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Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P, Lucknow v. Dunlop India Limited

Allahabad High Court
Oct 5, 1991
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — B.P. Jeevan Reddy, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Commissioner, Sales Tax, Lucknow preferred two revisions under section 11 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act against the judgment and order of the Sales Tax Tribunal, Lucknow, which had allowed appeals by the respondent-assessee, M/s. Dunlop India Ltd.

The respondent is a registered dealer under the U.P. Sales Tax Act and the Central Sales Tax Act dealing in tyres and related items. For assessment years 1975-76 and 1976-77 it filed returns disclosing taxable turnover and deposited tax. The assessing authority disagreed with the assessee's contention that sales of tyres and tubes to dealers holding recognition certificates were exempt and also did not accept the assessee's contention that cycle rims fell within "iron and steel" under section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act. On that basis the assessing authority enhanced taxable turnover.

The assessee's appeals to the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) were dismissed. On further appeal the Sales Tax Tribunal rejected the contention that cycle rims were iron and steel under section 14 but accepted the assessee's other contention (relating to recognition certificates and entitlement under section 4-B) and allowed the appeals. The Commissioner filed the present revisions challenging the Tribunal's order.

The factual backdrop also involves government notifications: Notification No. 4748 (dated October 10, 1968) declaring bicycles and perambulators as notified goods under section 4-B (allowing recognition certificates and concessions); Notification No. 3867 (dated June 11, 1974) which purported to supersede earlier notifications but, in the margin, accidentally described Notification No. 4748 as dated October 10, 1969 (a printing error); and a later corrigendum Notification No. 4841 dated June 25, 1986 which corrected the date in the margin of Notification No. 3867 from 1969 to 1968.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Notification No. 4841 dated June 25, 1986 (a corrigendum correcting the date in the margin of Notification No. 3867) must be treated as issued under section 25 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act with retrospective effect limited to six months by the proviso to that section.
  2. Whether Notification No. 3867 dated June 11, 1974 (which purported to supersede earlier notifications) in fact superseded Notification No. 4748 dated October 10, 1968, given the printing error in the margin of Notification No. 3867 that incorrectly recorded the date as October 10, 1969.
  3. Whether, as a consequence, Notification No. 4748 (October 10, 1968) should be regarded as having continued in force for the assessment years 1975-76 and 1976-77, thereby entitling the assessee to benefits under section 4-B (recognition certificates and concessional or exempt purchases).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Commissioner, Sales Tax, Lucknow) — as reflected in the opinion

  • The corrigendum (Notification No. 4841) is a correction and not an exercise of the power under section 25; it does not cite section 25 and therefore is not subject to the six-month retrospectivity limitation of section 25.
  • The power to issue the original notification and to correct it derives from section 4-B and the rules made thereunder (rules 25-A and 25-B), not from section 25.
  • A corrigendum is properly viewed as dating back to the date of the original notification corrected (i.e., the correction operates retrospectively to the original date rather than taking effect only from the date of the corrigendum).

Respondent-Assessee (M/s. Dunlop India Ltd.) — as reflected in the opinion

  • The respondent urged (and the Tribunal accepted) that Notification No. 4841 should be related to section 25 which authorizes issuance of notifications with retrospective effect but limited to six months; consequently the corrigendum (issued in 1986) could only have retrospective effect for six months preceding its issuance and therefore could not retrospectively validate a 1968 notification for the assessment years 1975-76 and 1976-77.
  • Because Notification No. 3867 in its margin referred to Notification No. 4748 as being dated October 10, 1969 (an incorrect date), Notification No. 3867 did not purport to supersede Notification No. 4748 dated October 10, 1968; hence Notification No. 4748 should be treated as continuing in force during the assessment years in question, entitling buyers with recognition certificates to exemption/concessional treatment.
  • The respondent relied on a prior single-judge judgment (Anshuman Singh, J.) in Dunlop India Limited v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow ([1987] 65 STC 364 (All.)) where similar contention had been considered and the matter was remanded to the Tribunal to examine whether Notification No. 3867 did or did not supersede Notification No. 4748.
  • The respondent argued that if the Government made an error in expressing a date in a notification, the assessee should not be deprived of the benefit arising from the original (correct) notification; the consequence of the Government's error should fall on the Government rather than the assessee.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dunlop India Limited v. Commissioner Of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow, [1987] 65 STC 364 (All.) (Single Judge judgment dated November 5, 1985) Earlier consideration of the same contention (whether Notification No. 3867 superseded Notification No. 4748) and a direction to the Tribunal to examine whether the earlier notification had been superseded. The Court explains that the earlier single-judge did not finally accept the assessee's contention but remanded the matter to the Tribunal to determine whether Notification No. 3867 superseded Notification No. 4748. The present Court notes that the Tribunal has not yet decided that remanded point and holds that the single-judge's observations do not support the view taken by the Tribunal in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the nature of Notification No. 4841 (dated June 25, 1986) and the basis on which the Tribunal had treated it. The Tribunal construed Notification No. 4841 as if it were issued under section 25 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, which permits issuance of certain notifications with retrospective effect but limits such retrospectivity to six months before the date of issuance.

The court observed that Notification No. 4841 does not state that it was issued under section 25 nor does it cite any provision of law; rather it expressly describes itself as a corrigendum (a correction/rectification). The court concluded that there was no basis for treating this corrigendum as an exercise of section 25 power and no justification for applying the six-month retrospectivity rule of section 25 to this corrigendum.

The court identified the relevant source of authority for the original notification and its correction as section 4-B of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and the rules made thereunder (rules 25-A and 25-B). It reasoned that the power to correct a clerical error in a notification is ancillary to the substantive power to issue the notification under section 4-B and is necessary for effective exercise of the substantive power.

Analytically, the court treated a corrigendum as a correction which, by its nature, dates back to the original order or notification; if a corrigendum merely corrects a clerical or printing error it must be treated as effective from the date of the original notification. If a subsequent document purporting to correct an earlier instrument were effective only from the date of correction, it would be an amendment, not a correction. To illustrate the point, the court gave a hypothetical example from land acquisition notifications showing that a corrigendum correcting a survey number would not make the corrected description effective only from the date of corrigendum; rather, the correction operates as if the original had correctly stated the information from the original date.

The court also rejected arguments advanced for strict construction favoring the assessee (that an assessee should keep advantage of an assessing authority's error). It held that such a principle did not prevent correcting an accidental printing error in a statutory notification and that laws (including taxation statutes and notifications under them) must be interpreted reasonably so as not to defeat the purpose of the statute.

Regarding the prior single-judge decision cited by the respondent, the court noted that the single judge had not accepted the respondent's contention outright but had remanded the matter to the Tribunal to determine whether Notification No. 3867 had actually superseded Notification No. 4748. The present Court observed that the Tribunal had apparently not yet made the remand determination and that the single-judge ruling did not warrant the Tribunal's conclusion in the present proceedings.

On the basis of the above reasoning, the court concluded that the Tribunal was not correct in the view it took concerning the effect of Notification No. 4841 and the status of Notification No. 4748 vis-à-vis Notification No. 3867.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Both revisions preferred by the Commissioner are allowed. The order of the Sales Tax Tribunal is set aside and the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) is restored. The petitions are allowed and there is no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Tribunal's decision allowing the respondent-assessee's appeals is overturned; the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) order (which had dismissed the assessee's appeals) is restored.
  • The Court held that Notification No. 4841 is a corrigendum that operates as a correction dating back to the date of the notification it corrects (Notification No. 3867 dated June 11, 1974) and therefore is not to be treated as a section 25 notification subject to the six-month retrospective limit. The Tribunal's contrary view was rejected.
  • The Court noted the earlier single-judge decision but explained that that decision remanded the matter for further fact-finding (whether Notification No. 3867 superseded Notification No. 4748) and did not resolve the question in favor of the assessee; the Tribunal had not completed the remand inquiry in the earlier matter.
  • No broader or novel procedural precedent beyond the reasoning applied to the specific notifications in this matter is stated by the Court in the opinion. The decision's immediate consequence is the restoration of the Deputy Commissioner's order and setting aside of the Tribunal's order in these revisions.

Order: Petitions allowed; no costs.

Show all summary ...

B.P Jeevan Reddy, C.J:— These revisions under section 11 of the U.P Sales Tax Act are preferred by the Commissioner, Sales Tax, Lucknow, against the judgment and order of the Sales Tax Tribunal, Lucknow, allowing the appeals preferred by the respondent-assessee.

2. The respondent-assessee, M/s. Dunlop India Ltd., is a registered dealer under the U.P Sales Tax Act as well as under the Central Sales Tax Act. It deals in tyres of motors, trucks, scooters and cycles, etc. For the assessment year 1975-76 and 1976-77 it submitted its return disclosing the taxable turnover at Rs. 8,90,93,957.11 and Rs. 9,20,18,922.23 respectively. It also deposited the requisite amount of tax. The assessing authority, however did not agree with the assessee's contention that the tyres and tubes sold by it to dealers holding recognition certificates were exempt from sales tax during the said assessment years. It also did not accept the assessee's plea that cycle rims were iron and steel as defined under section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act and, therefore, subject to the ceiling prescribed in the said section. On this basis the assessing authority enhanced the taxable turnover for both the years against which the assessee filed appeals before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) which were dismissed. The assessee then carried the matter in further appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal did not agree with the petitioner's contention that cycle rims were iron and steel within the meaning of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act and accordingly rejected that contention. But so far as the other contention is concerned it accepted the same and it is only that aspect which is relevant in these revisions.

3. section 4-B of the U.P Sales Tax Act provides a kind of relief to certain manufacturers. It is not necessary to notice the entire section. It will be sufficient if we notice clause (a) to sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) which only are relevant for our purpose. They read as follows:

“Section 4B. Special relief to certain manufacturers.— (1)……….

(a) Where any goods liable to tax under sub-section (1) of section 3-D are purchased by a dealer who is liable to tax on the turnover of first purchases, under that sub-section or where any goods are purchased by any dealer in circumstances in which such a dealer is liable to purchase tax in respect thereof under section 3-AAAA and the dealer holds a recognition certificate issued under sub-section (2) in respect thereof, he shall be liable in respect of those goods to tax at such concessional rate, or be wholly or partly exempt from tax, whether unconditionally or subject to the conditions and restrictions specified in that behalf, as may be notified in the Gazette by the State Government in that behalf;

(a-1) Where any declared goods liable to tax under sub-section (1) of section 3-D are sold or supplied by a dealer, who is the first purchaser thereof, to another dealer, holding a valid recognition certificate issued under sub-section (2) in respect thereof, the dealer who made the first purchase shall in respect of such purchase and subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be specified by notification in that behalf, be exempt from tax or be liable to tax at such concessional rate as may be notified by the State Government:

…………………….

(2) Where a dealer requires any goods, referred to in sub-section (1) for use in the manufacture by him, in the State of any notified goods, or in the packing of such notified goods manufactured or processed by him, and such notified goods are intended to be sold by him in the State or in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or in the course of export out of India, he may apply to the assessing authority in such form and manner and within such period as may be prescribed, for the grant of a recognition certificate in respect thereof; and if the applicant satisfies such requirement and conditions as may be prescribed, the assessing authority shall grant to him in respect of such goods a recognition certificate in such form, and subject to such conditions, as may be prescribed.”

4. A reading of the above sub-sections shows that where a dealer is engaged in manufacture of notified goods and where such goods manufactured by him are intended to be sold by Him within the State or in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or in the course of export out of India he may apply and obtain a recognition certificate. Such recognition certificate entitles him to purchase the raw material required by him at a concessional rate or without paying any sales tax, as the case may be.

5. On October 10, 1968, the Government had issued Notification No. 4748 according to which bicycles and perambulators among others were declared as notified goods and certain concessions were provided in the matter of purchase of raw material by manufacturers of such notified goods. It was by virtue and in pursuance of this notification that certain dealers obtained recognition certificates and who issued the same to the assessee-dealer herein while purchasing their requirements of raw material from the assessee-dealer.

6. On June 11, 1974, however, the Government issued another notification under section 4-B bearing Notification No. 3867 in supersession of certain earlier notifications including Notification No. 4748 dated October 10, 1968. The notifications superseded were mentioned in the margin to that notification. In describing Notification No. 4748 dated October 10, 1968 however, there was a slight printing error. Instead of mentioning the date as October 10, 1965 it was mentioned as October 10, 1969. It is necessary to mention that Notification No. 3867 dated June 11, 1974 evolved an altogether different scheme under section 4-B. It would be appropriate to set out Notification No. 3867 in so far it is relevant:

“In exercise of the powers under section 4-B of the U.P Sales Tax Act, 1948 (U.P Act No. XV of 1948) as amended by the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 1974 (U.P Ordinance No. 11 of 1974) read with section 21 of the U.P General Clauses Act, 1904 (U.P Act No. 1 of 1904), the Governor is pleased to supersede, with immediate effect, the marginally noted notification, and to order that, subject to the conditions and restrictions specified in the said section 4-B,—”.

(Emphasis* added)

(1) ST-2262.X—902(63)-50, dated June 12, 1969 (S. No. 369) (2) ST-2619.X—900(21)-69, dated July 1, 1969 (3) ST-4748.X—900(15)-61, dated October 10, 1969 (4) ST-11-1/X—902(70)-72, dated January 2, 1974 (S. No. 72)

7. The aforesaid printing error was discovered by the Government only after several years. Then it issued another Notification No. 4841 dated June 25, 1986 by way of corrigendum. This notification merely stated that in the margin to Notification No. 3867 dated June 11, 1974, Notification No. 4748 dated October 10, 1969 should be read as Notification No. 4748 dated October 10, 1968.

8. The appeals preferred by the respondent-assessee before the Tribunal came up for hearing in the 1989. The contention urged by the respondent-dealer and accepted by the Tribunal runs as follows:

Notification No. 4841 dated June 25, 1986 (corrigendum) must be related to section 25 of the U.P Sales Tax Act which empowers the State Government to issue a notification with retrospective effect. However, the proviso to section 25 limits the retrospectivity to six months only. The said notification has, therefore, retrospective effect only for a period of six months preceding its issuance. The assessment years concerned herein are clearly outside the said retrospectivity. So far as the assessment years 1975-76 and 1976-77 are concerned, it must be deemed that Notification No. 4748 dated October 10, 1968 continued to be in force during those years inasmuch as Notification No. 3867 dated June 11, 1974 did not purport to supersede the said notification but another notification bearing No. 4748 dated October 10, 1969.

9. In my opinion, the Tribunal was not right in the view it has taken.

10. Notification No. 4841 dated June 25, 1986 does not purport to have been issued under section 25 of the Act. It does not cite any provision of law under which it was issued. It merely claims to be a corrigendum. It was the respondent-dealer who sought to relate the said notification to section 25 and the Tribunal appears to agree implicitly with the dealer that it is so. In my opinion, there was no justification for doing this, particularly when Notification No. 4841 expressly states that it is a corrigendum, i.e, a correction or rectification as it may be called. We may in this connection notice that the power to issue above notification is derived not from section 25, but from section 4B and the rules made thereunder, namely, rules 25-A and 25-B. Section 25 merely empowers the State Government to issue notifications with retrospective effect but such retrospectivity shall not exceed six months. This is, how section 25 reads:

“Section 25: Power to issue notification with retrospective effect.— Where the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do in public interest, it may issue a notification under section 3-A or section 3-D, or section 4 or section 4-B so as to make it effective from a date not earlier than six months from the date of issuance of such notification:

Provided that no notification having the effect of increasing the liability to tax of a dealer shall be issued with retrospective effect under this section.”

11. In my opinion, Notification No. 4841 is in the nature of a correction (corrigendum) and, therefore, it dates back to the date of the notification corrected thereby, namely, June 11, 1974, on which date Notification No. 3867 was issued. A correction is a correction only when it dates back to the original order or the proceeding as the case may be. It ceases to be correction if it is effective from the date of its issuance; it then becomes an amendment. This intrinsic nature of concept of correction cannot bet lost sight of By way of illustration I may refer to a notification issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, where it describes the boundaries of a particular land correctly but while describing its survey number it mentions 111/10 (instead of 111/11. Suppose, a corrigendum is issued after one year correcting the number as 111/11, would it be permissible to argue that the date of notification under section 4, so far as survey No. 111/11 is concerned, is not the original date of notification but the date of corrigendum notification? I think not. The same result should follow here. It is equally relevant to notice that in the margin to Notification No. 3867 not merely the notification number but full reference of notification is given as “ST-4748.X— 900(15)-61” besides the date. Both the notifications, namely, No. 4748 and No. 3867 expressly purport to have been issued under section 4-B and deal with the subject of recognition certificate and levy of concessional duty or exemption from duty, as the case may be.

12. It is then argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in matters of taxation, strict construction must be adopted and that if the assessee is entitled to any advantage or benefit on account of any error or mistake of the assessing authority it should not be denied to him. I do not think that the said principle has any relevance here, where an accidental printing error is sought to be corrected in a statutory notification issued by the Government. It is difficult to deny this right of correction to the Government. Such a power is ancillary and incidental to the substantive power conferred upon the Government to issue a notification by section 4-B. Such a power is necessary for an effective exercise of the substantive power.

13. It is next argued that the assessee was not supposed to read the date of the notification correctly and that it was the duty of the Government to have expressed its intention clearly and without any error. It is also argued that if the Government has committed any error, be that an accidental error, it alone must take the consequences and not the assessee. I find it difficult to accede to this argument. Every law must be reasonably interpreted. No interpretation should be adopted which tends to defeat the very purpose of the law. Even a taxation law must be reasonably construed and the same principle applies to a notification issued under the taxation statute.

14. Lastly it is argued by Sri P.N Mathur, learned counsel for the respondent-assessee, that this question indeed has been adjudicated upon by a learned single Judge of this Court in a case of this very assessee though relating to another assessment year. The reference is to the judgment of Anshuman Singh, J., dated November 5, 1985 reported as Dunlop India Limited v. Commissioner Of Sales Tax, U.P, Lucknow [1987] 65 STC 364 (All.) in Sales Tax Revision No. 227 of 1985. That revision related to assessment year 1974-75 and this very contention was urged before the learned Judge. The contention was dealt with in the following words:

“The learned counsel for the applicant has contended that since notification dated October 10, 1968 has not been superseded by the notification dated June 11, 1974, the view taken by the Tribunal that the benefit of section 4-B was not available in the case of the assessee, is wholly erroneous. The said contention appears to have some force. If the notification dated October 10, 1968 had not been superseded or withdrawn and was in existence on the date of the assessment, the Tribunal was not justified in refusing to give the benefit of section 4-B of the U.P Sales Tax Act. It appears that the Tribunal has not tried to look into the notification dated October 10, 1968 while deciding the case and, as such, it is expedient that the Tribunal should be directed to decide the appeal afresh taking note of the notification dated October 10, 1968. In case the said notification has not been superseded and the assessee sold goods to the customers against the issuance of form 3 Kha, who had been granted recognition certificate under section 4-B of the U.P Sales Tax Act, the applicant would be entitled to the said benefit inasmuch as he could not have realised the sales tax from the customers, if they had been given recognition certificate and had issued form 3 Kha.

In the result, the revision succeeds and the order passed by the Tribunal dated December 14, 1984, is set aside and the Tribunal is directed to decide the case afresh in the light of the observations made above. However, there shall be no order as to costs.”

15. Sri P.N Mathur, learned counsel for the respondent-assessee, contended that the said observations uphold his contention. I am unable to agree. All that the learned Judge said was that “the said contention appears to have some force” but then he sent the matter back precisely to find out whether Notification No. 3867 did or did not supersede Notification No. 4748. Indeed, if the learned Judge had accepted the petitioner's contention, as contended by Sri Mathur, then there was no occasion to send the matter back to the Tribunal to verify the said aspect. When I asked the learned counsel as to what decision did the Tribunal take in pursuance of the said order of remand, I am told that the Tribunal has not so far decided the matter. If indeed it is so, it is but proper that the Tribunal decides the matter at an early date.

16. For the above reasons, both the revisions are allowed. The order of the Sales Tax Tribunal is set aside and the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) is restored. No costs.

17. Petitions allowed.