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Radha Wallabh v. Seth Gopaldas

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mar 29, 1966
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Shiv Dayal J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises from a suit for partition and separate possession in which a preliminary decree was passed on 6 January 1943 (Civil Suit No. 5-A of 1941, Additional District Judge, Khandwa). The decree contained a schedule describing properties in three lists: List A (houses), List B (agricultural lands) and List C (trees). By an order dated 11 April 1961, and by consent of the parties, three arbitrators (Hiralal son of Babalisha; Hiralal son of Dagdusa; Karsandas son of Varjiwandas) were appointed to divide the properties by metes and bounds. The arbitrators submitted an award dated 18 August 1961.

The defendant objected to the award and prayed for its setting aside. After evidence was recorded, the learned Additional District Judge set aside the award under section 30(c) of the Arbitration Act, holding that the arbitrators had not acted in a judicial manner, had failed to decide all matters in dispute, had not observed principles of natural justice, and that the inquiry was superficial and irregular (including findings that accounts were not inspected in the presence of both parties). Aggrieved, the plaintiff (now the appellants) filed the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the award made by the arbitrators was invalid such as to justify setting it aside under section 30(c) of the Arbitration Act on the grounds alleged by the trial Court (failure to act judicially, not deciding all matters in dispute, breach of natural justice, and a superficial inquiry).
  2. Whether specific procedural objections (books of account not examined in presence of both parties; parties examined in each other's absence; arbitrators staying at the plaintiff's house; alleged failure to consider increased value of properties; omission to deal with a sum of Rs. 1,950) vitiate the award.
  3. Whether the reference to arbitration was invalid for want of an application in writing as required by section 21 of the Arbitration Act.
  4. More generally, what is the scope of the court's supervisory jurisdiction when an application is made to set aside an arbitral award?

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments advanced in support of setting aside the award (Shri Seth / supporting the trial Court)

  • The arbitrators did not decide issues 5, 6 and 7 framed by the trial Court.
  • The arbitrators failed to take into account that property values given in 1941 had considerably increased, and this omission was significant.
  • The books of account were not inspected in the presence of both parties.
  • Parties were examined in the absence of each other.
  • Some arbitrators stayed at the plaintiff's house, suggesting possible impropriety.
  • The arbitrators omitted to take into account a sum of Rs. 1,950 received on a sale.
  • The reference to arbitration was invalid because no application signed by the parties was filed in Court as required by section 21 of the Arbitration Act.

Arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants / in support of the award

  • The arbitrators did consider and dispose of issues 5, 6 and 7; arbitrators may deliver a consolidated award and are not bound to decide every item separately.
  • Both parties had filed and signed lists of properties and agreed that the basis of valuation should remain as shown in the schedule to the plaint; the arbitrators followed that basis.
  • All three arbitrators, when examined (as witnesses called by the defendant), stated that account books shown by each party were inspected in the presence of the other party.
  • The arbitrators gave prior intimation before examining witnesses; the presence/absence of a party at portions of examination does not demonstrate that examinations were conducted improperly.
  • Staying at the plaintiff's house was not evidence of improper conduct; arbitrators stayed sometimes with plaintiff, sometimes with defendant and sometimes with a third person.
  • The alleged Rs. 1,950 was considered by the arbitrators and an admission of the parties was recorded that Shankardas was not liable for that amount.
  • The objection under section 21 was raised too late: the order-sheet shows consent of the parties and counsel (whose vakalatnamas authorized reference to arbitration) and section 21 does not prescribe a form beyond a written application; the parties participated in the arbitration proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M/s Alopi Parshad v. Union of India (AIR 1960 SC 688) Cited in support of principles regarding the finality of arbitral awards and the limited scope of court interference. The Court relied on this authority as part of the body of precedent recapitulating the scope and limits of judicial enquiry into awards.
Santa Sila v. Dhirendra Nath (AIR 1963 SC 1677) Cited in support of principles about the conclusiveness of awards and the role of courts vis-à-vis domestic tribunals. Used by the Court collectively with other decisions to emphasize that awards are ordinarily final and not subject to reappraisal by courts on mere error.
Union of India v. Rallia Sam (AIR 1963 SC 1685) Cited for the principle that courts should not substitute their view for that of arbitrators and must support awards where reasonably possible. The Court invoked the authority to support its corrective approach to the trial Court's setting aside of the award.
Gobardhan Das v. Lachhmi Ram (AIR 1954 SC 689) Cited regarding limitations on court interference with arbitrators' decisions. Part of the judicial framework the Court relied upon when analyzing whether the award ought to have been set aside.
Rustomji v. Manmal (1963 MPLJ 284) Cited for general principles on arbitration awards and judicial review. Referenced to reinforce the statement of law on who may be called to review an arbitrator's decision.
Seth Thawardas Pherumal v. The Union of India (AIR 1955 SC 468 = (1955) 2 SCR 48) Cited in relation to the limited grounds on which an arbitral award may be set aside. Employing this precedent, the Court framed the scope of permissible judicial enquiry into the award.
Pannalal v. State of M.P. (1963 MPLJ 307) Cited for principles on finality and the nature of arbitrators' decisions. Used collectively with the other authorities to justify overturning the trial Court's order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first recapitulated the governing legal principles and the limits of judicial intervention in challenges to arbitral awards. The key legal propositions (as set out in the opinion) were:

  • An award is a decision of an arbitrator chosen by the parties and is ordinarily not liable to be challenged merely because it is erroneous.
  • Award of the arbitrator is ordinarily final and conclusive unless a contrary intention appears in the agreement; civil courts cannot exercise appellate powers over domestic tribunals chosen by parties.
  • Court should approach an award with a desire to support it where reasonably possible rather than destroy it by calling it illegal.
  • Unless the reference specifically requires, an arbitrator is not bound to deal with each claim separately and can deliver a consolidated award.
  • Courts will presume, unless the contrary appears, that an award disposes finally of all matters in difference; silence on an item may be treated as intended rejection.
  • An award may be set aside for an error apparent on the face of it; answering a specific question (even if erroneous) does not necessarily make an award bad on its face.
  • Court has no jurisdiction to override arbitrators' decision or substitute its own even on mixed questions of law and fact.

The Court then applied these principles to each of the objections relied upon by the trial Court (and advanced by Shri Seth). The analysis proceeded point by point:

  1. Issues 5, 6 and 7: The Court found the arbitrators had seen, considered and disposed of these issues in their award. It emphasized that arbitrators are not obliged to decide every item separately and may deliver a consolidated award.
  2. Increase in property value since 1941: The Court rejected this objection. Both parties had filed signed lists and requested the arbitrators to keep the basis of valuation as in the plaint; the arbitrators so proceeded. The Court treated the contention as without substance.
  3. Books of account not examined in parties' presence: The Court accepted the evidence of all three arbitrators (examined as defendant's witnesses) that account books shown by each party were examined in the presence of the other party, and rejected the objection.
  4. Parties examined in absence of each other: The Court noted that arbitrator Hiralal (D.W.1) stated that parties were informed before examination and that the defendant was present during the plaintiff's examination (though he may have left after some time); the objection was rejected.
  5. Arbitrators staying at plaintiff's house: The Court found this objection unpersuasive in light of the concession that arbitrators' integrity was not doubted and evidence that arbitrators sometimes stayed with plaintiff, sometimes with defendants, and sometimes with a third person.
  6. Omission to take into account Rs. 1,950: The Court held that this matter had been considered by the arbitrators; the proceedings recorded an admission that Shankardas was not liable as that amount was spent on treatment and obsequies of Dwarkadas.
  7. Validity of reference under section 21 (no written application by parties): The Court treated this objection as too late. The order-sheet showed the parties proposed arbitration, the order appointing arbitrators was signed by counsel for both parties, and the vakalatnamas expressly authorized counsel to refer the case. The Court observed section 21 prescribes no particular form—only that there be an application in writing—and noted that parties participated in the arbitration. The Court rejected the contention that the reference was irregular for want of a section 21 application.

Having addressed each contention and relied upon the arbitrators' positive testimony (notably that of arbitrators who had been called as witnesses by the defendant), the Court concluded that the trial Court's order was superficial, did not convincingly demonstrate that the arbitral inquiry was superficial or that principles of natural justice were breached, and that there was no good ground for setting aside the award.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was allowed. The trial Court's order setting aside the award was reversed. The Court ordered that a decree shall be passed in terms of the award.

Further directions and practical consequences:

  • Costs: The appellants were awarded their costs from the respondent in both the trial Court and the appellate Court.
  • Counsel's fees: Counsel's fee fixed at Rs. 200 in each Court.

Implications: The direct effect is the restoration and enforcement of the arbitrators' award by passing a decree in its terms and awarding costs to the appellants. The opinion frames and applies established principles limiting court interference with arbitral awards; it does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying those established principles to the facts of this case.

Show all summary ...

SHIV DAYAL J.

(1.) - In a suit for partition and separate possession, a preliminary decree was passed on 6 January 1943 (Civil suit No. 5-A of 1941, in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Khandwa). The properties were described in the schedule annexed to the decree. List 'A' relates to houses; list 'B' relates to agricultural lands; and list 'C relates to trees.. By an order dated 11 April 1961, Hiralal son of Babalisha, Hiralal son of Dagdusa, and Karsandas son of Varjiwandas were, by the consent of the parties, appointed arbitrators to divide the properties by metes and bounds. The arbitrators filed their award dated 18 August 1961. The defendant Bled objections and prayed for setting aside the award. The plaintiff resisted the objections, whereupon, evidence was recorded. The learned Additional District Judge has set aside the award, under section 30 (c) of the Arbitration Act, as invalid. The learned Judge says:-

"True it is that the defendant has not challenged before me the integrity or honesty of purpose of the said arbitrators but his whole contention is that the arbitrators had not acted in a judicial manner in deciding the dispute. From the careful scrutiny of the evidence on record I am convinced that there is much force in the contention raised by the defendant"
. It is then observed by him that an award, which does not decide all matters in dispute, is invalid and that the arbitrators are bound to apply the principle of natural justice. Having said so, he found that the accounts were not inspected in the presence of both the parties face to face and that the whole enquiry was made in a superficial and fishy manner. Aggrieved by that order the plaintiff (now represented by the appellants) filed this appeal.

(2.) Shri Seth endeavoured to support the judgment of the trial Court by advancing certain contentions which we would presently consider. Before we do so, it is useful to recapitulate the scope of enquiry and the limits of the powers of the Court in dealing with an application for setting aside an award, which do not appear to have been present to the mind of the trial Judge. His order is superficial and does not carry conviction. The position of the law is this :

(1) An award being a decision of an arbitrator, whether a lawyer or a layman, chosen by the parties and entrusted with power to decide a dispute submitted to him, is ordinarily not liable to be challenged on the ground that it is erroneous.

(2) The award of the arbitrator is ordinarily final and conclusive, unless a contrary intention is disclosed by the agreement. The award is a decision of a domestic tribunal chosen by the parties, and the civil Courts which are entrusted with the power to facilitate arbitration and to effectuate the awards, cannot exercise appellate powers over the decision. Wrong or right, the decision is binding if it be reached finally after giving adequate opportunity to the parties to place their grievances in the manner provided by the arbitration agreement.

(3) The Court should approach an award with a desire to support it, if that is reasonably possible rather than destroy it by calling it illegal.

(4) Unless the reference to arbitration specifically so requires, the arbitrator is not bound to deal with each claim or matter separately, but can deliver a consolidated award. An award need not formally express the decision of the arbitrator on each matter of difference.

(5) Unless the contrary appears, the Court will presume that the award disposes finally of all the matters in difference and that the award is complete. The silence of the award as regards a particular item must be taken to be intended as a decision rejecting the claim to that relief.

6. An award may be set aside on the ground of an error on the face thereof. 7. Where a specific question is submitted to the arbitrator and he answers it, the fact that the answer involves an erroneous decision on a point of law, does not make the award bad on its face so as to permit of its being set aside..................If the reference is of a specific question of law, even if the award is erroneous, the decision being of arbitrators selected by the parties to adjudicate upon those questions, the award will bind the parties. 8. The Court has no jurisdiction to override the decision of the arbitrators or to substitute its own even where the question is a mixed question of law and fact.

[See M/s Alopi Parshad v. Union of India(AIR 1960 SC 688); Santa Sila v. Dhirendra Nath(AIR 1963 SC 1677); Union of India v. Rallia Sam(AIR 1963 SC 1685); Gobardhan Das v. Lachhmi Ram(AIR 1954 SC 689); Rustomji v. Manmal(1963 MPLJ 284); Seth Thawardas Pherumal v. The Union of India(AIR 1955 SC 468=(1955) 2 SCR 48) and Pannalal v. State of M.P.(1963 MPLJ 307)].

(3.) We would now turn to Shri Seth's objections. The first objection is that the arbitrators did not decide issues 5,6 and 7, which had been framed by the trial Court. There is no substance in this contention. The issues are these :

"5 (a) Whether the defendant No. 1 alone had dealing with Dwarkadas Vithaldas of Bombay and is he alone liable to pay the amount of the decree obtained by the latter in C.S. No. 486 of 1938 ? (b) Whether Rs. 5,500 had been borrowed from Parmanand Das and Purshottam Das in that connection as alleged by the defendant No. 2 ?

6(a) Whether the C.S. No. 584 of 1938 refers to the transactions of partnership with Purshottamdas ? (b) Will the defendant No. 1 be also liable if a decree is passed in that case ? 7(a) Whether the disputed items of Rs. 1,650, Rs. 4,500, Rs. 1,450 and Rs. 306-1-6 are debts due from the joint family ? (b) Is the defendant No. 1 also liable to account for the same ?

It is clear from the award that these issues were seen by the arbitrators. They considered and disposed of those points in their award. Secondly, the defendant Gopaldas was exonerated as regards issues 5 (b),6(b) and 7(b). In fact, the arbitrators are not bound to decide every item separately. They can deliver a consolidated award.

(4.) The second objection is that the value of the properties as given in the lists in the year 1941, considerably increased, but the arbitrators did not consider this significant feature of the case. This too does not vitiate the award. But that apart, the objection is wholly without substance. Both the parties filed under their signatures lists of properties in respect of which partition was to be effected and they also filed lists of those properties which had already been sold by them. Arbitrator Hiralal son of Dagdusa, who was examined on commission by the trial Court (in proceedings for setting aside the award) says that both the parties requested the arbitrators that the basis of valuation of property should remain the same as shown in the schedule to the plaint. So also is the statement of Karsandas, who was examined on commission and that of Hiralal son of Babalisha. All the three arbitrators were examined by the defendant as his witnesses. This contention is, therefore, rejected.

(5.) The third objection is that the books of account were not examined in the presence of the parties. The objection must also be rejected because all the three arbitrators, who were examined by the defendant as his witnesses, say that the account books shown by eaeh party were examined in the presence of the other.

(6.) The fourth objection is that the parties were examined in the absence of each other. This too is wrong. Arbitrator Hiralal son of Babalisha(D.W.1) says that the arbitrators gave intimation to the parties before examining the witnesses and when the plaintiff was examined, the defendant was present, although he went away after sometime.

(7.) The fifth objection is that some of the arbitrators stayed at the plaintiff's house. We are unable to appreciate the purpose of this objection when it was conceded before the trial Court that their integrity was not doubted. Arbitrator Hiralal son of Babalisha (D. W. 1) says that he had to go to Khandwa from Burhanpur for arbitration proceedings. He sometime stayed with the plaintiff and sometimes with the defendants, and sometimes with one Purshottam Bupchand. This objection is rejected.

(8.) The seventh objection is that the arbitrators did not take into account a sum of Rs. 1,950 for which Shankardas had sold a certain field. This objection is patently wrong because this was considered by the arbitrators. In their proceedings dated 9 June 1961, an admission of the parties is recorded. They agreed that Shankardas was not liable for that amount inasmuch as it had been spent for the treatment and obsequies of Dwarkadas.

(9.) It is then contended by Shri Seth that the reference to arbitration was itself invalid inasmuch as no application signed by the parties was filed in the Court as required by section 21 of the Arbitration Act. This contention is too late in the day. It appears from the order-sheet dated 28-1-1961 that the parties proposed to get the accounts settled by the arbitrators. Therefore, they obtained consent of the arbitrators. At their request reference was made. See orders dated 25-2-61,6-3-61, 9-3 61, 23-3-61 and 6-4-61. The order-sheet dated 11 April 1961 reads thus:

"With the consent of the parties the following persons, viz. (1) Hiralal son of Babalisha .........(2) Hiralal son of Dagdusa..............and (3) Shri Karsandas son of Varjiwandas .. ...........are appointed as arbitrators for the decision of the dispute between the parties in view of their consent on record. The necessary orders of their appointments as arbitrators be issued to them. The parties to supply the copies of necessary documents to the arbitrators to enable them to decide the case. The arbitrators are directed to submit their award within 3 months from today. Case for 15-7-1961."

This order-sheet is signed by Shri Gadre and Shri Pagare both counsel for the parties. Shri K.N. Gadre was the counsel for the defendant. In the Vakalatnama Shri Gadre was expressly authorised to refer the case to an arbitration. So also Shri Pagare was authorised in his Vakalatnama. Now, section 21 of the Arbitration Act does not prescribe any form of application. All that is necessary is that there should be an application in writing. Thereafter, both the parties participated in the proceedings before the arbitrators. They also filed lists of properties to be divided between them. The defendant cannot now turn round to contend that the reference was irregular for want of an application in writing under section 21 of the Act.

(10.) No other objection was raised before us. We hold that the trial Court was in error in setting aside the award. There is positive evidence of the arbitrators, who were the defendant's witnesses, that the accounts were inspected in the presence of both the parties. We further hold that the enquiry before the arbitrators was neither superficial nor fishy. There was no good' ground for setting aside the award.

(11.) The appeal is allowed. The order passed by the trial Court is set aside. A decree shall be passed in terms of the award. The appellants shall get their costs from the respondent in both the Courts. Counsel's fee Rs. 200 in each Court. Appeal allowed.