Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Biofarma And Another v. Sanjay Medical Store And Another

Delhi High Court
Oct 9, 1998
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff appealed against an order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court rejecting their application for an ad-interim injunction under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C). The suit was filed under the original side jurisdiction of the High Court. The plaintiff No. 1 is the registered proprietor of the trademark "Flavedon" in India, registered for pharmaceutical preparations. Plaintiff No. 2 was permitted to use this trademark under an agreement with plaintiff No. 1. The defendants began marketing a pharmaceutical product named "Trivedon," which the plaintiffs claimed infringed their trademark and amounted to passing off by deceptively resembling "Flavedon."

Both medicines contain the active ingredient Trimetazidine, a Schedule H drug sold only on prescription by licensed dealers. The plaintiffs contended that "Trivedon" was visually and phonetically similar to "Flavedon," causing deceptive similarity. The Single Judge, however, found otherwise and dismissed the plaintiff's injunction application.

The defendants opposed the injunction on grounds including the distinctiveness of the marks, the regulated nature of the drug's sale, differences in price and packaging, and the absence of likelihood of confusion or passing off.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the use of the trademark "Trivedon" by the defendants infringes the plaintiff’s registered trademark "Flavedon."
  2. Whether the defendants’ use of "Trivedon" constitutes passing off of the plaintiff’s goods.
  3. Whether an ad-interim injunction restraining the defendants from using "Trivedon" should be granted under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the C.P.C.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • "Flavedon" is a registered trademark for pharmaceutical products, and the plaintiff No.2 was authorized to use it.
  • The defendants’ product name "Trivedon" is deceptively similar to "Flavedon" both visually and phonetically.
  • This similarity causes confusion and amounts to trademark infringement and passing off.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The opening syllables of "Flavedon" and "Trivedon" are completely different.
  • The suffix "vedon" is commonly used by many pharmaceutical manufacturers and is not distinctive.
  • Trimetazidine is a Schedule H drug sold only on prescription, making consumer confusion unlikely.
  • The marks are visually and phonetically dissimilar, negating infringement or passing off.
  • There is a significant difference in pricing and packaging of the two products.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.B.L Limited v. The Himalaya Drug Co., 1997 67 DLT 803
  • Tests for infringement and passing off in pharmaceutical trademarks.
  • Consideration of statutory regulations affecting sale and purchase.
  • Assessment of likelihood of confusion by doctors, chemists, and customers.
  • Recognition that generic or publici juris words cannot be monopolized.
  • Importance of prefixes, suffixes, packaging, and overall impression on memory.
The court relied on these principles to evaluate the similarity and likelihood of confusion between "Flavedon" and "Trivedon" considering the regulated nature of the drug and the professional purchasers involved.
Roche & Co. v. G. Mannaers & Co., 1969 2 SCC 716
  • Assessment of deceptive similarity between trademarks DROPOVIT and PROTOVIT.
  • Recognition that common descriptive suffixes (e.g., "VIT") are not exclusively owned.
  • Consideration of phonetic and visual dissimilarity reducing confusion.
  • Impact of licensed sale reducing likelihood of confusion.
The court applied this precedent to find that despite some common suffixes, the marks were sufficiently different in appearance and sound, and the regulated sale of the drug further reduced confusion risk.
Pianotist Application (quoted in Lakshman Dhara)
  • Factors for judging trademark similarity: visual and phonetic comparison, nature of goods, type of customer, and surrounding circumstances.
  • Consideration of likely effects of normal use of trademarks in commerce.
The court endorsed this approach for analyzing the overall impression of trademarks in their commercial context.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the principles established in leading authorities regarding trademark infringement and passing off in the pharmaceutical sector, noting the special considerations due to statutory regulation of Schedule H drugs sold only on prescription. The court emphasized that the likelihood of confusion must be assessed from a practical business perspective, focusing on whether a trained doctor or chemist could be misled by the similarity of marks.

The court agreed with the learned Single Judge’s findings that the opening syllables of "Flavedon" and "Trivedon" are completely different, and the marks are neither phonetically nor visually similar. It also acknowledged the common use of the suffix "vedon" or similar endings by multiple pharmaceutical manufacturers, reducing the exclusivity of that element. Differences in pricing and packaging further distinguished the products.

Importantly, the court noted the absence of any evidence or allegation that the defendants attempted to pass off their product as that of the plaintiffs. Applying the legal tests and weighing all factors, the court found no error in the Single Judge’s refusal to grant an ad-interim injunction.

Holding and Implications

The appeal was held devoid of merit and was DISMISSED. The court upheld the rejection of the plaintiff's application for an ad-interim injunction restraining the use of the trademark "Trivedon" by the defendants.

The direct effect of this decision is that the defendants may continue marketing their product under the name "Trivedon." No broader precedent was established beyond affirming the application of established principles on trademark infringement and passing off in the context of regulated pharmaceutical products.

Show all summary ...

R.C Lahoti, J.:— Plaintiff has come up in appeal feeling aggrieved by the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge of this Court rejecting the plaintiff's application for the grant of ad injunction under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the C.P.C, in a suit filed on the original side jurisdiction of the High Court.

2. “Flavedon” is registered trade mark of the plaintiff No. 1.appellant in India having been so registered under No. 337006 dated 13.5.1978 in Clause V in respect of pharmaceutical preparation and substance. The plaintiff No. 1 has allowed the plaintiff No. 2 to use the said trade mark pursuant to an agreement entered into between the two. Shortly before the institution of the suit, the defendants have commenced marketing a pharmaceuticals product adopting the name “Trivedon”. According to the plaintiffs “Trivedon” amount to infringement of the plaintiffs trade mark and passing off by the defendants of their goods as the plaintiffs'.

3. It is not disputed that the active ingredients of both the medicines in Trimetazidine, which is prescribed for the treatment of heart diseases. The medicine is a Schedule H drug. It can be sold only on medical prescription and by a licensed dealer only. According to the plaintiffs, Trivedon is visually and phonetically similar to “Flavedon” of the plaintiffs and thus bears a deceptive similarity with the plaintiffs product. The learned Single Judge has however held to the contrary and hence dismissed the plaintiff's application for the grant of ad-interim injunction restraining the use of “Trivedon”.

4. The defendants contesting the plaintiff's application, set out the following factors in opposition to the plaintiffs prayer:

(a) That the two trade marks, namely, ‘Flavedon’ and “Trivedon” are different opening syllable are completely different and the suffix ‘vedon’ is commonly used by number of other pharmaceuticals manufacturers.

(b) That the pharmaceutical preparation in question being ‘TRIMETAZIDINE’ which is a Schedule ‘H’ drug, and more so, being used for the treatment of ischemetic heart diseases, any purchaser is not likely to walk out to a chemist and ask for the said medicine unless prescribed by a physician/cardiologist.

(c) That the two trade marks, each of the plaintiffs and the defendants, are both visually and phonetically totally dissimilar and different and therefore, there is neither any infringement nor any passing off committed by the defendants.

(d) That there is a marked difference in prices of drugs manufactured and sold by the parties.

(e) That the packing of the two drugs is also different.

5. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants has advanced more or less similar submissions as were made before the learned Single Judge. A host of authorities has been cited by the learned counsel for both the parties.

6. Recently, a Division Bench of this Court has an occasion to deal with law relating to infringement and passing off in the field of medicines and pharmaceutical preparations in S.B.L Limited… v. The Himalaya Drug Co.… . 1997 67 DLT 803., wherein LIV. 52 had sought an injunction to restrain LIV-T. The law was summed up in the following words:

(1) The crucial tests to the applied for judging an infringement action or a passing off action in the field of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparation remain the same as are applicable to other goods. However, in the case of preparation trading where of is government by statutory rules or regulations, additional considerations become relevant. They are (i) the manner is which the trade is carried on, such as sales being made only by authorised or licensed vendors who will be educated, also having special knowledge of medicines and pharmacy; (ii) the class of persons who would be the purchaser, whether they would be accompanied by doctors' prescription and would in all probability remain in touch with doctor while consuming the medicine purchased. The Court would ask Is there such a similarity between the two trade marks that a doctor or a chemist or the both by some carelessness in expression, some obscurity in handwriting, some slip of recollection or some careless mistake not expected of a trained professional doctor or chemist might lead to the one being contused for the other ? Regard shall be had not to hypothetical possibility but to ordinary practical business probabilities as applied to the circumstances of an individual case.

(2) The decision on the questions of likelihood of deception is to be left to the Court.

(3) Nobody can claim exclusive right to use any word, abbreviation, or acronym which has become public juris. In the trade of drugs it is common practice to name a drug by the name of the organ or ailment which it treats or the main ingredient of the drug. Such organ, ailment or ingredient being public juris or generic cannot be owned by any one for use as trade mark.

(4) Whether such feature is publici juris or generic is a question fact.

(5) If the two trade marks by the competing traders use a generic word or an expression publici juris common to both the trad marks it has to be seen if the customers who purchase the good would be guided by the use of such word or expression on would ignore it and give emphasis to prefixes of suffixes or word used in association therewith. The primary question to be asked is What would remain in the memory of customer ? The surrounding circumstances such as the presentation of goods colour scheme and lettering style etc. used on the packing also assume significance.

7. All the available leading authorities on the subject were placed before and considered by the Division Bench in the abovesaid case. The authorities which have been cited in the case at hand are mostly the same Still out of these we would like to refer to two.

8. The learned most is Roche & Co. v. G. Mannaers & Co. . 1969 2 SCC 716 The questior?? was whether DROPOVIT and PROTOVIT are deceptively similar. Vide para 12, their Lordships found that the last three letters were common; and in the uncommon part, the first two are consonants, the next is the same vowel “O” the next is a consonant and the fifth is again a common vowel “O”. The combined effect was to produce alliteration. VIT is a well known abbreviation used in pharmaceutical trade to denote vitamin preparation. Thus the terminal syllable ‘Vit’ in the two marks was both descriptive and common to the trade. Their Lordships held:

“If greater regard is paid to the uncommon element is these two words, it is difficult to hold that one will be mistaken for or confused with the others. The letters ‘D’ and ‘P’ in ‘DROPOVIT’ and the corresponding letters ‘P’ and ‘T’ in PROTOVIT cannot possibly be slurred over in pronunciation and the words are so dissimilar that there is no reasonable probability of confusion between the words either from visual or phonetic point of view.”

9. 9.1 Vide para 13 their Lordships have also noted that the question of confusion must be determined on the basis that the goods with one of the two rival trade marks would be sold only by a licensed dealer and would not be available in any other shop, which fact also reduces the possibility of confusion to a considerable extent.

10. The following statement of law made in Pianotist Application3, by Parker, J. has been quoted with approval in Lakshman Dhara4:

“You must take the two words. You must judge them, both by their look and by their sound. You must consider the goods to which they are to be applied. You must consider the nature and kind of customer who would be likely to buy those goods. In fact you must consider all the surrounding circumstances, and you must further consider what is likely to happen if each of those trade marks is used in a normal way as a trade mark for the goods of the respective owners of the marks.”

11. The learned Single Judge has vide para 10 of the impugned order noted that for deciding the question of deceptive similarity judicial pronouncements have laid down the following factors to be considered:

“(a) The nature of the marks, i.e, whether the marks are word marks or level marks or composite marks, i.e, both word and level marks.

(b) The degree of resemblances between the marks, whether they are phonetically, visually or structurally similar and hence similar in idea.

(c) The nature of the goods in respect of which they are used as trade marks.

(d) The similarity in the nature, character and performance of the goods of the rival traders.

(e) The class of purchasers who are likely to buy the goods bearing the marks.

(f) The mode of purchasing the goods or placing orders for the goods; and

(g) Any other surrounding circumstances.

It is also settled that weightage to be give to each of the aforesaid factors depends upon facts of each case and the same weightage cannot be given to each factor in every case.”

12. We find ourselves in entire agreement with the statement of law as abovesaid by the learned Single Judge.

13. Some of the findings further recorded by the learned Single Judge may also be noticed. He has found (i) that the opening syllables of the two competing trade marks are completely different and distinct; (ii) the degree of resemblance between “Flavedon” and ‘Trivedon’ phonetically and visually appears to be dissimilar, (iii) a list of several drugs ending with the suffix Vedone/Vidone which goes to show that the use of such suffix is common in the trade; (iv) there is a difference in the prices of the two products. Vide para 23, the learned Single Judge has further opined that on an overall consideration of each of the several factors detailed in the impugned judgment apparently the two trade names of the two products are totally dissimilar and different.

14. There is no evidence not even an allegation that the defendants have at any time attempted at passing of their products as that of the plaintiffs. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that no fault can be found with the impugned order. The learned Single Judge has not erred either on facts or in law in refusing the prayer for the grant of ad-interim injunction to the plaintiff-appellant.

15. The appeal is held devoid of any merits and liable to be dismissed. It is dismissed accordingly though without any order as to the costs.

16. Appeal dismissed.