Navalkishore Narayan Bhargava v. M P Road Transport Corporation Indore

(1.) THIS is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution filed against an order passed by the Industrial Court, Indore.

(2.) THE facts giving rise to this petition are that the petitioner was in the employment of the non-applicant No. 1 Corporation and was serving as a driver running a passenger bus. An enquiry was ordered against him by a charge sheet dated the 23rd September 1965 on the allegation that he did not stop the bus when a signal fr that purpose was given by the Traffic Inspector. However, we are not concerned in this petition with the merits of the charges. After enquiry, the petitioner was found guilty of misconduct and an order for his dismissal was passed on 2nd December 1965. The petitioner then made an approach under section 31 (3) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations act, 1960 (hereinafter called the Act) by a letter dated the 22nd December 1965, and as the non-applicant No. 1 refused to consider the matter the petitioner filed an application under sections 61 and 62 of the Act before the Labour court, Indore. After the written statement was filed by the non-applicant no. 1, the Labour Judge framed issue No. 2 as a preliminary issue and decided it in favour of the petitioner holding that the domestic enquiry conducted by the Inquiry Officer of the non-applicant No. 1 was not proper. Consequently the learned Labour Judge directed the non-applicant No. 1 to lead evidence to establish the charges levelled against the petitioner. Against this order of the labour Judge, the non-applicant No. 1 filed a petition before the Industrial court, Indore. The learned Judge of the Industrial Court, purporting to exercise jurisdiction under section 67 of the Act, set aside the order of the Labour judge and held that the enquiry conducted by the non-applicant No. 1 was proper. It is against this order of the Industrial Court that the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution has been filed.

(3.) SHRI J. D. Patel, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that section 67 of the Act is a provision conferring powers of superintendence on the industrial Court but these powers do not confer on the Industrial Court the power to interfere on merits with an order passed by the Labour Court and to hold that the domestic enquiry was proper. He contended that section 66 conferred revisional powers on the Industrial Court, and in view of language of section 66 the revisional jurisdiction of the Industrial Court is more or less analogous to that of this Court under section 115 Civil Procedure Code and, therefore, the learned Judge of the Industrial Court could not have exercised jurisdiction under section 66 to set aside the order passed by the Labour Judge. According to the learned counsel, it could not be said that the Industrial Court exercising jurisdiction under section 67 had any wider jurisdiction. He also contended that the scheme of the legislation was to give finality to the orders of the Labour Court and, therefore, there is no provision of any appeal but it is only a revision which is provided for, and consequently the order passed by the industrial Court is without jurisdiction and deserves to be set aside.

(4.) SHRI R. K. Vijaywargiya, learned counsel for the non-applicant No. 1 contended that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under section 67 of the act is analogous to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution and, therefore, the jurisdiction under section 67 was much wider than that under section 66 of the Act. He also contended that the question about the propriety of the domestic enquiry was itself a jurisdictional fact which conferred jurisdiction of the Labour Court to enquire into the merits of the charge-sheet, and that being so the Industrial Court, exercising jurisdiction under section 67, could go into facts to come to a conclusion. He referred at length to the various circumstances that were considered by the Labour Judge in order to contend that the view taken by the learned Judge was not correct and, therefore, the learned Judge of the Industrial Court was right in exercising jurisdiction under section 67 of the Act. 1975 M. P. L. J. ] Navalkishore v. M. P. R. T. Corpn. , Indore 253

(5.) SECTION 67 of the Act is as under:

"67. The Industrial Court shall, in respect to all matters subject to its appellate or revisional jurisdiction have superintendence over Labour Courts constituted under this Act and may call for returns in respect thereof."

It was contended that this section more or less confers similar jurisdiction on the Industrial Court as is conferred on this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The learned Judge of the Industrial Court felt that exercising the powers of superintendence he could go into the merits of the case to find out whether the conclusion arrived at by the subordinate tribunal is proper or not, and it is clear that in this the learned Judge was in error. It cannot be doubled that the powers of superintendence under section 67 of the Act are more or less similar to the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. But under Article 227 of the Constitution this Court cannot go into facts and merits of the case to find out whether the conclusions arrived at by the Court below are proper or not. It also cannot be doubted that under article 227 this Court can only interfere in cases where there is an apparent error of jurisdiction or some error apparent on the face of the records. The scope of Article 227 has been considered in a series of decisions of the Supreme court. In Nagendra Nath v. Commissioner of Hills Division (AIR 1958 SC 398.), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down the scope of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution in the following words :-

"it is thus clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judiciai nature are not greater than the powers under article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226; the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference js limited to seeing that the Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority."

Similarly in Nibaren Chandra v. Muhend'a Nath (A. I R 1963 SC 1895.) it was held that Article 227 of the Constitution merely conferred the power of superintendence to keep the subordinate Courts or tribunals within the bounds of their authority. It was observe d in that case :-

"the Jurisdiction conferred by that article is not by any means appellate in its nature for correcting errors in the decisions of subordinate Courts or Tribunals but is merely a power of superintendence to be used to keep them within the bounds of their authority."

It cannot, therefore, be doubted that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under section 67 of the Act is only to the extent of seeing that the subordinate courts are kept within the bounds of their authority, and not to go into the question of fact or law to find out their errors.

(6.) THE contention raised by the learned counsel for the non-applicant no. 1 is that the facts examined by the Industrial Court to come to a different conclusion were jurisdictional facts. It appears that the learned counsel wanted to contend that this conferred jurisdiction on the Labour Court. It is clear that against the order of dismissal by the respondent the petitioner was entitled to move an application before the Labour Court. The Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner's application and decide it on merits. The conclusions arrived at by the Labour Court about the domestic enquiry being proper or not is at best a question of inference to be drawn from the facts in the case. It can at the most be said to be a mixed question of law and fact. But it cannot be contended that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court depends on a finding on certain facts. The Labour Court is competent to entertain the application and to give a finding about the propriety of the enquiry. In these circumstances, therefore, the contention that the facts about the enquiry being proper are jurisdictional facts, thereby meaning that it is on the basis of the findings on those facts that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court depends, cannot be accepted. As pointed out earlier, even if on the facts and circumstances of the case it is possible to hold a view different from that held by the learned Labour Judge, still on that basis alone, even if it is assumed that the view of the Labour Judge is wrong, the Industrial Court exercising jurisdiction under section 67 of the Act cannot interfere with the conclusions arrived at by the learned Labour Judge. Consequently the jurisdiction of the industrial Court under section 67 of the Act cannot be said to confer on the industrial Court the power to interfere with the finding of the Labour Court on the question of the propriety of the enquiry held by the domestic Tribunal.

(7.) IT appears that the learned Judge of the Industrial Court felt that the inference drawn by the Labour Judge from certain facts was not correct, and in doing so he sought assistance from a reported decision. But the question of drawing inferences from facts will after all depend on the circumstances of each case, and even if the learned Judge of the Industrial Court was of a view different from that of the Labour Judge, still that could not confer jurisdiction on the Industrial Court to interfere with it under section 67 of the Act.

(8.) IN the light of the discussion above, the order dated the Ist January 1969 passed by the Industrial Court is set aside, and the matter is sent back to the Labour Court to proceed further and decide in accordance with law. The petitioner shall be entitled to costs of this application. Counsel's fee Rs. 100/-, if certified. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Application allowed.