional Court, he directed the maintenance to be payable from the date of Revisional Court's order. Thus, he carved out a third date, not stipulated in S. 125(2). This was beyond the scope of S. 125(2).

(18.) With utmost respect to Gyani, J., we are of the opinion that accumulation of large arrears is hardly a ground to deny the wife if she makes out a case for grant of maintenance from the date of application. We may refer to 1965 Pun LJ 170 : (1965) 67 Punjab Law Reporter 263, wherein it was held (at page 268 (of 65 Pun LR)) :-

"The fact that arrears have accumulated is no justification for writing them off. The argument that the petitioner- wife had somehow been managing to earn some amount to make her both ends meet during the interval is inconclusive. That the husband has all these years been neglecting the wife and has also been persisting in denying his marriage with her and their living together, in his efforts to avoid his liability, is also not irrelevant and may well be kept in view. It is not a matter of favour to the petitioner-wife, nor is she begging for any charity. It is her right which is being enforced by the Court and indulgence to the respondent husband in this respect can only be at the cost of the petitioner wife's right"
.In Hemibai v. Kundibai, AIR 1940 Sind 222, the opposite party was found to have behaved badly, so as not to deserve any sympathy or consideration, it was held that the maintenance should be awarded from the date of application.

(19.) In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the 'date of order' in S. 125(2) means the date of order of the Magistrate and not the date of revisional order. Gafoor Ahmed's case so far it directs payment of allowance from the date of order of the revisional Court, is not good law. The answers to the questions referred are:-(i) Recording of reasons is essential in either case namely when the maintenance is granted from the date of application or from the date of order. (ii) In the absence of reasons, it does not automatically follow that the maintenance should be awarded from the "date of order". (iii) The "date of order" in S. 125(2) means the date of Magistrate's order and not the revisional order. The record be placed before the single Judge for, disposal, of the revisions.Order accordingly.